Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite by Launius, Roger D.
-_/-/-...,
NA SA_/T M- 113448
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19980003950 2020-06-16T00:34:37+00:00Z

Reconsidering Sputnik:
Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite
S. Dillon Ripley Center Auditorium
Smithsonian Institution
1100 Jefferson Drive S.W.
Washington, D.C.
September 30 - October 1, 1997
NASA History Office, NASA Headquarters Office of Policy and Plans
National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution
Space Policy Institute, The George Washington University
Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center for International
Scholars
On October 4, 1957 the Soviet Union lofted the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, into Earth orbit.
This 184-pound, basketball-sized sphere ushered in the era of the space race. At the height of the
Cold War and several months into the International Geophysical Year, the Soviet Union had
beaten the United States into space, a symbolically significant achievement. In the immediate
aftermath, the American public was greatly distressed and the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration was created within a year. The real significance of the Sputnik I launch can be
seen over the long term, however, as the race for human exploration of the Moon began in the
early 1960s, global satellite communications became a reality, and new generations of scientific
spacecraft began exploring the universe.
The NASA Office of Policy and Plans/History Office, the National Air and Space Museum, the
George Washington University Space Policy Institute, and the Kennan Institute for Advanced
Russian Studies are proud to sponsor a symposium on the impact of Sputnik. Separate panels will
address Soviet and American activities prior to Sputnik, immediate ramifications of the launch in
the United States and around the world, and some of the long-term consequences.
The symposium will take place in the auditorium of the S. Dillon Ripley Center of the Smithsonian
Institution at 1000 Jefferson Drive SW, Washington, DC. Attendance at the symposium is open to
the public, but seating is limited so early registration is strongly encouraged. There is a $30
registration fee for breakfast, lunch, and refreshments.

AGENDA
Tuesday, September 30
9:00 a.m. Welcome, Announcements, and Introduction by Alan M. Ladwig, NASA Associate
Administrator for Policy and Plans; Roger D. Launius, NASA Chief Historian; and John M.
Logsdon, Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University
9:15 a.m. Keynote Speech: "Was Sputnik Really a Saltation?" by Walter A. McDougall,
Professor of I-Iistory and International Relations, University of Pennsylvania
9:45 a.m. The Soviet Union and Sputnik
Chair: Marcia S. Smith, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service
"Rising from the Cradle: Soviet Public Perceptions of Spaceflight Before Sputnik," by Peter A.
Gorin
"Korolev, Sputnik, and the International Geophysical Year," by AsifA. Siddiqi, Department of
History, Carnegie Mellon University
"Korolev's Triple Play: Sputniks 1, 2, and 3" by James J. Harford, Executive Director Emeritus,
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
"State Program, Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship, or Scientific Autonomy? Policymaking
Processes and Structures Behind the Launch of Sputnik" by Andrew J. Aldrin, TRW Components
International and Department of Politicai Science, California State University at Long Beach
11:00 a.m. Break
11:15 a.m. Space and the International Geophysical Year
Chair: Derek Elliott, Department of History, Geography, and Political Science, Tennessee State
University
"Before Sputnik: National Security and the Formation of U.S. Outer Space Policy, 1953-1957,"
by Kenneth A. Osgood, Department of History, University of California at Santa Barbara
"A Strategy for Space," by Dwayne A. Day, Guggenheim Fellow, National Air and Space
Museum
"Sputnik and the IGY," by Rip Bulkeley, Oxford, England
12:30 p.m. Lunch (catered box)
1:30p.m.Immediate Ramifications of Sputnik in the United States
Chair: John M. Logsdon, Director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University
"Sputnik, the Gaither Committee, and the Escalation of the Cold War," by David L. Snead,
Richmond, VA
"Organizing the U.S. Government for Outer Space: 1957-1958," by Eilene Galloway, Honorary
Director, International Institute of Space Law and Trustee Emeritus, International Academy of
Astronautics
"Sputnik: APolitical Symbol and Tool in 1960 Campaign Politics," by Gretchen J. Van Dyke,
Department of Political Science, University of Scranton
"Opening the Space Age: A Legacy of the International Geophysical Year," by J.A. Simpson,
Enrico Fermi Institute and Department of Physics, University of Chicago
3:00 p.m. Break
3:15 p.m. Immediate Ramifications of Sputnik - International Perspectives
Chair: Steven J. Dick, U.S. Naval Observatory
"Building a Third Space Power: Western European Reactions to Sputnik at the Dawn of the
Space Age," by John Ka-ige, Director, Centre de Recherche en I-Iistoire des Sciences et des
Techniques, Pads
"Sputnik and France: A 'Mission to Civilize?'," by Guillaume de Syon, History Department,
Albright College
"The Impact of Sputnik on American Foreign Policy," by Lawrence S. Kaplan, Director Emeritus,
Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Community Studies, Kent State University
4:30 p.m. General Discussion
5:00 p.m. Adjourn
Wednesday, October I
7:45 am Breakfast at National Air and Space Museum
9:00 a.m. Welcome and Announcements by Roger D. Launius, NASA ChiefI-Iistorian, and Blair
D. Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center for
International Scholars
9:15 a.m. Keynote Address: "The Long Term Consequences of the Soviet Union's Investment in
Space Exploration," by Sergei Khrushchev, Watson Institute, Brown University
9:45 a.m. Long-term Consequences of Sputnik:
Chair: Robert W. Smith, Chair, Space History Department, National Air and Space Museum
"Reflections on Sputnik," by Roald Sagdeev, East-West Space Science Center, University of
Maryland
"Artifacts or Facts?: Soviet Space Historiography in the Last Forty Years," by Cathleen S.
Lewis, Department of Space History, National Air and Space Museum
Break
"Sputnik and the Creation of the Soviet Space Industry," by William P. Barry, Department of
Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy
"A Certain Future: American Higher Education and the Survival of a Nation," by John A.
Douglass, University California at Santa Barbara and Berkeley Center for Studies in Higher
Education
"Sputnik and Technological Surprise," by Glenn P. Hastedt, Department of Political Science,
James Madison University
12:00 p.m. Adjourn
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Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite
Paper Proposal
The Earth is a cradle of human intellect.
but one cannot live in a cradle forever...
Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky
RISING FROM A CRADLE...
Soviet Public Perception of Spaceflight Before Sputnik
The paper is intended to describe Russian/Soviet public perception of spaceflight in the first
half of the 20th century, prior to the launch of the first satellite (1900 - 1957). The purpose of this
research is to show that despite the secrecy around Soviet rocket program the public in the USSR was
prepared to understand and accept the beginning of the space era. The paper will address the following
subjects:
• Early proponents of a spaceflight ideas in Russia and the USSR;
• Descriptions of future space explorations in Russian/Soviet popular science and science fiction
literature;
• Knowledge and response of the general public to a possibility of a spaceflight;
• Public spaceflight societies in the USSR;
• Political exploitation of the spaceflight idea in the 1920s - 1950s.
The author will deliberately avoid detailed description of professional rocket research
organizations: GDL, MosGIRD and RNII. Although those organizations in many respects created a
scientific foundation for the rocket technology in the USSR, their work is more or less known today in
the West. They also worked in secrecy, thus having only a marginal impact on a public opinion.
Instead, the author will concentrate on activities of the early spaceflight proponents who appealed
directly to the public. Apart from the works of the spaceflight pioneer Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the
paper will provide short accounts on activities of iesser-k_aown Soviet scientists mad writers, such as:
Yuri Kondratiuk, Friedreich Tsander, Yakov Perelman, Ari Schternfeld, Nikolay Rynin, Alexander
Beliyaev and others. It will show how popular science and science fiction literature deeply influenced
public awareness of a possibility of a spaceflight. The author will describe and demonstrate samples of
such literature of the 1930s - 1950s. The paper also intend to analyze the origin and trends of how
Soviet political leadership exploited spaceflight idea for political propaganda purposes. It will be
shown in the paper, that such political exploitation did not start with a launch of Sputnik but goes back
to the 1920s.
In author's opinion, the research subject of this proposed paper is new for the US public and
historians alike. The paper will be based mostly on Russian original materials.
The author intends to illustrate his presentation by view-graphs with rare images of how Soviet
scientists envisaged space activities before the launch of Sputnik.
REPRODUCED AT GOVT. EXPENSE
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Korolev, Sputnik, and The International Geophysical Year
Asif A. Siddiqi
From the point of historical inquiry, the institutional and pohtical machinations behind the genesis of
Sputnik have remained a largely ignored area of scholarship. Embellished by speculation and fueled by Soviet
secrecy, the story behind Sputnik has assumed the form of a parable, cobbled together from rumors and mythology,
and colored by an eagerness to fill in the blanks of what we did not know. Thus, while the post-mortem effects of
Sputnik have been the subject of much scholarly debate, the origins and motivations that led to the launch of the
first artificial satellite have remained, to a large degree, in the realm of conjecture. In recent years, with the
dissolution of the Soviet state in 1991, mythology came into confrontation with reality. Declassified primary
documents have provided a rich resource and incentive to look back again at an event which had such a profound
impact on the course of events in the latter part of the twentieth century.
Conception
Sputnik would not have been possible without the combined contributions of two men who had
consistently advocated a commitment for a space program to a reluctant Soviet government. Sergey Pavlovich
Korolev, the younger of the two, had become absorbed in dreams of space exploration during his short tenure as a
member and eventual leader of an amateur Soviet rocketry group in the early 1930s. 1 It was there that he
befriended Mikhail Klavdiyevich Tikhouravov, another former glider pilot. Their paths diverged during World
War II and in its aftermath they were working in different institutions, both contributing to the new long-range
ballistic missile effort. Korolev had the auspicious title of'Chief Designer,' by dint of his official title as head of the
Department No. 3 of the Specialized Design Bureau at the Scientific Research Institute No. 88 (I'qII-88' in its
Russian abbreviation). 2 Stalin had established the NII-88 (pronounced 'nee-88') in 1946 to serve as the leading
engineering organization in Soviet industry to develop long-range missiles.
During the following decade, Korolev's department, which eventually became an independent
organization, the Experimental Design Bureau No. 1 (OKB-1), focused efforts on a series of ballistic missiles for
the Soviet armed forces. Since the primary thematic thrust of Korolev's group was military missiles, there was
negligible work on projects which had purely scientific utility. Dedicated wholly to the grand ideals of space
exploration, Korolev did make a few spurious efforts to interest the leadership in artificial satellites in the late
1940s, but none of these ever proved to have any results until he combined his lobbying with Tikhonravov's
independent work at the NII-4, an unrelated military institution dedicated to research on applications of ballistic
missiles. After authoring several important R&D reports on the possibility of space launch vehicles and artificial
satellites in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Tikhonravov emerged in 1954 with a detailed technical exposition
entitled "Report on an Artificial Satellite of the Earth. "3 It was at the same time, on 20 May 1954, that the Soviet
government formally tasked Korolev's Design Bureau to develop the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM), the R-7. Korolev did not waste time. Just six days later, he sent Tikhonravov's satellite report to the Soviet
government with an attached cover letter stating:
I draw your attention to the memorandum of Comrade M. K. Tikhonravov,
1. For a detailed look at KoroleCs scientific activities in the 1930s see G. S. Vetrov, S. P. Korolev i kosmonavtika: pervye
shagi (Moscow. Nauka, 1994).
2. Yu. P. Semenov, ed., Raketno-Kosmicheskaya Korporatsiya "Energiya" imeni S. P. Koroleva (Korolev: RK_KEnergiya
named after S. P. Korolev, 1996), 22.
3. For an english language summary of the details of TikhonravoCs research during the 1940s and early 1950s as well as the
famous 1954 report itself, see AsifA. Siddiqi, "Before Sputnik: Early Satellite Studies in the Soviet Union, 1947-1957,"
forthcoming in two parts in Spaceflight, October and November 1997. TikhonravoCs document has been reproduced as/v_
Tildaonravov, "Report on an Artiticial Satellite of the Earth" (in Russian) in B. V. Raushenbakh, ed., Materialypo istorii
kosmicheskogo korabl _ostok' (Moscow:. Nauka, 1991), 5-15.
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"Reporton an Artificial Satellite of the Earth," and also to the forwardod
materials from the U.S.A. on work being carried out in this field. The
current development of a new product [the R-7 ICBM] makes it possible for us
to speak of the possibility of developing in the near future an artificial
satellite...It seems to me that in the present time there is the opporUmity...for
carrying out the initial exploratory work on a satellite and more detailed work
on complex problems involved with this goal. We await your decision. 4
IfKorolcv's goal was to elicit a formal decree for his proposal, his appeal was not very successful.
However, his request appears to have been passed on through various levels of the government and reached the
office of missile and nuclear industry chief Vyecheslav A. Malyshev, officially the Minister of Medium Machine
Building. Prompted by Korolev's persuasive arguments, Malyshev, along with three other top defense indnsUy
officials, submitted a proposal to Soviet leader Georgiy M. Maleukov asking permission to carry out "work on the
scientific-theoretical questions associated with space flight."s No doubt interested in the military applications of
Tikhonravov's satellite, Malenkov approved the idea. Armed with a modicum of support, Komlev commenced a
modest research project at his Design Bureau coordinated with Tikhonravov's own work at the NII-4. Incredi_oly, as
this research was ongoing, the satellite issue remained divorced from further governmental involvement, as
Korolev was diverted to more important matters relating to work on military missiles such as the Ro7 ICBM. It
was, however, the very first intervention by the Soviet government on an issue related to space exploration.
Korolev's satellite work may have continued at a leisurely pace through the mid-1950s with lukewarm
governmental support were it not for some surprising and well-publicized events outside of the USSR. In the spring
of 1950, a group of American scientists led by James van Allen met in Silver Springs, Maryland to discuss the
possibility of an international scientific program to study the upper atmosphere and outer space via sounding
rockets, balloons, and ground observations. Strong support from Western European scientists allowed the idea to
expand into a worldwide program timed to coincide with a period of intense solar activity, 1 July 1957 to 31
December 1958. The participants named this period the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and created the
Comit_ speciale de l'ann_e g_ophysique internationale (the 'Special Committee for the International Geophysical
Year' or 'CSAGr) to establish an agenda for the program. Soviet representatives, including Academy of Sciences
Vice-President Academician Ivan P. Bardin, served on the Committee, but do not appear to have had any
significant contribution to its proceedings. In fact, the May 1954 deadline for submissions for participation in the
IGY passed without any word from Soviet authorities. At a subsequent meeting in Rome on 4 October 1954, Soviet
scientists silently witnessed the approval of a historic U.S.-sponsored plan to orbit artificial satellites during the
IGY. 6 The satellite proposal clearly surprised the Soviet delegation, and perhaps had repercussions within the
USSR Academy of Sciences. In the fall of 1954, the Academy established the Interdepartmental Commission for
the Coordination and Control of Work in the Field of Organization and Accomplishment of Interplanetary
Communicatious, a typically longwinded title which obscured its primary role, a forum for Soviet scientists to
discuss space exploration in abstract terms, both in secret and in public. 7
The existence of the Commission was announced on 16 April 1955 in an article in a Moscow evening
newspaper; Academician Leonid I. Sedov, a relatively well-known gas dynamics expert was listed as the Chairman
of the Commission. s Unlike the title of the body, the primary duty of the Commission was stated with unusual
4. The text of this letter in a censored version has been published as S. P. Korolev, "On the Possibility of Work on an Artificial
Satellite of the Earth" (in Russian), M. V. Keldyslg ed., Tvorcheakoye naslediye Akademika Sergeya Pavlovicha Koroleva:
izbrannyye trudy i dokumenty (Moscow: Nauka, 1980), 343.
5. Semenov, 1996, 86. The co-authors of the proposal were: B. L. Vannikov (First Deputy Minister of Medium Machine
Building), M. V. Khrunichev (First Deputy Minister of Medium Machine Building), and K. N. Rudnev (Deputy Minister of
Defense Industries). Of interest is the fact that Malyshev, Vannikov, and Khrunichev were all high officials in the nuclear
weapons industry. Rudnev was the only one from the missile industry.
6. Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neumann EzeU, The Partnership: A History of the Apollo-Soyuz Teat Project (Washington,
D.C.: NASA SP-4209, 1978), 16; Nicholas Daniloff, The Kremlin and the Cosmos (New York: Alfred A. Knopf_ 1972), 54.
7. A. YIL Ishlinskiy, ecL,Akademik S. P. Korolev: ucheniy, inzhener, chelovek (Moscow:. Naulm, 1986), 453; Boris Konovalov,
"The Genealogy of Sputnik" (in Russian), in V. Sheherbakov, ed., Zagadki zvezdnykh ostrovov (Moseove. Molodaya gvardiya,
1989), 115.
$ "Commission on Interplanetary Communications" (in Russian), Vechernaya moskva (April 16, 1955), 1. An English
translation of the announcement is included in F. ]l _, Behind The Sputniks: A Survey of Soviet Space Science
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1958), 328-330. The names of only four other members were announced at the time:
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explicitness: "One of the immediate tasks of the Commission is to organize work concerning building an automatic
laboratory for scientific research in space. "9 In hindsight, it is clear that the Commission, a part of the Astronomy
Council in the Academy, had very little input or influence over de facto decision-making in the Soviet space
program, although one of its functions was to collect proposals from various scientists on possible scientific
experiments which could be mounted on future satellites. Sedov himself played a major role as Chairman by
appearing at numerous international conferences talking in very general terms on the future of space exploration.
None of its members had any direct connection or contact with the missile and space program, although they were
clearly aware of the broad nature of Korolev's work. The latter appears to have had little to do with the formation
or work of the Commission. He evidently attended one meeting in 1954 to inquire about the group's work. 10
While this Commission had little real authority, its Chairman Sedov may have played a crucial role in
connecting Koroleds satellite efforts with the International Geophysical Year. The chain of events was set off on
29 July 1955 by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Press Secretary James C. I-Iagerty who announced at the
White House that the United States would launch "small Earth-circling satellites" as part of its participation in the
IGY. n It was at this same time that the International Astronautical Federation was holding its Sixth International
Astronautical Congress at Copenhagen, Denmark. Heading the Soviet delegation was Sedov and K.irill F.
Ogorodnikov, the editor of a respected astronomy journal in the USSIL The two were called into action by an
announcement on 2 August by Fred C. Durant III, the President of the Congress, who reported the Eisenhower
Administration's intentions of launching a satellite during the IGY. Not to be outdone, Sedov convened a press
conference the same day at the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen for about 50 journalists during which he announced
that "In my opinion, it will be possible to launch an artificial Earth satellite within the next two years." He added
that "The realization of the Soviet project can be expected in the near future. "12
It is quite unlikely that Sedov was speaking on his own authority, and possibly had taken cues from
highly-placed Party officials who were aware of the government's approval in August 1954 of exploratory research
on space issues. Perhaps a Party or Academy of Sciences official hack in Moscow had decreed that Durant's
statement warranted a response from Sedov. Certainly, there had been much discussion on the possibility of Soviet
satellites by that time, although no single project had received approval. What is known is that the two
pronouncements, one by the Eisenhower Administration, and the one by Sedov, were the subject of relatively
intense scrutiny by the press all over the world. This response appears to have been critical for Korolev.
By coincidence, it was on 16 July 1955 that Tikhouravov, along with OKB-1 engineer Ilya V. Lavrov as
co-author, finished his latest study on artificial satellites. 13 Based on work originating from the May 1954
document, the two suggested a reduced mass of 1,000-1,400 kilograms for an automated satellite. They also
proposed the formation of a group of 70-80 people to carry out the task of designing and building the satellite and
to work on future piloted spacecraft (Korolev wrote in the margins: "Too many, 30-35 people."). The Chief
Designer, more attuned to the political reality of such a project, also added that "the creation of [a satellite] would
have enormous political significance as evidence of the high development level of our country's technology. "14 In a
move symptomatic of Korolev's relentless perseverance of the space issue since the early 1950s, Korolev also had
one of his sector chiefs at the OKB-1 prepare a technical report on the possibility of sending a probe to the Moon
using modified versions of the R-7 ICBM.
V. A Ambartstun_an, P. L. Kapitsa, B. V. Kukarin, and P. P. Parenago. A larger 27 member list was submitted to the
Intemauonal Astronautical Federation in October 1957.
9. "Comnussmn on Interplanetary Communications," 1955.
10. Of the 27 Comrmssion members listed in 1957, only two individuals, A. A. Blagonravov and D. Ye. Oldaotsimskiy, were
directly revolved in the ballistic missile and space programs. The former headed the Commission for Upper Atmosphere
Research of the Academy of Sciences which oversaw all scientific suborbital launches, while the latter was one of the leading
mathematicians at the Department of Applied Mathematics of the V. A. Steklov Mathematics Institute of the Academy of
Sciences (OPM lVIIAN) who was involved in the early design of the R-7 ICBM. See also Ishlinskiy, 1986, 453.
11. Ezell and Ezell, 1978, 18.
12. Robert W. Buchheim and the Staff of the Rand Corporation, Space Handbook: Astronautics and its Applications (New
York: Random House, 1959), 277; "We'll Launch 1st Moon, and Bigger, Says Russ," Los Angeles Examiner (August 3, 1955);
John Hillary, "Soviets Planning Early Satellite," The New York Times (August 3, 1955).
13. Ishlinskiy, 1986, 445; Yaroslav Golovanov, "The Beginning of the Space Era" (in Russian), Pravda (October 4, 1987), 3.
Note that in Semenov, 1996, 86, it is stated that the report was authored only by Lavrov and it was completed on 16 June 1955,
not 16 July 1955. Tikhonravov himself has, however, claimed they both authored the report.
14 Semenov, 1996, 87.
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The activity on the space fTont reached its zenith on 30 August 1955 when Korolev attended two different
meetings, one with the defense community, and one with the scientific community, to discuss the new satellite
report. The former was at the offices of the powerful Military-Industrial Commission, the coordinating mechanism
for management of the entire Soviet defense industry. Presiding over the meeting was the Commission's new
Chairman Vasiliy M. Ryabikov. Also in attendance were Academician Mstislav V. Keldysh, a noted scientist
involved in research and development on several high profile military programs, and Col.-Engineer Aleksandr G.
Mrykin, a senior artillery officer responsible for overseeing the procurement of new ballistic missiles for the Soviet
armed forces. 15At the meeting Korolev spoke of beth his satellites and lunar probes. Notorious for his legendary
short temper and larger-than-life personality, _ykin was not receptive to Korolev's old arguments of the possibly
great political importance of a Soviet satellite. The artillery officer told Korolev in no uncertain terms that only
when the R-7 had completed its flight testing would they consider a satellite. Fortunately for Korolev, he had
Keldysh's support, and that may have tipped the scales. While details of the deliberations remain extremely
sketchy, it appears that Ryabikov approved the use of an R-7 ICBM for a modest satellite program. Lunar probes
were not considered. There were probably two factors working in Korolev's favor: the possible use of a satellite for
military purposes; and the demonstration of Soviet science and technology during the IGY.
Armed with Ryabikov's approval, Korolev attended a second secret meeting the same day at the oitices of
the 'chief scholarly secretary' of the Academy of Sciences Gennadiy V. Topchiyev. Many other scientists and
designers including Keldysh, Tikhonravov, and rocket engine specialist Valentin P. Glnshko were present. Korelev
reported to the distinguished assemblage that the Council of Chief Designers at a recent meeting had conducted a
detailed examination on modifying the original R-7 into a vehicle capable of launching a satellite into orbit. No
doubt, he also spoke of the government's interest on the matter. At the end of his speech he formally proposed to
build and launch a series of satellites into space, including one with animals, and for the Academy to establish a
formal commission to carry out this goal. The Chief Designer had a specific timetable in mind. He told his
audience, "As for the booster rocket, we hope to begin the first launches in April-July 1957...before the start of the
International Geophysical Year. "16 If earlier, Korolev's satellite plans had been timed for the indefinite future, the
Eisenhower Administrations announcement in July 1955 completely changed the direction of Korolev's attack. Not
only did it imbue Korolev's satellite proposal with a new sense of urgency, but it also gave him a specific timetable
to aim for. If the United States was planning to launch during the IGY, then the Soviets would launch one a few
months before the beginning of the International Geophysical Year, guaranteeing a first place finish. The
attending scientists at the meeting accepted the new proposal, and at Korolev's recommendation Keldysh was
designated the Chairman of the commission. Korolev and Tildaonravov would serve as his deputies.
The following day, on 31 August, a smaller group, including Korolev, Tikhonravov, and Keldysh met to
discuss some of the proposals for satellite instruments which many scientists had submitted to Sedov's Commission
in the past year. A few days later Tikhonravov and Keldysh convened with some prominent Soviet scientific
scholars to explain details of the satellite design and how their instruments were being considered. Korolev himself
approved a preliminary scientific program in September 1955, a program which included the study of the
ionosphere, cosmic rays, the Earth's magnetic fields, luminescence in the upper atmosphere, the Sun, and its
influence on the Earth, and other natural phenomena. The detailed development of a scientific program was left in
the hands of the two existing commissions of the Academy headed by Anatoliy A. Blagonravov and Leonld I.
Sedov. 17
The approval by the Academy to conduct a purely scientific research program accelerated matters
considerably. In the ensuing months, several important meetings were held, both by Keldysh's commission and by
the Council of Chief Designers, which elaborated the details of the project. Between December 1955 and March
1956, Keldysh consulted a huge number of distinguished scholars to refine the scientific experiments package.
They included numerous famous Soviet scientists, many of whose names were public knowledge unlike those who
15 Semenov, 1996, 87. Keldysh's ofiicial posts were:Directorof the NII-1 and Chiefof the OPM MIAN. Mrykin's otticial post
was First DeputyCommander of the Directorateof the Chief of Reactive Armaments (UNRV). The UNRV was subordinate to
the ChiefARillery Directorate(GAU) of the GeneralStaffofthe Ministry of Defense.
16 _hlinskiy, 1986, 455, Yaroslav Golovanov,Korolev:fakty i mify (Moscow Nauka, 1994), 523-524; Golovanov, 1987.
Others present at this meeting were lVLA. Lawentiyev and G. A. SkuridixL
17. Ishlinskiy, 1986, 455-456; ChristianLardier, L'Aatronaua'queSovi#tique (Paris: Armand Colin, 1992), 107;Golovanov,
1987. BlagonravoCscommission was at the time directing the scientific investigations on boardsuborbital rockets,while
Sedov's commission had recently been establishedas a public forum for Soviet scientists to discuss space exploration.
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were actually developing the spacecmR, is It was a large-scale operation with a single coordinating mechanism
which, because of its 'civilian' nature, had little precedent. Korolev himself was very conscious of the fact that an
official decree on the project had yet to be issued, which meant that a rocket was still not officially available for the
project. The magnitude of the immediate tasks, however, obscured that important issue for the time being. There
were continuous problems with the program, especially since many who were cooperating did not share Korolev's
enthusiasm for the project.
It took about four months for Ryabikov's spoken approval in August 1955 to translate into a formal decree
of the Soviet government. As a purely scientific project managed by the Academy of Sciences, it was not
considered a top priority. In fact, the Soviet government probably viewed the satellite project in much the same
manner as they viewed the continuing series of scientific rocket flights into the upper atmosphere which also used
military missiles for 'civilian' purposes. They were relatively inexpensive, unobtrusive, and ignored by the political
leadership. Consequently, the USSR Council of Ministers issued a decree, number 149-88ss, on 30 January 1956,
calling for the creation of an unoriented artificial satellite. The document approved the launch of a satellite,
designated the 'Object D,' in 1957 in time for the International Geophysical Year. As per Tikhonmvov's previous
computations, the mass of the satellite was limited to 1,000 to 1,400 kilograms of which 200 to 300 kilograms
would be scientific instruments. Apart from the Academy of Sciences, five industrial ministries would be involved
in the project. The responsibility for preparing a Draft Plan for the Object D fell on the shoulders of Sergey S.
Kryukov, at the time a Department Chief at the OKB-1. Tikhonmvov served as the 'chief scientific consultant, q9
Korolev had his promise. It was now too late to turn back.
Labor
The Object D (or D-l) was so named since it would be the fifth type of payload to be carried on an R-7,
Objects A, B, V, and G being designations for different nuclear warhead containers. 2° The satellite was a complex
scientific laboratory, far more sophisticated than any other IGY proposal from the period. While Kayukov's
engineers depended a great deal on Tikhonravov's early work on satellites, much of the actual design was a journey
into uncharted territory for the OKB-1. There was little precedent for creating pressurized containers and
instrumentation for work in Earth orbit, while long-range communications systems had to be designed without the
benefit of prior experience. The engineers were aware of the trajectory tracking and support capabilities for the R-7
missile, and this provided a context for determining the levels of contact with the vehicle. The fact that the object
would be out of contact with the ground for long periods of time (unlike sounding rockets) meant that new self-
switching automated systems would have to be used. The selection of metals to construct the satellite also presented
problems to the engineers, since the effects of continuous exposure to the space environment was still in the realm
of conjecture. The experiments and experience from sounding rocket tests provided a database for the final
selection.
Technical work on the vehicle officially began on 25 February 1956 with actual construction beginning on
5 March. Tikhonmvov's group at the NII-4 and Korolev's Design Bureau at the NII-g8 were the two most active
participants in this process, but numerous other organizations provided various elements of the complete satellite.
By 14 June, Korolev finalized the necessary changes to the basic version of the R-7 ICBM in order to use it for a
satellite launch. The new booster would incorporate a number of major changes including the use of uprated main
engines, deletion of the central radio package on the booster, and a new payload fairing replacing the old one used
for a nuclear warhead. 21 A month later, on 24 July 1956, Korolev formally approved the initial Draft Plan for the
18. These included: atmospheric specialists V. I. Krasovskiy, L. V. Kumosovaya, and S. N. Vemo_ the young mathematicians
from the OPM MIAN T. M. Eneyev, M. L. Lidov, D. Ye. Olchotsimskiy, and V. A. Yegom_ solar battery expert N. S.
Lidorenko; and the more famous Academicians L. A. Artsimovich, V. L. Giusburg, A. 1:. Ioffe, P. L. Kapitsa, B. P.
Koustantinov, and V. A. Kotelnikov. See Ishlinskiy, 446, 456; Golovanov, 1987.
19. Keldysh, 1980, 362; Ishlinskiy, 1986, 445; Konovalov, 1989, 116-117; Golovanov, 1994, 529; Semenov, 1996, g7. B.
Konovalov, "Dash to the Stars" (in Russian), Izvesn'ya (October 1, 1987), 3. The five industrial ministries were: the Ministry of
Defense Industries, the MinisU'y of RMiotechuical Industry, the Ministry of Ship Building Industry, the Ministry of Mackine
Building, and the Ministry of Defense.
20. Raushenbakh, 1991, 209. A, B, V, G, and D are the first five letters of the Russian cyrillic alphabet.
21. Ishlinskiy, 1986, 446, Golovanov, 1994, 530; Timothy Varfolomeyev, "Soviet Rocketry that Conquered Space: Part 1: From
First ICBM to Sputnik Launcher, NSpaceflight (August 1995), 260-263.
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ObjectD. The document was co-signed by his semor associates Tikhonravov, Konstantin D. Bnshuyev, Sergey O.
Okhapkin, and Leonid A_ Voskresenskiy. 22
By mid-1956 the Object D project was beginning to fall significantly behind schedule. Some
subcontractors were particularly lackadaisical in their assignments, and parts were often delivered which did not fit
the original specifications. On 14 September, Keldysh made a personal plea at a meeting of the Academy of
Sciences Presidium for speeding up work, invoking a threat all would understand: "we all want our satellite to fly
earlier than the Americans. "23 Events in the satellite program took an abrupt turn in the waning months of 1956.
Actual test models of the Object D, expected to be ready by October, remained unfinished. By the end of
November, Korolev began to suffer from great anxiety, no doubt compounded by his extraordinarily busy plans,
traveling from Kaliningrad to Kapustin Yar to Tyura-Tam to Molotovsk and back several times to oversee various
projects. 24 Part of this anxiety was due to serious concerns that his project would be suddenly preempted with a
sateLlite launch from the United States. He had been informed of a September 1956 launch of a missile from
Patrick Air Force Base at Cape Canaveral, Florida which, according to his erroneous information, was a failed
attempt to launch a satellite into orbit.25 A second concern were the results of static testing of the R-7 engines on
the ground. Instead of the projected specific impulse of 309-310 seconds, the R-7 engines would not produce more
than 304 seconds, too low for the heavy Object D satellite. He realized that perhaps he was making this effort too
complicated. Why not attempt to launch something simpler on the first orbital attempt instead of a sophisticated
one-and-a-half-ton scientific observatory?
At the end of November Tikhonravov was perceptive enough to detect Korolev's anxiety and verbalized it:
"What if we make the satellite a little lighter? Thirty kilograms or so, or even lighter? ''26 Keldysh was at first
opposed to the idea, but eventually ceded to the strong-willed Korolev. This time Korolev would not depend on
dozens of other subcontractors: he made sure that the smaller sateRite would be designed and manufactured
completely in his own Design Bureau with the help of only two outside organizations: the Scientific Research
Institute of Current Sources under Nikolay S. Lidorenko for the design of the on board batteries, and the N11-885
under Chief Designer Mikhail S. Ryazanskiy for the radio-transmitters. On 5 January 1957, Korolev sent off a
letter to the government which described his revised plan. He asked that permission be given to launch two small
satellites, each with masses of 40-50 kilograms, in the period April-June 1957 immediately prior to the beginning
of the IGY. This plan would be contingent upon the timetable for the R-7 program which Korolev admitted was
behind schedule, the first launch of the missile was set for March 1957 at the earliest. Each satellite would orbit the
Earth at altitudes of 225 X 500 kilometers and contain a simple shortwave transmitter with a power source
sufficient for 10 days operation. Korolev did not obscure the reasons for the abrupt change in plans:
...the United States is conducting very intensive plans for launching an
artificial Earth satellite. The most well-known project under the name
"Vanguard" uses a three-stage missile...the satellite proposed is a spherical
container of 50 centimeters diameter and a mass of approximately 10
kilograms. In September 1956, the U.S.A. attempted to launch a three-stage
missile with a satellite from Patrick Base [sic] in the state of Florida which was
kept secret The Americans failed to launch the satellite...and the payload flew
about 3,000 miles or approximately 4,800 kilometers. This flight was then
publicized in the press as a national record. They emphasized that U.S. rockets
can fly higher and farther than all the rockets in the world, including Soviet
rockets. From separate printed reports, it is known that the U.S.A. is preparing
in the nearest months a new attempt to launch an artificial Earth satellite and
22. Golovanov, 1994,530; Lardief, 1992, 107. Tikhonravov was officially an employee of the NII-4 but was temporarily
working as the Chief Consultant to the N11-88 OKB-1.
23. An edited version of Keldysh's speech has been published as/v£ V. Keldysh, "On Artifidal Satellites of the Earth" (in
Russian), V. S. Avduyevskiy and T. M. Eneyev, eds. M. V. Keldysh: izbranny_ trudy: rakemaya teidmika i k_smonav_ka
(Moscow:. Nauka, 1988), 235-240; See also Golovanov, 1994, 530.
24. Kaliningrad was the location of the OKB-1, while sea trials of the R-11FM were carried out near Molotovsk. Kapustin Yar
and Tyura-Tam were the two missile launch ranges.
25. This was a Jupiter C missile (no. RaW-I) which flew a distance of 5,300 kilometers on 20 September 1956 during a re-
entry test. A live third stage could have put a small payload into orbit, but this was not the intended goal.
26. Golovanov, 1987; Golovanov, 1994, 532.
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iswillingtopayanypricetoachievethispriority.27
WhileKorolev's information on U.S. plans may have been in error, his instincts were not that far off. The United
States could have launched a satellite by early 1957, but various institutional and political obstacles precluded such
an attempt.
By 25 January 1957, the Chief Designer approved the initial design details of the satellite, now officially
designated Simple Satellite No. 1 (PS-1). 28 Although there was some token resistance to Korolev's revised plan,
primarily from Keldysh, his letter appeared to have adequately invoked the specter of U.S. eminence in the field of
military technology. On 15 February, the USSR Council of Ministers formally signed a decree (no. 171-83ss)
entitled "On Measures to Carry Out in the International Geophysical Year," approving the new proposal. 29 The
two new satellites, PS-1 and PS-2, would weigh approximately 100 kilograms and be launched in April-May 1957
after one or two fully successful R-7 launches. Eisenhower's plan to launch an American satellite during IGY was
the deciding factor on a launch date. The Object D launch, meanwhile was pushed back to April 1958. Focused on
a more modest objective, Korolev wasted little time. He quickly sent out technical specifications for the initial
satellite PS-1 to the two subcontractors. By this time there was an impressive sight at the Tyura-Tam launch base
in Soviet Central Asia: the first flight article of the magnificent R-7 was on the launch pad.
The first three launches of the R-7 ICBM in May-July 1957 were all failures, completely disrupting
Korolev's schedule to launch a satellite before the beginning of the IGY. The days following the last failure were
the lowest point for Korolev and his associates. Suddenly evel3a.l_g they had labored for over three years had been
put into doubt. There was severe criticism from higher officials and even talk of curtailing the entire program. For
Korolev, the headaches were compounded by the cumulative delays of his Simple Satellite project. It was now a
month into the IGY and the R-7 itself had not flown a successful mission. His dreams, his position, his status were
all in jeopardy, and this began to affect his temperament. In mid-June he had written to his wife from the launch
site, "Things are not going very well again," adding with a note of optimism, "...right here and now, we must strive
for the solution we need!" By July things began to deteriorate. On the 8th he wrote "We are working very hard,"
but after the second launch failure, he wrote on the 23rd "Things are very, very bad. ''3° Korolev's biographer wrote
in 1987, "In all the postwar years, no days were more painful, difficult, or tense for Sergey Pavlovich Korolev than
those of that hot summer of 1957. "31
Apart from competition from the United States, Korolev had to unexpectedly deal with a different kind of
threat at the time, one from within the USSR in the person of Chief Designer Mikhail K. Yangel of the
Experimental Design Bureau No. 586 (OKB-586). In the first quarter of 1957, Yangel's Design Bureau at
Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine, on orders from ministerial boss Dmitriy F. Ustinov, had begun to explore the
possibility of modifying their R-12 intermediate range ballistic missile into a satellite launch vehicle. 32 The missile
itself, fueled by storable hypergolic propellants unlike the R-7, was the subject of a five year long development
program, at first under Korolev's tutelage, but later transferred to Dnepropetrovsk. Prodded by the unending delays
in the R-7 program, Yangel evaluated "the possibility of the immediate launch of a similar satellite [as Korolev's]
using the simplest of booster rockets based on the strategic R-12 missile. "33 Although analysis proved that a hastily
modified two-stage R-12 could be used for this goal, it did not seem likely that a first launch could be carried out
prior to either the R-7 or the Americans. To Korolev's relief, the plan was shelved.
Back at the launch range of Tyura-Tam, the fourth R-7 launch on 21 August 1957 was successful. The
missile and its payload flew 6,500 kilometers, the warhead finally entering the atmosphere over the target point at
Kamchatka. Korolev was so subsumed by euphoria that he stayed awake until three in the morning speaking to his
27. The complete text of Korolev's letter is reproduced as S. P. Korolev, "Proposal on the First Launch of an Artificial Satellite
of the Earth Before the Start of the International Geophysical Year" (in Russian) in Keldysh, 1980, 369-370.
28. Ishlinskiy, 1986, 447.
29. Semenov, 1996, 88, 632.
30. Golovanov, 1987.
31. Golovanov, 1987.
32. V. Pappo-Korystin, V. Platonov, and V. Pashchenko, Dncprovsla'y raketno-kosmichesla'y tsentr (Dnepropetrovsk: PO
YuMZ/KBYu, 1994), 60; S. N. Konyukhov and V. A. Pashchenko, "History of Space Launch Vehicles Development,"
presented at the 46th International Astronautical Congress, October 2-6, 1995, Oslo, Norway, IAA-95-IAA 2.2.09. The range of
the missile was about 2,000 kilometers.
33. Yu. Biryukov, MFromthe History of Space Science: The Price of Decision-First Place (The First Satellites) n (in Russian),
Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika (October 1991), no. 10: 37-39. Author's emphasis.
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deputies and aides about the great possibilities that had opened up, the future, and mostly about his artificial
satellite. 34 It was extremely unusual for the Soviets to publicize successes in any military field, so it was all the
more odd when six days after the R-7 launch, the official news agency TASS released a brief communiqu6:
A few days ago a super-long-range, intercontinental multistage ballistic
missile was launched. The tests of the missile were successfifl; they fully
confirmed the correctness of the calculations and the selected design. The
flight of the missile took place at a very great, hitherto unattained, altitude.
Covering an enormous distance in a short time, the missile hit the assigned
region. The results obtained show that there is the possibility of launching
missiles into any region of the terrestrial globe. The sohition of the problem of
creating intercontinental hallistic missiles will make it possible to reach
remote regions without resorting to strategic aviation, which at the present
time is vulnerable to modem means of antiaircraft defense. 35
Clearly it did not have the intended effect on the U.S. public or media, since for the most part, little attention was
given it. Those that did pay lip service to the announcement spoke only to dismiss the claim, a stance justified
partly by the black hole of information on Soviet ballistic missiles. It would take 38 more days before the entire
world would take notice that a new age had arrived, heralded by that same intercontinental ballistic missile.
Birth
Work on the 'simple satellite' PS-1 had continued at an uneven pace since development of the object began
in January 1957. Between March and August, engineers carried out computations to select and refine the trajectory
of the launch vehicle and the sateRite during launch. These enormously complicated computations for the R-7
program were initially done by hand using electrical arithrometers and six-digit trigonometric tables. When more
complex calculations were required, engineers at the OKB-1 were offered the use of a 'real' computer recently
installed at the premises of the Academy of Sciences at Keldysh's request. The gigantic machine fiUed up a huge
room at the department and may have been the fastest computer in the USSR in the late 1950s: it could perform ten
thousand operations per second, a high-end capability for Soviet computing machines of the time. 36
There were many debates on the shape of the first satellite, with most senior OKB-1 designers preferring a
conical form since it fit well with the nose cone of the rocket. At a meeting early in the year, Korolev had a
change-of-heart and suggested a metal sphere at least one meter in diameter. 37 There were six major guidelines
followed in the construction of PS-l:
• the satellite would have to be of maximum simplicity and reliability while keeping in mind that methods
used for the spacecraft would be used in future projects;
• the body of the satellite was to be spherical in order to determine atmospheric density in its path;
• the satellite was to be equipped with radio equipment working on at least two wavelengths of sufficient
power to be tracked by amateurs and to obtain data on the propagation of radio waves through the atmosphere;
• the antennae were to be designed so as to not affect the intensity of the radio signals due to spinning;
• the power sources were to be onboard batteries ensuring work for two to three weeks; and
• the attachment of the satellite to the core stage would be such that there would be no failure to separate.
The five primary scientific objectives of the mission were:
• to test the method of placing an artificial satellite into Earth orbit;
34. Golovanov, 1987; Golovanov, 1994, 514; Council of Veterans of theBaykonurCosmodrome, Proryv v kosmos: ocherld ob
ispitatelyak_ spet$ialiatakh i stroite_ffch kosmodromaBaykonur (Moscow:.TOOVeles, 1994), 25, 174
35. _eport on IntercontinentalBallistic Missile" (in Russian), Pravda (August27, 1957). A complete English translation of
thepress release is includedin Krieger, 1958, 233-234.
36. Ishlinskiy, 1986, 447; V. Lysenko, eeL,ThreePaces Beyond the Horizon (Moscov_.MirPublishers, 1989), 58.
37. L Minyuk and G. Vetrov, "Fantasy and Reality" (in Russian), Aviatsiya i kosmonavffka(September 1987), no. 9: 46-47.
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• to provide information on the density of the atmosphere by calculating its lifetime in orbit;
• to test radio and optical methods of orbital tracking;
• to determine the effects of radio wave propagation through the atmosphere; and
• to check principles of pressurization used on the satellite. 3s
The satellite as it eventually emerged was a pressurized sphere, 58 centimeters in diameter made of an
aluminum alloy. The sphere was constructed by combining two hemispherical casings together. The pressurized
internal volume of the sphere was filled with nitrogen at 1.3 atmospheres which maintained an electro-chemical
source of power (three silver-zinc batteries), two D-200 radio-transmitters, a DTK-34 thermo-regnlation system a
ventilation system, a communications system, temperature and pressure transmitters, and associated wiring. The
two radio transmitters operated at frequencies of 20.005 and 40.002 megacycles at wavelengths of 1.5 and 7.5
meters. The signals on both the frequencies were spurts lasting 0.2 to 0.6 seconds, providing the famous _p-
beep' sound to the transmissions. The antennae system comprised four rods, two with a length of 2.4 meters each
and the remaining two with a length of 2.9 meters each. Tests of this radio system were completed as early as 5
May 1957 using a helicopter and a ground station. 39The total mass of the satelhte was 83.6 kilograms of which
51.0 kilograms was simply the power source. The lead designer for PS-1 was Mikhail S. Khomyakov. Oleg G.
Ivanovskiy was his deputy. 4°
Korolev, of course, kept close tabs on the development of PS-1 and continuously saw to it that the
spherical satellite was kept spotlessly clean and shiny not only for its reflective qualities, but perhaps also for its
overall aesthetic beauty. On one occasion he flew into a rage at a junior assembly shop worker for doing a poor job
on the outer surface ofa mockup of the satellite. "This ball will be exhibited in museums!," he shouted. 41 An aide
from Moscow telephoned Korolev at Tyura-Tam on 24 June to inform him that he had just signed the document
specifying the final configuration of the satellite. The launch vehicle earmarked for the satellite was a slightly
uprated version of the basic R-7 ICBM variant. The modifications included: the omission of a 300 kilogram radio-
package from the top of the core booster; the changing of burn times of the main engines; the removal of a
vibration measurement system; the use of a special nozzle system to separate the booster from the satellite installed
at the top of the core stage; and the installation of a completely new payload shroud and container replacing the
warhead configuration. 42 The length of the booster with the new shroud was 29.167 meters, almost four meters
shorter than the ICBM version.
The Council of Ministers had formally approved the simple satellite program in Febnmxy 1957. With one
R-7 success under his belt, Korolev now needed final permission from the State Commission to proceed with an
orbital launch after a second successful launch. Despite the official governmental sanction, this process appears to
have been fraught with difficulty, suggesting that even at this late stage, there were individuals on the Commission
who were not interested in the satellite attempt. At a State Commission meeting soon after the August launch,
Korolev formally asked for permission to launch a satellite ff a second R-7 successfully flew in early September.
Convincing the Commission proved to be much harder than expected and the meeting ended in fierce arguments
and recriminations. Not easily turned away, Korolev tried again at a second session soon after, this time using a
political ploy: "I propose let us put the question of national priority in launching the world's first artificial Earth
satellite to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Let them settle it. "43 It worked. None
of the members wanted to take the blame for a potential miscalculation, and Korolev got what he wanted. A final
document for launch, "The Program for Carrying Out a Test Launch of a Simple Unoriented ISZ (the Object PS)
Using the Product 8KT1PS," was later signed by:
• Vasiliy F. Ryabikov (Militaly-Industrial Commission);
• Mitrofan I. Nedelin (Ministry of Defeuse);
38. M.K. Tikhonravov, "The Creation of the First Artificial Earth Satellite: Some Historical Details," Journal of theBritish
InterplanetarySocieO_ (May 1994), V. 47, no. 5: 191-194.
39. Tikhonravov, 1995; G. A. Kustova, Otpervogo Sputnika do "Energii"- "Burana"i "Mir" (Kaliningrad: RKK Energiya,
1994), 37; Jacques Villain, ed., Ba_onour: laporte des #toiles (Paris: Armand Colin, 1994), 26; Golovanov, 1994, 537.
40. O. G. Ivanovskiy, NaperekorzenmoraypriO_azhenyu (Moscow. Politicheskoy hteratury, 1988), 167-169.
41. l_{ikhailFlorianskiy, "October 4 - For theFirst Time in the World," Moscow News Supplement (1987), no. 40.
42. Varfolomeyev, 1995; Keldysh, 1980, 365; Yu. A. Mozzhorin et al., eds., Nachalo kosmicheskoy ery: vospominaniya
veteranov raketno-kosmicheskoytekhnila"i kosmonavtila':vypusk vtoroy (Moscow. RNITsKD, 1994), 60-61.
43. Councilof Veterans of the BaykonurCosmodrome, 1994,29-30.
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• Dmitriy F. Ustinov (Ministry of Defense Industries);
• Valeriy D. Kalmykov (Ministry of Radio-Technical Industry); and
• Aleksandr N. Nesmeyanov (Academy of Sciences). 44
The subsequent launch of the Ro7 on 7 September was as successful as the one in August, and the R-7
ICBM flew across the Soviet Union before depositing its dummy warhead over the Kamchatl_ peninsnla. 45 In the
summer, Korolev and the other Chief Designers began to informally target the satellite launch for the one
hundredth anniversary of spaceflight visionary Tsiolkovskiy's birth on 17 September, but achieving this date
proved increasingly unrealistic. Instead of being at Tyura-Tam for a space launch on that day, Korolev and R-7
rocket engine designer Ghishko were both in attendance at the Pfllard Hall of the Palace of Unions in Moscow for a
special celebration of the great visionary's birthday. In a long speech to the distinguished audience, Korulev, whose
real job was not revealed, prophesized that, "in the nearest future the first test launches of artificial satellites of the
Earth with scientific goals will take place in the USSR and the USA. "46 The audience had little idea of the
accuracy of the prediction.
On 20 September Komlev was at Moscow for a meeting of the State Commission for the PS-1 launch.47
Chairman Ryabikov, Korolev, Keldysh, and Marshall Nedelin were the principle participants and established 6
October as the target date of the launch based on the pace of preparations. At the same meeting, the Commission
decided to publicly announce the launch of PS-1 only after completion of the first orbit. A communiqu6 to this
effect was written up by Ryabikov himself on 23 September. 48 The frequencies for tracking by amateurs had
already been announced earlier in the year in the issues of the journal Radio although details of the program had
obviously been omitted. Korolev himself flew into Tyum-Tam on 29 September staying in a small house close to
the primary activity area near site two.
The preparations for launching were for the most part uneventful save for the last minute replacement of
one of the batteries on the flight version of PS-1. Still apprehensive over a last minute U.S. launch, Korolev
abruptly proposed to the State Commission that the launch be brought forward two days. His concerns were
apparently prompted by plans for a conference in Washington, D.C. in early October as part of IGY proceedings.
On the 6th, the day of PS-rs scheduled launch, a paper entitled "Satellite Over the Planet" was to be presented by
the American delegation. He believed that the presentation was to be timed to coincide with a hitherto
unannounced launch of a U.S. satellite. 49 Local KGB representatives assured Korolev that this was not so, but
Korolev was convinced that a launch of Army Jupiter C might be attempted. In the end, the schedule for PS-I's
44. Semenov, 1996, 90. _Z' is the Russian abbreviation for Artificial Satellite of the Earth. The 8K71PS was the industrial
designation for the modified version of the R-7 used for the satellite launch.
45. Yu. V. Bkyukov, "Materials from the Biographical Chronicles of Sergey Pavlovich Korolev" (in Russian), in B. V.
Raushenbakh, ed., Iz istorii sovetskoy kosmonm, tiki (Mosco_ Nauka, 1983), 238; Lardier, 1992, 93; Golovanov, 1994, 517.
Soviet leader Khn_chev is said to have been present at this launch, but this is unconfirmed by Soviet or Russian sources.
46 S.P. Korolev, "On the Practical Significance ofK. E. Tsiolkovskiy's Proposals in the Field of Rocket Technology" (in
Russian), in B. V. Raushenbakh, ed., I_ledovaniya170 iatorii i teorfi razvit_'ya aviataionnoy i raketno-kosmicheskoy nauki i
teldmila" (lvioscow:. Naulm, 1981), 40. This is a complete version of his speech. An abridged English translation has been
reproduced in Institute of the History of Natural Sciences and Technology, History of the USSR: New Research. 5: Yuri
Gagarin: To Mark the 25th Anniversary of the First Manned Space Flight (Moscow:. Social Sciences Today, 1986), 48-63.
Note that the latter does not include the above quote.
47. The State Commission for the Launch of the Object PS-1 comprised the following members: Chairman V. lv£ Ryabikov
(Chairman of the VPK); V. P. Barmin (Chief Designer of GKSB SpetsMash); L T. Bulychev (Deputy Chief of Military
Communications of the Ministry of Defense' General Staff); V. P. Glushko (Chief Designer ofOKB-456); S. P. Komlev (Chief
Designer ofOKB-1), V. L Kuznetsov (Chief Designer ofNII-944); A. A. Maksimov (from the UNRV); A. G. lvLrykin (First
Deputy Chief of the UlqRV); M. I. Nedelin (Deputy Minister of Defense for Reactive Armaments)', A. I. Nesterenko
(Commander of the NIIP-5); G. N. Pashkov (Deputy Chairman of the VPK); N. A. Pilyugin (Chief Designer ofNII-885); M. S.
Ryazansldy (Chief Designer and Director ofNII-g85); S. P. Shishkin (Chief Designer at Atzamas-16). Others involved were: A.
F. Bogolomov (Chief Designer of the OKB-MEI); M. V. Keldysh (Director of NII-1 and Chief of the OPM MIAN); I. T.
Peresypkin (Minister of Communications); K. N. Rudnev (Deputy Minister of Defense Induslries); G. R. Udarov (Deputy
Chairman of the State Committee for Defense Technology_, and S. M_ Vladimirskiy (Deputy Chairman of the State Committee
for Radio Electronics). See Yu. A. Skopinskiy, "State Acceptance of the Space Program: Thh_ Years of Work" (in Russian),
2emlya i vselennaya (September-October 1988), 73-79; Lardier, 1992, 285.
48. Ishllnskiy, 1986, 447; Lardier, 108-109; Konovalov, 1989, 122-123.
49. Golovanov, 1994, 537-538.
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launch was moved forward two days to the 4th; Korolev signed the final order for launch at four in the afternoon
on the 2nd and sent it to Moscow for approval. 5°
The R-7 was transported and installed on the launch pad in the early morning of 3 October escorted on
foot by Korolev, Ryabikov, and other members of the State Commission. Fueling began early the following
morning at 0545 hours local time. 51 Korolev, under a great amount of pressure, remained cautious throughout the
proceedings. He told his engineers, "Nobody will hurry us. If you have even the tiniest doubt, we will stop the
testing and make the corrections on the satellite. There is still time... "52 Most of the engineers, understandably
enough, did not have time to ponder over the historical value or importance of the upcoming event. PS-rs deputy
designer Ivanovskiy recalled "...Nobody back then was thinking about the magnitude of what was going on:
everyone did his own job, living through its disappointments and joys. "53
On the night of the 4th, huge flood lights illuminated the launchpad as the engineers in their blockhouse
checked off all the systems. In the command bunker accompanying Korolev were some of the senior members of
the State Commission. All launch operations for Sputnik were handled by two men, a civilian and a military
officer. Representing the civilians was Korolev's deputy Leonid A. Voskresenskiy, one of the most colorful
characters in the history of the Soviet space program. A daredevil motorcyclist with a legendary penchant for
taking risks, he had been with the program since the early days in 1945 when the Soviets had scoured Germany for
the remains of the A-4 missile. Lt.-Col. Aleksandr I. Nosov represented the military. Both men were 44 years old
at the time. The actual command for launch was entrusted to the hands of Boris S. Chekunov, a young artillery
forces lieutenant. He later recalled the final moments as the clock ticked past midnight local time: "When only a
few minutes remained until lift-off, Korolev nodded to his deputy Voskresenskiy. The operators froze, awaiting the
final order. Nosov, the chief of the launch control team, stood at the periscope. He could see the whole pad. 'One
minute to go!,' he called. "54 Another senior engineer in the bunker recalled:
With the exception of the operators, everybody was standing. Only N. A.
Pilyugin and S. P. Korolev were allowed to sit down. The launch director
[Nosov] began issuing commands. I kept an eye on S. P. Korolev. He seemed
nervous although he tried to conceal it. He was carefully examining the
readings of the various instruments without missing any nuance of our body
language and tone of voice. If anybody raised their voice or showed signs of
nervousness, Korolev was instantly on the alert to see what was going on. 55
The seconds counted down to zero and Nosov shouted the command for lift-off. Chekunov immediately pressed the
lift-off button. At exactly 2228 hours 34 seconds Moscow Time on 4 October, the engines ignited and the 272,830
kilogram booster lifted off the pad in a blaze of light and smoke. The five engines of the R-7 generated about 398
tons of thrust at launch. Although the rocket lifted off gracefully, there were problems. Delays in the firing of
several engines almost resulted in a launch abort. Additionally, at T+16 seconds, the System for the Simultaneous
Emptying of the Tanks (SOBIS) failed, which resulted in higher than normal kerosene consumption. A turbine
failure due to this resulted in main engine cut-off one second prior to the planned moment. 56 Separation from the
core stage, however, occurred successfully at T+324.5 seconds, and the 83.6 kilogram PS-1 successfully flew into a
free-fall elliptical trajectory. The first human-made object entered orbit around the Earth inaugurating a new era in
exploration.
With most State Commission members still in the bunker, engineers at Tyura-Tam awaited confirmation
of orbit insertion from the satellite in a van set up about 800 meters from the launch pad. As a huge crowd waited
outside the van, radio operator Vyecheslav I. Lappo from the NII-885, who had personally designed the onboard
transmitters, sat expectantly for the first signal. The Kamchatka station picked up signals from the satellite and
there was cheering but Korolev cut everybody off: "Hold off on the celebrations. The station people could be
50. This document was not actually signed until the morning of the launch. See Ishlinskiy, 1986, 448.
51. Mozzhorin, 1994, 63.
52. Golovanov, 1987.
53. Golovanov, 1987.
54. Ivan Borisenko and Alexander Romanov, Where All Roads Lead to Space Begin (Moseo_ Progress Publishers, 1982), 66.
55. Mozzhorin, 1994, 63. The author of this quote is (at the time) OKB-1 engineer Ye. V. Shabarov.
56. Ishlinskiy, 1986, 448, 464; B. Ye. Chertok, Rakety i lyudi: Fili PodlipM Tyuratam (Moscow:. Mashinostroyeniye, 1996),
197.
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mistaken.Let'sjudge the signalsforourselveswhen thesatellitecomes hack afteritsfirstorbitaround the
Earth. "sv Eventually the distinct 'beep-beep-beep' of the craft came in clearly over the radio waves and the crowd
began to celebrate. Chief Designer Ryazanskiy who was at the van immediately telephoned Korolev in the bunker.
The ballistics experts at the Coordination-Computation Center in Moscow had determined that the satellite was in
an orbit with a perigee of 228 kilometers and an apogee of 947 kilometers, the latter about 80 kilometers lower
than planned due to the early engine cutzoff. Inclination of the orbit to the Earth's equator was 65.6 degrees while
orbital period was 96.17 minutes. 5s Experts at the Moscow Center also ascertained that the satellite was slowly
losing altitude, but State Commission Chairman Ryabikov waited until the second orbit was over prior to
telephoning Soviet leader Nikita S. Khn_hchev.
Khn_hchev's reaction to the launch was unusually subdued for an event of such magnitude and perhaps
indicates that he, like many others, had not grasped the true propaganda effect of such a historic occurrence. He
later related:
When the satellite was launched, they phoned me that the rocket had taken the
right course and that the satellite was already revolving around the earth. I
congratulated the entire group of engineers and technicians on this
outstanding achievement and calmly went to bed. 59
The officialSovietnews agency TASS releasedthe communiqud Ryabikov had authoredon the morning of5
October.Publishedinthemorning editionofPravda,itwas exceptionallylow-keyand was not theheadlineofthe
day:
For several years scientific research and experimental design work have been
conducted in the Soviet Union on the creation of artificial satellites. As has
already been reported in the press, the first launching of the satellites in the
USSR were plannedforrealizationm accordancewith thescientificresearch
program oftheInternationalGeophysicalYear.As a resultofvery intensive
work by scientificresearchinstitutesand designbureausthefirstartificial
satelliteintheworld has been created.On October4,1957,thisfirstsatellite
was successfixllylaunched intheUSSR. According topre"luninalydata,the
carrierockethas impartedtothesatelliteherequiredorbitalvelocityof
about 8,000 metersper second.At thepresenttime thesatelliteisdescribing
ellipticaltrajectoriesaround theEarth,and itsflightcan be observedinthe
raysoftherisingand settingSun with theaid ofverysimpleoptical
instruments(binoculars,telescopes,etc.).6°
The Soviet media did not ascribe a specific name for the satellite, generally referring to it as 'Sputnik,' the Russian
word for 'satellite,' often also loosely translated as 'fellow traveler.'
As the media tumult over Sputnik began to mount in the West, the Soviet leadership began to capitalize
on the utter pandemonium pervading the discourse on the satellite in the United States. On 9 October, Pravda
published a long report anonymously authored by Korolev and other designers detailing the construction and
design of the satellite. 61 The parties responsible for this great deed were, of course, not named. Having been
involved in the defense industry, the real job titles of the members of the Council of Chief Designers had always
remained secret, although Tikhonravov and others had freely published under their own names through the 1950s
on topics of general interest. This suddenly changed as their names disappeared from official histories. Beginning
with the launch of Sputnik, of the four major contributors to the success of Sputnik, Korolev, Glushko, and
Keldysh were referred in the open press as the Chief Designer of Rocket-Space Systems, the Chief Designer of
57. Mozzhorin, 1994, 64.
5s. Ishlinskiy, 1986, 464;
59. Daniloff_ 1972, 65-66.
60. "AnnouncementoftheFirstSatellite"(inRussian),Pravda(October5,1957).A completeEnglishtranslationofthis
announcementisincludedinKrieger,1958,311-312.
61. "ReportontheFLrstSatellite"(inRussian),Prm,da(October9,1957).A completeEnglishtranslationfthisarticlein
includedinKrieger,1958,313-325.
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Rocket Engines, and the Chief Theoretician of Cosmonautics respectively. The fourth, Tikhonmvov, did not even
have a pseudonym for himself.
The titles not only hid their identities, but also added an element of attraction and enigma to the men
behind the world's first space program. New editions of histories of Soviet rocketry published prior to 1957 ceased
to carry Korolcv's name, and Soviet encyclopedias now merely listed him as heading a laboratory in an unspecified
'machine building' institute in the USSR. Glnshko meanwhile was now said to be laboratory chief at the Moscow
Institute of Mineral Fuels. 62 Korolev, certainly in recognition of the key role he played, was allowed to write in no
less an important newspaper as Pravda, but under the pseudonym 'Professor K. Sergeyev.' His first article rifled
"Research into Cosmic Space" was published on 12 December 1957. Khmshchev claimed at the rime that as the
years went by "the photographs and names of these illustrious people will be made public," but that for the moment
"in order to ensure the country's security and the lives of these scientists, engineers, technicians, and other
specialists, we cannot yet make known their names or publish their photographs. "63
Conclusion
The riming of the Sputnik launch was motivated by a single reasoning: Korolev's drive to preempt a U.S.
satellite launch attempt during the International Geophysical Year. At first, it was a competition with Vanguard.
Spurred by the July 1955 announcement of U.S. satellite plans for the IGY, Korolev, joined by Tikhonravov and
Keldysh, convinced both the government and the Academy of Sciences within a month to proffer support for a
complex Soviet satellite project timed for launch before the IGY. A second jolt came as a result of
miscommunication about a U.S. Army missile launch in September 1956. Pu_ing the heavy scientific satellite on
the backburner, Korolev's engineers put together a much simpler satellite to beat any American attempt. Once
again, they timed it for launch before the start of the IGY. This 84 kilogram ball, although delayed several months,
lifted off into orbit on 4 October 1957 and opened a new era.
The political and cultural shock bequeathed by Sputnik set events in motion that eventually gave rise to
Apollo, perhaps the central artifact of the so-called 'space race' of the Cold War. Conventional wisdom suggests
that the race began on 4 October 1957 and ended on 20 July 1969 with the Moon landing. But as we begin to dig
deeper into the origins of the space race, it is clear that that race began long before the launch of Sputnik, in 1955,
with the Eisenhower Administration's famous announcement on satellites. And perhaps fortunately for the Soviet
Union, it was a race in which one of the participants, the United States, did not even know it was running until it
was too late.
62. Soviet Space Programs, 1962-65; Goals and Purposes, Achievements, Plans, and International Implications, Prepared for
the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, U.S. Senate, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, De, ember 1966), 149-150.
63. Soviet Space Programs, 1962-65, 1966, 71-72.
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Korolev's Triple Play: Sputniks 1, 2 and 3
James Harford, Executive Director Emeritus, AIAA
601 Lake Dr., Princeton NJ 08540
Abstract
The paper deals with the politics, planning and technology of the period 1946-1958, spanning the
development of the R-7 ICBM technology which made possible the launching of an artificial satellite; the
strategy used by Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, with the support of Mystislav Keldysh, in bringing the
satellite from conceptualization by Mikhail Tikhortravov to actuality; the early work on Sputnik 3, which
was planned to be Sputnik 1; the hurried development of Sputnik 1 when Spumik 3 was not ready; the
even more hurried development of Sputnik 2 (the Laika carrier) at Khrushchev's behest; the actual
launches; the failure to map the radiation belts; the casual reaction, at first, by Kremlin officialdom to
Sputnik l's success; and then the quick switch to braggadocio when the world impact was realized. 1
Initial Soviet Reaction to Sputnik 1 Launch
While it jolted the rest of the world, the successful launch of Sputnik i on October 4, 1957,
received casual treatment, at first, in Moscow. Korolev's former colleague, Academician Boris
Rauschenbakh, told me, some 35 years later, "Look up the pages of Pravda for the first day after the
launch. It got only a few paragraphs. Then look at the next day's issue, when the Kremlin realized what
the world impact was. ,,2
The article in the October 5 Pravda was, indeed, tersely phrased. Positioned modestly in a right
hand column part way down on the first page, it did not even mention the satellite in its head. Titled
routinely, "Tass Report," it gave the facts of the launch clinically, and the editors apparently felt obliged
from the very first sentence to educate the readers on what it was all about:
In the course of the last years in the Soviet Union scientific research
and experimental construction work on the creation of artificial satellites of
the Earth has been going on.
As already reported in the press, the first launches of satellites in the
USSR were planned for implementation in accordance with the program of
scientific research for the International Geophysical Year.
As the result of a large, dedicated effort by scientific-research
institutes and construction bureaus the world's first artificial satellite
of the Earth has been created. On 4 October, 1957 in the USSR the first
successful satellite launch has been achieved. According to preliminary data,
the rocket launcher carried the satellite to the necessary orbital speed of
about 8,000 meters per second. At the present time the satellite is moving in
an elliptical trajectory around the Earth and its flight can be observed in the
1 Adapted from KOROLEVHowOne Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to BeatAmerica to the Moon, James
Harford, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1997, pp. 121-137
2 Rauschenbakh con_nent to author at 41st International Astronautical Congress, Montreal, Oct. II,
1991
rays of the eastern and western Sun with the help of simple optical
instruments (binoculars, spyglasses, etc.). 3
The article went on to give the basic information--size, weight, orbital inclination, radio frequency
on which the beep could be heard--and it credited the great Tsiolkovsky with having established the
feasibility of artificial Earth satellites decades earlier. 4
The Next Day's Turnabout
The next day's Pravda was something else: 'World's First Artificial Satellite of Earth Created in
Soviet Nation" stretched across the top of page one, which was devoted almost entirely to the
achievement. But the lead story in the right hand column did not recount the feat itself, with first hand
reports from the Soviet protagonists--their names were top secret, after all, so they could not even be
contacted. Instead, the column was datelined New York, and it quoted in detail the congratulations of
Russia's fiercest Cold War rival, the USA. The words, generous in their praise, were from Joseph
Kaplan, chairman of the U.S. National Committee for the International Geophysical Year. Both the Soviet
and American satellite programs were carded out under IGY auspices, with the results available to the
world's scientists. Below the Kaplan item were congratulatory bulletins from A. C. B. Lovell, the British
astronomer, and from a member of the USSR's political family, Pavel Novatsky of the Polish Academy of
Sciences--the latter headed "Big Victory."
Big victory it certainly was. Poems lyricized the event, like "Leap into the Future" and "Scouting
the Celestial Deep." An ephemeris, showing the times when the carder rocket would be visible over cities
in the USSR, as well as Detroit and Washington, was printed like a Wain timetable. It was the moment to
cash in on the performance of a feat that Nikita Khrushchev could never have dreamed would have so
powerful an effect. He, after all, had been apathetic about "just another Korolev rocket launch," as
Rauschenbakh described the attitude of the Soviet premier and his claque on first hearing the news.
In the days to come, though, Pravda was delighted to print the praises of friends and enemies.
Reactions from Peking and Shanghai (that friendship would dissolve only a few years hence), Warsaw,
Paris, Vienna, Rome, London, and an especially long one from New York, ran under a big headline that
ran across the page, "Russians Won the Competition. ''6
The US Moffed the Chance to be First
It was a competition which the Americans should have won hands down. The concept of putting
up a satellite had been known to the world's space enthusiasts for many years. In America serious
proposals to launch a spacecraft into Earth orbit had been discussed since the mid-1940's. Robert P.
Haviland recalls that when he was working in the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics in 1945, motivated by a
report on space rockets in a document captured from the Peenemunde Germans, he "wrote a 4-5 page
memo proposing a Navy satellite development but it was scorned. ''7
In February, 1946, the US Army Air Corps asked the major air frame companies to submit secret
proposals for the design of an "earth orbiting satellite." Douglas Aircraft was notified on July 1 that its
3 Pravda, Oct. 5, 1957, p. 1
4 In Rockets and Cosmic Space, a monograph published by Tsiolkovsky in 1903.
5 Pravda, Oct. 6, 1957, pp. 1-2
6 Pravda, OCt. 8, 1957, p. 3
7 Haviland telephone interview with author, May 22, 1995
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design was judged the winner. Today's aerospace companies will find it hard to believe that the Air Corps
evaluation was completed in less than four months! What's more, Douglas was funded for the study at the
"unheard of amount in those days" of $1 million but their contract was switched to the newly-formed
Project RAND (for Research and Development) in Santa Monica, California. 8 RAND's eventual report on
"Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship" predicted, with keen perception, that
"The achievement of a satellite craft by the United States would inflame the imagination of mankind, and
would probably produce repercussions in the world comparable to the explosion of the atomic bomb. ,,9
Alas, nothing followed the study, and so it would not be a US satellite that would generate those
repercussions.
Tsiolkovsky Showed in 1903 That a Satellite Could be Orbited
In Russia, as mentioned earlier, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky had shown mathematically in 1903 how a
device launched at a certain velocity would achieve Earth orbit. Then in 1948, forty-five years later, the
visionary Mikhail Tikhonravov had made the case to Korolev for developing just such a device. At first he
was unable to get support for the concept. His presentation to a meeting of the Academy of Artillery
Sciences was treated skeptically. Golovanov quotes the remarks of the Academy president, Anatoli
Blagonravov, at the meeting: "The topic is interesting. But we cannot include your report. Nobody would
understand why...They would accuse us of getting involved in things we do not need to get involved
in..." However, what Blagonravov said officially was not what he thought instinctively. This courteous,
mild-mannered, chain-smoking, white-haired former general, who would become in later years one of the
chief spokesmen for the Soviet Union in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, was bothered by the wary reception of Tikhonravov's ideas. "There was no way he could escape
the thought that this ridiculous report was in fact not very ridiculous at all." Blagonravov, risking the
derision of his colleagues, put the report back on the agenda, thereby giving Tikhonravov--and Korolev--
license to study possible satellite designs. 10
The R-7 ICBM Carrier Made a Sputnik Launch Feasible
Some five years later, towards the end of 1953, having redesigned the R-7 rocket to carry a heavier
payload, Korolev had drafted a proposed decree for the Central Committee of the Communist Party which
included the possibility of using the vehicle to launch a satellite. However, while the draft "was making its
way to the top" mention of the satellite was struck out. n Not until May 26, 1954 did Korolev formally
propose the satellite launch to Dimitri Ustinov, Minister of Armaments. 12 By then the R-7 was capable of
propelling an H-bomb warhead of 5 tons--the actual size had not yet been determined--over an
intercontinental ballistic trajectory. It could easily orbit a satellite of some 1.5 tons. According to Korolev's
deputy, Vassily Mishin, Korolev had to propose a Spumik launch as part of the test program of the ICBM
8 Brill, Yvonne, one of the participants in the Rand study, letter to the author, June 15, 1995
9 Project RAND Report SM-I1827, May 2, 1946, from Rand 25thAnniversary Volume, Rand Corp., Santa
Monica, CA, 1973, p. 3
I0 Golovanov, Yaroslav, The Beginning of the Space Era, Pravda, Oct. 4, 1987, p. 3, translated into
English in JPRS-USP-88-001, Feb. 26, 1988, p. 48
21Vetrov, Gyorgi, private cormnunication, June 13, 1995
12 Keldysh and Vetrov, Creative Legacy .... p. 343, and Tarasenko, Maxim, Military Aspecrs of Soviet
Cosmonautics, Nikol, Moscow, 1992, p. 16. Tarasenko reports that the recommendation called
for "development of a 2-3 ton satellite, a recoverable satellite, a satellite for a long
orbital stay of 1-2 people and an orbital station with regular Earth ferry cor_nunication.'
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program.13 In any case, Korolev's proposal to Ustinov is so delicately phrased that R-7 is not mentioned
at all, but merely referred to as the
...new article which permits speaking about the possibility of
designing an artificial Earth satellite within the next few years. By a certain
reduction of the weight of the payload it will be possible for the satellite to
achieve the necessary velocity of 8,000 m/secJ 4
As Roald Sagdeev, longtime head of the USSR Space Research Institute, put it, "Korolev and his
colleagues could have only had a vague idea of how heavy the final reentry vehicle (for the ICBM
warhead) should be. Sakharov <Andrei> was still far from knowing how to make this deadly weapon
relatively compact and easily portable. Since rapid progress was required, rocket designers adopted a
worst-case strategy and started to develop an ICBM that, as it was discovered later, had a substantial
excess of launch capability, or throw weight. ,,15
US Vanguard Chosen Over Pro_iect Orbiter
Meanwhile more substantive thinking on possible satellite designs had been resumed in the U.S.
The most expedient design approach came fi'om Von Braun's team at the Army's Redstone Arsenal in
Huntsville, Alabama. Starting with a meeting in early 1954 with George Hoover of the Office of Naval
Research, yon Braun and his colleagues eventually came up with Project Orbiter, which would have been
an Army-Navy-Air Force design using already-developed Army Ordnance weapons technology to put a
small satellite into orbit. 16But the Eisenhower administration had reasons to choose a different approach.
Eisenhower wanted to keep the military out of the IGY program, which was dedicated to scientific
purposes. That was the surface reason. The other one, more telling, was--ironically--based on military
strategy. He wanted to be consistent with his well-publicized "Open Skies" stance at a time when U-2's
and spy satellites were being developed to begin reconnoitering the USSR. Eiserthower reasoned that a
satellite put up as part of the IGY program would strengthen the freedom of the skies policy and would be
less likely to disturb Nikita Khrushchev's sensibilities about overflight than one sponsored by three
military services. Also, Soviets were likely to launch an IGY satellite themselves. And so a project named
Vanguard--which proved to be an embarrassing choice of names--was chosen to carry the US banner into
the space age. Based on a sounding rocket developed by the Naval Research Laboratory, but under the
auspices of the National Science Foundation, it was going to be a riskier venture than Orbiter because it
called for substantially modified first and second stages, a new third stage, and new rocket engines and
guidance technology.
Sedov Reveals Soviet Satellite Plan at IAF
On July 29, 1955, the Eisenhower Administration announced that the U.S. would launch
Vanguard for scientific purposes during the 1957-58 IGY. A few days later, at the Sixth Congress of the
International Astronautical Federation in Copenhagen, a delegation of Soviet scientists, appearing at IAF
for the first time, revealed at a press conference that the USSR, too, might be in the game. Leonid Sedov,
13 Mishin interview with author, Sept. 2, 1992
14 Keldysh and Vetrov, Creative Legacy...
15 Sagdeev, Roald, The Making of a Soviet Scientist, John Wiley, New York, 1994, p. 155
16 For a detailed account of the genesis of Project Orbiter see Stuhlinger, Ernst, and Ordway,
Frederick I. III, in Wernher von Braun Crusader for Space, Krieger Publishing, Malabar FL,
1994, pp. 123-131
head of the Soviet delegation, and the newly appointed chairman of an Academy of Sciences Commission
on Interplanetary Communications, 17 choosing his words carefully, said:
From a technical point of view, it is possible to create a satellite of larger
dimensions than that reported in the newspapers which we had the opportunity of
scanning today. The realization of the Soviet project can be expected in the
comparatively near future. I won't take it upon myself to name the date more
preciselyJ 8
But, Sedov, it seems, was speculating, since no official decision had yet been made that there
would be a Soviet satellite in IGY. In fact, not until January 30, 1956 would the Council of Ministers
issue a decree authorizing its development-
Tikhonravov Transferred to Korolev Bureau
It was at this time that Korolev was able to arrange for Mikhail Tikhonravov and his team, which
had been working on a satellite concept at Special Design Bureau #385 in the Ural Mountains, to join him.
One of the members of that team, Konstantin Feoktistov, recalled:
We wanted to build a satellite but Korolev had that responsibility.
Tikhouravov was transferred to Korolev's bureau in early 1956 after the Party and
the Goverment had authorized Korolev to proceed with the development of a
satellite. But the rest of us in the group had to apply to Korolev individually.
However, Korolev relied on the advice of Tikhnoravov, his old friend and, by the
end of 1957 1 was chosen, although it was difficult to leave #385.19
Sputnik Plans Lag, Keldysh Criticizes Industry
Even the January decision, however, was not followed by sufficiently aggressive support for the
satellite development in the opinion of Korolev and his close ally, Mstislav Keldysh. Time to beat the
Americans had flown by and the Soviet establishment was not yet rewed up. Nine months later, on
September 14, in what must have been exasperation, and probably with Korolev's prodding, Keldysh
appeared before the presidium of the Soviet Academy of Sciences to state his case. 2° He first reviewed
patiently, like a good teacher, the physics of placing a satellite in orbit. Then he covered the pioneering
scientific measurements which the Soviet satellite would make--the Earth's magnetic fields, the "ionic
composition of the upper layers of the amaosphere," the "corpuscular radiation of the Sun," cosmic
radiation, possible micrometeorites.
17 The full name seems a satire on Soviet bureaucracy. It was the Interdepartmental Co_m_ission for
the Coordination and Control of Scientific-Theoretical Work in the Field of Organization and
Accomplishment of Interplanetary Corm_unications of the Astronomical Council of the USSR
Academy of Sciences
18 Krieger, F. J., Behind the Sputniks, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1958, p. 330
19 Feoktistov interview with author, Moscow, Dec. 12, 1991
20 Avduyevsky, V. S., M. V. Keldysh Selected Works Rocket Technology and Cosmonautics, (Russian),
Nauka, Moscow, 1988, p. 235
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He must have caused eyes to widen a bit when he said "...we are considering placing a live
organism in the satellite--a dog. It turns out that the perception of a dog is the most similar to the
perception of a man--biologists so consider it. The dog will live there in the absence of a gravitational
field, in conditions of irradiation, of cosmic radiation. The dog will be undergoing all sorts of dangers,
because ff the satellite is hit by a large meteoric particle, it will broach the satellite..."
By then he surely had their full attention, but he went on. "We, of course, can't stop at the task of
creating an Earth satellite. We, naturally, are thinking of further tasks-of space flight. The first project
along these lines, I believe, will be to fly around the Moon and photograph it from the side which is
always hidden to us." Then came hard criticism: "We have come up short in a whole series of tasks in the
Academy of Sciences, and are lagging now. Back in August we were to turn in the dimensions of the
equipment and their mode of attachment to the rocket...We delayed this work, which resulted in a notable
delay in the planning and development of the satellite itself."
He called out specific industry laggards: "In general, the radiotechnological industry isn't helping
us enough...They are sluggishly regarding the creation of this satellite...We have already committed one
breach in delaying the delivery of size specifications and other information to the Korolev Design Bureau."
Finally, the ultimate motivation came out baldly: "...it would be good if the Presidium were to turn the
serious attention of all its institutions to the necessity of doing this work on time...we all want our satellite
to fly earlier than the Americans'. ''21
Keldysh and Korolev had not only the Academy of Sciences and industry to motivate, they had to
deal with the objections of the military generals, who feared that the satellite project would slow down the
development of the R-7 ICBM. The fear was understandable since R-7's first five launch attempts had
failed. 22 But foot-dragging by the support institutions was only one of Korolev's problems. In spite of
Keldysh's speech, the satellite which was supposed to have the honor of being first continued to fall
behind schedule. In fact, it would lag so badly that it would become Sputnik 3--a huge, sophisticated
satellite, eventually launched on May 15, 1958. Sputnik 3's 1,327 kg payload included virtually all of the
instruments called out in Keldysh's speech.
"Sim_ulest" Spumik Moves Ahead of Big Science Sat¢lli_.
"But," said Gyorgi Grechko, one of the engineers who worked at the Korolev design bureau
during those days, and who later became a cosmonaut, "these devices were not reliable enough so the
scientists who created them asked us to delay the launch month by month. We thought that if we
postponed and postponed we would be second to the US in the space race so we made the simplest
satellite, called just that--Prostreishiy Spumik, or 'PS'. We made it in one month, with only one reason, to
be first in space. ,,23
It was at this time, on August 21, 1957, that the R-7, in its sixth attempt, propelled a dummy H-
bomb warhead all the way to Kamchatka, some 6,000 kin. With that success the confident Korolev made
his move to beat the Americans with his PS. His next obstacle was a skeptical State Commission for the
R-7 ICBM. Discussion of Korolev's satellite proposal before that body, according to a 1992 report by a
journalist in a Moscow magazine, was "sharp, the opponents arguing primarily about the tight liming,"
and "complete agreement was not achieved." Korolev had to go back to the Commission a second time.
This time he tried a different ploy. Why not, he challenged the members, put the question of authorization
to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party--in the context of whether or not the
21 Ibid., pp 235-240
23 Grechko interview with author, Moscow, May 16, 1993
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USSR should try to be the first country in the world to launch a satellite? The Commission blanched.
"Nobody wanted to be scapegoat." And so the project proceeded. 24
With the Commission's nervous acquiescence, Korolev bulldozed the development, in a little more
than a month, of a plain, polished 83.6 kg sphere containing only a radio transmitter, batteries and
temperature measuring instruments, with the intent to place it in orbit on a rocket which had failed in five
of its first six launch attempts. It was a very hectic month, and while the sateUite was simple, the attention
given to its manufacture was unsparing, especially by Korolev, himself.
"I coordinated the production, testing, launch preparations and the launch itself," recalled Oleg
Ivanovsky, looking back 36 years during a 1993 interview. Ivanovsky had been deputy to Mikhail
Khomyakov, Sputnik l's principal designer. He recalled that there were problems:
For example, there were two peculiarities which satellites had that missiles
did not. One was that the satellite required precise thermal control and the other was
that vacuum sealing was used to assure reliable performance. We had to find new
techniques of manufacturing the surfaces in order to achieve the necessary optical
and thermal qualities. We had no experience in this work. We needed vacuum
chambers. I recall one episode when we had to persuade the production shop that
the satellite was a new item, not a missile.
Korolev, with his iron character, was able to influence the attitude of
people. The Party directed that new paint be put on the factory walls. Korolev put
the satellite on a special stand, draped in velvet, in order that the workers would
show reverence towards it. He supervised the carrying out of the production
schedule every day personally. 25
One of the metalworkers who was assigned to the Sputnik 1 manufacture was Gennadi Strekalov,
later to become a cosmonaut. "My teacher in metalworking did the finishing," he told me. "Two half
spheres were stamped, then machined, then the masters did the finishing. ''26 S_ekalov, who, in 1995,
flew to the Mir space station with American astronaut Norman Thagard and then participated in the first
Mir-Shuttle rendezvous, is as proud of his work on Sputnik i as he is of his four orbital flights. 27
"Korolev came over to the shop and insisted that both halves of the sputnik's metallic sphere be
polished until they shone, that they be spotlessly clean," recalled Konstantin Feoktistov, who would be the
first engineer-cosmonaut to go into orbit in the three-man Voskhod 1 seven years later. "The people who
developed the radio equipment were actually the ones demanding this. They were afraid of the system
overheating, and they wanted the orbiting sphere to reflect as many rays of the Sun as possible. ''2s
24
25
26
27
28
K. Gerchik, "Proryv v Kosmos (Breakthrough into the Cosmos)," Central Council of Veterans of
Baikonur Cosmodrome, Moscow, 1992, pp. 77-78. The State Commission was chaired by Vassily
Ryabikov. It included, besides Korolev himself, Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin, G_orgi Pashkov,
Valentin Glushko, Nikolai Pilyugin, Viktor Kuznetsov, Mikhail Ryazanski, Vladimir Barmin,
Alexander Mrykin, S. Shishkin, I. Bulychev, Alexei Nesterenko, and A. Maksimov.
Ivanovsky interview with author, Moscow, Jan. 26, 1993
Strekalov interview with author, Moscow, Jan. 28, 1993
The Mir-Shuttle rendezvous was Strekalov's fourth orbital flight, although his fifth space
launch. He and Vladimir Titov were successfully ejected by the launch escape system when
their Soyuz T-10 spacecraft was engulfed by flames in 1983.
Zheleznov, Nikolai, Hello---(Bip-Bip) Scientist, Designer and Cosmonaut Speaking, Soviet Life,
October, 1982, D- 35
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An idea of how intense were the preparations for the launch of the "simplest samllite," and how
sensitive Korolev was to the event's historical importance, comes from the recollections, on the 30th
anniversary of the launch, of one of the design team, Mikhail Horiansky:
The jettisoning of the nose cone and the process of separation of the
sputnik from its carrier was being tested at the assembly shop late in
August, 1957. It is not a complex procedure, but fraught with possible
surprises. Everything was going on normally--or so it seemed--when
Korolev all of a sudden subjected the plant's chief engineer to a terrible
dressing down. Korolev was berating him--what for!--for the poor quality
of the surface of the moekup of the sputnik! The quality of the surface is
really important in flight because the heat conditions of the sputnik depend
on it, but why the dressing down now, when quite a different process was
being tested?
Korolev said angrily:
"This ball will be exhibited in museums! ''_
It was Korolev's aesthetic as well as engineering sense that had led him to insist on the ball shape
for Sputnik 1, although one of the early designs proposed was for a cone-shaped structure. "Today, after
decades have passed," recalled colleague Mark Gallai in a 1980's interview, "we simply cannot imagine
the first sputnik to be anything other than what it was: an elegant ball.. .with an antenna thrown back like a
galloping horse. ''3° There were two flight-ready spheres built, one for the launch and another one for
ground testing, developing the welding and other fabrication techniques. The second one would later be
launched too, with the carrier for the dog Laika on Sputnik 2.
Rebrov Recalls the Launch Prep_arati0ns
A recollection of the preparations for Sputnik 1, and the launch itself from Baikonur, comes from
Colonel Mikhail Rebrov:
People in the "space room" worked in white smocks, performing each
operation with the greatest thoroughness. The rocket was assembled in the big
hangar. Silence fell when the Chief Designer appeared. At the time Sergei Korolev
was exacting and more strict than ever...
Only two days were left. The carrier rocket was rolled out to the launch pad
in the early morning of October 2, 1957. Korolev walked in front, together with all
the other chief designers. They walked in silence the entire 1.5 km long way from
the assembly-testing building to the pad. No one will ever know what was going
through Sergei Korolev's mind at the time. Later on, when the sputnik was
installed in orbit, and its call sign was heard over the globe, he said:
"I_,e been waiting all my life for this day!"
The moment of the blast-off has been described many times. Then the
rocket got out of the radio zone. The communication with the sputnik ended. The
small room where the radio receivers were was overcrowded. Time dragged on
29 Floriansky, Mikhail, October 4--For the First Time in
(3288), 1987
30 Ishlinsky, Academician S. P. Korolev...p. 62
the World, Moscow News Supplement, No. 40
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slowly. Waiting built up the stress. Everyone stopped talking. There was absolute
silence. All that could be heard was the breathing of the people and the quiet static
in the loudspeaker...And then from very far-off there appeared, at first very quietly
and then louder and louder, those "bleep-bleeps" which confirmed that it was in
orbit and in operation.
Once again everyone rejoiced. There were kisses, hugs and cries of
"Hurrah!" The austere men, who were greeted out of space by the messenger they
had made, had tears in their eyes. 31
Arnefican_ Shock¢4 But Determined to Re _spond
Hardly tearful, more like rueful, was the reaction of the American space community. Even though
the possibility that the Soviets had been making plans for launching a satellite was known in the US, and
not only to government insiders, the fact of the launch was a deep jolt to the space professionals. 32
At that time, I was Executive Secretary of the professional society for space engineers--the
American Rocket Society (ARS). Astronaun'cs magazine, the main ARS publication, could not resist
reminding its readers that, "A little over two years ago, when the government's guided missile policy
committee decided against the Von Braun-Medaris 33 satellite proposal in favor of Project Vanguard, there
were four dissenters who voted to send the idea on to the National Security Council for further
consideration. One of them was the q.,one Eagle,' Charles A. Lindbergh, the last one to make aviation
headlines of the same maguitude as 'Sputnik. '''34
Grim determination characterized the American rocketeers. "They <the Russians> must not be
allowed to win this game--a game with far-reaching political, social and economic consequences,"
Astronautics editorialized. 35
In the same issue, a very insightful interpretation of the technological significance of the Russian
feat by Martin Summerfield of Princeton University had an upbeat aspect, but was somber in its reflection
on the advanced state of Soviet space technology.
The success of the Russian "Spumik" was convincing and dramatic
proof to people around the world of the real prospects of space travel in the
not distant future. The fact that a 23-in. sphere weighing 184 lb has been
placed in an almost precise circular orbit indicates that a number of
important technological problems such as high thrust rocket engines,
lightweight missile structures, accurate guidance, stable autopilot control,
and large scale launching methods have been solved, at least to the degree
required for a satellite project. 36
31 Rebrov, Col. Mikhail, Sputnik No. i, Moscow News Supplement, No. 40 (3288), 1987, p. 3
32 US IGY officials had known of the Soviet plans since 1955 when Pravda had alerted its readers,
and the delegates to the 1955 International Astronautical Congress in Copenhagen were
informed as well. In June, 1957, an article appeared in the Soviet journal Radio, by one V.
Vakhnin, alerting radio specialists on how to tune in on an orbiting satellite's signal.
33 Major General John B. Medaris, Von Braun's boss at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency.
34 Astronautics, Nov. 1957, p. 6
35 Ibid., p. 17
36 Summerfield, Martin, Problems of launching an earth satellite, Astronautics, Nov., 1957, pp. 18-
21, 86-88
I got a phone call at my home in Princeton about 7:00PM on Friday evening, October 4, from the
New York Times aeronautics reporter, Richard Witldn. Had I heard? What is the reaction of the US rocket
community? My response is not even in my memory. But the impact of the launch on the US, as well as
on my own career, would be powerful, indeed. ARS at the time had a membership of about 5,000
engineers and scientists, most of them working on missile programs, although a few dozen were on
Project Vanguard. By 1962, just seven years later, the membership quadrupled to 20,000, a growth so
rapid that industry and government pressures caused a merger of ARS with the Institute of Aeronautical
Sciences, the society for aeronautical engineers, into what is today the 40,000 member American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics (A/AA).
World Reaction
The news of the launch in the world's leading newspapers got Second Coming treatment. The
New York Times, receiving the story in the late afternoon of Friday, October 4, printed the next morning a
rarely used three-line head in half-inch capital letters, running full length across the front page:
SOVIET FIRES EARTH SATELLITE INTO SPACE;
IT IS CIRCLING THE GLOBE AT 18,000 M.P.H.;
SPHERE TRACKED IN 4 CROSSINGS OVER U.S.
Other world newspapers gave the event similar play. Then the interpretation began. The
Manchester Guardian needed only a couple of days to begin to speculate apocalyptically on what the
Russians might now do. An October 7 editorial titled "Next Stop Mars?" read, "The achievement is
immense. It demands a psychological adjuslment on our part towards Soviet society, Soviet military
capabilities and--perhaps most of all--to the relationship of the world with what is beyond." Some of the
Guardian's speculation was downright clairvoyant. "We must be prepared to be told what the other side of
the Moon looks like <Lunik 3 produced the photos only two years later>, or how thick the cloud on Venus
may be <revealed by the Soviet Venera and US Mariner series starting in the '60's>. Accurately, the
Guardian pointed out that, "The Russians can now build balli._tic missiles capable of hitting any chosen
target anywhere in the world." That, certainly, was true, but it would be some years before improvements
in guidance technology made the capability an actuality. It certainly did not follow, as the Guardian stated a
few sentences later, that "Clearly they have established a great lead in missile technology." This was one
of the earliest inaccurate predictions of a missile gap.
French reaction was equally ebullient. "Myth has become reality: Earth's gravity conquered,"
bannered Le Figaro, and went on to report the "disillusion and bitter reflections" of "The Americans (who)
have had little experience with humiliation in the technical domain. ''37 For three weeks the world could
hear the beeping of Sputnik 1 before the radio died out, and it orbited more than 1,400 times before
burning up in the atmosphere after three months in space.
Much has been written about the effect of the Sputnik 1 launch on the world scene. Many
American space enthusiasts, slricken with gloom at the time, now reflect that it might have been the best
thing that could have happened to awaken the need for an aggressive space program. Only four years later
President Kennedy would call for what became the Apollo program. An enormous infrastructure of space
research and development centers, test and launch facilities and supporting industry and university
programs, would come into being.
Some Negative Western Reaction to Space Buildup_
37 Le Figaro, Paris, October 7, 1957, pp 4-5
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There were those who reacted negatively to the surge in space technology and its consequent
spurring of the growth of high tech weapons. As former Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan
put it in his memoirs, "It <Sputnik> caused Western alarmists, such as my friend Joe Alsop, to demand
the immediate subordination of all other national interests to the launching of immensely expensive crash
programs to outdo the Russians in this competition. It gave effective arguments to the various enthusiasts
for nuclear armament in the American military-industrial complex. That the dangerousness and
expensiveness of this competition should be raised to a new and higher order just at the time when the
prospects for negotiation in this field were being worsened by the introduction of nuclear weapons into the
armed forces of the Continental NATO powers was a development that brought alarm and dismay to many
people besides myself. ,,38
Sputnik 2. Pushed bv Khrushchev. Readied in One Month
While all this introspection was taking place in the West, the creators of Sputnik were unable to be
interviewed, take bows, be photographed, get medals. Sergei Korolev was literally back at the office,
because Khrushchev, realizing what a hot property he had, gave him new orders. Do something bold,
Sergei Pavlovich, to celebrate the upcoming 40th anniversary of the Revolution! It's only a month away.
Cosmonaut Grechko tells the story.
I heard this from Korolev himself with my own ears. After Sputnik
1 Korolev went to the Kremlin and Khrushchev said to him,
"We never thought that you would launch a Sputnik before the
Americans. But you did it. Now please launch something new in space for
the next anniversary of our revolution."
The anniversary would be in one month! I]l bet that even with
today's computers nobody would launch something into space in one
month. It was, I think, the happiest month of his <Korolev's> life. He told
his staff, and his workers, that there would be no special drawings, no
quality check, everyone would have to be guided by his own conscience.
The engineers would make drawings and give them directly to the workers.
And we launched on November 3, 1957, in time for the celebration of the
Revolution. 39
The payload of Spumik 2 weighed 508 kg, more than six times the weight of Spumik 1. A shroud
housed a carrier containing the world's first space passenger, the mongrel dog Laika, plus a duplicate of
the Sputnik 1 sphere. Laika is reported to have barked and eaten food during his lonely sojourn but, alas,
he died when the capsule overheated after failing to separate from its booster, thereby rendering the
thermal control system inoperative. Animal groups protested, but the Soviets made Laika into a martyr for
a noble cause. Veterans of the Sputnik 2 project regard it as an even more significant achievement than
Spumik 1. Not a single engineering task had been performed on it until after Sputnik 1 went up.
With the new triumph Khrushchev could not resist escalating his needling of the Americans. In a
speech at the 40th anniversary of the Revolution, on November 6, he said, "It appears that the name
Vanguard reflected the confidence of the Americans that their satellite wouldbe the first in the world.
But..it was the Soviet satellites which proved to be ahead, to be in the vanguard...In orbiting our earth,
38 Kennan, George F., George F. Kennan Memoirs 1950-1963, Pantheon Books, New York, 1972, p. 140
39 Grechko interview
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the Soviet sputniks proclaim the heights of the development of science and technology and of the entire
economy of the Soviet Union, whose people are building a new life under the banner of Mamism-
Leninism."
Van maard. Rushed to Launch. Exolodes on Pad
Those derisive comments proved even more galling to the Americans a month later when, on
December 6, the first attempt to launch the Vanguard satellite was an ignominious failure before the
world's television cameras. The three stage rocket was designated TV-3, for Test Vehicle 3, and it had
been originally scheduled to be just that, a test. But under Sputnik pressure, the "test" was moved up
several months, and made into a full-fledged attempt at a satellite launch. But the vehicle got only a few
feet off the ground before sagging back, buckling, bursting into a huge conflagration and tossing its tiny
1.47 kg payload, still transmitting, some yards away.
Pravda delightedly reproduced the front page of the London Daily Herald which showed a photo of
the Vanguard being readied on the launch pad next to one of the explosion. Superimposed above the
immense Herald headline, which read, "OH, WHAT A FLOPNIK!" was Pravda's comment, "Reklama
and Deistvitelnost," or "Publicity and Reality."
US Explorer Authorized. Launched. Discovers Van Allen Belts
Following the Sputnik 2 launch, a team composed of the Von Braun group from the Army Balli._tic
Missile Agency--for the launch vehicle-and one from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California--for the
space capsule --the latter headed by William H. Pickering, was given the nod to put up the first US
satellite. On its initial try the team launched the 14 kg Explorer 1, on January 31, 1958. Fortunately,
Picketing and Ernst Stuhlinger, one of Von Braun's staff chiefs, conscious of the odds against
Vanguard's success, had persuaded James Van Allen of the University of Iowa to make the package of
scientific instruments being readied for Vanguard compatible with Explorer l's Jupiter C launch vehicle. 4°
This turned out to be particularly fortuitous because Explorer 1, with only one sixth the payload weight of
Spumik 1, scored a major scientific coup when its instruments sensed a pattern of radiation around the
Earth leading to the discovery of the now famous Van Allen Belts. It is an interesting footnote on scientific
history that Spumik 1 could have made the discovery if it had installed simple instruments. Sputnik 2, in
fact, did have the instruments, wrote Van Allen: "a pair of Geiger-MueUer tubes...which operated properly
and yielded data for seven days ''41 but the Soviet scientists failed to develop the data necessary to interpret
the discovery.
Sputnik 3 Finally Orbited, NASA Established
Oleg Ivanovsky, who worked on Spumiks 1, 2, and 3, speaks with deserved satisfaction of the
Soviet achievements of those months in late 1957 and early 1958. But there was trouble too. "We had our
first space failure," he told me, with the difficult Sputnik 3. "It was April 27, 1958, and it was caused by a
rocket engine failure. The rocket went up about 12-15 km and the satellite fell separately. There was a
40 Van Allen, James A., Origins of Magnetospheric Physics, Smithsonian Institution Press,
Washington, 1983, p. 49. Stuhlinger and Van Allen had begun discussions on the use of a
satellite to investigate cosmic rays above the atmosphere more than three years earlier, in
1954, when Van Allen was at Princeton University. Also, Picketing cormm/nication with author,
Mar. 18, 1996
41 Ibid., p. 93
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search for the satellite. I remember that the pilots conducting the search were not allowed to know what
they were looking for. 'Just search the area for anything unusual,' they were told, 'and don't attract the
camels.' It was crazy secrecy. Finally one pilot came back and said he had seen something that sounded to
us like the satellite. We sent out a rescue team in an armored vehicle. When we got it back some of the
instruments could still operate." Ivanovsky then showed me proudly a copper wire which he had
recovered from one of the instruments which kept the satellite beeper from operating prematurely.
When the 1.5 ton Spumik 3 was launched successfully, on May 15, 1958, it caused even more
anxiety in the West. Any doubt that the Russians would soon have the capability to send an ICBM to the
United States was demolished. Lyndon Johnson, then Senate Majority Leader, had demanded a
Congressional investigation of the impact of Sputnik 1 only a few days after its launch. On the Senate
floor in January he had made recommendations originating in his Preparedness Subcommittee to "Start
work at once on the development of a rocket motor with a million pound thrust, .... Put more effort in the
development of manned missiles (satellites)," and "Accelerate and expand research and development
programs, provide funding on a long-term basis, and improve control and administration within the
Department of Defense or through the establishment of an independent agency."
During the same months in early 1958 President Eisenhower, with his science adviser, James
Killian, also concluded that a civilian space agency was needed, and directed Hugh Dryden, head of the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), to prepare legislation which would create such an
agency on that relatively small organization's structure. The result was Public Law 85-568, signed on July
29, 1958 by the President, calling for the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). It was quite an about-face for a president whose staff members had belittled Spumik i as "a silly
bauble" and "a neat scientific trick" and who, himself, had said that it had not bothered him "one iota."42
Sputnik 3's large load of scientific instruments was designed to measure micrometeorites, density
of the upper atmosphere, cosmic rays, solar radiation, the presence and effect of high energy particles and
the Earth's own radiation environment. 43 It could have performed a tour de force of scientific research in
virgin territory. The Manchester Guardian reported that "This impressive list (of instruments) is a telling
demonstration of the fact that the latest Russian spumik has been launched for strictly scientific purposes."
Spumik 3 Misses Chance to Map Van Allen Belts
Unfortunately, to the great embarrassment of the Soviets, the huge vehicle missed one more chance at
what would have been its most significant achievement--mapping the radiation belts. Explorer l's
instruments, which had revealed the existence of the radiation from the belts, had at first been
overwhelmed by its intensity, and it took some time for the Van Allen analysis team to understand what it
had measured. Sputnik 3 could have mapped the belts systematically, but failed to do so because of a
defective tape recorder. The recorder, designed to store and transmit to Earth the information collected by
the instruments when it was out of direct radio contact, had failed utterly to transmit the necessary data.
Roald Sagdeev recounts what happened:
A scientific team landed at the Baikonur Cosmodrome for the final
integration and testing of hardware on Sputnik 3. Korolev invited everyone for the
last briefing before the final okay was to be given and the countdown started...It
42 Wilson, Glen P., Prologue, Quarterly of the National Archives, Winter, 1993, pp 364-70
43 These objectives are virtually the same as those developed at a conference at the University of
Michigan on January 27, 1956, the results of which were published in Scientific Uses of Earth
Satellites, University of Michigan Press, 1956
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was the first impressive collection of scientific instruments, each of which was
reported to be functioning normally.
However, trouble was soon discovered in some of the supporting
hardware. The problem was with the more or less routine tape recorder, whose
function was to accumulate data from the different experiments and to prepare
messages for the ground station. The spacecraft, revolving around the globe, would
only be in contact with the ground station during periods of "direct radio visibility."
Simply speaking, the ground station would be unable to sense the signals from the
spacecraft when it was behind the horizon...With such a crucial role, members of
the scientific team were extremely worded about the troubled tape recorder and they
recommended postponing the actual launch to give the technicians a chance to fix it.
However, the tape recorder's ambitious engineer, Alexei Bogomolov <"I too often
had to depend on his hardware," Sagdeev footnotes acidly> did not want to be
considered a loser in the company of winners. He suggested that the testing failure
was simply caused by electromagnetic interference from the multiplicity of different
electrical circuits in the test room. He boldly proposed to launch Sputnik 3 on time.
To the great disappointment of the scientific team, Korolev accepted
Bogomolov's suggestion... During the flight, however, it was conf'Lrmed that
Bogomolov had been dead wrong. His tape recorder did not work. Consequently,
the scientific information gathered was limited by the area of direct radio
visibility...Each scientific group had results, but because of the recorder failure they
had to guess whether the phenomena discovered were of local or planetary
significance. 44
The most disappointed scientist, says Sagdeev, was Sergei Vernov, a renowned physicist. The
detectors on Sputnik 3 sensed extremely high levels of radiation, but was it local or did it exist around the
Earth? Some six weeks earlier, on March 26, Explorer 3 had been launched (Explorer 2 had failed to
orbit), carrying the first tape recorder ever launched on a satellite. As Van Allen wrote, it "functioned
beautifully in response to ground command and fulfilled our plan of providing complete orbital coverage
of radiation intensity data. ''45
The Soviets, without tape recorded data, were hogtied. As Van Alien recalled, the team was at first
puzzled that they "were encountering a mysterious physical effect of a real nature. ''46 They "worked
feverishly in analyzing the data from Explorers 1 and 3 (by primitive hand _r,_,_,,uction of pen-and-ink
recordings) and organizing them on an altitude, latitude and longitude basis. 47 In an interesting sidelight
on the whole episode, at first there was suspicion that the intense radiation was coming from a Soviet
nuclear test. Subsequent analysis, however, proved that it was "geomagnetically trapped corpuscular
radiation" distributed in a "belt" around the Earth. At a conference in the summer of 1958, the name "Van
Allen radiation belt" was applied for the first lime. 48 More confirmation of the origin of the radiation, as
well as the discovery that there was also an outer belt, came two months later--again from the Americans--
when Explorer 4 mapped the belts from Iuly 26 to September 19, 1958.
44 Sagdeev, The Making...pp. 156-57
45 Van Allen, Origins...p. 82
46 Ibid., p. 66
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., p. 72. Van Allen reports that it was physicist Robert Jastrow who first used the tezm at a
meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Europe
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"On a purely observational basis," wrote Van Allen, "the Sputnik 3 data actually represented
discovery of the earth's outer radiation belt inasmuch as they were acquired before those of Explorer 4 and
Pioneer 3."49 However, Vemov and colleagues had not yet interpreted the observational finding, although
in what seems to have been hindsight, Vemov published a photo of what is now known as the Van Allen
belts in Pravda on March 6, 1959, alleging that the data were based on findings that he had reported at an
IGY conference in August, 1958. However, colleagues of Van Allen who heard the paper maintain that the
fragmentary data available at that time from Spumiks 1, 2 and 3 could not have formed the basis for such a
f'mding, and, what's more, no such finding was reported in the paper. 5o
Afterwards, a Russian joke circulated that the belts were to be called the Van Allen-Vemov
radiation belts. "What did Vemov do? He discovered the Van Allen belts."
The Sputnik/Vanguard/Explorer Race 1957.58
October 4, 1957
November 3
December 6
January 31, 1958
February 3
February 5
March 5
March 17
March 26
April 28
May 15
May 27
June 26
luly 26
August 24
September 26
USSR: Sputnik 1 (83.6 kg) launched
USSR: Spuntik 2 (508.3 kg), with dog Laika as passenger, launched
USA: Vanguard TV-3 explodes on launch pad
USA: Explorer 1 (14 kg), America's first
satellite, discovers the Van Allen radiation belts
USSR: First try to launch Sputnik 3 fails
USA: A second Vanguard try fails
USA: Explorer 2 fails to orbit
USA: Vanguard 1 (1.47 kg) successfully orbits,
establishes the pear-shapedness of the Earth
USA: Explorer 3 orbits, collects radiation
and micrometeoroid data
USA: Another Vanguard fails to orbit (third failure)
USSR: Sputnik 3 (1,327 kg) orbits, carrying large
array of scientific instruments, but tape recorder fails, so it can't map Van
Allen belts
USA Vanguard fails for the fourth time
USA Vanguard fails for fifth time
USA Explorer 4 orbits and maps Van Allen radiation
belts for 2 1/2 months
USA Explorer 5 fails to orbit
USA Vanguard fails for the sixth time
49 Pioneers 1,2,3 and 4 were attempted lunar probes launched in 1958 and early 1959.
50 Van Allen, Origins...pp. 129-130. Letter from Van Allen to Robert Toth, New York Herald
Tribune, Mar. 13, 1959
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Andrew J. Aldrin
"Ministers come and ministers go, but we remain, a unified collective
performing our own work. "'
Sergei Korolev's last words to his First Deputy, Vasiliy Mishin
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES_ POLICY WINDOWS AND SPUTNIK
At 10:28 p.m., Moscow time, October 4, 1957 another rocket was launched from
the steppes of Kazakhstan. But unlike any rocket launched before it, a part of this rocket
would not return to Earth. The 80 kg. sphere atop Korolev's R-7 rocket continued to
orbit around the Earth for several years, a small radio transmitter inside emitting a "beep
beep" heard round the world. The launch of Sputnik was a defining moment in history.
For historians and philosophers, it marked the beginning of the "Space Age." Mankind
took his first tentative step into the cosmos, where surely the greatest of wonders awaited
in the years to come. For political leaders and policy makers, this date was of less noble
significance, but far more important. It underscored the first Soviet victory in its
technological competition with the United States which characterized the Cold War. US
technological hegemony had been cracked. U.S. Secretary of State Averell Harriman
found it as "shocking: that a backward nation like the USSR could perform such a feat."
Senator Henry Jackson called it "a devastating blow to US scientific, industrial and
technological prestige" which plunged the US into "a week of shame and danger. "1 The
shock of Sputnik reverberated with the launch of the first man into space, a Russian, Iuri
Gagarin. Like Harriman, policy makers, pundits, and people everywhere puzzled over
how a technological backwater like the Soviet Union won the early heats of the space
race.
For political scientists and public administrators, the question was almost
rhetorical. The answer, they assumed, was that Soviet political and military leadership
focused a sizable portion of the nations' scientific and technological effort on the single
goal of beating America into space. 2 The Soviets began running early and hard, and beat
the Americans into space in order to demonstrate the superiority of a centrally-planned
1 See New York Times, October 8, 9, I0, 1957.
2 See in particular William Schaeur, The Politics of Space: A Comparison of the Soviet andAmerican
Space Programs, (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976).
socialist system. Political scientists examining this program concluded that it was a top-
down effort. 3 For 25 years this view persisted. I-Iolloway noted that
a crucial feature of the ICBM program is that ever since the decisions to undertake
development of the atomic bomb and long-range rockets it has enjoyed the highest
priority. The top party leaders have placed great importance on the creation of
strategic power, and have devoted time, energy and resources to ensuring the
success of ICBM development, a
Speilman and Evangelista are among others concluding that the ICBM case was consistent
with a leadership driven program. _
However, much has changed in the former Soviet Union since these authors
examined the subject. Now the assumption can be tested, and subjected to empirical
warrant and validation. History has literally been brought out of the safe. Data,
previously considered to be unimaginably secret is now openly discussed in journals, at
historical conferences, and even in popular newspapers published in Russia. Engineers,
policy makers and scientists, whose very existence was kept secret, now openly discuss
past Soviet military programs with Western researchers. This newfound wealth of
information paints a very different picture of the Soviet space program's development.
There is no question that Stalin provided necessary support for the development of
long-range ballistic missiles. But the evidence suggests that rockets were not a high
priority. Greater attention was devoted to developing long-range aviation, cruise missiles,
and anti-aircraft missiles. The Soviet military was openly hostile to missiles, and was
dragged, kicking and screaming, into the space age. Recently released information reveals
that the mutation of the missile program into a space program was even more interesting.
3For an historical interpretation of the sputnik launch see in particular, Walter A. McDougall, The
Heavens and the Earth: a Political History of the Space Age, (New York: Basic Books, 1985); For
interpretations of the program by political scientists see David Holloway, "Innovation in the Defense
Sector: Battle Tanks and ICBMs," in Ronald Amann and Julian Cooper, Industrial Innovation in the
Soviet Union, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Karl F. Spielmann, Analyzing Soviet
Strategic Arms Decisions, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978); and Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and
the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies,
(IthacaNY: Cornell, 1988).
4See Holloway, "Innovation in the Defense Sector... p. 401.
5See Spielmann, Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions... pp. 109-145. Evangelista, Innovation and
the Arms Race... pp. 243-244
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The Chief Designer of Long-Range Missiles, Sergei Korolev, kept Stalin and the rest of
the political, military, and economic leadership intentionally in the dark the regarding the
early development of a space program. When the military and economic leadership was
made aware of the possibility of a space program, after four years of covert research, they
rejected the idea, forcing proponents to sell the program to a reluctant Academy of
Sciences. The political leadership ultimately accepted the program, but only after repeated
entreaties by Korolev, who finally carried the day by convincing them that there would be
a tremendous political payoffto putting a Soviet satellite in space before the Americans.
This explanation of the genesis and success of the Soviet space departs
dramatically from the top-down process typically assumed to be the model for
technological development in the Soviet Union. s In fact, development of the Soviet space
program closely resembles the classical version of the development of American programs
in which ideas "bubble up from the bottom," rendering a case, once a fairly uninteresting
to social scientists, significantly more intriguing. 7
Clearly, the driving force behind this program was its Chief Designer, Sergei
Pavlovich Korolev, an observation which has been ably demonstrated elsewhere. 8
However, in the words of James Q. Wilson, "it is not easy to build a useful social science
theory out of [the] 'chance appearance'" of an individual. 9 This paper will attempt to
bridge the gap between the chance appearance of Korolev, the individual, to focus on his
specific actions, and the bureaucratic environment with which he interacted. Unlike
individuals, which are not easily compared, policy process and bureaucratc structures are
the stuff of useful social theory. Ultimately therefore, it is the aim of this paper to transfer
Korolev, and the Sputnik program into a format which will be more easily compared with
other programs, and lead to a deeper understanding of the significance of Sputnik from the
standpoint of social scientists.
The analytic framework of this paper will be built upon the organizational
foundations of the early Soviet missile and space program. It is one of the interesting
historical paradoxes of Sputnik that the Soviet defense industrial system which was
designed to exert airtight control over military R&D, held within it organizational flaws
6 See Zbigniev Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, (New York, 1972)
7 See Brzezinski and Huntington, Political Power: US4/USSR ... pp. 228-229.
8 For detailed biographies of Korolev see James Harford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the
Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon, (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1977); and Iaroslavl
Golovanov, Korolev: Fakti i Mifi, (Moscow: Nauka, 1994).
9See, James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, (New York, Basic Books, 1989). It should be noted that there
have been attepts to construct ueseful social theory out of individuals, see for example Jameson W. Doig
and Erwin C. Hargrove, Leadership and Innovation: a Biographical Perspective on Entrepreneurs in
Government, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
whichgreatlydiminished its capacity to manage a highly innovative program. It part these
organizational cracks appeared as the result of historical happenstance. In part they
appeared as a result of apparently bad decisions by the Soviet leadership. Whatever the
ease, Korol_ used these organizational soit spots to drive his program through a resistant
bureaucracy. For his own part, Korolev did a masterful job of creating a tightly knit
organization of rocket scientists and engineers that held and maintained a strong
informational advantage over the Soviet leadership.
The paper will then examine how Korolev used his informational advantage to
push his agenda forward and move from a purely military missile program to a civilian
space program. Sputnik did not occur as the result of a well planned out long-term
program, but rather in fits and starts as a result of opportunities which presented
themselves to Korolev. It was the ability of Korolev to jump through these "policy
windows" that led to the launch of Sputnik. The Soviet leadership was only an observer,
and it only played this role for the latter stages of the program. For most of the period
that satellite programs were being developed in the Soviet Union, the leadership was
completely ignorant. Ultimately, we are led to the question of whether the Soviet
leadership was effectively duped by Korolev into supporting a program for which it had no
ex ante desire.
THE BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET MISSILE PROGRAM
The relationship between Korolev and the Soviet leadership in the case of the
Sputnik program is well described in terms of the relationship between principals and
agents _0These theories have been adapted to deal with the problems of political control
_oPrincipal=agent" theory derives from microeconomic theories of the relationship between owners
(principals) and workers (agents). For some the early work applied to behavior in the private sector see
Michael C Jensen, and Willian Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structm'e," Journal of Financia! Economics, Vol. 3 (October, 1976) pp. 305-360;
Eugene Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88
(April, 1980) pp. 288-307, and Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and
Control," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26 (June, 1983) pp. 301-325.
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over public bureaucracies. 11 In the case of the Soviet missile and space program the
principals were the leadership which made decisions on program initiation, cancellation, or
significant revisions. The agents were the scientific-technological, and industrial
community which designed and built the systems. 12 In most governments, there is a vast
gulf between the two sides of government, filled with administrative agencies charged with
ensuring that the decisions of the political leadership are faithfully implemented. In the
terms of principal-agency these agencies are acting as monitors for the principals. In the
Soviet government, the gulf was even broader and the proliferation of government
monitoring agencies even greater._3
Principal-agency focuses upon informational asymmetries between the political
leadership (principals) and the individual bureaus (agents) and the alignment of incentives,
in particular, on information available to bureaucrats -- on their true "types"
(honesty, personal goals, policy positions) and their true performance -- that
politicians do not automatically possess and often can only acquire with much
imprecision and expense. It then encourages us to inquire into the monitoring
devices and incentive structures -- aspects of institutional design -- that mitigate
the asymmetry and thus minimize the problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard that will otherwise cause bureaucrats to depart from their political
directives. _4
Thus principal-agency theory assumes that there was a fundamental tension
between Korolev and the Soviet leadership, and it encourages us to direct our attention on
the ability of Korolev to control the flow of potentially adverse information to the
leadership, and the ability of the leadership to develop objective means of monitoring the
progress of Korolev's program. This framework treats the military service or government
agency which ultimately uses the systems produced by Korolev as a principal whose
n See Terry Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," American Journal of Political Science, Vol.
28 (November, 1984) pp. 739-777; Terry Moe, "Politics and the Theory of Organization," Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 7 (1991 special edition) pp. 106-129; Mathew D. McCubbins
and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,
Political Sciences Quarterly, Vol. 28:1 (1984) pp. 165-179. and Barry Weingast, "The Congressional-
Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective," Public Choice Vol. 44 (1984) pp. 147-192.
t2 See Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor, and Roland Van Gaalen, "Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic
Missions and Policy Design," American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, pp. 873-896.
13For a discnsson of the Soviet government in terms of principal agency theory see Phillip Roeder, Red
Sunset, (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1994).
14Moe "The New Economics of Organization..."
interests were consistent with, if not identical to those of the leadership, is The leadership
will first attempt to establish incentives to encourage the scientists to engage in useful
innovation.16 Since the leadership cannot be certain that the incentives are working
perfectly, it will employ monitors to supervise the activities of the scientists. _7 The
scientists in turn will use their expertise to manipulate their relationship with the leadership
so that the leadership provides them with all of the resources they might need to pursue
their research agendas with minimal oversight.n
The ensuing sections wil explore the decision-making structures to identify and
assess the actual levels of control. Ultimately, they will conclude that leadership was
placed in a very poor position to control the development of the missile and space
program.
LEADERSHIP DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURE
Some people say we were technological ignoramuses. Well yes we were that, but we
weren't the only ones. There were some other people who didn 't know the first thing
about missile technology.
]5 As we will see, military often acts as a monitor to a greater degree than it does a principal. This is
particularly the case with respect to programmatic innovation. For an application of the principal-
agency framework to defense procurement see Tracy Lewis, "Defense Procurement and the Theory of
Agency," in Jim Leitzel (ed.) Economics and National Security,( Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993)
pp. 57-72.
16On incentives and risks see in particular David E. M. Sappington, "Incentives in Principal-Agent
Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2, (Spring 1991) pp. 45-66;
17See McCubbins and Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked..."
_8See Michael W. Lawless and Linda L. Price, "An Agency Perspective on New Technology
Champions," Organizational Science, (1992) 3:3 pp. 342-355; see also Jonathan Bendor, Serge Taylor,
and Roland Van Gaalen, "Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy Design," American
Political Science Review, Vol. 81 No 3. (September 1987) pp. 873-896.
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Nikita Khrushchev
When a decision is made to initiate a new program, the leadership appears to hold
a preponderance of authority. It controls the funding, and must make a positive decision
in order for a program to begin formulation. However, for dramatically new technologies,
it possesses tittle understanding of the realistic costs and possibilities for programmatic
success. It may not even have a clear understanding of the objectives. Time constraints,
imperfect understanding of technology, conflicts over basic goals, and the limited attention
the leadership is able to devote to consideration of technically complex issues, are
weaknesses of the leadership that scientists may be able to exploit.19
Joseph Stalin was seemingly capable of exercising complete control over
administrative affairs in the Soviet Union from 1944 to 1953. His decision on any issue
was final. Through the widespread use of terror, he ostensibly maintained a high level of
compliance from his administrators. "Sabotage," or the failure to implement CPSU
policies, was the crime for which many R&D managers were shot during the purges of the
late 1930s. 2° Perceived omnipresence of the secret police created the impression that
Stalin was capable of knowing everything. Therefore, once Stalin made a decision, there
was a high perceived cost associated with failure to faithfully implement that policy.
However, the gap between potential and actual control was great during the post
WW II Soviet Union. 2t Because of the tremendous concentration of authority in the
hands of a single individual, Stalin's ability to control the Soviet Union as a whole was
severely circumscribed. 22 Therefore, question becomes one of how decision making was
actually performed and policies actually monitored under Stalin. Which programs really
received his attention?
In the post war years, Stalin's ability to manage affairs was compromised by his
ever decreasing attention span. As Stalin aged, and became increasingly incapable of
managing such a large bureaucracy, the government settled into a sort of political
paralysis. Hough and Fainsod note that "there were very few striking policy innovations
taken in these years, and in one policy area after another, one gains the clear impression of
petrifaction. ''z3 By the end of the war, Stalin was exhausted and increasingly came to rely
19See in particular John W. IOngdon, Agendas, Alternatives, andPublic Policies, (Boston: Little
Brown, 1984).
20See Kendall Bailes, Technology and Society Under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical
lnteilgensia, 1917-1941, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978)
21See Timothy Dunmore, Soviet Politics 1945-53, (London: Macmillan, 1984).
22This is Downs' "Law of Diminishing Control" See Downs, lnside Bureaucracy...
23See Ierry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed,(Cambridge: Harvard
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upon his colleagues in the Politburo to manage the daily affairs of state. Authority for
decision-making on many issues grew unclear in late 1945, and by the end of 1946 the
leadership settled into a pattern in which ad hoc groups would gather in the late night and
early morning hours over bottles of vodka and snacks to determine the future course of
the world's second most powerful nationfl
The political leadership showed little interest in rocketry alter the war. Only after
repeated prodding by the scientists, it finally respond in 1946 by creating an organizational
structure for the development of rocketry. However Stalin's initial decision did not
provide for a development program, not even the launch of captured German V-2s) s The
structure of the program itself was ill-suited for development of a new complex
technology. Rocketry was put under the management of both an industrial ministry which
had little understanding of the technology, and military leaders who were openly hostile
toward using missiles as military weapons. Even within the institute charged with the
development of rocketry (NII-88), long range rocketry remained a distant second-order
priority behind anti-aircraft missiles.
Most analyses to date have argued that these decisions, particularly the 1946
decision to create a missile industry, were conscious efforts to establish a Soviet long
range missile program to deliver nuclear weapons to the United States. _ However, at the
time these decisions were being made, the Soviet leadership was besieged by a huge
number of more pressing issues. It had a very poor understanding of the capabilities of
ballistic missiles, and there was no indication that it had any knowledge of the potential
use of missiles as nuclear delivery vehicles.
In reality Soviet leadership decision-making closely resembled a "garbage can"
University Press, 1979, p. 363.
24 See Werner Hahn, Post-War Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation
1946-53, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); Timothy Dunsmore, Soviet Politics 1941-53,
(London, Macmillan, 1984); Strobe Talbott, N.S. Klm_hchev, Khrushchev Remembers: the Last
Testament, (New York: Little Brown, 1971); Jerry Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is
Governed, (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 1979); and Milavan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin,
(New York: I-Iarcort, 1962)
25 See Vetrov, Sekerty Ostrova Gorodomliia...
26 See David Holloway, "Innovation in the Defense Sector: Battle Tanks and ICBMa," in Ronald
Amann and Julian Cooper, Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union, (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1982); Karl F. Spielmann, Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions, (Boulder: Westview Press,
1978); David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1984); and Ronald D. Humble, The Soviet Space Programme, (London: Routledge, 1988).
process. The scientists advancing the missile program were a solution looking for a
problem and a decision-making opportunity. In the end, they were coupled with a
problem (shooting down American aircra_f_) which had little to do with their solution
(ballistic missiles), but the decision-making opportunities created by the end ofWW II
made it difficult for the leadership to refuse to initiate the program. 27
The Decision to Initiate a Rocket Program
On May 9, 1946 (the first anniversary the German surrender -- Victory Day), the
Politburo approved the decree on the development of rocketry in the Soviet Union. On
May 13 the Council of Ministers issued a broad-ranging decree calling for:
1. priority development of rocketry;
2. established a high level monitoring organization--Spetzkomitet-2, under the
direction of Georgi Malenkov;
3. designated the Ministry of Armaments as the responsible ministry; and,
. designated the design bureaus and scientific research institutes, from the MV as
well as other ministries, which would be participants in the missile development
programs. 2s
The primary design and production organization was designated as NII-88 under
the direction ofA.D. Kalistratov. Prior to the decree, NII-88 was a poorly equipped
factory scheduled for conversion from production of artillery pieces to oil drilling
equipment. 29 It was far from the best equipped facility in the Soviet Union for for what
was perportedly a high profile program. 3° Because there were a great many more
important issues which the political leadership in late 1945 and early 1946, there were few
other details provided for in this decree.
27See Michael D. Cohen, James G. March and Iohan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of
Organizational Choice," Administrative Sciences Quarterly, Vol. 17 (1972) pp. 1-25, more recent and
detailed accounts appear in James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (eds.),Ambiguity and Choice in
Organizations, (Bergen Norway: Universitetsfoflaget, 1976); and James G. March and Roger
Weissinger-Baylon, Ambiguity and Command: Organizational Perspectives on ,_/_litary Decision
Making, (Marshfield MA: Pitman Publishing. 1986).
2Slnterviews with Chertok, Golovanov.
29Progress...
30For a mor in depth discussion of the conditions at NII-88 see Chertok, Raketi i Liudi...
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Figure 1 -- The structure of NII-88 circa 1948
There were four rocket programs approved in the 1946 decree. Three of these
were for the Taifun, Shmeterling, and Vasserfal anti-aircratt rockets. The fourth was
Korolev's long-range ballistic missiles (BRDDs). 31 Among the rocket programs, anti-
aircraft systems were Stalin's highest priority. Even among long-range missiles, it is far
from clear that Korolev's program was the most important. There were two other
programs for unmanned missiles in the Ministry of Aviation Production (NKAP). The
Chelomei Design Bureau was developing primitive cruise missiles based on the captured
remnants of V-1 cruise missiles. 32 There may have been another rocket-plane project
3]See Vetrov, Secrety Gorodomliia...
32See "Zhizn' i tvorchestvo Akademika V.N. Chelomeia" lz lstoriiaAviatsii i Kosmonavtiki, No. 60
(1990) p. 72.
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withinNKAP basedlooselyupontheSangerspaceplaneconceptinvolvingathreestage
boosterwith awingedre-entryvehicle.33Giventherelativelylimited informationavailable
on theTokaevproject, andquestionsover its existence,it is difficult to establishits
institutionalstability. If it did exist,it wasassignedto NKAP. Thatmuchis beyond
question.However,it isunclearwhetherTokaevrepresenteda distinctdesignbureauor
somedesigngroupwithin someotherorganization,or possiblyeventhe SovietAir Force
(vvs).
In reality, the decree issued by the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers
only elaborated on points made in the fourth five year plan (1946-1950). This plan
reflected the overall trend to increase the level of defense preparedness after the war. In
1941, the R&D budget was 1.6 billion rubles. By 1945, it increased to 2 billion. In 1946,
it shot up to 6.3 billion rubles, and increased to 9 billion by 1950. 34 There was also a
specific reference to rocketry in the document of the Chairman of Gosplan of the USSR,
N.A. Voznesenski. He emphasized that it
is necessary for us to guarantee work on development of new branches of
technology and production. To this it is referred...work on development of reactive
technology, utiliTJng new types of engines, creating new speeds and capabilities;
work on research in the interest of producing and transporting internal atomic
33Some caution must be used in discussion of the Tokaty project. The existence of this project revolves
around the recollections of a single man G.A. Tokaty-Tokaev who defected to England in 1948. In the
voluminous literature on the history of Soviet rocketry there is not a single reference to this person and
none of the participants who were interviewed for this study have any recollection of his existence or the
existence of his project. However, in other respects his accounts of the post-war history of the Soviet
rocket program are remarkably consistent with information which was only released some 40 years after
his defection. It is entirely possible that his story is correct, but that the project was closed down and all
traces removed after his defection. See G.A. Tokaty, "Soviet Space Technology" Spaceflight, Vol. 5,
No. 2 (March 1963), pp. 58-64; and G.A. Tokaly, "Foundations of Soviet Cosmonautics," Spaceflight,
Vol. 10, No. 10, pp. 335-343.
Gerhardt Sanger was a German rocket engineer who developed a spaceplane concept for delivering a
bomb to the United States from Germany. The project was never approved nonetheless he managed to
flesh-out the general concept in considerable detail. For a more detailed description see Ordway, The
Rocket Team...
34Parrott, Politics and Technology...pp. 100-101. Reactive technology was the Soviet term for rocket
propulsion. Emphasis mine.
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energy. 35
Similar decrees for the organization of the nuclear and aviation programs were also
issued in the same year. 36 Viewed in this context, the missile program, which involved no
more than hundreds of engineers and technicians, was probably the most trivial of the
post-war development programs.
i_ Politburo }r .... (I.V. Stalin
Spetzkomitet-2](G.M. M alen kov)]
"- M inistry of the
Armed Forces
Air Forces }
Navy }
_ I i I I I I I i i I i i I I i o I
| | tI I I °1 iI :Ministry Ship- Heavy end l :for Aviation Building Transport / :Production Industry Industries / :
rr_-zwl..._ I_ ......... i_°-, ...... i-j- .....
Figure 2 -- The Organization of the Soviet Missile Program in 1950
35A.P. Romanov and V.S. Gubarev, Konstruktori, (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989) p. 301. See also,
Avduevskii, V.S. and Grishin, S.P., "Razvitie raketnoi tekhniki v SSSR v period 1946-1957 gg." in
D'ianenko, S.M., lssledovaniia po istorii i teorii razvitiia aviatsionnoi i raketno-kosmicheskoi nauki i
tekhniki, Vol. 111, (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), p. 9. for a reference to the same information.
36 See Steven J. Zaloga, "The Soviet Nuclear Bomb Programme-The First Decade," Jane's Soviet
Intelligence Review, April 1991, pp. 174-181.
12
The basic organizational structure as it existed in 1950 is depicted in figure 2. The
most important point illustrated in this diagram is the difference between formal and
informal channels. Formally, the program was under the direction of Georgi Malenkov, a
leading member of the Politburo, who headed Spetzkomitet-2 (Special Committee-2). In
practice, Malenkov was seldom involved in decision making. Dmitry Ustinov, the
Minister of Armaments, had informal channels of communication with Stalin which
circumvented Malenkov. Similarly, the Council of Chief Designers itself was an informal
structure. Formally, the institutes were completely separate. Informal coordination
between Korolev and the military at NII-4 served to build his constituency in the military
from the ground up.
Spetzkomitet-2
Formally, the programs were under the direction of Georgi Malenkov, a leading
member of the Politburo, who headed Spetzkomitet-2 (Special Committee-2). The
Spetzkomitet system was instituted following the war primarily in order to facilitate the
development of nuclear weapons. 37 The system was subsequently transferred to the
missile, and radar programs and Spetzkomteti were created for each. 38 Long range
aviation programs also operated under Stalin as an informal special committee. 39
However, the missile committee was clearly the lowest priority.
To some extent, the low priority of the committee was due to the weakness of
Malekov as an administrator. 4° Other committees were headed by the Chief of secret
police, Lavrenti Beriia, and Stalin himself. Both were far more forceful administrators
than Malenkov. As already noted above, Malenkov was preoccupied with maintaining his
position within the Soviet leadership. 41
Both nuclear weapons and aviation also benefited from the fact that they could
37See Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb...
3sNuclear weapons fell under Spetzkomiteti #1, rocketry under #2, radar under #3. Chertok, Raketi I
Liudi... The long-range aviation program fell directly under Stalin's guidance, but was may not have
been assigned a formal designation.
39See Zaloga, Target America...
40Interview with Boris Chertok, Moscow, August 1994.
4_See Hahn, Post War Soviet Politics... and Ktu'ushchev, Khrushchev Remembers...
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stealmanyof the designs from the Americans and therefore could simply order Soviet
designers to copy American designs exactly. Such was clearly the case with aviation (the
B-29) and the first nuclear weapons. 42 Since there were no such plans for either anti-
aircraft or ballistic missiles in America at the time, Malenkov had no ready design
parameters to enforce. When the anti-aircraft program was taken away from Malenkov's
committee in 1950 and transferred to the radar program, the priority of Spetzkomitet-2
only further diminished.
Malenkov's attention was primarily occupied with political intrigue. For the entire
period from the end of the war until his death in 1953, Stalin remained in poor health. For
most of this period Malenkov was the heir apparent, if for no other reason than he was the
least offensive to other Politburo members. Consequently he often found himself at the
center of political battles first with Zhdanov, then with Beriia, and finally with Sflain's
ultimate successor Khrushchev. There was precious little time for learning even the basics
of ballistic missile technology. There were very few recorded instances of meetings
between Korolev and his designers and Malenkov.
The Death of Stalin and the transition to new leadership
Stalin died on March 3, 1953. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a
greater power vacuum was created at the pinnacle of national leadership. Moreover,
there were no formal mechanisms for political succession, and no less than six contenders
for national leadership were removed from positions of power in the next four years.
More than four years of political turmoil ensued. The leadership of the Soviet state was
not settled until the Summer of 1957. During this time, virtually all of the major decisions
regarding the development of ICBMs and the initiation of a space program would be made
by a leadership preoccupied by internal struggles.
The Soviet constitution made no explicit arrangements for political succession nor
did the political institutions provide any informal arrangements for the succession, of
authority, outside of an open competition for assumption of political power. Rush offers
the following clarification:
In the last analysis, the chief sanction for the dictator's rule in the Soviet system is
the fact that he exercises it, and has placed it beyond the challenge of legitimate
political activity. While this sanction may suffice for the incumbent, it has the defect
that it provides no principle for establishing the legitimacy of a successor until he
too has placed his rule beyond challenge by customary political means. 43
42See Zaloga, Target America... for a discussion of aviation, and Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb... on
nuclear weapons.
43SeeMyron Rush, Political Succession in the USSR, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965) p.
74.
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As a result, several individuals and factions vied for leadership of the Soviet
government following Stalin's death. In sequence, Khrushchev and his supporters
eliminated each contender to the throne, often using one to eliminate another, then, in turn
eliminating the first group. One potential claimant, Lavrenti Beriia, was shot, and others
such as Georgi Malenkov, Viacheslav Molotov, and Nikolai Bulganin, were dismissed
from high positions and relegated to insignificant posts during this four-year power
struggle. As a consequence, from 1953 to 1957 lines of authority were extremely unclear,
and members of the leadership devoted most of their time to the struggl e for succession
4.4
rather than the business of running the country.
Beyond the general decision-making uncertainty, the Soviet leadership was
especially immobilized on topics related to defense technology. Up to his death, Stalin
confined information on defense systems to himself and Beriia, and to a lesser degree
Malenkov. Khrushchev remarked that he had been completely excluded from decisions
related to military systems. 45 Consequently, with the execution of Beriia and the exclusion
of Malenkov, the Soviet leadership had no one with any experience with military
technology in general, let alone defense technology. Khrushchev himself commented on
their lack of technological competence with respect to missiles:
Not too long after Stalin's death, Korolev came to a Politburo meeting to report on
his work. I don't want to exaggerate, but I'd say we gawked at what he showed us
as if we were sheep seeing a new gate for the first time. When he showed us one of
his rockets, we thought it looked like nothing but a huge, cigar shaped tube, and we
didn't believe it would fly. Korolev took us on a tour of the launching pad and tried
to explain to us how a rocked worked. We were like peasants in a marketplace.
We walked around and around the rocket, touching it, tapping it to see if it was
sturdy enough--we did everything but lick it to see how it tasted.
Some people say we were technological ignoramuses. Well yes, we were that, but
we weren't the only ones. There were some other people who didn't know the first
thing about missile technology either. 4_
Technological ignorance was complicated by formalized decision making
procedures which placed an extremely high burden on leadership, leaving virtually no time
for discussion. Weekly Politburo sessions perfunctorily passed through 50 or 60 decisions
in the space of a few hours. 47 Unable to deal with decisions at a high level of detail, the
Presidium perforce relied upon the staff of the Soviet bureaucracy for support. This
44See Talbot, Khrushchev Remembers ....
451bid.
461bid.p. 46
47These were the recollections of Michael Voslensky, in Ra'anan, Inside theApparat.., op. cit. p. 62.
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placeda great deal of authority in the hands of the bureaucrats who set the agendas for
Presidium meetings, and those who prepared proposals for consideration. But even before
Stalin's death, the Spetskomiteti system was dismantled, thus severing even this weak
connection between the leadership and the missile program. Within the Central
Committee, the Department for Defense Industries held no expertise over missilesfl
Thus, from 1953 to 1955 there was nothing between the ministries and the leadership to
assist in the management of missile technology. In 1955, the Military Industrial
Commission was created to oversee all military technology programs. The first Chairman
was Dmitry Ustinov.
Leadership Capacity and Decision=Making Uncertainty
Preoccupied with internal struggles, the Khrushchevian leadership was unclear on
strategic goals, was totally ignorant of technological means, and was given little time to
devote to decisions due to formalistic decision-making processes. As was the case under
Stalin, decision-making under these conditions tended to permit perfunctory review of
mid-level decisions, but led to avoidance of the most important issues. 49 It was a
leadership extraordinarily ill-equipped to effectively manage missile technology. It would
have to rely heavily upon monitoring agencies to provide accurate information regarding
missile programs. This was fertile ground for Korolev, who had already developed strong
constituencies in both key administrative agencies.
MONITORING/ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
What are you doing?/? You put more than four tons of alcohol in a rocket. If you give
my division this alcohol it couM take any town. But your rocket could not even hit the
town. Who needs it?
Unidentified Red Army Marshal (1948)
Principal agency theory directs attention to several methods of controlling a
program which hold relevance to the case of the Soviet missile and space program.
Interview with Stroganoxr, see also, Golovanov, Korolev...
49 S_ Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies...
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Control is particularlyproblematicin cases of very new technology programs requiting
effective monitoring techniques. The most pervasive technique in Soviet society was
through what Roeder terms colonization a technique that involves population of an
organization with personnel which leadership believes it can trust. 5° A second technique is
the creation of competing sources of expertise which can serve as judges, albeit hardly
impartial judges, of the progress of their competitors. 51 A third method is to establish
independent committees to oversee important milestones. _2 All three methods were
employed by Soviet administrators, but with little success. Ultimately, it was Korolev
who was able to colonize his administrative agencies, developing them into strong
constituencies.
When the official decision to create a Soviet rocket program was issued in 1946,
there were only hollow administrative agencies for monitoring and managing the
development of missiles. By the end of 1954, both the Ministry of Armaments (MV) and
Ministry of the Armed Forces (MVS) had their own research institutes as well as a variety
of administrative organizations to monitor missile development. A directorate for the
missile program was formed within the MV (the 7th Directorate) under the direction of
Sergei Vetoshkin. During the period from 1949 to 1953, it was staffed primarily by
engineers trained by Korolev. Within the MVS, missile programs were assigned to the
Main Artillery Directorate (GAL0 under Marshal N.D. Iakovlev. General Ivan
Nestorenko was put in charge of a research institute (NII-4) created in 1947 with specific
responsibility for monitoring the development of ballistic and ZUR missile programs.
During the time that the German rocket scientists were involved, the secret police
(NKVD) supervised some aspects of the program, but were not nearly as intrusive here as
they were wit the nuclear program.
The Ministry of Armaments and the the Artillery Troops
Separated by the capriciousness of Stalin's purge of scientists and engineers with
ties to the unjustly discredited (and executed) Marshal Tukhachevskii, many of the rocket
scientists who had worked with Korolev before the war were reunited in Germany for the
purpose of collection of Nazi aviation technology. 53 What the rocket scientists found in
Germany was by their estimation truly remarkable technology, representing a considerable
step toward Tsiolkovkii's dream of space flight. Preoccupied with construction of a post
5oSee PhiUip Roederm, Red Sunset, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994).
5_See Downs, Inside Bureaucracy...
52Ibid.
53 It is worth noting that Korolev and others were sent to Germany primarily to collect aiviation
technology, not rocket technology. In fact the leadership showed very little interest in rocket
technology. On this point see in particular Chertok, Raketi i Liudi...
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war order, Stalin was uninterested in German rocket technology. Similarly, administrative
agencies saw few prospects. Korolev's rocket program was an organizational orphan.
The search for an administrative home for the missile program predated Korolev's
arrival in Germany by almost a year. On September 30, 1944, Korolev wrote to the
Deputy Minister of NKAP requesting that the group of rocket specialists from Plant 16 in
Kazan (including himself, and Valentin Glushko), recently released from the Peoples
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) systems ofsharag/, be transferred to the
People's Commissariat for Aviation Production (NKAP). _4 His proposal was rejected. 5s
Korolev resubmitted the proposal in June 1945, only to be rejected again. 56 The l_.mistry
of Aviation Production was not merely disinterested in development of rocket technology,
it was afraid of it. 5v The German accomplishments were considerable, and Deputy Peoples
Commissar of Aviation Industry, Dementev, justifiably feared that production of Soviet
versions of the V-2 would involve considerable technological as well as personal risk. 5s
Failure to successfully assimilate the technologies involved in the V-2 could easily lead to
charges of sabotage, and the ministry was already faced with the difficult task of absorbing
the technologies involved in reproducing the German V-l, as well as the American B-29. 59
As events turned, the NKAP was unable to avoid charges of mismanagement. In early
1946, the Peoples Commissar, Novikov, was jailed for his mismanagement of the B-29
program. 6°
Korolev was finally sent to Germany in October 1945 along with a small group of
scientists and engineers under the direction of General Gaidukov, who worked within the
administrative apparatus of the Central Committee. Rejected by NKAP, Gaidukov's group
was in a state of organizational limbo. In order to survive, it had to have a clear afYfliation
with an industrial ministry. Despite Gaidukov's entreaties to the Central Committee
apparatus, there were no takers. Neither Malenkov nor Stalin showed any interest at this
point. Clearly, additional persuasive power was needed. To this end, Gaidukov studied
the organizational details ofpre-war Soviet rocket technology under Korolev's tutelage.
The two prepared a sales pitch based on the long Soviet rocket history, and emphasized
_Correspondence from Korolev, Archives oft_he Cosmonautics Memorial Museum/Memorial of
Korolev's house, F.1, ed. xp. kp 135, I1. 16-21.
S_Vetrov. Secrets of Gorodomliia Island...
_Gcorgi Vetrov, S.P. Korolev i Kosmonavtild: Pervye Shagi, (Moscow: Nauka, forthcoming) p. 270
5VInterviews with Chertok, Mishin, and Golovanov.
5s Interview with Chertok.
59See Steven Zaloga, Target Araeriea: the Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race, 1945-1964,
(Navato: Presidio Press, 1993) pp. 69-80.
6°See Target America,... p. 70.
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theopportunityprovidedby thecollectedGermantechnologyfor the SovietUnion to
advancebeyondtherestof theworld. Armedwith thisnarrative,GaidukovandKorolev
renewedtheir searchfor anadministrativehomein January1946,but weregreetedwith
scepticisminMoscow.Theywent first to thePeoples'Commissarfor Aviation
Production,Shakyurin,who not onlyrejectedtheprogramagain,but alsorecalledall the
specialistsfrom NKAP workingon rocketry.61ThePeoples'Commissarfor Munitions,
BorisVannikov,initially acceptedGaidukov'soffer,but changedhismind after two
weeks, arguing (somewhat disingenuously) that he had just been given another program. 62
Gaidukov and Korolev also paid visits to the Peoples' Commissariats for the Mortar
Industry and Heavy Industry only to be rejected there as well. 6s Korolev and Gaidukov
also considered the idea of setting up an entirely new narkom to manage rocketry. 64 The
scientists favored this option, arguing that rocket technology could not be developed
within any of the existing Narkoms (with the exception of the Narkom for Aviation
Production.) 6s As a last resort, Gaidukov went to the Peoples' Commissar for
Armaments, Dmitry Ustinov. While Ustinov expressed interest, he refused to accept the
program immediately, agreeing only to send his first deputy, Vasilii Riabikov, to examine
Gaidukov's rockets, ss
Riabikov's only industrial experience had been at the Bolshevik naval artillery
factory in Leningrad. His work there was in party organization; not design, or even
production. He was not suited to judge the value of this new technology. Upon
Riabikov's arrival in Germany, Korolev guided him through the captured underground
factories at Mittlewerk and Montana, various design bureaus, and finally to the test stands.
Riabikov seemed unimpressed. Even the rocket engine tests drew the disheartening
response from Riabikov that he thought the one minute test had lasted for hours. A
banquet was prepared, offering their best vodka and cognac, but Riabikov was virtually a
teetotaler, and remained silent. Finally, however, Riabikov broke his silence and
announced to the assembled rocketeers:
Well comrades, everything that you have shown me is very interesting. I believe
that our narkom should take up this work. I will speak to Dmitry Fedorovich
61Gaidukov was successful in preventing the departure of all but two specialists, rocket engine designer
Isaev, and one of his co-workers. See Chertok, Raketi i Liudi... p. 139.
62Vannikov was actually tasked with the atomic bomb program several months earlier, but did not
disclose this to Gaidukov. Therefore, his excuse was somewhat disingenuous.
63Interview with Chertok.
64See Secrets of Gorodomliia...
ks Interview with Chertok...
66See Golovanov, Korolev.. pp. 361-362..
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(Ustinov) about this...67
Ustinov considered the program further. He determined that he must go to Stalin with
this information in an effort to apprise Stalin before the Chief of the secret police, Beriia,
had a chance to do the same. This tactic was necessary to diminish the possibility of an
inquiry from Stalin as to why Ustinov had not taken up this "promising new technology. ''68
Ultimately, Ustinov agreed to take responsibility for the program only atter an implied
threat of reprisal from Stalin. On May 13, the Council of Ministers issued a decree
assigning all missile programs to the Narkom for Armaments, but there were no immediate
tangible effects of this decree to the rocket scientists in Germany. While Korolev
recognized that there were few other possibilities, the other scientists feared that this was
a mistake. The Narkom for Armaments knew nothing about missiles. Mishin later
proclaimed "that this was the single biggest mistake the Soviet government made in the
entire missile program. ''69
In reality, MJshin was exactly wrong. In Ustinov, Korolev had what should be any
program manager's dream - a technically ignorant administrator committed to mission
success, without a clear idea of what that mission should be. Ustinov was aware that in
order to be successful in the Soviet defense industrial bureaucracy, he needed to head an
important research program, along with his bread and butter artillery and tank business.
Without the technical competence to question Korolev, Ustinov presented only a very
loose monitoring structure. For a time at least, Korolev and Ustinov were dependent
upon each other. Korolev needed Ustinov's administrative support with the leadership,
and Ustinov's own career was closely tied to Korolev's success. A relationship of mutual
reciprocity developed which bound the two men's careers to each other. T°
The Main Artillery Directorate (GAU)
For a time, relations between Korolev and his other monitoring agent, the Main
Artillery Directorate of the Red Army were far more problematic. Marshal Iakovlev,
Deputy Chief of the Artillery Troops who were saddled with the rocket program was
resistant to the introduction of Korolev's technology. Iakovlev persistently refused to
67See Golovanov, Korolev .... p. 363.
See Golovanov, Korolev .... p. 363. It is also interesting to note that during the late 1930s many R&D
managers were accused of stifling inventors' initiative by rejecting proposals without thorough
investigation. See Bailes, Technology and Society...
69 Interview with Mishin.
7oThe concept of mutual recipricity is predicted by Roeder to characterize much of the administrative
hierachy of the Soviet Union. See Roeder, Red Sunset...
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accept Korolev's original rocket (the R-l) into service in spite of the fact that it had
ostensibly met testing requirements. For a time he even openly defied Stalin's orders to
accept the missile into service. 71 At one point, Iakovlev refused acceptance because his
measurements indicated that the fuselage of Korolev's missile was one millimeter out of
specification. While at another he argued that the system should not be accepted because
it had not met the testing specification of launch at -50 degrees Celsius. 72
The course of events took an abrupt change in 1952 when Iakovlev was arrested
and replaced by Marshal M.I. Nedelin as CinC of the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU).
Iakovlev had been a constant thorn in Korolev's side from the beginning of the post-war
missile development program, refusing to accept any missiles into his services without
serious resistance. Ironically, Iakovlev was arrested in 1952 for allegedly allowing the
launch of a missile which was ill prepared for testing. 7s
Korolev and Nedelin immediately established good working relations, in large part
because Nedelin was willing to admit his own technological ignorance. TM Nedelin's
background suggests that he was incapable of independently determining the technical
merits of ballistic missiles. His educational training was limited to the political faculties of
military academies. 7S His political training, combined with the arrest of Iakovlev, indicates
that he was given responsibility for the artillery program more due to his political
reliability than his technical competence. 7_ Not surprisingly, Nedelin did not prove to be a
particularly demanding military customer; Korolev aptly described the Marshal as "an
experienced and benevolent advisor-consultant. ''77
Since before Nedelin, Korolev pushed for a separate branch of the military devoted
to the missile program. Both he and the lower ranking military officers working on the
71 See Golovanov, Korolev...
72 Of course both rejections were totally ridiculous. One milimeter may make a great deal of difference
in an artillery shell but it is totally inconsequential in a rocket. See Vetrov, Sekrety Gorodomlia...
73 This probably involved anti-aircraft missiles, but there is no information to confirm this. See Iaroslav
Golovanov, Korolev: Fakti i Myfi, (Moscow: Nauka, 1994), p 461.
74 See Golovanov, Korolev...p 461.
75Nedelin's training was first in the Military-political courses in Turkestan (1923), and the Higher
Komsomal Faculty (Komsostav) of the Dzerzhinskii Artillery Academy.
7_ledelin began his military career as a political commissar and only later became a fully fledged
artillery commander, after the institution of political commissars was abolished. He had no engineering
background.
77See V. Tolubko, Nedelin (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardiia, 1979) p. 176.
21
programfelt that they were being stifled by the rest of the artillery "ground pounders who
refused to acknowledge the significance of the new technology. ''Ts In 1953 the
Directorate of the Artillery Command for Special Technology (UZKA) was officially
created under Nedelin's command to supervise the introduction of missiles into the Army.
Unofficially, it had the effect of isolating the missile program from the rest of the Artillery
program. _9 In 1955, after the first successful test of a nuclear armed missile, the
management of the missile program was brought out of the artillery troops altogether and
put under the command of Nedelin as the Deputy lVfmister of Defense for Special
Weapons and Pocket Technology) °
Nedelin's career was therefore also tied inextricably to the success of Korolev's
program. He too was tied into a relationship of reciprocal accountability in which he had
little choice but to defend Korolev's program before the leadership. Consequently, both
Korolev's monitoring agents possessed were seriously compromised.
Competition: The German Rocket Scientists
Korolev did not hold a monopoly over information related to missiles in the
immediate post war years. He may not have even been among the most knowledgeable
scientists in the Soviet Union. The German scientists who came to the Soviet Union in
late 1946 had been working on V-2s for three years, and had developed considerable
experience. Even if they were not the most qualified German scientists, they held
sufficient expertise in rocketry to provide a critical review of Korolev's proposals. A
critical review was not what Korolev wanted at this time.
The German rocket scientists arrived for their "visit" to the Soviet Union in late
October 1946. For a short time, they mingled freely with their Soviet counterparts as they
had in Germany, but in spring 1947 almost all were relocated to Gorodomliia Island on
Lake Selenger near Moscow. One hundred seventy-seven German specialists came to the
Soviet Union, including: 24 Doctors of Science, 88 engineers, and 27 workers, sl Korolev
arranged that the German scientists would labor in relative isolation from Soviet scientists
at NII-88, arguing to Ustinov that this move was necessary to insure that the German
7s Interview with Kerimov
79This was the conclusion of an official history of the military missile program. See Iu. p. Maksimov,
Raketnye Voiska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniia: Voenno-istoricheskii Trud, (Moscow: RVSN, 1992)
pp. 40-41.
8°lbid., p. 41.
s_ The source does not make it clear what specialty the remaining 38 Germans held. See Vetrov, Sekrety
Ostrova Gorodomliia... p. 48
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scientistswould have creative independence. 82 Korolev tasked them with development of
an improved version of the V-2, requiring only that the missile have the same basic
dimensions as its predecessor. Under Helmut Grottrup's directions, the German scientists
began designing what was referred to as the G- 1.
There were more sinister, or at least bureaucratically motivated, reasons for the
Germans' isolation. Korolev was keenly aware that the Germans presented him with a
problem. There was a risk that Grottrup would eventually dominate the Soviet missile
program. Korolev wished to be the unquestioned leader. By isolating Grottrup's group
Korolev controlled the flow of information regarding their activities, s3
Thus, Korolev could not only shape perceptions regarding the quality of the
German work, but he could also use German technology without appropriate attribution.
Korolev used both to his advantage. The arrangement also gave the Germans little access
to the work of the Soviet scientists. Consequently, they could criticize neither Korolev's
proposals nor his work.
In September 1947, Grottrup's group completed its preliminary plans for the G-1.
As directed by Korolev, Grottrup's plan pushed the technological frontiers in several
directions. By using radio guidance in place of an inertial system, Grottrup claimed to
increase the accuracy over the V-2 by factor often. Through the use of aluminum, the
weight was reduced by more than 100 kg. Given the lower weight, only minor
improvements in the engine were required to achieve a range of 600 kin. Additionally, as
with Korolev's R-2 being designed at the time, the most important innovation was the
separation of the warhead from the rest of the missile, u
Grottrup and his colleagues made their presentation on September 25 at a meeting
of the Scientific Technical Council (NTS) of the MV. Before the meeting Korolev made
sure that he could control the outcome. The majority of the discussants worked directly
under Korolev. Others had close ties to the Chief Designer. After the Germans'
presentation, the first discussant, M.K. Tikhonravov, gave a fairly positive assessment of
the concepts forwarded by Crrottrup. He was one of a minority of discussants without
direct institutional ties to Korolev. s5 But then came Korolev's deputy, Vasiliy Mishin,
g2This pattern of isolating the German scientist was consistent with that practiced in the nuclear
program. Therefore, Grottrup may have been isolated at the NKVD's urging. However, Chertok and
Vetrov make it clear that Korolev at least encouraged this arrangement.
s3 See Vetrov, Sekrety Ostrova Gorodomliia...; and Chertok, Raketi i Liudi...
s4 Korolev had independently developed a separable warhead during his stay in Germany and intended
to use it on the R-2. See Vetrov, Se/o'ety Ostrova Gorodomliia..pp 67-91.
s5 It should be noted that even Tikhonravov was a longtime friend and colleague of Korolev, going back
to their work together at GIRD and RNII in the early 1930's.
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who noted that while there were several interesting ideas, Grottrup's project was not
realistic, and that it made far more sense to pursue Korolev's plan for the R-2, which had
already been approved by the NTS. Mishin was followed by several other members of
Korolev's retinue. Glushko criticized the engines' turbo pumps. Riazanski questioned the
claims of accuracy, and Piliugin simply announced that "he could never agree with the
proposed system." By that time, the feeding frenzy was out of control. V.M. Panferov,
the head of the reliability department of the NII, remarked: "It seems to me that the
project is of a preliminary character. There are no basic assessments of the materials, and
these were not calculated today. At the session we attempted to clafif3, several questions
but were unsuccessful... I can only say the project may present some interesting thoughts
for future design developments." Even Boris Chertok, who helped the Germans with their
guidance system, criticized the proposal. In the end, Deputy Minister of Armaments E.A.
Satel' concluded:
Undoubtedly, this project presents some new technical thoughts... But at the same
time, it seems to me that the materials as they are presented here cannot be
supported as a draft project. The basic requirement for a draft project -- complete
technical assessments, complete scientific analyses of questions are underdeveloped
in the design elements. Unfortunately, in the materials presented, as we were able to
observe at the concluding section, the defense of the design, sufficient assessments
and scientific materials were not present in the proposed project, s6
The Germans were sent back to the drawing board. Their project would be presented
again in another year. Many things would change in the interim. Until then, Korolev
could rest assured that the Germans would pose no serious threat to his program. Instead,
he would incorporate their technical concepts in his own designs.
Grottrup presented a more refined version of the (3-1 to the NTS of NII-88 in
November 1948. In spite of the fact that Grottrup had responded to most of the earlier
criticisms of insufficient theoretical work, the NTS remained unwilling to accept his
design. Again, Korolev's deputies led the attack. Konstantin Bushuev asserted that "for
an experimental system the sum of new design elements is too burdensome.., all of these
ideas cannot be put into a single vehicle at once. "s_ Mishin was not nearly so kind in his
assault on the proposal: "It amazed me throughout the proposal. The supplied data
appears to be an advertisement. Instead of an engineering approach--a poorly executed
essay..."ss The Council concluded with the recommendation that further experimentation
would be required before the project could be concluded, effectively killing the G-1
s6 Stenogramma placnarnogo zacedaniia NTS NII ot 28.12 Archives of TsNIIMash, f. 9, op. I No. 801.
As quoted in Vetrov, Sekrety Ostrova Gorodomliia .... p 84.
s7 Ibid. pp. 172-173.
ss 1bid. pp. 173-174.
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project.
Nevertheless, Korolev held a certain interest in seeing that the Germans continued
to serve as a source of productive ideas and theoretical work. There were many ideas,
such as the separation of the warhead from the fuselage, and the extensive use of
aluminum, which Korolev borrowed from the Germans without necessarily providing
attribution. However, he did not want the German project to be approved thereby
challenging his position as the leader of the long-range missile program. He surely had a
hand in the rejection of Grottrup's proposals. Overall, the Germans contributed a great
deal to the Soviet missile program, but it was all indirect knowledge, s9 Despite his
attacks, Mishin later remarked in an interview that the Soviet rocket scientists "could not
have accomplished anything without the Germans' help. "9° But that assistance was
carefully controlled. Korolev made sure that the Germans did not become competitors.
In the end, however, the German program was a victim of Soviet leadership
politics, not Korolev's bureaucratic intrigues. In early 1949, the so-called anti-
cosmopolitan campaign began. All foreign science was condemned as "bourgeois
science." Soviet scientists were careful to limit their ties with their foreign colleagues.
The German scientists became casualties of Soviet politics. 91 In early 1950, the entire
research agenda of the German group was dosed. The following year, the German
scientists began to return to East Germany.
Competing programs provide a powerful source of information for monitors and
the political leadership. 92 They can be used to validate the concepts, cost estimates, or
expressed risks of a program. The German rocket scientists presented such a threat to
Korolev's autonomy. Their proposal for the G-1 was technically more advanced than
those being developed by Korolev's group at the time. Yet Korolev was able to discredit
Grottrup's design by stacking the NTS with his own representatives. It was a highly
successful technique and effectively eliminated Korolev's primary competition at the time.
Colonization: The struggle for control of NII-88
As a rehabilitated former political prisoner who was not a member of the
Communist Party, Korolev was always held some distance away from positions of power.
Up until 1950 he was still only the chief of a secondary department within NII-88. In
s9 See Chertok, Raketi i Liudi..; Vetrov, Sekrety Ostrova Gorodomliia,... and Mishin.
90 Interview with Mishin.
9_ Of course this campaign had little effect on the use of foreign intelligence for the development of
Soviet systems, particularly in the case of the atomic bomb. See Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb... on
the "anti-cosmopolitan campaign" see Hahn, Andrei Zhdanov...
92 See Downs, lnside Bureaucracy...; Wilson, Bureaucracy...
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1950,when the anti-aircraft program was passed on to another institute, he was elevated
to the position of chief designer of OK.B- 1 within NII-88, informally, the third in
command. As was the case with any defense industrial facility at the time, the institute's
leadership was subjected to intense political scrutiny. In 1950, the instititute's first
director was replaced for political reasons and replaced by Konstantin Rudnev who had
much closer connections with Ustinov. 93
At the same time Mikhail Iangel was appointed as chief of the guidance section.
From the time Iangel arrived at NII-88 it was clear that he was very well connected
politically. Iangel served as the scientific attach6 in the Soviet Embassy in the United
States during the war, and in Germany prior to that. Only the most politically reliable
were permitted such foreign postings, and only the most truly blessed were qble to return
to successful careers in the Soviet Union. Many were either imprisoned or relegated to
insignificant positions following a foreign posting. Iangel was widely seen as Ustinov's
man. 94
At the time of Rudnev's appointment the issue in dispute was they type rocket fuel
to be used in the next generation of missiles. Korolev supported the use of liquid oxygen
and kerosene, while the military supported the use of storable propellants. Korolev's
missiles promised greater range but were cumbersome on the battlefield because liquid
oxygen required refrigeration and could only be loaded immediately prior to launch.
Missiles using storable propellants could remain fully fueled in their launchers for weeks
prior to launch, but their range remained in question. The military made a powerful case
against Korolev, and shortly after his arrival Rudnev declared that storable propellants
would be "the main direction of the institute. ''95 In all probability the discussion was as
much about control of the institute as it was about technology. Rudnev, despite his
proclamations was unable to turn the institute's agenda away from Korolev's about
Korolev's direction.
In August 1952 Rudnev was promoted and Iangel became the director of the
institute. The appointment of a subordinate to serve as institute director irritated Korolev
and the two developed a strong rivalry. The strain in personal relations was exacerbated
by Iangel's support of storable propellants, and his opposition to Korolev's report of
December 1951 declaring that storable propellants were not sufficiently energetic to
See Chertok, Raketi i Liudi... and Progress, gazeta tsentral'nogo isledoskogo institiuta
mashinostroenoe, May 23, 1991, pl 1.
94See Chertok, Raketi i Liudi...
95Iu. A. Mozhorrtn, "Istoriia sozdaniia i razvitiia Tsentral'nye nauclmo-issledovatel'skii institute
mashinostroeniia" (The History of the Creation and Development of the Central Research Institute of
Machinebuilding,) Kosmonavtika i Raketostroenie, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1993) p. 23.
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powera long-rangemissile.9_Accordingto Chertok,thetwo onlyspoketo eachother
when it was absolutely necessary. Routine communications were conducted through
intermediaries. 97 An uncomfortable modus vivendi was established while Iangel was
director, but it did not last.
Korolev understood it would be possible to achieve intercontinental ranges given
further development of storable propellants. But he knew it would be very difficult to
make a missile powerful enough to launch a large satellite into orbit using these fuel
components given the existing state of technology. 9s He knew he could get into space
using liquid oxygen and kerosene. It was necessary therefore, to stall the development of
these systems at least until he could get his space program started. 99 To support his case,
Korolev commissioned a study by M.V. Keldysh, who by then was a close colleague of
Korolev, and an informal member of the Council of Chief Designers. Keldysh supported
Korolev's position in a late 1953 report asserting that the practical limitation for storable
propellants was 1000 km. z°° As a leading member of the Academy of Sciences, Keldysh's
position was unassailable. The report was a political victory for Korolev over Iangel. On
June 9, 1954, Iangel was sent to Dnepropetrovsk in the Ukraine to head the newly formed
design bureau and factory (OKB-586). Their competition would continue from a distance.
Ultimately, Iangel would prove Korolev and Keldysh wrong, but by that time Korolev was
well on his Way to space. _°1
Korolev's struggle for control over NII-88 seemed unending. But the final battle
was fought with Iangel in 1953. To prevail, Korolev capitalized on his developing
relationship with Keldysh whose technical competence was unquestioned. While there is
no evidence that Keldysh intentionally distorted his report to support Korolev, in 1956,
Iangel designed a missile capable of twice the range Korolev predicted using the same
storable propellants. At the same time, Korolev and Keldysh were plotting the
96 See Korolev, "Tezizy doklad..."; and, interview with Mishin.
9_ Interview _-ith Chertok; see also Chertok, Raketi i Liudi, ..
98Korolev noted that the development of UDMI-I (hydrazine) as a propellant would greatly increase the
range of storable propellants. See Keldysh, Tvorcheskoe Nasledie...Interview with Budnik,
Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, August 19, 1992.
99 Inter_aew _th Mishin.
10oSee Avduevskii, M. V. Keldysh lzbrannye Trudy... pp. 142-144.
lol In 1958 a research institute in Leningrad developed a means of producing hydrazine, a sufficiently
energetic storable propellant which would be used in Iangel's missiles. In fairness to Korolev, he had
noted that hydrazine would make a useful fuel, but he did not believe it would be developed soon.
Interview with V.S. Budnik, Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine.
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development of a satellite program, in which Keldysh figured prominently. 1°2 Therefore,
he held many of the same incentives as Korolev to see that missiles with higher payload
capacities survived long enough to begin a space program. Whatever the motivations, the
result of Keldysh's report was clear, NII-88 would focus on Korolev's choice of
propellants. The appeal to unquestioned outside experts proved unassailable. 103 The
military, Ustinov, and Iangel had to go elsewhere. Korolev would never again be
challenged for control of his design bureau.
Expert Committees: Korolev's control over the State Commission
In the Soviet defense industrial system, no major weapon system could be accepted
into service without passing trial as approved by a State Commission comprised of leading
military and defense industrial officials. In this respect Korolev's rockets were no
exception. The difference was that in the case of most State Commissions, it it not
difficult to find sufficient technical expertise among military and industrial administrators
to effectively evaluate the system. In particular, expertise is required for failure analysis.
In the case of rocketry, however, such officials did not exist within administrative
organizations, and the State Commissions relied upon the expertise of Korolev and his
scientists. One example of an R-7 failure illustrates the consequences.
In the spring of 1957, the Council, the State Commission, the missiles, and
countless technicians proceeded to the new launch range at Tiuratam in Kazakhstan.104
The first launch attempt ended in failure, when the R-7 blew up early in flight. The
problem was traced to dirt in the vernier engines. In response, Ustinov sent one of his
deputies to sit in Korolev's design bureau until the problem was corrected. How Karasev,
who had no competence in missile technology, would know when the problem was
corrected was unclear. Literally all he could do was verify that people were indeed
working.I°5 The second test on June 7 failed to ignite. A valve had been installed
backwards by Korolev's technicians. The third missile launched a month later exploded as
the strap-on stages were separating from the core stage. The State Commission
temporarily halted the test series after the third failure.
The State Commission created by Ustinov to oversee the launches was headed by
_o2Interview with Eneev.
lo3 On the importance of outside expertise see in particular James D. Thompson, Organizations in
Action, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966);
lo4In 1955 a new launch facility was established at Tiuratam which is now referred to as the Baikonur
cosmodrome. For a history of the facility see N.S. Narvolianskii, TakNachinalsia Baikonur, (Moscow:
Promotei, 1991).
io5 See Golovanov, Korolev... pp. 503-504.
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his deputy for rocketry Vasilii Riabikov.106 His counterpart on the military side was
Deputy Minister of Defense for Special Weapons and Rocket Technology, Marshal
Nedelin, who was Deputy Chairman. As was the practice, the State Commission relied
upon the technical staff of the Council of Chief Designers to produce reports and
analyses.I°7 Korolev's deputies drafted the reports. Korolev provided the executive
summary, which was the only part of the reports transmitted to the leadership. The results
were predictable. Even in the case of the worst failures, his remarks were along the lines
or2 "It is a complicated business: there may have been some glitches, but these can't be
traced to Korolev..." After one failure, Riabikov read Korolev's summary and remarked
with a smile: "You're a clever man Sergei Pavlovich. [Korolev] You have resolved all
problems with a magic wand, but your shit does not want to become cologne just to avoid
offending your nose...,,los And so it went. The political leadership was, no doubt, aware
that there were launch failures, but blissfully ignorant of the depth of the problems, and
never casting their suspicions upon Korolev as the culprit.
The Failure of Monitoring Ovaanizations
From the beginning, Soviet administrators were faced with a formidable task.
Possessing limited technical competence, they were incapable of understanding either the
basic mission of rocketry or the technology involved. Complicating matters, the basic
structure of the Soviet system did not offer either Ustinov or Nedelin any alternative to
supporting Korolev once the and-aircraft mission was taken away. For Ustinov and
Nedelin Korolev offered them the best opportunity to advance their own careers.
Attempts at monitoring Korolev's program proved to be almost complete failures. Within
his organization, Korolev defeated competitors, thwarted attempts at colonization, and
gained control of technical commissions.
1o6Riabikov left the Ministry of Armaments in 1949 to oversee anti-aircra_ systems. He returned to
work with Ustinov sometime after Ustinov was appointed as head of the Military Industrial Commission
in 1955.
lo7 The majority of State Commistion members were tied csosely to Korolev. See Iu. A. Skopinskii,
"Gospriemka kosmicheskoi program/' (State Acceptance of the space program,) Zemlia i Vselennaia
No. 5 (September-October) 1988, pp. 73-79.
10e See Golovanov, Korolev... p. 506.
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BUILDING THE SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATION
The most important thing was not that we learned rocket technology,
but that we closed ranks as a collective.
S.P. Korolev (1947)
Early creation of a tightly knit organizational structure proved to be a primary
source of strength for Korolev's program. But the impetus for this organizational
structure came not fi'om Korolev, but from the ideas of the father of Russian space flight,
Konstqantin Tsiolkovskii. The importance of Tsiolkovskii as an organizing force must be
recognized. He provided the basic mathematical calculations demonstrating that space
travel was possible. This is the first major step in any new technology. Believing that
space travel was an achievable goal was a powerful unifying force in itself. But
Tsiolkovskii's work went much further, providing a road map to the stars. 1°9 Korolev,
Glushko, and Tikhonravov found a mission in Tsiolkovskii's words. It was the mission
which would unify the emerging cosmic collective through the difficult years of the war,
and provide them with a vision of their destination during the test range failures of the
limited range R- 1. It would commit their conversations regarding space travel to the
relative secrecy of their own collective.l_°
Two factors were key to maintaining the autonomy ofKorolev's emerging space
program. The first was the ability to conceal Korolev's true intentions to develop a space
program at least in parallel with missile technology, if not as his primary priority. The
second related factor was Korolev's ability to successfully manage a complex,
interdepartmental program without leadership or administrative interference. This section
explores Korolev's ability to achieve these goals.
Develooin_ the Technology Underground
Prior to their retum to separate organizations in the Soviet Union, the group of
Soviet rocketeers in Germany established close working relationships. Those who had not
worked v_ith Korolev and Glushko at RNII were quickly brought into the community of
space flight advocates. A division of duties was established, and Korolev was accepted as
their unquestioned leader, m Most importantly, Korolev devoted a great deal of effort to
109A.A. Kosmodemianskiy, Konstantin Tsiolkovskii - His Life and Work, (Moscow, Nauka, 1960) as
cited in Daniloff, The Kremlin and the Cosmos... p. 20.
l_o On the importance of mission to maintaining control over information see Wilson, Bureaucracy...
1_1For a detailed discussion of the rocket scientists' activities in Germany see Chapter 3.
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establishinga commonsetof goalsamonghisworkers which far exceeded those of simply
launching rockets for use as long-range artillery.
From the time they arrived in Germany, Korolev made it clear to all within the
scientific community that his destination was extraterrestrialY 2 He extended his vision
beyond the scientific community, establishing adherents among the lower ranking military
officers, and scientists from the Academy of Sciences. m One military engineer, arriving in
Germany fresh out of school in 1946, recalled Korolev's response to his question
regarding the future of rocketry:
In his answer I first realized that basic idea, you might say his credo, to the
realization of which he dedicated his entire life: a rocket--it is the only means to
remove a person from his earthly cradle into space, the only means, the help of
which might reveal the secrets of the Universe, which is hidden from us by
enormous distances. Everything, which in the future would be created in the field
of military rocketry, served, by stages in this path to space (including the semerka),
from which he did not deviate his entire life. n4
Korolev was guarded regarding his extraterrestrial ambitions in conversation with
his superiors, however. Sergei Vetoshkin, the Deputy Minister of Armaments, noted that
Korolev spoke about space "only very rarely, and with great caution. I had the impression
that he was probing us: how would we react to such words...We would not react. We
were not going into space. ''n5 Korolev understood that the leadership would not directly
support the necessary basic research to develop more detailed theories of space flight. He
would have to find more circuitous means of building a research base.
Such an opportunity appeared in 1948. An old colleague from his days at GIRD,
Mikhail Tikhonravov, theorized that by combining a number of rockets, virtually any
range or speed could be achieved, n6 It was a purely theoretical piece of work, but by mid
1948, he came to the conclusion that this concept could be used for propelling an object
into outer space. Tikhonravov resolved to present these findings at the first plenary
session of the Academy of Artillery Sciences (AAN). n7 The AAN was concerned
n2 Interviews with Chertok, Mishin, and Mozhorrin.
H3 Interview with Keriraov. See also Golovanov, Korolev... p. 456.
H4See "Kazanskii, Viktor Vasil'evich," in Dorogi v Kosmos... I_.1, p. 70.
115See Golovanov, Korolev...p. 400.
116Tikhonravov's ideas were not openly published until 1980, and then in a classitied journal of the
rocket industry. See M.K. Tikhonravov, "Purl ocushchestvleniia bolshikh dal'nostei strel'by raketami,
Doklad v Akademii A.rtilerichekikh nauk, July 14, 1948)" Raketnaia Tekhnika, January 1980, pp. 10-19.
_7The Academy of Artillery Sciences was created in the wake of WW 1/to serve as a forum for
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primarily with the application of the experience ofWW II to the further development of
unguided short range solid fueled rockets such as the Katiusha. Anti-aircraft systems were
of secondary concern and the lowest priority was long range rocketry.n8 Nevertheless,
Tikhonravov and a group of his colleagues approached the President of the AAN with
their idea, proposing to present a paper at the upcoming session. Gen. Anatolii
Blagonravov initially rejected the proposal, noting that "the topic is interesting. But we
cannot include your report. Nobody would understand why...They would accuse us of
getting involved in things we do not need to get involved in..." But the rocket scientists
were not dissuaded so easily. The next day Tikhortravov returned, and Blagonravov
relented, cautioning: "Be prepared. We shall blushtogether. "u9 Blagonravov's
prediction proved prescient. After Tikhonravov's presentation, one high ranking military
official remarked: "The institute must not have much to do. Has it decided to switch to
the realm of fantasy? "12° This was not isolated criticism. Another participant recalled that
"one after another skeptics and critics came up to the lectern" criticizing Tikhonravov's
presentation. 121
One person who took Tikhonravov's report more seriously was Korolev, who sat
on the Presidium of the AAN. m Keenly aware that Tikhonravov's packets presented the
first possibility for putting objects into orbit around the Earth, Korolev was intrigued by
Tikhonravov's report. Following the attacks, Korolev encouraged his old friend but
cautioned him that such open discussions of space flight would be unproductive until they
could produce a useful missile.m
Tikhonravov was chief of a small research group within a military institute =, NII-4
-- which was hastily created in 1946 as part of the reorganizations necessitated by the
decision to create a rocket industry in Russia. The basic mission of the organization was
to provide assistance in the utilization of rocketry for the artillery troops. 124 In the ensuing
years, Tikhonravov's group became a think tank for Korolev's most ambitious schemes.
discussing future warfare. It was far different from the Academy of Sciences in that it had no permanet
institutes attached to it. Its only function, according to participants interviewed for this study was to
serve a a meeting place for old Generals to rehash the battles fought in WW If.
Hs See K.V. Frolov, AnatoliiArkad'evich Blagonravov, (Moscow: Nauka, 1982)pp. 70-72.
H9 See laroslav Golovanov, "Start kosmicbeskii cry," Pravda, October 4, 1987 p.3
120Ibid.
m See Maksimov and Bazhmov .... pp. 16-17.
!_, Ibid.
m See Golovanov, "Start kosmicheskii cry'...
124The structure, personnel and purpose of NII-4 are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
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Ironically, the group was partially shielded by the fact that they were under military
control. The Director of the institute, Gen. Nestorenko, was not entirely cognizant of the
work that was taking place within his own institute. According to one participant, he came
to the position of director only "because after the war there were many military generals
without jobs, and they had to receive suitably high positions. ''_25 Nestorenko had no
background in rocketry, and at times exhibited a certain hostility toward the rocket
scientists and the military men who supported them. But Nestorenko was surrounded by
military men who had worked closely with the rocket specialists in Germany, several of
whom worked with Korolev and Glushko before the war. Nestorenko's Deputy, Gen.
Gaidukov, had personally persuaded Stalin to create a missile program and hadworked
closely with Korolev in Germany._26 Another leading figure and deputy to Nestorenko,
Col. Tiulin, headed a missile research group in Germany, and worked with Korolev prior
to the war at GIRD and RNII. Invariably, Nestorenko yielded in the face of pressure
from his deputies. 127
The tepid support from Nestorenko not withstanding, Korolev understood that
neither he nor Tikhonravov was likely to get support from the current military and
political leadership for space flight._28 In order to circumvent leadership approval
processes, Korolev resolved to fund Tikhonravov's work at NII-4 outside of regular
funding channels. 129 He told Tikhonravov: "Work, calculate, design in your institute; I
will give you money and serve as the customer; I do not have any free people. They are
all busy, no one can sit and do this work. Get agreement from your leadership so that I
can order this work. ''13° Tikhonravov received approval from the Deputy Chief of GAU,
Gen. Mrykin, who commented: "It is good that Korolev should pay for this work." and
G.N. Pashkov, the head of a group supervising rocketry in the Council of Ministers, who
"wished him luck. ''131
_25Interview with Chertok.
126Gaidukov was the director of the Vystrel facility with Korolev as his deputy. His support was pivotal
in gaining approval for initiation of the missile program in 1946. See Chapter 3 for an in depth
discussion of the relationship between Korolev and Galdukov.
127Interviews with Bazhinov and Maksimov.; Golovanov, "Start kosmicheskii cry"...; and Vetrov,
"Mikhail Kladevich Tikhonravov..." pp. 40-41.
12sInterview with Mishin, see also Golovanov, "Start kosmicheskii ety"...
129See "M.K. Tikhonravov" in Ishlinskii...; and G.S. Vetrov, "Mikhail Kladevich Tikhonravov, k 80
letniu dnia rozhdeniia" Zemlia i Vselennaia, May 1980, p. 40
13oSee "M.K. Tikhonravoxe' in Ishlinskii...
131These accounts appear in the original version of"M.K. Tikhonravov" Iu.A. Ishlinskii, Akademik S.P.
Korolev: Uchenyi, lnzhener, Chelovek, (Moscow: Nauka, 1986) but are ommitted in the final version.
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Korolev maintained a reserve fund for just such purposes, but it was a closely
guarded secret. No one within the design bureau was certain of how much money he had
reserved in this account. Even his administrative officer, Sergei Okhapkin, claimed
ignorance noting, "Korolev had a genuine reserve, he always did, how much, no one
knew: not the people in his own design bureau, not his subcontractors, not the ministry.
This secret Sergei Pavlovich [Korolev] never opened to anyone..." But he did not
dispense of these funds readily.132 They were set aside for critical tasks, such as those he
wanted Tikhonravov to perform.
For the next three years Tikhonravov and his group concentrated on using the
packet system to launch an artificial Earth satellite. 133 Their research, performed in
cooperation with Korolev's design bureau within NII-88, included examination of the
guidance requirements for entering into orbit, means of correcting inaccuracies in orbital
insertion, thermal protection, and optimal characteristics for the launch vehicle.134 By late
1953, Tikhonravov prepared a report on artificial satellites which would be the basis for
Korolev's ensuing proposal to the leadership. The basic premise of the study was that the
R-7 was capable of propelling a one ton object in excess of 8 km per second, the speed
necessary to achieve Earth orbit. It divided satellites into two basic types: stabilized and
unstabilized. Unstabilized satellites, "the most simple satellites" (PS) weighed
approximatelyl. 1 to 1.4 tons, including 300-400 kg. of scientific instruments. Stabilized
satellites weighing approximately 3 tons, were also examined with reference to the
possibility of putting cameras on board. The study also included a discussion of projects
involving manned spacecraft using existing rockets, manned space stations, and unmanned
lunar flights, claiming all could be achieved in the near future. 135
Principal-agency theory concerns itself with the ability of principals to understand
the true utility function of agents. The preceding paragraphs indicate that Korolev was
Maksimov and Vetrov confirmed that the original version was correct.
1s2See Golovanov, Korolev... p. 479.
_33The "paket" refers to the clustering of rocket boosters. This idea was developed by Tikhomvov at
NII-4 under the guidance and sponsorship of Korolev. This project is discussed in more detail in
chapter 5. Interview with Bazhinov, and Maksimov.
_34See I.K. Bazhinov, "O teoreticheskikh isslecovaniiakh problem sozdaniia iskusstvennykh sputnikov
zemli v SSSR v 1947-1956 gg." (Theoretical research on problems of the creation of articiacial Earth
satellites in the USSR from 1947-1956) Separate publication Academy of Scientists Institute of the
Natural Sciences and Technology, (Moscow: Nauka, 1981)
_35M.K. Tikhonravov, S.P. Korolev, "Dokladnaia zapiska ob iskusstbeunom sputnike zemli," (Report on
artificial earth satellites,") in Materialy po lstorii Kosmicheskogo Koroblia "Vostok, " (Material on the
History of the Spacecraft "Vostok"), (Moscow: Nauka, 1991)
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ableto convincetheleadershipandadministratorsthatbuildinglong-rangemissileswashis
overarchinggoal. To the extentthatKorolev let thembecomeawareof histrue
preferencefor spaceexploration,it wasonlyasavaguedreamsometimeoff in thefuture.
From thebeginningthough,it wasclearto thoseworkingwith Korolevthat missileswere
only avehicleto achievementof Korolev's cosmicambitions.Korolev indeedpursued
researchonspaceflight,but hedid soin awaywhichwasnot obviousto hisprimary
administrator,Dmitry Ustinov. Thus,whentheopportunitypresenteditself,Korolev had
awell developedresearchprogramto convincetheleadershipof thefeasibilityof space
travel.
The Council of Chief Designers
The most important organizational tool devised by Korolev was the Council of
Chief Designers. Driven by necessity, the Council combined the resources of institutes
and design bureaus across five industrial ministries. Moreover, it was an informal
organization which eluded cumbersome administrative prcedures for interministerial
coordination. Perhaps moreso than any other policy implemented by Korolev, the Council
provided Korolev and his colleagues technological autonomy from administrative
structures.
The Council of Chief Designers was informally created on the test range of
Kapustin Iar. Boris Chertok recalled the most important result of the first series of tests:
The process of the first flight tests strengthened the informal organ--the Council of
Chief Designers under the direction of Sergei Pavlovich Korolev. The authority of
this Council as an interdepartmental, not administrative, but scientific-technical
leadership organization played a decisive role for all our activities which followed.136
One of the early problems facing the scientists and engineers interested in ballistic
missiles was coordinating the work of specialists working in different organizations under
different jurisdictions. In the latter years ofWW II, a vast number of engineers from
various design bureaus and scientific research institutes traveled to formerly occupied
areas of Europe looking for information on German technology programs. A group
interested in surface to surface missiles coalesced around six Chief Designers, from five
different ministries. In the Soviet system of industrial organization, crossing
interministerial boundaries was no easy task. Simple interactions required the signatures
of all concerned ministries. This process was time consuming, and ministers were
reluctant to commit their resources to projects in which they were unlikely to enjoy the
a36 See Chertok, Raketi i Liudi .... p. 195.
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rewards. _37
To overcome these problems, a unique organization was created by Korolev which
permitted the informal cooperation of organizations from disparate ministries without the
interference of the ministers, t38 This organization was formally named "the Council of
Chief Designers for Collective Resolution of Scientific-technical Problems in the Creation
of Ballistic Missiles. "139 The Council was a "special organization of collective thought. ''14°
One member, guidance specialist N.A. Piliugin, noted:
The Council of Chief Designers was not only the 'splinters' from the various
organizations which we all represented but also above all a qualitatively new
collective, a specific form of management. The Council was necessary because
rocket technology is very many-sided. One organization, one man--even of the
scale of Sergei Pavlovich Korolev--could not encompass it. 141
G.A. Tiulin, who throughout his career was in charge of the interface between the
designers and the military users, recalled that "the Council of Chief Designers was
formulated in Germany, all of its members represented different ministries: someone was
from aviation, someone from radio technical production. Even there were those, like
Viktor Ivanovich Kuznetsov from the shipbuilding industry...We did not have
interministerial barriers...142
137See Janous Kornai, The Socialists System: The Political Economy of Communism, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992)
13sAll of the early participants agreed that the Council was Korolev's idea. Interviews with Miskin,
Chertok, Mozhorrin, and Maksimov.
13_Raushenbakh, Iz lstorii.., p. 225.
14°Krasnaia Zvezda, April 8, 1989, p. 3.
141As cited in Holloway, op. tit., p. 392.
142See "G.A. Tiulin" in Dorogi v Kosmos, Vol. 1., (Moscow: Moscow Aviation Institute Press, 1992, p.
160.
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Figure 3 -- The Council of Chief Designers
The center of activity was Korolev' s design bureau (OKB-3), within NII-8 8,
located in Podlibki, outside of Moscow. Other members were spread throughout the
Moscow suburbs. Glushko re-established the GDL-OKB, as OKB-486, in the Khimky
region of Moscow. 143 At the same time, V. P. Barmin was appointed as the Chief
designer of launch facilities.144 Mikhail Riazanskii and Nikolai Piliugin worked at NII-885,
located near the Central airport in Moscow, with Riazanskii as director and Piliugin as
143SeeGlushko, GDI_,-OK.B...p. 31.
]_See Trud, April 12, 1987, p. 1.
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headof the sectionfor inertialguidancesystems.145RiazanskiiandPiliuginwereappointed
aschiefdesignersof radiocontrol andautomaticcontrolsystemsrespectively.TheChief
Designerfor Instruments, V. I. Kuznetsov, headed a design bureau within NII-10, and was
under the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry (MSP). 1_ In turn, each of the "big six," as
they were called, held responsibility for the activities of enterprises working on missiles
within that ministry and functioned, for all practical purposes, as a mini-minister. By
1960, there were 200-3 00 organizations involved in this informal structure. 147
There were several aspects of the operational procedures of the Council which
made it an effective organization. Most importantly, the Council's decisions had authority
over other agencies and ministries. An article originally written in 1958, but only recently
published, recalls the significance of this aspect. "Creation of such an organ had decisive
significance for the successful development of complexes. In the first stage, the authority
of the Council permitted excluding the procedures of reaching agreement on technical
solutions between departments. ''148 V.P. Barmin recounted the ability of the Council to
overcome ministerial resistance.
Each of us headed a design bureau, had the authority in his own area, and could
implement decisions. Of course, far from always did our ministry leaders like it, and
there were conflicts. As a result, S.P. Korolev later succeeded in securing a
resolution whereby the decisions of the Council of Chief Designers were binding on
all ministries and agencies. 149
Because the Council did not have to go through cumbersome interdepartmental
coordination procedures, there was little opportunity for ministers, party officials, and
military officers to interfere in its work. Since most proposals subjected to routine
interdepartmental coordination procedures never survived the formal process of getting
approval from sometimes dozens of state officials, the establishment of the Council was as
much a matter of survival as expediency.iS°
14SSee, Krasnaia Zvezda, March 11, 1989 p. 3, for a biographical article on Riazanskii and Krasnaia
Zvezda, February 25, 1989, p. 4, for a biographical article on Piliugin.
l_See Krasnaia Zvezda, February 25, 1989, p. 4.
147See Ishlinskii, Korolev... p. 317.
l_See Vetrov, Sekrety Ostrova Gorodomliia..., pp. 14-15.
149See lzvestiia, September 20, 1987, p. 3.
lS°Fyodor Burlatskii noted that in his study of the approval process, only 30% of the "zapiski"
successfully obtained signatures from the necessary officials, sometimes numbering in the dozens.
Seminar given by Fyodor Burlatskii at the RAND Corp. April 28, 1989.
38
Barminalsorecalledhow the members of the Council acted outside the Soviet
planning system with flexibility and autonomy to develop their own schedules, and
mechanisms to maintain them.
The interrelationship and interdependence of the operations make missing a deadline
in any section unacceptable. For that reason, every director and participant--from
the Chief Designer to the shop master--in assessing the status of the work in his
own area, considered the schedule above all as, by and large, the ultimate end and
immediately sounded the alarm if there was a threat of a missed deadline. The
feedback worked flawlessly. Any danger of missing a deadline went off like an
alarm, immediately to the Council of Chief Designers, to the proper ministry or
directing agency. In every serious instance, aid was rendered without delay.
Depending on the circumstances, the aid might be people, equipment, finances, or
additional production power.
I think it very significant that the work deadlines, although tightly compressed, were
realistic, because they were established by the equipment designers and makers
themselves.151
The local autonomy afforded to the Council allowed them to create a flexible and
informal working relationship between design bureaus, suppliers, and scientists. A co-
worker ofKorolev's, B.E. Chertok, recalled that "settling a complex question took simply
a visit or even a phone call. ''1s2 Another, Academician V.S. Avduevskii, described how
this flexible relationship fostered productivity.
I remember, in 1953, various heat-shield coatings that were to prevent spacecraft
from severely overheating upon entry into the atmosphere were developed and
tested. Our group of young research-institute associates came up with a new idea
for facilitating the development of a heat shield. We immediately went to the design
bureau headed by Sergei Pavlovich [Korolev]. And by chance, we met him on the
plant grounds, as he was returning from a shop. We spoke as we walked--it took
Korolev only about 5 minutes to get the gist of the idea and to make some
observations on its development. Within a half an hour, the designers were already
working on the idea. And that is how it always was. Nobody ever ran into any kind
of bureaucratic delay with Sergei Pavlovich, and there were never any problems of
'implementation.' All ideas worth doing were snatched up instantly and were
quickly converted into designs, and trust of and good will toward those enthusiastic
about their own work was the rule. That was the primary incentive that inspired the
participants in this collective work, and there were many of them. Industrial and
academic institutes and enterprises did not solicit the decisions and resolutions of
_5_Seelzvestiia, September 27, 1987, p. 3.
_S2Seelzvestiia, October 1, 1987, p. 3.
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higheragenciesmtheywent straight to the chief design bureau and performed
complex theoretical and experimental operations within schedules that spanned only
months. 153
It was either a lack of interest or a lack of foresight on the part of the
administrators which led to the creation of the Council of Chief Designers. IfBRDDs
were a high priority the leadership would have transferred the five key organizations into a
single ministry when, in the immediate post-war years, there was a complete
reorganization of the Soviet economy. The rocket scientists made their desire to be
placed in a single ministry known to the Ustinov. That this was done suggests that
Ustinov was not willing to force the issue among other ministerial officials, or to take it to
a higher administrative level. Whatever his reasons, the creation of the Council, and
Ustinov's support for the institution in the years to come, had far reaching consequences,
both intended and unintended.
The Council of Chief designers proved to be a remarkable, though unusual,
organizational structure. It was neither a formal hierarchy nor an informal coupling of
individual organizations. In many ways, it combined the best of both forms of
organization. The Council created the regularized procedures and lines of authority of a
hierarchy while preserving the flexibility and autonomy of informal organizational
coordination.154 For Korolev, what mattered most was that the Council permitted him to
coordinate activities across industrial ministries without having to go through the time
consuming process of seeking ministerial approval for routine coordination. The Council
also established the precedent of local autonomy which Korolev used to his advantage in
the years to come.
Weak Administrative Structure: Necessary But Insufficient Cause
Setting aside for the moment the historical significance of the weakness of the
Soviet administrative structure for the missile program, it is clear that it was an important
contributive factor to Korolev's success in gaining approval to launch Sputnik. Principal-
agency theory has illuminated many of the flaws in the Soviet system's ability to control a
program which neither the leadership nor the administrators understood either by virtue of
their own technical competence or by copying the work of the United States. For
Korolev's success, control over information proved critical.
153See Literaturnaiia Gazeta, September 30 1987, p. 14.
_54On the strengths of hierarchical relations in see Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies:
Analysis and Antitrust Implication, (New York: Free Press, 1975). On the value of informal
coordination see Donald Chisholm, Coordination Without Hierarchy: Informal Structures in
Multiorganizational Systems, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
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If principalagencytheoristaresatisfiedthat their their analyticframeworkhas
pointedout the importantvariablesin thisprogram,theymustfind theinteractionof these
variableto besomewhatdisquieting.In thefirst place,Korolev's success was the result of
contractual disequilibrium. Korolev held and used an informational advantage to advance
his own agenda. Leadership attempts at restoring equilibrium through monitoring proved
ineffective. From this perspective then, the case of Sputnik was a case of agents run
amuck. They would stress that while Korolev was successful at launching Sputnik, it was
his failure to build an effective ICBM that may have been more important to Soviet
leadership. Sputnik was only a fortuitous consequence.
THE DECISION TO LAUNCH SPUTNIK: JUMPING THROUGH A POLICY
WINDOW
Nevertheless, structural factors only contributed to the launch of Sputnik. They
provided a necessary bureaucratic platform from which Korolev could push his program.
To understand the decision-making process for Sputnik itself it is useful to employ the
concept of a policy window. Kingdon describes policy using an apropos metaphor:
In space shots, the window presents the opportunity for a launch. The target planets
are in proper alignment, but will not stay that way for long. Thus the launch must
take place when the window is open, lest the opportunity slip away. Once lost, the
opportunity may recur, but in the interim, astronauts and space engineers must wait
until the window reopens. 125
For Kingdon, a policy window opens when various policy and event streams
converge to reduce the constraints to policy initiatives. Well developed programs and
policy solutions held by policy entrepreneurs are coupled with real or imagined problems
at the time that event streams converge to place a broader issue on the political agenda.
Such convergence, Kingdon argues s necessary for new programs to be initiated by policy
entrepreneurs from lower levels within the polity. Without policy windows, an inherently
stagnant bureaucracy would be unlikely to seriously consider any initiative coming from
lower levels.156
A series of event and policy streams converged to make it possible for Korolev to
_55 See Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies... p. 171.
1561bid.
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bringhiscosmicagendaout intothe open. The first was a complete overturn of the
political leadership. Stalin died in March 1953. His deputy in charge of the secret police,
Lavrentii Beriia, was arrested three months later, removing the most dangerous potential
opponents to Korolev's space plans from the leadership. Ultimately, Malenkov's fall left
the political leadership with precious little technical competence. The rest of the
leadership was composed of self-descfibed technological "ignoramuses. "_s7
The second stream was technical. By late 1953, Tikhom-avov and Korolev had
completed preliminary design work of a rocket capable of launching a satellite into orbit.
The ostensible purpose of the rocket was for launching nuclear warheads. However by
using his informational monopoly, Korolev was able to foist requirements and
specifications more suited to space launch than military use. Along with Keldysh from the
Academy of Sciences they had a well developed plan for a satellite program. All they
needed was the fight opportuity.
The opportunity was provided by the third stream which was international. In
1952, a group of international scientists announced the celebration of the International
Geophysical Year (IGY) which would last from July 1957 to the end of 1958, and invited
the nations of the world to participate by launching artificial earth satellites to conduct
scientific research. Eisenhower's July 1955 announcement that the United States would
participate was thus the official commencement of the space race. Korolev had a policy
window, the task was to jump through it. as8
Throughout the tortuous process of fighting for approval of every step of the
missile program, Korolev realized that Stalin would not easily be convinced of the value in
returning to failed policies of the past. Stalin wanted a solid defense, not space
spectaculars. Anything which detracted from that was sabotage. Given that Boris
Chenok, Mikhail Riazanskii, Marshal Iakovlev, and Dmitry Ustinov were all under
suspicion for sabotage over the previous three years, Korolev was reluctant to test his luck
with Stalin by proposing that state resources be used for satellite launches, ls9
Stalin died in March 1953. Lei_ in his wake was a confused, amorphous, political
leadership. Beriia, who had the greatest cognizance of military technical affairs among the
remaining leadership, was arrested in June and executed shortly thereafter. Georgi
Malenkov, who was the political leader in charge of Spetzkomitet-2, was locked in a
political struggle with Khrushchev arguing that the focus of the Soviet economy should be
_5_See Strobe Talbott, editor and translator, N.S. Klmashchev, Khrushchev Remembers: the Last
Testament, (New York: Little Brown, 1971) p. 46
ass See Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Publi¢ Policies...
159Chapter 5 covers the beginings of Stalin's next purge in greater detail.
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redirectedfrom wartime priorities to those of a peacetime economy.X6° Malenkov argued
that military-related production should be sharply cut back and was thus opposed to
further development of long-range ballistic missiles. Opposing him, Khrushchev argued
for increased military modernization.161 The political conflict was won decisively in
January 1955, when Malenkov was forced to resign as Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, eliminating yet another potential opponent of the space program.
From Korolev's perspective, aside from elimination of a potential opponent, the
result of the debate was decision-making paralysis. In the absence of decision-making at
the top, lower level administrators made decisions without consulting the political
leadership. During mid to late 1953, Korolev, Ustinov, and Minister of the atomic
industry, Malyshev, decided upon: development of an SLBM (the R-11); "Operation
Baikal" (the test of an R-5 with a live atomic warhead); and the R-7 (the first ICBM) with
virtually no discussions at the leadership level. For example, after heating arguments by
Korolev, that if they did not make a decision, no one will make such a decision for us
upstairs" Pashkov, a department head in the State planning committee (GOSPLAN),
decided to go ahead with the plan for "Operation Baikal," without even soliciting the
opinions of the new Soviet leadership, m Thus, by mid 1954, they were confident that
decision making could be driven from the bottom up.163
In 1953, Korolev completed the conceptual and theoretical work for a missile
capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Only two months after Stalin's death, Korolev
presented a proposal for the R-6 with an intended payload of three tons and a range of
8,000 kin. Outwardly, it seemed to be a curious choice of vehicle size. Soviet atomic
weapons at the time were only 1,000 kg., and thermonuclear warheads under development
16oSpetzkomitet-2 was created in 1946 as a high level monitoring organization overseeing the missile
programs. The committee was disbanded around 1951. See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion.
16_See for example Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders...; and, Bruce Parrott, Politics and
Technology in the Soviet Union, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985).
_62See Iaroslav Golovanov, "Operatsiia Baikal" Poisk, 7:42 p. 7.
_63For a discussion of the proposition that innovation tends to come from the bottom in public
bureaucracies see John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, (Boston: Little Brown,
1984), Kingdon is basing his theory on the model of decision making developed in Michael D. Cohen,
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," Administrative
Sciences Quarterly, Vol. 17 (1972) pp. 1-25, more recent and detailed accounts appear in James G.
March and Johan P. Olsen (eds.), Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations, (Bergen Norway:
Universitetsfoflaget, 1976); and James G. March and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, Ambiguity and
Command: Organizational Perspectives on Military Decision Making, (Marshfield MA: Pitman
Publishing, 1986).
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would be in the range of five tons. 164 In reality, Korolev arrived at the three ton figure
methodically. A missile with a one ton warhead was not large enough to launch a satellite
into orbit, and a missile with a three ton warhead could be constructed from existing R-5
components, and would be large enough to launch a satellite into orbit.162 The Minister of
the atomic industry Viacheslav Malyshev, who was at the Scientific Technical Council
(NTS) meeting, understood what Korolev was doing, and accused him of "attempting to
develop a space booster disguised as a military missile. ''1_ Over Malyshev's objections,
the project was approved. Only weeks before his arrest, Beriia signed the decree
authorizing development of the first ICBM without notifying the rest of the leadership.167
Korolev had approval for the rocket he needed to get into space.
Following the successful test of a thermonuclear weapon in the fall of 1953,
Malyshev returned to Korolev requesting that he increase the payload capacity of the R-6
to six tons. Korolev agreed, but only after acknowledgment that much greater funds
would be committed to development of an entirely new system._68 Tikhonravov's
calculations suggested that this new rocket -- the R-7 -- might be large enough to put a
man into space.169 Not only did Korolev now have a rocket capable of putting a satellite
into space, but, he could also begin to think realistically of the possibility of putting a man
into space. Tsiolkovskii's dreams were becoming reality.
The third stream of events converging to open this policy window was the
movement within the international space community to push for peaceful satellite
launches. In 1950, an international group of scientists convened at the home of James
Van Allen outside of Washington D.C. The topic of discussion was establishment an
International Geophysical Year (IGY), coordinating international high altitude research
during the unusually high solar activity predicted for 1957-1958. In October 1952, the
IGY was officially announced, proposing satellite launches as the centerpiece. After open
public discussion, on May 26, 1955, the National Security Council of the United States
approved a program for orbiting a scientific satellite. The public announcement of U.S.
164The First Deputy to the Director of the Atomic research institute reported that Korolev discussed
warhead size with Igor Kurchatov, the Chief Scientists for the atomic program, in 1952. Interview with
Golovin.
165Interviews with Mishin, Chertok, and Vetrov.
_66See Golovanov, Korolev...pp. 473-474; and Varfolomeyev, "Soviet Rocketry ...
_6_In fact one of the charges leveled against Beriia was that he approved this program without
consulting with that rest of the collective leadership. See Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb... p. 321.
1¢_This discussion is covered in greater detail in Chapter 5. See also Golovanov, Korolev... pp. 473-
475.
1¢_See Tikhomvov, and, Korolev, "Dokladnaia zapiska ob iskusstvennom spumike zemli...
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participationwasmadeon July 29th. There was no response from the Soviet Union._7°
Korolev was aware of the IGY proposal, and in late 1953 began circulating the
satellite idea within the Academy of Sciences, first building support within Keldysh's
institute. The two scientists had informally discussed the idea of space flight for years, but
their discussions took on a more serious note in 1953. _7_ Korolev also held meetings with
Academician Lavrov, astronomer, Academician Kykarkin, and the most famous member
of the Academy, Petr Kapitsa. Together, Korolev and Keldysh proposed the idea that the
first satellite should feature biological experiments on several types of living organisms.
This supported Korolev's plans for manned space flight, and it quickly gained the support
of the President of the Academy, A.N. Nesmeianov, a biologist. On May 25th, 1954, a
meeting of the Presidium of the Academy approved Keldysh's proposal for creating an
artificial satellite.
The same day, Korolev transmitted final approval of the specifications for the
ICBM to Pashkov, at Gosplan, Riabikov, at the Council of Ministers, and Ustinov. This
was the final stage in the formal approval process for the R-7. But the timing was no
coincidence. On the following day Korolev sent another letter to the same list:
For your consideration I present the report of Comrade Tikhonravov, M.K.
"Artificial Earth Satellites," and also translated material on this subject coming from
the United States. The development of the new article [the R-7] which is currently
taking place raises the possibility of creating an artificial earth satellites in the
nearest years.
If we reduce the weight of the payload we may achieve the terminal speed of 8000
m/sec. The article [R-7] - satellite may be developed on the basis of the article
currently under development; but requiring serious redevelopment of the latter
[satellite].
It seems to me to that now it is an opportune and expedient time to consider
organizing a scientific department for conducting initial basic research on satellites
and more detailed development of related issues.
I request your decision._72
17oSee, McDougall, The Heavans and the Earth... pp. 118-121.
1_1Interviews with Eneev, Akim
172S.P. Korolev, "O vozmoshnosti razrabotki isksstvennogo sputnika Zemli" ('The possibility of
developing an artificial Earth satellite,") in Keldysh, Tvorcheskoe Nasledie... p. 343. Golovanov notes
that the letter was sent to the same list as Korolev's acceptance of the ICBM specifications mailed a day
earlier. See Golovanov, Korolev... pp. 519-520.
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This letter was the first official communication with administrtors regarding
satellites.173 However, it did not catch Ustinov by surprise. Korolev discussed the
satellite proposal with him for the first time in February, and he was willing to support
Korolev's satellite provided it did not put more important missile programs at risk.174
Consequently, the proposal was not considered a high priority, and was put on the slow
track for approval. Given the unfamiliarity of the decision-making apparatus with space
technology, this process would take many months.1_s The proposal probably never
reached the Presidium, but stalled in the Central Committee decision making apparatus. 176
In the absence of official sponsorship, Korolev continued to fund Tikhonravov out of his
own reserve.
Korolev's proposal was greeted with indifference by most, and hostility by some.
The Deputy director of_-4, Gen. Gfigofi Tiulin, helped Korolev push the proposal
through a resistant bureaucracy by writing yet another letter to Grigofi Pashkov, the
official in Gosplan who had responsibility for the missile program. 1_ Tiulin compared
Korolev, to Tsiolkovsl_, that "enthusiastic fa_ntisizer, town lunatic," and encouraged
Pasl_ov to support his plans. They arranged a meeting with Vasilii Riabikov at the
Council of Ministers. Korolev modified his tactics, stressing the political, rather than
17_1bid. See also Golovanov, Korolev... p. 520; and, "M.K. Tikhonravov," in Ishlinskii, Korolev ....
174Interview with Piskaraev. See alsoGolovanov, Korolev... pp. 519-520.
175A former participant in Politpuro decision-making noted that there were three basic speeds which
proposals could mover through the Soviet administrative system. The highest priority issues, such as
crises of foreign affairs go directly to the General Secretary (or Primier) for immediate resolution
regardless of time of day. Other high priority decisions, are routed through the bureaucracy within a
matter of days to a couple of weeks. These would include the decisions which were made on the ICBM.
Other decisions fall into the normal channels. Here, each proposal must go through a painstaking
process of approval of all Central Committee Departments which might have some cognizance over it.
This process usually takes several months before te proposal can even get in the cueue for consideration
by the Presidium. See Iuri Ra'anan and Igor Lukes, lnside the Arraprat: Perspectives on the Soviet
Unonfrom Former Functionaries, (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1990).
176A former staff member of the Central Committee who did not begin working there until after Sputnik
felt that, given the structure, it was unlikely that the first propsal ever reaeched the Presidium. Interview
with Stroganov.
177Pashkov moved to Gosplan for a short time in the mid 1950s. His involvement in the missile
program was informal stemming from his earlier work at the Ministry of Armaments and later at the
Council of Ministers. Interview with Piskareev.
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scientific, aspects of the first satellite flight, and the limited amount of additional resources
he would require to conduct this mission. Riabikov was indifferent, but Gen. Mrykin,
deputy chief of the Directorate of the Artillery Command for Special Technology
(UZKA), objected to Korolev's proposal interjecting, "Why are we even talking about
this?! When we launch the R-7, then we can think about satellites." Korolev had a list of
participants in front of him and wrote "later" next to Mrykin's name.178 Mrykin was not
alone. There were others within the Soviet government, and even within the Council of
Chief Designers, who felt Korolev's proposal was premature.179 They did not share
Korolev's sense of urgency over beating the Americans into space.
Undeterred, Korolev continued funding Tikhonravov's work. Another version of
the "Document on Artificial Earth Satellites" was produced in July 1955, going into
greater technical detail, with a discussion of the basic missions to be performed by
satellites as well as organizational issues. Tikhonravov proposed expanding his group to
70-80 staff members, but Korolev pared this down to 30-35. Both were in agreement that
the satellite design group should remain within NII-4 for the time beingfl ° Korolev
waited for the fight time to submit this revised version the administrative agencies.
Korolev'sdid not have to wait long. On July 29, President Eisenhower announced
that the United States would launch an Earth satellite during the IGY. Both Korolev and
Keldysh had been keeping close track of the American space efforts, and their
participation in the IGY did not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, the announcement
created an international sensation in the popular press. TM Within the Soviet Academy of
Sciences, Keldysh held a series of conferences on space research the summer of 1955
which built a broad base of support not only among the leading members, but among the
rank and file.IS2
The American announcement gave Korolev the pretext he was looking for.
Korolev transmitted Tikhonravov's revised document to Pashkov on September 3. In the
cover letter, he called attention to the political significance of the program, underlining
this phrase three times, the economic uses of satellites, and finally the military uses,
underlining the latter phrase a single time. 183 In the ensuing meetings, Korolev reiterated
at the political significance of the space program. To make it appear scientifically
legitimate, Korolev proposed that Keldysh, the new Vice President of the Academy, serve
178SP,_ Golovanov, Korolev... p. 520.
179 Interviews with Chertok, Mozhorrirt, and Mishin.
lgo See "M.K. Tikhonravov," in Ishlinskii, Korolev ....
m See McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth...
is2 Interview with Eneev, see also Golovanov, Korolev... p. 527.
_g3These comments came from Tikhonravov's original unpublished, article.
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asthe Chief Scientist and Chairman of an Academy commission coordinating the satellite
effort. Korolev wanted t give the impression that he was only the project coordinator for
Keldysh. _84 This alsoreassured Ustinov and the leadership that Korolev's first priority
remained his missile work.
This superficial division of duties between Korolev and Keldysh also made political
sense for the Academy. The Academy President, Nesmeianov, was under attack at the
time for isolating the Academy from the industrial ministries.tSs The satellite program
gave him a chance to demonstrate that the Academy could work together with industrial
design bureaus to produce scientific experiments which could advance Soviet industry.
Putting the project under Keldysh's direction also provided a demonstration of
Nesmeianov's assertion that the Academy "can fulfill its role in the country's scientific
orchestra if it is the conductor, not merely a single performer. "1s6
Korolev's strategy was finally successful. On January 30, 1956, the Council of
Ministers issued a decree approving the use of one R-7 booster for launching an
unstabilized 1,000-1,400 kg. satellite with unspecified scientific equipment comprising
between 200-300 kg. of the overall weight. The satellite would be known as "Object D,"
and had a preliminary target launch deadline of the end of 1957. The technical proposal
was exactly as Korolev had submitted to the leadership over 18 months earlier. It was
Korolev's added emphasis on politics and the U.S. announcement that made the project
more palatable to the Soviet leadership.
For more than a year and a half, Korolev and Keldysh pushed their proposal on the
political leadership. Why did it stagnate for so long only to be summarily approved? The
answer lies in timing. Kingdon developed the concept of a policy window, a limited time
at which political streams, policy streams, and agendas converge, providing an opportunity
for major policy changes to take place, ls7 Korolev built political force behind his
proposal, steadily raising it higher on the leadership agenda by building a coalition within
the Academy. This was not enough, to open the window. The final push came from the
American announcement of their intention to launch a satellite, and the strong public
reaction supporting scientific space exploration. This opened the policy window. It was
Korolev's bureaucratic acumen that enabled him to jump through it, by stressing the
political aspect of beating the Americans into space.
_s4InterviewwithEneev, Golovanov,Korolev...p.519, 528.
ls5 See Parrott, Politics and Technology... pp. 159-167.
1s61bid. p. 160.
ls7 See Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies... esp. pp. 174-180.
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CONCLUSION
This paper began with the objective of explaining how Korolev was able to initiate
the Soviet space program in terms that would invite comparison to other apparently
similar programs. It concluded that part of the success of the program was explained by
weak control by the Soviet leadership and "agents run amuck." Without getting into
historical details, such concepts could easily be applied to such programs as the U.S.
atomic program in which Oppenheimer and Groves pursued an inefficient and duplicative
research strategy well after the initial goal of the program had passed._Ss Evangelista
characterized most U.S. programs as being driven primarily by the scientific community
often using disingenuous arguments to support their technological flights of fancy by
jumping through the appropriate policy windows.189 Agents also enjoyed a significant
degree of autonomy under the direction of Admiral Raborn, the manager of the Polaris
missile program. _9° The U.S. ICBM program owed its initial success to the relaxation of
monitoring organizations and regulations. _9_ The fact that each of these programs
featured a very different type of programmatic leadership indicates the organizational
approach taken in paper is more theoretically productive than explorations based on a
single personality alone. The U.S. atomic program featured several intellectual leaders,
and the programmatic leadership for the final push was split between a scientist and a
military officer. The U.S. ICBM program was not noteable for any single programmatic
leader.
Ultimately, what may be most interesting about this program, therefore, was that
Korolev was able to achieve any sort of programmatic autonomy in the Stalinist economic
and political system. The system was indeed created to avoid such opportunistic
behavior. Clearly, much of the credit for overcoming the obstacles of this system must be
afforded to Sergei Korolev. But this paper has pointed out that a significant factor in the
success of the Sputnik program was embodied in the failure of Soviet administrators to
effectively administer the program.
We are led to the question of whether organizational factors were more important
than Korolev himself?. It is difficult to answer this question based on evidence alone.
Instead, we must refer to conjecture based upon historical counterfactuals. That would be
to posit whether Sputnik could have been launched without Korolev; or whether it could
have been launched without agents run amuck. It is difficult to point to another individual
in the Soviet Union other than Korolev who was capable of masterminding Sputnik.
Neither Mishin nor Tikhonravov appeared to possess the administrative aggressiveness of
iss See Richard Rhodes, Making the Atomic Bomb, (
189See Evangelista, lnovation and the Arms Race...
19oSee Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris Program...
191Edmund Beard,
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Korolev; andGlushkomaynot have held the interpersonal skills to hold the diverse group
of designers together. Other talented General Designers such as Iangel and Vladimir
Chelomei did not share the cosmic ambition of Korolev. Nevertheless, it is at least
plausible that one of these men could have risen to the challenge.
On the other hand, it does not seem plausible that Sputnik could have been
launched without the initiative coming from the level of the scientists. Given the lack of
interest on the part of Soviet ministers, it is unlikely that there would have even been a
rocket program without some scientific autonomy. Moreover, under the watchful eye of
the Ministry of Aviation Industry which was primarily interested in long-range aviation the
Soviet rocket program would have been starved for funds. It is also worth noting that the
Soviet leadership did initiate a space program, but even with the unconditional support of
Ustinov, Iangel did not launch a satellite until 5 years after Korolev. Perhaps most
convincingly though, without Korolev's apparently inflated throweight requirements there
would not have been a booster powerful enough to launch a satellite. There, of course
can be no conclusive answer to the question of personality vs. structure. Bit if this
discussion has at least pointed out that there is a question, then it has served its purpose
well.
This paper also contains what may prove to be fruitful ground for further
theoretical discussion of the causes of innovation. If the success of these programs was
partially explained by the ability of agents to run amuck, then principal-agency theorists
might be led to question the sanctity of stable contractual relations between the scientists
and the state. It may be that stable contractual relations are difficult or impossible for at
least certain types of innovation. Support for this notion comes from no less than the
guiding force behind U.S. post-war science policy, Vannevar Bush who noted: "Research,
however, is the exploration of the unknown. It is speculative, uncertain. It cannot be
standardized. It succeeds, moreover, in virtually direct proportion to its freedom from
performance controls."
Clearly however, there were innovations such as the Soviet atomic bomb program
which were tightly controlled. 192 The fact that the Soviet leadership had possession of
American bomb designs suggests that emulation of technological programs redresses the
informational imbalance between scientists and state administrators inherent in
technological innovation. Most Soviet technological programs were characterized by
emulation, and it could be argued that the R-7 and Sputnik represented one of the very
few instances in which the Soviet leadership developed a significant military technology in
advance of the rest of the word. Close control over technological programs was the rule
in the Soviet system. A fruitful line of inquiry remains to be explored at another time
relating state structure, innovation and sequence.
1_ See Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb...
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BEFORE SPUTNIK:
National Security and the Formation of U.S. Outer Space Policy,
1953-1957
Kenneth A. Osgood
University of California, Santa Barbara
The successful launch of the first earth satellite by the Soviet Union on
October 4, 1957 shocked the world, but nowhere was there greater
consternation than in Washington, D.C. 1 The United States had always been
first--first to exploit the spatting of the atom, In-st to successfully detonate a
thermonuclear device--in the Cold War's scientific arena. To many Americans,
the forces of democracy had been suddenly beaten to the punch by backward
communists in the Soviet Union. In the wake of the announcement from
Moscow, American pundits and Congressional leaders pressured the
Eisenhower administration to redouble its efforts to place an American
satellite in orbit. In what has been described as the "Sputnik panic, ''2
Americans demanded that the United States reassert the superiority of
American technology by surpassing the Soviet Union in space exploration.
The widespread domestic outcry which followed Sputnik has diverted
attention away from the formative years of the U.S. outer space program. By
examining the period from 1953-1957 from a national security planning
perspective, this essay contests the view that "political realism" and domestic
considerations alone propelled the space race. 3 Further, it challenges the
conventional view that the Eisenhower administration failed to recognize the
prestige value of spaceflight prior to the Sputnik launch. Rather, the
American space effort grew logically out of the administration's evolving Cold
War strategy. Based to a great extent on psychological considerations, this
strategy accorded science and technology a significant and increasingly
important role in Cold War planning. The administration believed that the
United States needed to demonstrate technological superiority over the Soviet
Union or risk forfeiting its position of leadership in the free world. By taking
the lead in the scientific exploration of outer space, moreover, the United
States could also demonstrate its commitment to scientific progress and the
promise of peace. Viewed this way, Sputnik appears less instrumental than
conventional wisdom holds. The American space effort, rather than being
viewed as a response to Soviet success, should be seen as part of a broader
1 The author wishes to thank Wilson Miscarnble, C.S.C. of the University of Notre Dame, Dwayne
Day of the George Washington University Space Policy Institute, Ronald Doel of Oregon State University,
and the faculty and graduate student members of the Cold War History Group of the University of
California, Santa Barbara for reading earlier drafts of this paper and for providing valuable criticism.
2 Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States Since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1995), 216.
3 Robert Divine,The Sputnik Challenge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 110.
strategy to demonstrate not only the technological and military superiority of
the United States, but also (paradoxically) its peaceful intentions.
Historians have tended to view American space policy largely as a
product of the domestic outcry which followed the Sputnik launch. In most
accounts, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, pressured by a panic-stricken press
corps and opportunistic politicians, abandoned his policy of fiscal restraint in
order to reassure a badly-shaken nation and quiet his political opponents. 4
Most historians, notably Walter McDougaU and Robert Divine, agree that prior
to Sputnik, Eisenhower gave military and strategic imperatives priority over
questions of national prestige. S For Eisenhower, according to this
interpretation, space-related research served two primary objectives. First,
anticipating the day when the high-flying U2 spy plane would lose its
invulnerability to Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), he sought the
development and production of spy satellites to monitor Soviet military
developments. 6 Second, the president wanted to bolster the American
4Historians have emphasized Eisenhower's prudent response to the *Sputnik panic" and the missile gap
crises which followed. In what has become a widely accepted view, E/senhower refused to panic in the face
of considerable congressional and public pressure for a massive arms build-up in reaction to Sputnik.
Because of his commitment to balanced budgets and his determination to avoid an arms race, Eisenhower
resisted political pressure to recklessly pursue a "Manhattan approach" to ICBM development or to pursue
expensive space spectaculars based on shoring-up American prestige. According to this perspective, U-2
intelligence convinced F..isenhower that the United States deterrent remained unaffected by the Soviet
success. Nonetheless, Eisenhower's refusal to divulge the source of his confidence (the U2) meant that he
could not convince the public of the prudence of his policies. For a concise summary of the traditional
view, see Giles Alston "Eisenhower. Leadership in Space Policy," in Reexamining the Eisenhower
Pres/dency, ed. Shirley Anne Warshaw (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). The standard work on the
Cold War in space is Walter MeDongall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985). Robert Divine especially emphasizes the importance of domestic
politics in propelling the space race. See Divine, Sputnik Challenge. For other historians who support
this interpretation, see Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1984), esp. 423-461; Jack Manno Arming the Heavens: The Hidden Military Agenda for Space, 1945-1995
(New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1982); Zuoyue Wang, "American Science and the Cold War, The
Rise of the U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee" (Ph.D. digs., University of California, Santa
Barbara, 1994), 100-182; Paul B. Stares, Space Weapons and U.S. Strategy: Origins and Development
(London: Croom Helm, 1986), 38-58; and Sherry, Shadow of War, 214-237. On Eiserdaower's response to
the missile gap see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty
Years (New York: Random House, Inc., 1988), 236-358; Peter J. Roman Eisenhower and the Missile Gap
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).
5 McDougall emphasizes that the challenge Sputnik posed to America's image and prestige
transformed the conflict into "total Cold War." By presaging nuclear parity and suggesting Soviet scientific
superiority Sputnik turned the superpower rivalry into a colossal public relations contest: 'The Cold War
now became total, a competition for the loyalty and trust of all peoples fought out in all arenas of social
achievement." See McDougall, Heavens, 8. Divine's recent study confirms McDougall's conclusion that
public pressure following Soviet successes in space forced a major reorientation in space policy. Largely a
study in txesidential politics, Divine's book laments the reversal of Eisenhower's prudent and restrained
economic policies and blames the reversal on opportunistic politicians and pundits. Political realism,
Divine emphasizes, dictated that Eisenhower reorient American space policy towards capturing the lead in
space exploration. It was not until the last two years of F_,isenhower's presidency that "Ike would give as
much weight to intangible factors such as world opinion and prestige as to missiles and space craft.' See
Divine, Sputnik Challenge, esp. 183, 205.
6 On the U.S. spy satellite program see Jeffrey T. Richelson, America's Secret Eyes in Space: The
U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 1-123; and Kenneth E. Greer,
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deterrent capability through the development of ballistic missile systems. It
was not until after Sputnik, these authors contend, that the promotion of
American prestige became a primary objective of U.S. outer space policy.
Soviet "firsts" in space and embarrassing American launch failures caused the
administration to reorder its priorities. Henceforth, Eisenhower placed a
premium on programs which he considered unnecessary from a national
security perspective but imperative to promoting American prestige.
Ultimately, these authors maintain that Sputnik did more than fire the
starter's pistol for the space race. It also ushered in a new emphasis on
prestige as a critical component of the Eisenhower administration's foreign
policy. 7
Admittedly, there is much to be gleaned from this interpretation;
however, it tells only part of the story. From the decision to pursue the
satellite program to the selection of a launch vehicle, psychological
considerations permeated U.S. outer space policy. The American effort was
predicated from the start on the belief that the nation which first successfully
launched a satellite would be in a position to reap considerable prestige and
psychological benefits--which could then be used as international currency in
the struggle between Moscow and Washington. Because a powerful balllistic
missile would hurl the satellite into orbit, a successful launch would signal to
world audiences that the United States possessed an effective intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. Eisenhower's National Security Council
(NSC) believed that the satellite's unambiguous relationship to ICBM
technology could affect the will of neutral nations--especially in the
developing world--to resist Communist threats. Furthermore, administration
officials saw a link between demonstrations of scientific and technical
prowess and American credibility. They understood that the inevitable
nuclear stalemate that would result from deployment of ICBMs placed a
premium on alternative demonstrations of national power. 8
"Corona," in Corona: America's First Satellite Program, ed. Kevin C. Ruffner (Washington, D.C.: History
Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1995.)
7 Two historians who challenge this view, in different contexts, are Robert J. McMahon and Rip
Bulkeley. McMahon suggests that image, prestige, credibility and other psychological considerations
always exerted a powerful influence on Eisenhower's foreign policy decisions. See Robert J. McMahon,
"Credibility and World Power:. Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy,"
Diplomatic History vol. 15, no. 4 (Fall 1991), 455-471. Bulkeley's critique of space historiography also
notes the importance Eisenhower attached to psychological matters. He checks the Eisenhower
administration's post-Sputnik rhetoric against its actions prior to the Soviet launch and finds that contrary
to the administration's public statements, its space efforts were "not part of a disinterested policy of SUplXm
for pure science." Rather the administration was concerned from the start that the satellite project "should
be conducted and publicly presented in such a way as to secure the maximum benefit for the prestige and
influence of the United States in the propaganda competition with the Soviet Union." See Rip Bulkeley,
The Sputniks Crises and Early United States Space Policy: A Critique of the Historiography o/Space
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 162.
8 McMahon defines prestige as an "elusive concept" that connoted "a blend of resolve, reliability,
believability and decisiveness; equally important, it has served as a code word for America's image and
reputation." See McMahon, "Credibility," 455. John Lewis Gaddis suggests that by as early as 1950,
when the Truman administration adopted the important policy paper NSC-68, American security "had come
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PARITY AND THE "PEACE OFFENSIVE"
Against a background of steadily increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities,
the Eisenhower administration formally committed the United States to the
scientific exploration of space in 1955. In 1949 the Soviets shocked the Truman
administration with the detonation of an atomic bomb. Four years later the
Soviets again demonstrated their technical proficiency by exploding a
hydrogen weapon. At the same time, reports of Soviet successes in rocketry
provided evidence that soon they would possess ballistic missiles. 9 These
developments came at a Oxne when the United States--under the guidance of
Eisenhower's "new look" strategy--relied heavily on nuclear weapons to deter
Soviet aggression. 10 To the consternation of policymakers, Soviet
technological feats suggested that the era of American overwhelming
superiority would soon give way to an age of nuclear stalemate.11 Moscow's
conciliatory tactics compounded the situation. In the years following Stalin's
death, the new Soviet leadership helped bring the Korean War to a close;
negotiated a peace treaty with Austria; pursued improved relations with such
countries as Israel, Yugoslavia, and Greece; agreed to a summit with Western
leaders; and, in general, emphasized "peaceful coerdstence" over
confrontation with the West. 12 These developments threatened to render
to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that balance actually was."
Consequently, "judgments based on such traditional criteria as geography, economic capacity, or military
potential now had to be balanced against considerations of image, prestige, and credibility." Like the
authors of NSC-68, Gaddis contends, Eisenhower and his advisors attached great importance to perceptions
of power. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American
National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 92 and 144. For analysis of
credibility and deterrence see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976) and Richard Lebow, Between Peace and War: The
Nature oflnternational Crises (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1981). On prestige and the space race see
William H. Schauer, The Politics of Space: A Comparison of the Soviet and American Space Programs
(New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976), esp. 91-105.
9 On the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons see David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet
Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994) and Richard Rhodes,
Dark Sun: The Making ofthe Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Sehnster, 1995). On Stalin's
successors (especially Khrushcbev) and technology, see Vladislov Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside
the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), esp.
138-209.
10 On the "new look" see Gaddis, Strategies, 127-197; Btmdy, Danger, 246-260, Robert A. Divine,
Eisenhower and the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 33-70. For extensive and detailed
discussion of the strategy see Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961
(New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996). on John Foster Dulles and massive retaliation see Gaddis, The
United States and the End o/the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations ( Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992).
11 See for example NIE 11-4-54, 27 Augnst 1954, Declassified Documents Catalog, 1981, document
283A [hereafter DDC with year/document number].
12 On Soviet peace initiatives after Stalin see James Richter, Khrushchev'sDouble Bind: International
Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Volteeh
Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press,
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obsolete assumptions on how best to deal with the Soviet threat and forced
officials in Washington to reevaluate their strategy for opposing the Soviet
Union.
The National Security Council (NSC) warned in 1953 that Soviet nuclear
capabilities combined with the new "soft line" coming from Moscow
strengthened the Soviet hand by undermining American leadership. National
Security Council report 162/2--the policy paper which guided the
implementation of the "New Look" as basic national security policy--predicted
that American retaliatory power remained strong enough to deter the Soviets
from a general attack on the WesL 13 Nevertheless, the NSC cautioned that fear
of involvement in nuclear war circumscribed the will of American allies to
risk war and prematurely led to allied pressure to negotiate. According to this
analysis, Soviet peace overtures exacerbated this trend. Because American
allies "tend to see the actual danger of Soviet aggression as less imminent than
the United States does," the NSC warned that they might fall prey to Soviet
tactics designed to undermine the cohesion of the free world coalition.
Assuming that Soviet peace gestures were "merely designed to divide the West,"
the NSC warned that the twirl tactics of nuclear terror and peace rhetoric
portended serious political and psychological difficulties for United States
leadership. "Using both the fear of atomic warfare and the hope of peace,"
NSC 162/2 concluded, "such political warfare will seek to exploit differences
among members of the free world, neutralist attitudes, and anti-colonial and
nationalist sentiments in underdeveloped areas." 14
Articulated in mid-1953, these themes achieved greater significance in
the second half of the decade. Although the United States enjoyed a clear
preponderance of power vis-a-vis the Soviet Union throughout the 1950s,
alarming reports of Soviet technological and military growth and assertive
diplomatic and economic initiatives by the Soviets in the Third World caused
the U.S. to reasses the very nature of the Soviet threat. 15 As Robert McMahon
has shown, U.S. strategists deviated from the previous administration's
emphasis on military and geostrategic concerns. They emphasized instead the
political, ideological and psychological challenges posed by Soviet conciliatory
tactics and initiatives in the developing world. 16 The United States continued
1996), 171-198; Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973 (New York:
Praeger, 1974), 496-694; Zubok and Pleshakov, Kremlin's Cold War, 138-235.
13 NSC 162/2, 30 October 1953, FRUS 1955-1957, 2: 578-596.
14 National Security Council Planning Board, "Tentative Guidelines Under NSC 16212 for FY 1956,"
14 June 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, 2: 649-665.
15 See JCS to Wilson, June 23, 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, 2: 680-681; John Ddles to the NSC, 15
November 1954, FRUS 1952-1954, 2: 772-776; Streibert to the NSC, 19 November 1954, FRUS 1952-
1954, 2: 784; and Allen Dulles to the NSC, 18 November 1954, DDC, 81/415"B. Their concerns were
likely based, in part, on intelligence estimates warning of Soviet advances in guided missiles technology.
The first estimate to treat the subject was NIE 1I-6-54, 5 November 1954. See Steury, "Missile Gap,
"lntentions and Capabilities, 55. See also NIE 114-54, 27 August 1954, DDC, 81/233A.
16 Robert J. McMahon, "The Illusion of Vulnerability: American Reassessments of the Soviet
Threat, 1955-1956," International History Review, XVIII, 3 (August 1996), 591-619. On the Truman
to fret over the ramifications of the U.S.S.R.'s growing nuclear might to the
cohesion of western alliances. But the dismantling of European empires and
the emergence of dozens of newly independent states introduced a dynamic
new variable into the international equation--one that threatened to alter the
international status quo in favor of the Soviet Union. Administration officials
feared that these previously "peripheral" states would gravitate voluntarily
into the Soviet orbit, as a result of sympathy to communist ideology, lingering
hostility to European imperialists, material necessity, or admiration for Soviet
industrial and technological feats. 17
These developments led to a major reappraisal of basic national security
policy, formalized in NSC SSO1 and adopted in January 1955. This new report
emphatically reiterated the belief that Soviet peace tactics and the approach of
nuclear balance posed the foremost challenges to the United States. 18 "Greater
receptivity by the allies to Soviet peace overtures" and "growing fears of
atomic war on the part of the allies" threatened serious strains between the
United States and its major allies. Furthermore, the growth of Soviet military
only encouraged communist expansion in the developing world, which the
paper described as "a major source of weakness in the position of the free
world." To meet these challenges, NSC SSO1 advised, the United States should
place more emphasis on building the strength and cohesion of the non-
communist world, including both developing nations and major industrialized
allies. Solidifying principal alliances and shoring-up American leadership in
the Third World, then, achieved a new urgency in U.S. policy.
The Eisenhower administlation responded with a new emphasis on
psychological and political activities. On the one hand, the United States
needed to fortify its striking power to reassure American allies of its defense
capabilities. On the other, the competition between the Soviet Union and the
United States to acquire political, economic and military support from
uncommitted countries meant that the United States had to present itself as the
nation best-suited for leadership. Soviet initiatives challenged the United
States to demonstrate its credentials as a promoter of peace and world
development. As NSC 5501 stated, "The ability of the free world, over the long
pull, to meet the challenge and competition of the Communist world will
depend in large measure on the capacity to demonstrate progress toward
meeting the basic needs and aspirations of its people." This meant
encouraging modernization across the globe, fostering international trade,
moderating disputes within the free world, and developing a sound economy.
As the administration t_me-tuned and modified this policy in the years between
NSC 5501 and Sputnik, it also required countering Soviet technological feats
administration's gcostrategy see Mcivyn P. Loftier, Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman
Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).
17 McMahon, "Illusion," 591-619.
18 NSC 5501, 7 January 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, 2: 24-38. For similar sentiments from the
intelligence community, see NIE 11-3-53, 17 May 1955, DDC, 78/22B.
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with American successes. At the same time, Soviet tactics designed to contrast
the belligerence of the United States with the peaceful intentions of the Soviet
Union mandated that the U.S. conduct its Cold War activities in a way that
ensured their reception as peaceful and non-aggressive.
PRELUDE TO LIFTOFF
While policymakers deliberated on the repercussions of nuclear parity
and the Soviet "peace offensive" to national security, scientists and military
personnel investigated the feasibility of launching a "world-circling
spaceship." These studies led to a scientific satellite program geared towards
countering Soviet psychological gains. Early satellite proposals concentrated
primarily on the scientific, reconnaissance, and military utility of satellite
vehicles, but they also presciently noted the political and psychological
ramifications of satellites. The Air Force think-tank RAND forewarned as
early as 1946 that the achievement of a satellite craft "would inflame the
imagination of mankind, and would probably produce repercussions in the
world comparable to the explosion of the atomic bomb." 19 This study had little
appreciable impact, but a subsequent report by Manhattan Project scientist
Aristid V. Grosse brought the potential propaganda consequences of a Soviet
first launch directly to the top levels of the government. 20 Grosse's far-
sighted report, presented to Eiserthower's Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Development Donald Quarles in August 1953, warned that because
the Soviet Union had trailed the United States in the development of atomic and
hydrogen warheads, it might attempt to take the lead in the development of a
satellite. Noting that the satellite "would have the enormous advantage of
influencing the minds of millions of people the world over," Grosse accurately
predicted that the Soviets might forego complicated instrumentation in favor
of putting the satellite into orbit before the United States. "If the Soviet Union
should accomplish this ahead of us," he warned, "it would be a serious blow to
the technical and engineering prestige of America the world over. It would be
used by Soviet propaganda for all its worth. ''21
A number of spaceflight recommendations by prominent scientists and
military leaders followed Grosse's report. Of special significance was a study
delivered by the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) in February 1955.
19 Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., "Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling
Spaceship," Report No. SM-11827, 2 May 1946 in John M. Logsdon, ed.,Exploring the Unknown:
Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Ovil Space Program, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: NASA
History Office, 1995), 236-244. For more on RAND see Merton E. Davies and William 1L Hams,
RAND's Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems and Related U.S. Space
Technology (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 1988).
20 R. Cargill Hall, "Origins of U.S. Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space,"
in Logsdon, Exploring, 213-229.
21 Grosse to Quarles, "Report on the Present Status of the Satellite Problem," 25 August 1953, in
Logsdon, Exploring, 267-269.
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James Ki_ian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
coordinated this influential two-volume inquiry into the problem of surprise
attack. 22 In addition to its important recommendations for accelerating
ballistic missile programs and for providing better strategic warning, the TCP
called for the use of artifidal satellites for intelligence purposes. Z3 All three
services proposed, or had already in progress, satellite programs. These
included the Air Force WS 117L reconnaissance satellite program (later Corona
under CIA auspices), the Navy's scientific satellite proposal (later renamed
Vanguard), and the Army Project Orbiter (later renamed Explorer.)
Additionally, civilian scientists urged the United States to contribute a
scientific satellite as a contribution to the International Geophysical Year
(IGY). In May 1955 the issue of U.S. government support for a scientific
satellite came before the National Security Council, which agreed to launch
such a satellite as a contribution to the IGY. 24
In analyzing the NSC's decision to launch a scientific satellite,
historians have stressed that the President agreed to the proposal only half-
heartedly. Walter McDougaU and Robert Divine describe this early program
as a relatively unimportant, low-priority facade, designed to divert attention
away from the more important military and reconnaissance programs and to
establish the legal principle of "freedom of space." In McDougalI's words, the
NSC gave "indubitable primacy" to the protection of the military and
reconnaissance programs while the prescient findings of Aristid Grosse
"vanished into White House files. "25 This interpretation is consistent with the
argument that Eisenhower, because of his dogmatic commitment to fiscal
responsibility, only belatedly--and under considerable public and
congressional pressure--pursued space spectaculars based on shoring up
American prestige. Eisenhower either did not recognize the political
ramifications of being first in space, this view suggests, or consciously chose
to ignore them. Consequently, historians have found in FAsenhower's aversion
to prestige-oriented space stunts an easy explanation for the American failure
to beat the Soviets into space.
This interpretation, however, accords too much weight to Eisenhower's
post-missile gap recollections and exaggerates his personal role in directing
U.S. space efforts. As pundits and congressional leaders called the President to
22 M_rge Bandy described the Killian report as one of the "most influential in the history of
Americn nuclear policy" for its impact on the development of ballistic missile systems, intelligence
collection recommendations, and efforts to provide better strategic warning m the threat of surprise attack.
See Bandy, Danger and Survival, 325. See also James Killian's comprehensive memoir, Sputnik.
Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978).
23 Portions of the report remain classified, although a general summary is in FRUS 1955-1957, 19:
41-56. The declassified sections of the TCP report and related documents may be found on DDC 93/2972,
93/3111, 96/2701, and 96/2778. See also Bandy, Danger and Survival 325-328; and McDougall, Heavens,
115-118.
24 Hill, "Origins," 221.
25 MeDougall, Heavens, 119-121.
account for failing to beat the Soviets into space, _senhower defended his
actions by claiming the United States was not racing the Soviet Union to begin
with. 26 Yet as Bulkeley has shown, the "bogus" distinction he drew between
the allegedly peaceful, scientific and disinterested American program, and the
militaristic Soviet one was merely a "damage-limiting public-relations
excercise. ''27 Eisenhower's largely self-serving memoirs too should be treated
with care. Written after the missile gap episode and after Kennedy's victory
in the early 1960s, Eisenhower's memoirs were clearly slanted to resurrect his
damaged image, to highlight his restraint in light of JFK's free-spending
policies. 28 While Eisenhower revisionists have correctly refuted the image of
Eisenhower as an inactive president who followed public opinion rather than
leading it, some have tended to overestimate the extent to which Eisenhower
involved himself in policy-making. Admittedly, Eisenhower's balanced budget
mandate did limit the scope and expense of national security programs and he
did devote his personal attention overwhelmingly to missile and
reconnaissance programs. Yet in space policy especially, Eisenhower only
established broad guidelines regarding cost and priority. Having delegated the
authority elsewhere, he left the matter to the executing agencies. The "hidden
hand" President clearly deferred to the advice and judgment of his advisors in
this case. 29
The traditional interpretation also over-states the importance of the
"freedom of space" issue to the scientific sateUite program. 30 Because the TCP
recommended that government agencies re-examine international law to
determine if artificial satellites violated air-space agreements--and because the
IGY provided a convenient opportunity to establish the legal precedent for
later reconnaisance satellites--this argument holds that the United States
participated in the IGY primarily as "cover" for its inteUigence operations.
But the Eisenhower administration was less concerned with the "freedom of
space" principle than it appears. The June 1955 interdepartmental progress
report on the status of TCP recommendations, NSC 5522, supports this view. 31
Submitted after the authorization of the IGY satellite, NSC 5522 reported that
the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense and Justice all concurred that the
26 See for example, Eisenhower's news conferences, 3 October 1957 and 9 October 1957, Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 707-709, 719-32.
27 See Bulkeley, Sputniks Crises, 120, 154-160.
28 John Robert Greene, 'Bibliographic Essay: Eisenhower Revisionism, 1952-1992, A Reappraisal"
in Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency, ed. Shirley Anne Warshaw (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1993), 209-219.
29 For the classic revisionist account, see Fred I. Greenstein, TheHidden-HandPresidency:
Eisenhower as Leader, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982). For historiographical discussion see Shirley
Anne Warshaw, ed. Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993) and
Roman, Missile Gap, 9-18.
30 McDougall, Heavens, 119-121,134. For an alternative view, see Dwayne Day, "A Strategy for
Reconnaissance: Dwight D. Eisenhower and Freedom of Space," unpublished manuscript from his
forthcoming book.
31 NSC 5522, 8 June 1955, DDC 96/2811.
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launching of an artificial satellite was permissible under international law.
The Departments reported that "by customary law every State has exclusive
sovereignty 'over the space above its territory'. However, air space ends with
the atmosphere. There has been no recognition that sovereignty extends into
the airless space beyond the atmosphere. "32 The Deparunents expressed little
concern for U.S. vulnerability to criticism on that front. The IGY satellite,
according to Defense Department comments, was intended "for propaganda and
scientific purposes." Its connection to the freedom of space principle provided
a supplementary motive, but did not drive early U.S. outer space policy.
What about intelligence? To be sure, intelligence applications
undoubtedly provided the primary impetus for satellite research and
development. Not coincidentally, the CIA generously contributed funds to the
IGY program, a sign of its importance to the intelligence community.33
However, CIA funding of the scientific satellite does not by itself prove the
Agency's overriding concern for the legality of reconnaisance overflight.
Instead, the evidence suggests that Central Intelligence conceived of the IG Y
satellite in terms of its psychological significance to U.S. leadership. CIA
comments on the TCP satellite recommendation devoted five lengthy
paragraphs to discussion of its "psychological warfare value," only one short
paragraph to intelligence applications, and zero paragraphs to freedom of
space. As the Agency commented, the Soviets undoubtedly endeavored to
"further her influence over neutralist states and to shake the confidence of
states allied with the United States." Should the Soviets launch a satellite
before the United States, the American reputation as the scientific and
industrial leader of the world would be called into question--a Soviet first
launch would provide Soviet propaganda with "sensational and convincing
evidence of Soviet superiority" to neutral and allied states. Repeating Grosses's
earlier prediction, the CIA advised: "The nation that first accomplishes this
feat will gain incalculable prestige and recognition throughout the world. "34
As the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Department comments
suggest, the Eisenhower administration was not insensitive to the relationship
between American technology and U.S. prestige. They hardly failed to
appreciate the psychological significance of spaceflight. The IGY satellite
program, it seems, was from the outset a defensive rear-guard action designed
to protect the United States from a Soviet propaganda broadside. The United
States had to get a satellite into space before--or at least not much later than--
the Soviets, and it had to design its program in such a way that would deflect
potentially damaging Soviet propaganda.
The timing of the decision itself reflects this view. Scientists had been
debating the merits of an earth satellite for several years and the TCP
recommended a reconnalsance satellite in early 1955, but not until the Soviets
32 NSC 5522, 8 June 1955. Emphasis added.
33 Day, "Strategy for Reconnaisance."
34 NSC 5522, 8 June 1955.
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declared their intention to launch a satellite did proposals in the United States
receive pressing urgency. When, on April 16, 1955, the Soviet Union
announced the creation of a space flight commission charged with orbiting a
space laboratory, American scientists and policymakers reacted swiftly. 35
Joseph Kaplan of the National Academy of Scientists wrote to Alan T.
Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation, calling for swift
executive action on the IGY proposal. "I should like at this time to dwell
briefly on the urgency of this matter," Kaplan wrote after the Soviet
announcement, reminding Waterman that if funds were not forthcoming by
July, it would be virtually impossible for the satellite launch to take place
before the end of the IGY in December 1958. To make perfectly clear the
importance of immediate action Kaplan enclosed a copy of the Washington Post
article reporting the Soviet announcement and added, "the critical shortage of
time cannot be over-emphasized. "36 Kaplan's sentiment is reflected in the
official actions of the U.S. National Committee for the International
Geophysical Year (USNC-IGY). When the USNC-IGY gave its formal approval to
the project at its May 18, 1955 meeting, the official proposal noted not only the
usual scientific, technical and budgetary considerations, but also drew
attention to the importance of expediting the IGY satellite Munch. As the
attachment labeled "Factors Affecting USNC-IGY Schedule" mentioned, "it is of
interest to note that at least one other nation has announced plans for a
similar program under the direction of an extremely able physicist. ''37 The
meaning was clear. The Soviet announcement made American success in this
field imperative.
This sentiment was not lost on Eisenhower's advisors. Nelson A.
Rockefeller, who succeeded C.D. Jackson as Eisenhower's psychological
warfare guru, prepared a substantial memorandum for the NSC calling for
immediate action. Rockefeller placed considerable emphasis on beating the
Soviets to the launching pad. Noting the psychological importance of being
first to launch a satellite, Rockefeller cautioned the NSC of the "costly
consequences of allowing the Russian initiative to outrun ours through an
achievement that will symbolize scientific and technological advancement to
peoples everywhere. 'r He urged the NSC to act quickly in order to deny the
Soviets an opportunity to deprive the United States of whatever psychological
and prestige awards were to be gained. Clearly sensitive to the political
ramifications of spaceflight, he continued emphatically, "The stake of prestige
that is involved makes this a race that we cannot afford to lose."38
, i
35 "Interplanetary Commission Created," Washington Post, 17 April 1955 in Logsdon, Exp/or/ng,
3(38.
36 Kaplan to Alan Waterman, National Science Foundation, 6 May 1955, in Logsdon, Exploring,
302-303. This was Kaplan's second letter on the subject and contained an urgent tone not present in the
first. See Kaplan to Detlev Bronk, President, National Academy of Sciences, 14 March 1955, in Logsdon,
Exploring, 301-302.
37 USNC-IGY, "Minutes of the Eighth Meeting," 18 May 1955, in Logsdon, Exploring, 295-308.
38 Rockefeller to Lay, 17 May 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, 11: 731-733.
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In addition to speed, Rockefeller listed other essential parameters for
the program, many of them firmly rooted in political and psychological
concerns. Since "vigorous propaganda will be employed to exploit all possible
derogatory implications of any American success that may be achieved, it is
highly important that the U.S. effort be initiated under auspices that are least
vulnerable to effective criticism." Rockefeller feared that first launch by the
United States of an uninstrumented satellite could be quickly discounted if the
Soviets were to follow it with the launching of a more sophisticated type. Even
though the United States should endeavor to be first, Rockefeller cautioned,
the American satellite should also possess sophisticated instrumentation.
Furthermore, the U.S. should launch a satellite under international (IGY)
auspices in order to ward off any Soviet propaganda which might bill the
American effort as somehow militaristic or aggressive. Finally, Rockefeller
advised, the American project should share with the international community
the information gleaned from the satellite in order to enhance its perception
as a scientific and therefore peaceful project. 39
Rockefeller's memorandum possesses a fundamental significance. All of
its themes were presented to the National Security Council; it was attached to
NSC 5520, the document authorizing the IGY project, and, most important, its
suggestions were incorporated into the project's guidelines. 40 NSC 5520
emphasized in no uncertain terms the importance of the timely success of the
sateUite project to American prestige. The document began by reminding its
readers that the Soviets were believed to be working on a satellite program and
warned that "considerable prestige and psychological benefits will accrue to
the nation which first is successful in launching a satellite." Just as
important, NSC 5520's provisions were designed to cut to a minimum
ammunition available for the Soviet propaganda machine.
Historians have looked to two of these provisions--one placing the
project under international auspices and the other mandating that it not
materially delay the ICBM and reconnaissance sateUite programs--as proof that
Eisenhower appreciated neither the importance of being first into space nor
the propaganda value of spaceflight. 41 On the contrary, these directives were
predicated on maximizing American prestige gains at the expense of the
Soviets. The NSC believed that the United States needed to launch a satellite as
quickly as possible to reap the prestige benefits of being first into space and to
demonstrate progress in ballistic missile development. Paradoxically,
however, they did not want to use an actual ICBM to do so. The Council wanted
to sidestep propaganda charging the U_. with nuclear belligerence. They also
did not want it to appear as if the United States were actually racing the Soviet
Union, which wouid happen if an uninstnunented satellite were hastily
39 RockefeUer to Lay, 17 May 1955.
40 NSC 5520, 20 May 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, 11: 725-733.
41 Giles Aston, "Eisenhower:. I_xadership in Space Policy," 104-106; McDougallj-/eavens, 132-134;
Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 102-105.
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hurled into space. So the American satellite had to be as "scientific" as possible
and had to provide some useful information. In short, the satellite had to be
quick, but not too quick; it had to demonstrate success in ballistic missile
technology without using "real" ballistic missiles; and it had to be used as a
propaganda weapon without appearing to do so. In light of these confusing
mandates it seems that the shock of October 1957 was preordained not by the
administrations insensitivity to poLitical concerns, but rather by its very
fixation on them.
The three basic principles of NSC 5520--timeliness, peaceful image, and
non-interference--figured prominently in the selection of a launch vehicle
for the satellite. McDougall argues that assuring the project's "civilian flavor"
and non-interference with military programs governed the selection of the
rocket vehicle because Eisenhower did not appreciate the political
implications of being first In space, tf the Eisenhower administration clearly
understood the ramifications of spaceflight, he asks, why then did it assign the
satellite to the doomed Project Vanguard? Was not the selection of the
Vanguard rocket, in McDougall's words, a "disaster"? If so, it was by no means
clear at the time, In fact, the Vanguard rocket was selected precisely because
it promised to deliver the best combination of a// three considerations.
A reexamination of the evidence suggests that timeliness figured just as
prominently--ff not more so--in the selection of a launch vehicle. 42 It should
be kept in mind that the job of selecting a launch vehicle fell to Assistant
Secretary of Defense Donald Qtmrles, to whom the "vanishing" Grosse report
was addressed, who was fully aware of Rockefeller's memorandum, and who
was fully cognizant of the aims established in NSC 5520. If Quarles disregarded
the importance of a timely launch, he did so despite the policy guidance
papers, not because they had mysteriously vanished. Significantly, O uarles's
comments to the TCP progress report NSC 5522 noted that the IGY satellite was
intended "for propaganda and scientific purposes" and mentioned nothing
about "freedom of space" or intelligence applications. 43 Furthermore, the
available evidence suggests that the Stewart Committee--the subcommittee
(named after its director Homer J. Stewart) Quarles appointed to recommend a
launch vehicle for the satellite--assigned speed a high priority.
Confronted with promising proposals from all three services, the
committee selected a launch vehicle based on the three principles of NSC 5520:
42 Divine and McDougall argue that the Eisenhower administration attached very little importance to
speed because of his overriding concern for ballistic missile programs and his determination to maintain the
American project's civilian character. See McDougall, Heavens, 122; Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 102-110;
Giles Alston, "Eisenhower. Leadership in Space Policy," 104-105. Bulkeley, on the other hand, provides
convincing evidence to the contrary. He writes, "the historical perception of... Eisenhower's early space
policy has been coloured by the fact that after Sputnik 1 the admimstration staged a damage-limiting
public-relations exercise ... which drew a bogus but meretricious distinction between its own peaceful,
scientific and allegedly disinterested satellite project and the somehow more sinister and less noble, if more
effective, Soviet one." See Bulkeley, Sputniks, 156-162.
43 NSC 5522, 8 June 1955.
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timeliness, peaceful image, and non-interference with ICBM development. It
irn'st ruled out the powerful Atlas rocket, the Air Force ICBM-in-progress.
Even though the committee expressed concerns that the satellite might
interfere with the development of this important ICBM project, timeliness also
weighed heavily on this decision. The first test launches of Atlas-B were
scheduled for January, February and March 1958, at best an uncomfortably
narrow margin for the IGY. 44 The committee rejected the Atlas for its
guaranteed tardiness and was then left to choose between the Army Orbiter
project and the Naval Research Laboratory's (NRL) project. Contrary to
McDougall's claim that there was "little doubt" that the Army proposal
promised a sateUite soonest, 45 half of the committee members thought Orbiter
less likely to succeed than the NRL Viking rocket. Moreover, some members
also believed that the bigger, heavier Orbiter rocket would cost considerably
more than the Viking. Finally, the Navy's satellite promised far superior
instrumentation and was designed as a research rocket, not a weapon.
Committee members voted three in favor of the Viking rocket, two dissented,
and one abstained on account of illness. 46
Faced with a less than decisive vote for the NRL project, QuarIes
accepted vigorous Army demands to reconsider. Major General Leslie Simon of
the Army Ordnance Corps protested that developmental problems cast doubt on
the Navy's abiliw to launch a satellite within the IGY. Simon's urgent plea
focused on the Army's ability--and the Navy's inability--to orbit a satellite
before the Russians. He promised an Army launch by January 1957 and
warned, "Since this is the date by which the U.S.S.R. may well be ready to
launch, U.S. prestige dictates that every effort should be made to launch the
first U.S. sateRite at that time. ''47 When the Navy got word that the Army was
attempting to snatch their hard-won project, the NRL responded with
assurances of its own. Earning a second hearing before the Stewart
Committee, the Naval Research Laboratory reversed its earlier estimates and
confidently announced that "the first satellite can be launched eighteen
months from the start of the program." This revision of the earlier estimate
was supported from the Glenn L. Martin Company, producer of the Viking. The
company's executive vice president stated: "We see no reason why it should
not be possible to put a satellite in being in approximately 18 months. "48 As
Green and Lomask stated in their official history of the Vanguard project, the
assurances from reputable industrial firms, particularly in regard to delivery
dates, impressed the Stewart Committee. The time element, enthusiastically
44 It should be noted here that McDougall also cites the official Vanguard history by Green and
Lomask for his interpretation of these events. Contance McLanghlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vangutmi:
A H/story (Washington, D.C., 1970), 41.
45 McDougall, Heavens, 123.
46 Green and Lomask, Vanguard, 45-52.
47 Quoted in Green and Lomask, Vanguard, 52-53.
48 Quoted in Green and Lomask, Vanguard, 54.
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stressed by the Army general who spoke for Orbiter, now appeared to be about
equal in both the Army and Navy propositions. 49 Thus, in accordance with
NSC 5520, even though schedule may not have been the primary consideration
and was certainly not the only consideration, it is clear that the scientists and
administration officials charged with implementing the satellite decision
nevertheless appreciated its significance and its connection to American
prestige and credibility.
TECHNOLOGY, CREDIBILITY, AND THE BANNER OF PEACE
Even ff the administration understood the satellite program in terms of
its prestige and political value, important questions remain unanswered. If
Eisenhower believed, as his post-Sputnik and subsequent missile gap
statements suggested, that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) possessed
sufficient firepower to inflict massive and unacceptable damage in response to
a Soviet first strike--if, in other words, the efficacy of the U.S. deterrent to
general war remained unaffected by Soviet ballistic missile deployment--why
then did the administration place such a high priority on a seemingly
insignificant proposal to launch a ten-pound sphere into the atmosphere?
The answer to this question brings us back to the administration's broader
national security concerns. The satellite proposal should be seen in relation to
the administration's efforts to counteract the Soviet's supposed two-pronged
strategy of nuclear threat and the promise of peace. Because the
administration believed that Soviet successes in atomic weaponry threatened
to dismantle U.S, alliances and encouraged third-world neutralism, the United
States attached maximum urgency to its own ballistic missile programs.
Furthermore, the satellite's self-evident relation to the ICBM made early
success in this field an important objective of American foreign policy. A
crucial passage in NSC 5520 stated this psychological connection explicitly:
"The inference of such a demonstration of advanced technology and its
unmistakable relationship to intercontinental ballistic missile technology
might have important repercussions on the political determination of free
world countries to resist Communist threats, especially ff the USSR were to be
the first to establish a sateUite. ''50 In short, the administration was fighting
fire with fire. It sought to counter Soviet "war and peace" tactics with similar
efforts of its own. To counteract Soviet gains in nuclear weapons and
rocketry, it endeavored to demonstrate its own proficiency. At the same time,
the Soviet peace offensive pushed the administration to do so in a manner that
made the United States appear the true bearer of peace and freedom.
In the face of serious challenges to U.S. leadership, then, technology
itself provided a means for demonstrating not only American military power,
49 Green and Lomask, Vanguard, 55.
50 NSC 5520, 20 May 1955.
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but also America's peaceful intentions. This became increasingly clear as
Soviet technological advances coupled with Soviet peace overtures again
forced a review of basic national security policy. The State Deparunent's
Policy Hanning Staff (PPS) recommended such a review in October 1955. The
PPS expressed an especially strong concern for the emphasis in Soviet
diplomacy on "amiability and lure." These flexible tactics caused American
allies to let down their guard and strengthened impulses towards neutralism
and disengagement. To face this challenge, the Staff warned, the U.S. needed
to double its efforts to build free world unity. This meant both maintaining the
credibility of the U.S. deterrent and demonstrating American peaceful
intentions. Technology would help: "We shall have to replace the cement of
fear with new means of cohesion [including] common efforts to use
technological advances for peaceful ends. ''51 At once a symbol of national
power and human progress, the PPS advised, technology should form a major
component of U.S. policies to contain Communist expansion and reinforce
American leadership.
This sentiment was echoed two months later by an Office of Defense
Mobilization-Defense Department (ODM-Defense) working group charged with
recommending to the NSC responses to Soviet technological gains. The task
force, warning that the Soviet Union was several years ahead of the U.S. in
important fields of weaponry and perhaps leading by two or more years in
ICBMs, prescribed constant vigilance and preparation. Although the United
States in 1955 still possessed superior overall firepower, Soviet advances
suggested that "it will take continuous, unrelenting effort on the part of the
U.S. to maintain such superiority on into the future." Dire consequences
awaited: "Failure to maintain technological superiority by the U.S. could result
in loss of confidence by the Free World in U.S. technology and power;
accelerated Soviet expansion geographically and economically; swing of
important uncommitted nations into the Soviet orbit;, [and] defection of
important countries now members of the Free World community." Weapons
systems alone would not suffice, the report cautioned. The U.S. must reflect
overall technological superiority including technology for peaceful purposes,
inventiveness in basic research, and pools of scientific and technical
personnel and institutions. Achieving and maintaining of technological
superiority, the working group advised, were now indispensable elements of
U.S. policies to counter Soviet expansion.52
With each passing year the NSC placed greater and greater stress on
science and technology as central components of United States national
security policy. The ODM-Defense and PPS reports were transmitted to the NSC
planning board and incorporated into the Eisenhower administration's third
51 Department of State, "General Comments on NSC 5501", 3 October 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, 1_.
123-125.
52 "Report by the ODM-Defense Working Group", 20 December 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, 19: 173-
177.
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major revision of basic national security policy, NSC 5602. $3 Reflecting a
broader trend in national security planning, NSC 5602 included expanded
emphasis on U.S. policies to counter Soviet flexible diplomatic initiatives and
technological gains. This 1956 revision of national security policy, like its
1955 predecessor NSC 5501 and its 1957 successor NSC 5707, recommended that
the United States shore-up American leadership by pursuing policies which
reassured the world of American peaceful intentions and technological
superiority. 54
Why such an emphasis on scientific research and technological
innovation? First and foremost, the NSC called for maintaining technological
superiority out of fear that the Soviets might make a breakthrough rendering
the American deterrent inadequate or obsolete. The National Security Council
also saw a link between technological superiority and American leadership.
The NSC felt that the United States had to demonstrate to its allies its capacity to
fulfill its defense commitments. Furthermore, the NSC expressed concern that
Soviet technological and economic progress might serve as "an impressive
example" for peoples of the developing world, which might result in the
expansion of Soviet influence. 55 If the United States fell too far behind in
technological innovation, the NSC believed, it would drastically weaken the
position of the free world. Industrialized allies and developing nations,
lacking confidence in American abilities, would increasingly operate
independently of the United States, undermining its ability to contain Soviet
expansion.
The years dividing the Eisenhower administration's initial satellite
decisions from Sputnik suggested to the administration that its worst fears
were coming true. Anti-colonialist sentiment in the developing world and
strains in the Atlantic alliance seemed to verify that Soviet "war and peace"
tactics were working all too well. Many intelligence analysts and
policymakers in the administration warned apocalyptically that unless the U.S.
moved quickly, it faced isolation from its allies and perhaps even from the rest
of the world. 56 The Eisenhower administration responded to these warnings
immediately. By May 1956, a year after approving the IGY satellite project, the
National Security Council boosted the ICBM to the highest priority of all
defense programs in the country, placed the shorter-range IRBM directly
beside it, and tacked second-highest priority on the satellite program. 57
53 NSC 5602/I, March 15, 1956, FRUS 1955-1957, 19:.242-268.
54 NSC 5707/8, June 3, 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 19:. 507-524. See also NSC meeting, 28 February
1957, DDC, 96/1053.
55 NSC 5602/1,263.
56 See for example NIE 100-5-55, 14 June 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, 19: 85-87; NSC 5525, 31
August 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, 9: 529-531; DOS comments on NSC 5501, 3 October 1955 FRUS 1955-
1957, 19:. 123-125; and NIE 103-7-55, 1 November 1955, DDC 8813158.
57 For official DOS chronologies of important developments in the ICBM and satellite programs see
DDC 9412000, DDC 9412000 and DDC 81/221A.
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The first of these decisions came in September 1955, when the NSC met
to discuss the ballistic missile program. The decision to attach to the ICBM
program the highest priority above all other defense programs again
illustrates the significance the Eisenhower administration attached to
psychological matters in formulating its Cold War policy. This sentiment was
most clearly expressed by the State Department. Acting Secretary of State
Herbert Hoover, Jr., interrupted a seemingly constipated discussion
concerning the precise wording of the ICBM directive--whether the program
should be pursued with "all practicable speed" or "all possible speed"-- to
remind the NSC of the tremendous importance of the ICBM to American
foreign relations. "If the Soviets were to demonstrate to the world that they
actually had an ICBM before we had such a weapon," he warned emphatically,
"the result would have the most devastating effect on the foreign relations of
the United States of anything that could possibly happen." Hoover pointed out
that the Western coalition was held together essentially by the knowledge that
the United States could protect them. "If this umbrella of protection were
removed," he continued, repeating familiar logic, "neutralism would advance
tremendously throughout the free world." To assure continued free world
leadership, in other words, the United States had to maintain its technological
edge: the U.S. had to have an ICBM as soon as possible. 58
President Eisenhower, who was not present at this meeting, removed
any doubts about his feelings on these matters. He unambiguously resolved
the dispute over how best to word the NSC directive, changing the phrase "all
practicable speed" to "maximum urgency." He also authorized, "in view of
known Soviet progress in this field," placing the ICBM program as an R&D
program of the highest priority above all others. Finally, he ordered the State
Department to study of the political ramifications of the intermediate range
ballistic missile, an inquiry to determine whether early achievement of an
IRBM by the United States would counter the implications of a Soviet first
ICBM.59
Of course, the most important issue at stake here was American
credibility. The administration felt it had to make clear the reliability and
superiority of U.S. power. However, the threat of immediate and massive
destruction posed by ballistic missiles carrying hydrogen warheads
complicated matters. The administration understood that in a situation of
nuclear parity its freedom of action would be sharply circumscribed by the
catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. In such a situation perceptions of
power became paramount and placed a premium on overall technological
superiority. As Vice President Nixon expressed at the September 1955 NSC
meeting, "The important thing is not merely the achievement of a developed
weapons capability in the ICBM field, but, from the point of view of foreign
58 NSC meeting, 8 September 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, 19: 111-122.
• 59 NSC meeting, 8 September 1955.
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relations, that the peoples of the free world believe that you have achieved an
ICBM.',60
In the eyes of policymakers, programs like the scientific satellite were
valuable because they reinforced confidence in the capacity of the United
States to resist Communist threats through the visible display of technological
prowess. This sentiment was most clearly expressed by Under Secretary
Hoover. He called the NSC's attention to the fact that the earth satellite was
helping them overcome some of the psychological difficulties posed by Soviet
nuclear capabilities. The mere knowledge that the U.S. was pursuing the
project had "gone a long way to help the free peoples of the world realize that
we were forging ahead in our technical capabilities." As the National Security
Council believed, such confidence was the cement necessary to maintain the
cohesion of the western alliance. 61
The administration also knew, however, that earth-circling spaceships
couid only go so far to demonstrate military capabilities, especially when the
intelligence community predicted that the United States tagged behind the
Soviets by almost two years in ballistic missile technology. 62 Consequently the
NSC moved quickly to expand its missile programs, granting the IRBM the same
"maximum urgency" as its intercontinental cousIn. The decision to step-up the
IRBM came when the study Eisenhower commissioned to forecast the
consequences of Soviet first achievement of a ballistic missile system predicted
disaster. The report, prepared in the State Department by the Policy Planning
Staff, emphasized the psychological ramifications of Soviet first achievement
of an intermediate range missile. This Soviet "first" would "reduce the free
wodd's confidence in U.S. technological superiority and enhance its fears as to
the consequences of war." As a result, the PLanning Staff warned, American
aUies would face increased domestic pressure to adopt independent foreign
policies. They would more vigorously oppose policies carrying risk of war and
would be more likely to compromise on outstanding Kast-West issues.
Moreover, the Soviets could exacerbate these trends toward neutralism by
conciliatory tactics intended to persuade the allies of the wisdom of
accommodation. American achievement of an IRBM at the earliest date, the
report concluded, would be necessary to strengthen confidence in American
retaliatory power and to prevent the erosion of Western alliances. 63
President Eisenhower concurred that the United States needed to possess
and demonstrate an effective ballistic missile capability as soon as possible.
When Secretary DuUes presented the Planning Staff report to the National
Security Council in December, the President reacted in an uncharacteristicaUy
vocal and temperamental fashion. With great emphasis, Eisenhower
hammered Council members for apparent inaction, bureaucratic resistance
60 NSC meeting, 8 September 1955. Emphasis adde_k
61 NSC meeting, 8 September 1955.
62 NIE 100-7-55, 1 November 1955, DDC, 88/3158.
63 DOS memo, undated, FRUS 1955-1957, 19: 154-161.
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and obstructive interservice rivalries. In response to a comment by Air Force
Assistant Secretary Trevor Gardner that the Soviets possessed a two-year lead
over the U.S. in ballistic missiles, Eisenhower responded cryptically, saying
that he "would like to know what had been going on since last July when he
had issued his strong directive on achievement of a U.S. capabili W in the field
of ballistic missiles." Fully subscribing to the views of the State Department as
to the "profound and overriding political and psychological importance" of
such weapons, Eisenhower warned that he was "absolutely determined not to
tolerate any fooling with this thing." The NSC action record for the meeting
reinforced these sentiments with equal force. _senhower, noting that the
political and psychological impact of an effective IRBM would be so great that
early U.S. achievement of such a missile would be of "critical importance" to
the national security interests of the United States, assigned both the ICBM and
the IRBM programs highest priority of all defense programs in the country. 64
These actions run counter to the image of Eisenhower as a President
who only belatedly recognized the importance of prestige to American foreign
policy. To be sure, to note the tremendous political and psychological values
the administration attached to ballistic missiles and to note that the scientific
satellite program was pursued because of its obvious relationship to such
weapons does not necessarily mean that the administration assigned the
satellite program the same priority as the missile programs. Nor does
FAsenhower's enthusiastic endorsement of the ballistic missile programs mean
that the President harbored equal enthusiasm for the satellite project. Indeed
the evidence suggests otherwise. The missile programs were by far the most
important research and development projects in progress and were so because
the President and his advisors believed they should be. The evidence also
suggests that Eisenhower was not overly enthusiastic about the satellite
program to begin with. He was skeptical of its spiraling costs and he harbored
doubts about whether orbiting such a satellite was in fact even possible. 65
On the other hand, the Eisenhower administration placed considerable
emphasis on the project, attaching to the IGY satellite a significance not fully
appreciated in the historical literature. When the NSC met in May 1956 to
discuss the progress of the program, the Council reafFn'rned its belief that the
satellite should not interfere with ICBM or IRBM programs. However, the NSC
also commanded that the satellite be given sufficient priority in relation to
other R&D projects to ensure a launch during the IGY. Thus the
administration ranked the urgency of the satellite program just below the
missile programs and above the roughly 180 other high-priority DOD
programs .66
64 NSC meeting, 1 October 1955, FRUS 1955-1957) 19:. 166-170. See also footnote no. 9, ibid.,
170.
65 These sentiments are well documented by Divine and McDougall and are also illustrated by
Eisenhowefs comments at the NSC meeting, 3 May 1956, DDC, 8711614.
66 NSC meeting, 3 May 1956.
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Just as importanL it would be incorrect to conclude that because the
President voiced some skepticism toward the project that he therefore failed to
understand its political and psychological significance. Eisenhower's
comments at the May 1957 NSC meeting are instructive. The meeting, which
took place shortly after a National IntpAligence Estimate (NIE) predicted the
USSR ;;_uld ,,,o.,,e--_l-a major effo_ to be Pa'st in launching a satellite, 67 reveals
that Eisenhower fully understood the political implications of the scientific
satellite expressed in NSC 5520. Complaining about the spiraling costs of
instrumentation for the satellite, Eisenhower charged the scientists with
wasting too much time and money on gadgets instead of focusing on the main
objective of getting a satellite into orbit in the first place. Betraying
skepticism about the technical feasibility of the project, he confessed he was
annoyed by the tendency to "gold plate" the satellite before "we had proved the
basic feasibility of orbiting any kind of earth satellite." He pointedly stressed
"that the element of national prestige, so strongly emphasized in NSC 5520,
depended on getting a satellite into orbit, and not on the instrumentation of
the scientific satellite." Eisenhower's comments suggest that he was fully
aware of the prestige value of the satellite long before Sputnik and the
ensuing domestic outcry.68
SPUTNIK RECONSIDERED
If the years preceding Sputnik saw the administration placing more an(]
more emphasis on technology as an extension of foreign policy, it remains
true that the period immediately following the Soviet satellite saw these
efforts stepped up dramatically. The expansion of the space program after
October 1957 has been discussed in detail elsewhere, but a few comments
linking national security s_'ategy before and a.,_er Sputnik are _n order.69
Considering that Sputnik ushered in the highly politicized "missile gap",
historians have generally explained the expansion and acceleration of the
space program in terms of domestic politics. While one cannot disregard the
very real political pressure to which Eisenhower was in the wake of Sputnik,
the emphasis placed on domestic politics obscures the fact that the
administration's actions immediately following Sputnik were consistent with
the evolution of its broader national security strategy. From 1953 to 1957, as
Soviet technological gains threatened confidence in American superiority and
as "peaceful coexistence" appeared to undermine U.S. leadership, the
67 NIE 11-5-57, 12 March 1957, in Steury, Intentions, 5962.
68 NSC meeting, 10 May 1957, DDC, 87/846 and 87/844.
69 In addition to the works cited in note 4 above, see Roger D. Launius, NASA: A Histo_. of the
U.S. Civil Space Program, (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing Co., 1994) and John Logsdon,
'Opportunities for Policy Historians: The Evolution of the U.S. Civilian Space Program," in A
Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflight ed. Alex Roland (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1985), 81-107.
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Eisenhower administration placed greater and greater stress on efforts to
advertise American peaceful intentions and to maintain American
technological superiority. Sputnik merely confirmed the wisdom of such
policies. A first-rate propaganda victory, it seemed to prove that the Soviet
"peace and war" strategy--embodied in a scientific satellite launched by a
powerful ballistic missile--was working spectacularly. Indeed, the Sputnik
outcry seemed to verify the most dire predictions of intelligence officers and
policymakers as confidence in American leadership appeared shaken around
the world and at home.
To the NSC, Sputnik not only sapped U.S. prestige by suggesting Soviet
technological superiority, but it also lent added credibility to Soviet
pronouncements--particularly Khrushchev's claim a few months earlier that
it had successfully tested an ICBM. 70 At a meeting of the national security
council a few days after the launch of Sputnik, Allen Dulles interpreted the
event as part of a trilogy of Soviet propaganda moves--the August ICBM test,
the September hydrogen bomb tests, and the satellite launch. Together, he
warned, they seemed to provide the world with convincing evidence that the
Soviets possessed a substantial lead in the technology necessary to construct
an operational ICBM. As Donald Qgarles admitted, Sputnik revealed that the
Soviets possessed even more competence in long-range rocketry and in
auxiliary fields than the U.S. had given them credit.
Additionally, Council members interpreted reactions to Sputnik abroad
as verifying earlier fears that Soviet technological success would undermine
American leadership. As the Director of Central Intelligence warned, Sputnik
was exerting a "very wide and deep impact" in Western Europe, Africa and
Asia. Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter echoed Allen DuUes's
assessment. He reported to the NSC that even the best allies "require assurance
that we have not been surpassed scientifically and militarily by the USSR."
The situation appeared even more disastrous outside the Western alliance,
Herter cautioned, because the Soviet feat seemed to affirm the wisdom of
neutrality. The neutral countries, he noted, "are chiefly engaged in patting
themselves on the back and insisting that the Soviet feat proves the value and
wisdom of the neutralism which these countries have adopted." To the NSC,
then, Sputnik confirmed predictions that Soviet technological spectaculars
could deal a severe blow to U.S. prestige and credibility. 71
The administration's overall response to Sputnik is best summarized in a
State Department memorandum evaluating reactions to the Soviet sateUite. The
document is especially important because many of its concerns came to be
addressed by subsequent revisions of U.S. space policy. The memorandum
outlined four major effects on world public opinion:
70 In a memorandum to the President, White House Press Secretary James Hagerty cautioned that the
satellite does tend to corroboram the Soviet ICBM claim of 27 August 1955. Hagerty to Eisenhower, 7
October 1957, DDC, 87/126.
71 NSC meeting, 10 October 1957, DDC, 87/1653.
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1. Soviet claims of scientific and technological superiority over the West and especially
the U.S. have won greatly widened acceptance.
2. Public opinion in friendly countries shows decided concern over the possibility that
the balance of power has shifted or may soon shift in favor of the USSR.
3. The general credibility of Soviet propaganda has been greatly enhanced.
4. American prestige is viewed as having sustained a severe blow.
Harking back to the earlier predictions of NSC 5520 and 5522, the State
Department expressed the belief that Sputnilgs repercussions would be
greatest among the newly independent or dependent peoples, largely
preoccupied with economic development. The technologically less-advanced
areas of the world would be most easily "dazzled" by the feat. They were also
the areas "least able to understand it" and "most vulnerable to the attractions
of the Soviet system." The State Department warned that by demonstrating the
ability of the Soviet system to compete on a technological level with the West,
Sputnik meant that developing nations would be more likely to turn to the
Soviet bloc for technical and material aid. This, the Department reasoned,
would place them directly or indirectly in the Soviet camp. Because "the
satellite, presented as the achievement and symbolic vindication of the Soviet
system, helps to lend credence to Soviet claims," Sputnik paved the way for an
intensive psychological warfare campaign. 72
These views were reflected in the National Security Council's second
major statement of outer space policy, NSC 5814. Formally adopted in August
1958 after the creation of NASA, it no longer repeated the 1953-1957 warnings
that the U.S.S.R. was threatening to surpass the United States in science and
technology. By this time, the Soviets had orbited two other satellites, one
carrying a live dog and the other nearly 100 times heavier than the biggest
American sateUite. 73 These successes, compounded by televised American
failures, including the Vanguard launch--the "ignominious flop" that burst
into flames before viewers around the world74--seemed to verify the NSC's
predictions. As NSC 5814 stated, "The USSR has surpassed the United States and
the Free World in scientific and technological accomplishments in outer space,
which captured the imagination and admiration of the world." Echoing lines
of reasoning established long-before Sputnik, the Security Council warned
72 DOS, "Reaction to the Soviet Satellite," 16 October 1957, DDC, 81/373A. For similar
expressmns see also: USIA Circular Telegram to All Missions, 16 October 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 24:
167-168; CIA Consultants to Allen Dulles, 23 October 1957, DDC, 95/3241; NIE 11-4-57, 23 November
1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 19: 665-672; Arneson to John Dulles, 14 November 1957, FRUS 1955-1957,
I1: 768-769; Soviet Embassy to DOS, 16 November 1957, FRUS 1955-1957, 24: 185-187; USIA survey,
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that further Soviet demonstrations of superiority in outer space technology
would "dangerously impair" confidence in over-all U.S. leadership. Strength
in space technology was necessary to "enhance the prestige of the United
States among the people of the world and [to] create added confidence in U.S.
scientific, technological, industrial and military strength. "75
The National Security Council dictated the overali goals and parameters
of the now-adolescent space program. In addition to important military and
reconnaissance applications, the NSC directed NASA to "judiciously select"
projects designed to achieve a "favorable world-wide psychological impact." Of
the possibilities--unmanned earth sateMtes, lunar rockets, manned earth
sateMtes, planetary probes, manned circumlunar flights--manned spaceflight
ranked highest because "to the layman" manned exploration represented the
"true conquest" of outer space. "No unmanned experiment can substitute for
manned exploration in its psychological effect on the peoples of the world."
Besides prestige-oriented space spectaculars, NSC 5814 also called for
international cooperation in space activities and directed the U.S. to seek a
treaty banning the use of space for military purposes, both to establish the
United States as leader in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.
The Eisenhower administration's 1958 outer-space policy statement
suggests that Sputnik inspired an increased emphasis on the psychological
impact of U.S. policies. This Included a renewed emphasis not only on space
programs but on other foreign and domestic policies as well As a revision of
basic national security policy advised in May 1958, "The psychological impact
abroad of our policies, both foreign and domestic, plays a crucial part in the
over-all advancement of U.S. objectives. It is essential therefore that along
with the pertinent military, political and economic considerations, the
psychological factor be given due weight during the policy forming
process. ''76 But what ff there had been no Sputnik? As this essay has argued,
the expanded emphasis on psychological matters did not just derive from
domestic pressure nor did it stem solely from the Sputnik challenge. It should
be seen instead as part of a broader response to the changing nature of the
Cold War, a by-product of "peaceful coexistence" in an era of nuclear
devastation. As a 1960 NIE put it, peaceful coexistence, "a strategy to defeat the
West without war," involved a political struggle to capture the support of
peoples across the world. By manipulating issues of peace, disarmament,
anticolonlalism and economic development, by dramatizing the growth of
Soviet power, and by capturing the imagination of the world's peoples with
their technical prowess, the Soviets threatened to attract the allegiance of the
underdeveloped and uncommitted states against the West. 77 If an era of "total
Cold War" developed after October 1957, in which science, technology,
75 NSC 5814/1, 18 August 1958, FRUS 1958-1960, 2: 845-863.
76 NSC 581011, "Psychological Aspects of U.S. Policies," 5 May 1958, DDC, 94/2261.
77 NIE 11-4-60, undated, in Steury, lmentions, 141-146.
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education and the pursuit of national prestige ranked with military and
economic strength as vital forces in the U.S.-Soviet struggle 78, it was as much
a product of the changing nature of the Soviet-American rivalry as it was a
product of Sputnik, Sputnik simply provided the defining image of a struggle
already underway and a race already being run.
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Cover Stories and Hidden Agendas:
Early American Space and National Security Policy
Dwayne A. Day
Abstract:
The recent declassification of a large number of National Security Council documents
clearly shows that the centerpiece of the early American civilian space program--the U.S.
scientific satellite for the International Geophysical Year (IGY)--was in fact started
because of the desire by President Eisenhower and his top advisors to establish a legal
precedent for flying reconnaissance satellites over the Soviet Union. Eisenhower
approved the U.S. scientific satellite program in 1955 as a means of serving as a "stalking
horse" for future intelligence satellite programs) Furthermore, not only was the
Department of Defense interested in this strategy, but the Central Intelligence Agency was
as well, and actually contributed several million dollars in funding to the civilian U.S.
scientific satellite program.
It was language that perfectly in keeping with the popular conception of space at
the time, but which was not well-received in the White House. On February 19, 1957,
before a collection of spaceflight enthusiasts gathered in San Diego, Major General
Bernard Schriever delivered a speech entitled "ICBM - A Step Toward Space Conquest."
Schfiever was the head of the Western Development Division (WDD), the Air Force
development office which was assigned the task of building an operational ICBM as
quickly as possible. Schfiever's role in developing the ICBM was well-known. What was
unknown, however, was the fact that WDD was also responsible for developing
intelligence satellites. The Air Force planned to launch 92 intelligence satellites over the
next five years, culminating in a large signals intelligence satellite in 1962. It was an
ambitious plan, but one still lacking money and unknown to the outside world.
Schriever could not speak in San Diego of the classified mission he oversaw.
Instead he talked about how WDD's experience in developing the Atlas ICBM could be
applied to space. He also spoke of the value of space to the military, and he did not mince
words:
2In the long haul our safety as a nation may depend upon our achieving 'space
superiority.' Several decades from now the important battles may not be sea
battles or air battles, but space battles, and we should be spending a certain
fraction of our national resources to insure that we do not lag in obtaining space
supremacy. 2
The next day, arriving at his headquarters in Los Angeles, Schriever had a telegram
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense waiting for him. It was explick: do not use
the word "space" in any more speeches. Remembering back on this event, Schriever's
frustration still showed. "I was angry," he recalled over 40 years later while sitting in his
office in Washington. But he was an Air Force officer and the Secretary of Defense was
his boss. There was never any question about what he would do: "I didn't use the word
space anymore in my speeches. "a
The language in Schrieveffs speech was not unusual for the times. Wernher von
Braun, who had far more visibility as a spokesperson for space than Schfiever, had used
the terra "conquest" often when discussing space, including a series of high-profile articles
for Collliers' magazine. But where yon Braun saw space as new territory to be conquered
like the Old West, Schriever saw it as new territory from which to wage battle. He had
not been reticent to talk about it in these terms, and despite the muzzling from the
Pentagon, the message had already gotten out. On March 4, Newsweek ran an article
about the American Vanguard space program. A small accompanying article included a
picture of a stem-looking Schriever and referred to him as "one of the major prophets of
space warfare." It quoted the general as stating that "the compelling motive for the
development of space technology is... national defense. ,,4
Schriever was only mentioned in the sidebar article, but the main story was
unlikely to be any more soothing to the Eisenhower White House, for it was titled "Race
Into Space: Can We Win?" The story likely rattled the White House because President
Eisenhower and his advisors had explicitly chosen a space policy and a public posture that
attempted to downplay the idea the United States was attempting to "race" the Soviets
into space. They had chosen a policy which portrayed the fledgling American space
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programas a small, scientific effort--the development of a rocket and satellite combination
referred to as Vanguard. Official Pentagon policy was to make no mention of a race and
no mention of a military space program.
The only public space program was in actuality a cover, a deception. It shielded
what the White House and Pentagon leadership actually cared about, the political
vulnerability of its defense programs. This was not unique to the space program. It was a
common strategy for the way that Eisenhower approached many sensitive national security
missions--hiding them behind open programs, usually scientific and civilian in appearance,
so that they would not be challenged openly by the Soviets. It was to become a common
strategy for the later military space program, but it all started with Vanguard.
The Killian Report
In September 1954, the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense
Mobilization, under orders from President Eisenhower, began a scientific study of the
problem of surprise attack. 5 Eisenhower was concerned about recent Soviet developments
in various strategic weapons systems and asked the Committee to evaluate American
capabilities to respond to them using the latest advances in science and technology. This
study was headed by James Killian, then president of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The group was known as the Technological Capabilities Panel; it issued its
report "Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack" on February 14, 1955. This was otten
referred to as the "Killian Report" and it greatly impressed Eisenhower. It convinced him
that science and technology could be used to defeat an enemy.
During the course of its deliberations, the study's intelligence panel, headed by
Polaroid's Edwin "Din" Land, became aware of two advanced proposals for intelligence
collection. One was a nuclear powered reconnaissance satellite using a television camera.
This was outlined in a report by the Air Force's think-tank, the RAND Corporation,
known as Project Feed Back. The other idea that Land's panel investigated was a U.S.
4Air Force development program called BALD EAGLE which was intended to develop a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.
While investigating the aircraft program, the panel became aware of another
proposal by the Lockheed Skunk Works for its own high-flying strategic reconnaissance
aircraft, known as the CL-282. Land brought this proposal to the attention of President
Eisenhower in November 1954. Unlike the Air Force program to develop a
reconnaissance aircraft, the CL-282 would be configured to carry out strategic
reconnaissance prior to hostilities--so-called pre D-Day reconnaissance. This was a
mission that the Strategic Air Command had previously rejected, but one that those on the
TCP thought vital.
Eisenhower approved the CL-282 project and placed it under the charge of the
Central Intelligence Agency. The plane eventually became known as the U-2. The
program was managed by a newcomer to the CIA, Richard Bissell. The aircraft was never
mentioned in the TCP report itself, but was described in a highly classified annex. This
annex was for the "Eyes Only" of President Eisenhower, and was probably destroyed by
him along with another classified annex on the submarine-launched ballistic missile
program. 6
According to Eisenhower's staff secretary, then-Colonel Andrew Goodpaster,
Eisenhower assigned the U-2 mission to the CIA for three reasons. First, he thought it
would be less provocative if a civilian pilot, rather than a military one, flew the aircraft
into foreign territory. Second, he wanted the product--the reconnaissance photographs--
to be evaluated at the national leadership level, as opposed to being evaluated within the
military services. Based upon his long years of experience in the military, Eisenhower
knew that the military had an incentive to interpret intelligence to its advantage. Finally,
he was concerned about not antagonizing the Soviets by pursuing a provocative program
in the open. He was concerned that the military would pursue the program in a way that
would only escalate tensions between the superpowers. 7 According to Goodpaster,
Eiserthower was always distressed to see magazines carrying advertisements of bombers
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and fighter aircratt. He felt that the military encouraged defense contractors to place such
ads and that they projected an image of a society preparing for war with the Soviet Union.
This could prompt the Soviets to respond the same way, leading to a spiraling arms race.
For Eisenhower, stealth and concealment were the preferable approach, hence the U-2
was given to an organization that could operate in secret.
Those involved in the TCP report realized that overflight of another nation's
territory by such an alrcratt would constitute a clear violation of international law and
could be viewed as a hostile act by the Soviets. In fact, such issues were not abstract,
since American aircratt flying missions on the periphery of the Soviet Union were being
fired upon on a regular basis and even shot down. The consequences of violating national
airspace was clearly a major concern for those planning aircratt reconnaissance missions.
But a satellite, flying much higher, would not necessarily violate international law since no
clear definition existed of where "airspace" ended and "space" began. Realizing this, Land
and the others on the panel decided to attempt to strongly influence the establishment of
international law.
The intelligence committee recommended that the United States develop a small
artificial earth satellite to establish the right of "freedom of space" for future larger
intelligence satellites. 8 Doing so would allow the United States to distinguish between
"national airspace" and "international space." By establishing the definition itself, the
United States could later use international space to its advantage by flying intelligence
satellites over the Soviet Union?
Land, Killian and others in 1955 considered the reconnaissance satellite to be
technologically unrealistic in the near future. They believed that the CL-282 and an Air
Force reconnaissance balloon program (later known as GENETRIX) were more realistic
near-term possibilities worthy of the most effort. But they felt that the United States
should begin work toward establishing a precedent to enable future satellite
recormaissance missions. The TCP advocated using an ostensibly civilian program to clear
a path for a future military program.
5
The Scientific Satellite Program
In parallel to the deliberations of the Technological Capabilities Panel, serious
proposals for an initial U.S. scientific satellite were emerging. For example, Wernher yon
Braun and his colleagues at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Alabama,
teamed up with the Office of Naval Research to propose a satellite called Orbiter. Later
in the year, the American Rocket Society prepared a detailed survey of possible scientific
and other uses of a satellite and proposed it to the National Academy of Sciences' U.S.
National Committee for the International Geophysical Year. The IGY was to run from
June 1957 to December 1958 and involve international cooperation on the study of the
earth.
As it was, 1954 proved to be a very significant year for the generation of ideas
concerning scientific and intelligence collection systems. In addition to both the Feed
Back and CL-282 proposals, the National Academy .was now considering a scientific
satellite as well. These projects became inextricably politically linked.
The Feed Back and the Killian reports were both highly secret, although the
Orbiter proposal was not. The CL-282 proposal, in particular, was known to only a
handful of people? ° One person who did know of all three projects, as well as of the TCP
report, was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for R.esearch and Development, Donald
Quarles.
Quarles was also no stranger to proposals for Earth-orbiting satellites. In 1952,
Aristid Grosse, a physicist at Temple University, had been asked by President Truman to
prepare a report on "the Present Status of the Satellite Problem." The report was not
ready before Truman left office and instead the White House forwarded it to Quarles, who
as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Kesearch and Development was in charge of
virtually all defense-related research projects.
On March 14, 1955 (the same day as the presentation of the TCP report), the U.S.
National Committee on the International Geophysical Year of the National Academy of
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Sciences (NAS) presented a recommendation to Alan Waterman, the Director of the
National Science Foundation (NSF). The Committee recommended that a scientific
satellite be developed as part of the IGY. 11 After the TCP report came out, Quarles asked
Waterman to formally suggest the National Academy's idea to the National Security
Council. Four days later Waterman sent a letter to Robert Murphy, Deputy Under
Secretary of State, proposing that the United States conduct just such a scientific
mission? 2 Those at the National Academy would not have been privy to information
about Feed Back, CL-282, or the TCP report, so they were unlikely to recognize the
strategic objectives behind Quarles' support of their satellite proposal.
Four days later Murphy met with Waterman, Detlev Bronk, President of the NAS,
and Lloyd Berkner, one of the Academy's influential members, to discuss the issue. In a
letter one month later, Murphy stated that such a proposal would "as a matter of fact,
undoubtedly add to the scientific prestige of the United States, and it would have a
considerable propaganda value in the cold war. ''t3 Having gained the support of the
Department of State, Waterman then discussed the issue once again with Quarles, who
suggested that he consult the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, on how best
to proceed. Waterman did so and gained Dulles' support for the program. He also spoke
with Percival Brundage, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to gain his cooperation
when needed. Thus, the scientific satellite proposal now had the support of the
Departments of State, Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the Bureau
of the Budget. Waterman also agreed to formally propose the full program to an
executive session of the National Science Board on May 20. TM Waterman was lining up
bureaucratic support for the project at Quarles' urging.
Whether any of these other people were aware that Quarles' interest in the
proposal had been prompted by a classified national security report is unknown. But
clearly Quarles was on a mission to enact one of the TCP's recommendations and he
worked quickly.
NSC 5520
The speed at which these events took place is startling. Only nine weeks after the
TCP report recommended the approval of a scientific satellite program, on May 20, 1955,
the National Security Council approved a top-level policy document known as NSC 5520,
"U.S. Scientific Satellite Program." The document stated that the United States should
develop a small scientific satellite weighing 5 to 10 pounds. It was very clear about why
the United States should do this:
The report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the President's Science
Advisory Committee recommended that intelligence applications warrant an
immediate program leading to a very small satellite in orbit around the earth, and
that re-examination should be made of the principles or practices of international
law with regard to Treedom of Space' from the standpoint of recent advances in
weapon technology._S
The document continued:
From a military standpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated their belief that
intelligence applications strongly warrant the construction of a large surveillance
satellite. While a small scientific satellite cannot carry surveillance equipment and
therefore will have no direct intelligence potential, it does represent a technological
step toward the achievement of the large surveillance satellite, and will be helpful
to this end so long as the small scientific satellite program does not impede
development of the large surveillance satellite. 16
NSC 5520 also stated:
Furthermore, a small scientific satellite will provide a test of the principle of
Treedom of Space.' The implications of this principle are being studied within the
Executive Branch. However, preliminary studies indicate that there is no obstacle
under international law to the launching of such a satellite.
It should be emphasized that a satellite would constitute no active military
offensive threat to any country over which it might pass. Although a large satellite
might conceivably serve to launch a guided missile at a ground target, it will
always be a poor choice for the purpose. A bomb could not be dropped from a
satellite on a target below, because anything dropped from a satellite would simply
continue alongside in the orbit.
Although the document correctly noted the limited utility of satellites as active
military offensive threats, this was not the purpose of the surveillance satellite program. In
fact, deploying weapons systems in orbit has never been a significant aspect of American
military space policy.
A year later, another White House document stated that the scientific satellite
program would have the target date of 1958 "with the understanding that the program
developed thereunder will not be allowed to interfere with the ICBM and IRBM programs
but will be given sufficient priority by the Department of Defense in relation to other
weapons systems to achieve the objectives of NSC 5520. "17 In other words, the scientific
satellite would not be allowed to interfere with ballistic missile programs like Atlas and
Jupiter, but it also would not be allowed to languish without attention while the
Department of Defense focused on other programs with more direct military utility. Such
inattention would have effectively undercut the entire purpose of NSC 5520. At the same
time, the launching of such a satellite was not to interfere with the development of the
intelligence satellite.
NSC 5520 specifically directed that the scientific satellite program be associated
with the International Geophysical Year. "Freedom of space" could be challenged by the
Soviets more easily if the U.S. simply launched a satellite at any time. The IGY provided
an international context for conducting the program--an excuse. It was a legitimate cover
story even better than the civilian auspices of the existing program. Even if the Soviets
had not announced their intention to build a satellite for the IGY, the United States would
be able to use the IGY to justify its program if the Soviets complained. Quarles himself
specifically noted this reality only a week after the approval of NSC 5520. _g
The Technological Capabilities Panel report was perhaps one of the most
influential documents of the Cold War. It served as the starting point of a number of
major American defense programs in the 1950s. Not only did it recommend the
development of what became the U-2, the scientific satellite program, and reconnaissance
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satellites, but it also recommended the development of what became the Polaris
submarine-launched balhstic missile, the SOSUS underwater sonar array, and the
extension of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. The freedom of space
recommendation was therefore one among many, and it was in no way particularly special.
It was merely one that was unlikely to make progress without specific high-level
involvement. Quarles gave it the start that it required.
Defining the Heavens
The TCP's extensive list of recommendations required a concerted implementation
effort by the various agencies and military services that were affected. It required an
extensive oversight effort as well and this task fell to the Operations Coordinating Board
of the National Security Council which produced a progress report in June 1955 on the
status of the TCP recommendations. This progress report, known as NSC 5522, also
included reports from various government departments on their views on the Panel's
recommendations. In response to the TCP recommendation concerning freedom of space,
NSC 5522 noted that a program had already been started to meet the recommendation.
Further it stated:
State, Treasury, Defense and Justice Comment: Any unilateral statement by the
U.S. concerning the freedom of outer space is unnecessary. It is clear that the
jurisdiction of a state over the air space above its territory is limited and that the
operation of an artificial satellite in outer space would not be in violation of
international law. State and Justice point out that by the convention on
international civil aviation of 1944 (to which the U.S. is a party, but the U.S.S.R. is
not) and by customary law every State has exclusive sovereignty "over the air
space above its territory." However, air space ends with the atmosphere. There
has been no recognition that sovereignty extends into airless space beyond the
atmosphere. _9
This statement may have appeared self-evident to those involved, but in effect it
begged the question: if space was not sovereign territory (a question for which there was
no precedent), how was a nation to determine where the atmosphere-which was
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sovereign territory--ended and space began? The edge of the atmosphere was not a
clearly defined boundary and, indeed, could not be defined until satellites began orbiting
the Earth to measure the extent of the atmosphere. Still, it made sense for the
Departments to advise that the United States not issue a unilateral statement concerning
freedom of space, for such a statement would only draw more attention to the subject at a
time when the whole point of the scientific satellite program was to establish freedom of
space in as inconspicious a manner as possible. For the government lawyers as well as the
policy makers, it was better to simply do it and talk about it later.
The CIA also expressed its opinion on the subject, in a commentary that proves
highly illuminating and remarkably prescient, especially in light of the world reaction to
Sputnik two years later:
The psychological warfare value of launching the first earth satellite makes its
prompt development of great interest to the intelligence community and may make
it a crucial event in sustaining the international prestige of the United States.
There is an increasing amount of evidence that the Soviet Union is placing more
and more emphasis on the successful launching of the satellite. Press and radio
statements since September 1954 have indicated a growing scientific effort
directed toward the successful launching of the first satellite. Evidently the Soviet
Union has concluded that their satellite program can contribute enough prestige of
cold war value or knowledge of military value to justify the diversion of the
necessary skills, scarce material and labor from immediate military production. If
the Soviet effort should prove successful before a similar United States effort,
there is no doubt but that their propaganda would capitalize on the theme of the
scientific and industrial superiority of the communist system.
The successful launching of the first satellite will undoubtedly be an event
comparable to the first successful release of nuclear energy in the world's scientific
community, and will undoubtedly receive comparable publicity throughout the
world. Public opinion in both neutral and allied states will be centered on the
satellite's development. For centuries scientists and laymen have dreamed of
exploring outer space. The first successful penetration of space will probably be
the small satellite vehicle recommended by the Technological Capabilities Panel.
The nation that first accomplishes this feat will gain incalculable prestige and
recognition throughout the world.
The United States' reputation as the scientific and industrial leader of the world has
been of immeasurable value in competing against Soviet aims in both neutral and
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allied states. Since the war the reputation of the United States' scientific
community has been sharply challenged by Soviet progress and claims. There is
little doubt but that the Soviet Union would like to surpass our scientific and
industrial reputation in order to further her influence over neutralist states and to
shake the confidence of states allied with the United States. If the Soviet Union's
scientists, technicians and industrialists were apparently to surpass the United
States and first explore outer space, her propaganda machine would have
sensational and convincing evidence of Soviet superiority.
If'the United States successfully launches the first satellite, it is most important that
this be done with unquestionable peaceful intent. The Soviet Union will
undoubtedly attempt to attach hostile motivation to this development in order to
cover her own inability to win this race. To minimize the effectiveness of Soviet
accusations, the satellite should be launched in an atmosphere of international good
will and common scientific interest. For this reason, the CIA strongly concurs in
the Department of Defense's suggestion that a civilian agency such as the U.S.
National Committee of the IGY supervise its development and that an effort be
made to release some of the knowledge to the international scientific community.
The small scientific vehicle is also a necessary step in the development of a larger
satellite that could possibly provide early warning information through continuous
electronic and photographic surveillance of the USSR. A future satellite that could
directly collect intelligence data would be of great interest to the intelligence
community.
The Department of Defense has consulted with the [Central Intelligence] Agency,
and we are aware of their recommendations, which have our full concurrence and
strong support? °
The Department of Defense in mid-1955 was not pursuing an active intelligence
satellite program. All it had at the time was a series of small Air Force technology
development efforts. But the scientific satellite program was underway and the lawyers
were now debating the legalities of the program in secret.
If those involved with the legal issues needed their thinking sharpened about issues
of international airspace, they could ask for no better lesson than that provided less than a
year later by the GENETR/X reconnaissance balloon program, which had also been
endorsed by Killian and Land. Hundreds of balloons were launched beginning in January
1956 so that they would dritt over the Soviet Union, their cameras photographing the
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countryside. Officially, the balloons were part of a scientific program intended to
photograph clouds. In reality, they carried sophisticated reconnaissance equipment.
The majority of the balloons were never seen again and American officials knew
that they had come down (or been shot down) inside the Soviet Union. This was in reality
a rather ironic development; because of the planned future flights of the U-2 at 70,000
feet, the balloons had been ballasted to fly lower than their operational altitude. This was
done so that the Soviets would not be provoked into quickly developing a capability to
track and shoot down objects at that extreme altitude. The result was that as the balloons
cooled at night, they sank below 40,000 feet and well within range of Soviet aircraft,
in the early morning hours before they rose back to theirwhich shot them down
operational altitude.
On February 7, anticipating the Soviet response, Eisenhower suggested to
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that the operation be suspended and "we should
handle it so it would not look as though we had been caught with jam on our fingers." On
February 9, the Soviets held a press conference outside Spridonovka Palace. About fifty
balloons and instrument containers were placed on display. The balloons, the Soviets said,
were part of an espionage project and had been a clear violation of their airspace. It was a
major embarrassment for the United States, but the U-2 was still under development and
promised far greater capabilities.
Meanwhile, legal issues concerning exactly what "freedom of space" meant
occupied U.S. government lawyers. The State Department's Policy Planning Staff was
assigned the task of reporting on-going progress on achieving several of the TCP report's
recommendations. On October 2, 1956, the Policy Planning Staff reported some
preliminary thinking on the issue of freedom of space:
So far as law is concerned, space beyond the earth is an uncharted region
concerning which no firm rules have been established. The law on the subject will
necessarily differ with the passage of time and with practical efforts at space
navigation. Various theories have been advanced concerning the upper limits of a
state's jurisdiction, but no firm conclusions are now possible.
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A few tentative observations may be made: (1) A state could scarcely claim
territorial sovereignty at altitudes where orbital velocity of an object is practicable
(perhaps in the neighborhood of 200 miles); (2) a state would, however, be on
strong ground in claiming territorial sovereignty up through the "air space"
(perhaps ultimately to be fixed somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 miles); (3)
regions of space which are eventually established to be free for navigation without
regard to territorial jurisdiction will be open not only to one country or a few, but
to all; (4) if, contrary to planning and expectation, a satellite launched from the
earth should not be consumed upon reentering the atmosphere, and should fall to
the earth and do damage, the question of liability on the part of the launching
authority would arise. 2_
GENETRIX had provided a good warning of what could happen if an intelligence
mission went wrong and if a program's cover was blown. A different lesson was provided
in July, when the U-2 made a half dozen sorties over the Soviet Union. The U-2, like
GENETRIX, also had a cover story. It was portrayed as a civilian weather
reconnaissance aircraft. But the aircraft went virtually unnoticed outside of the aviation
trade press, where some reporters accurately surmised its true purpose. Although the
Soviets tracked the plane immediately, they did not protest. Lacking the ability to knock
the U-2 out of the sky, they chose not to publicly admit their vulnerability to American
reconnaissance technology.
The U-2 demonstrated a number of things to Eisenhower and his advisors. First
and foremost, it demonstrated the immense value of overhead reconnaissance systems.
The photographs returned by the U-2 were stunning in their quality. The U-2 also
demonstrated that both the United States and the Soviet Union had a stake in keeping
certain things private. Finally, it demonstrated that a cover story could work.
Concealment and obfuscation of intelligence missions had a benefit for superpower
relations even when the other side suspected, or actually knew, what was happening. =
This was the guiding principle of the satellite program adopted under NSC 5520. It was
to be a guiding principle for other space programs as well.
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Selectinga Satellite Plan
After the scientific satellite concept had received approval with NSC 5520 in May
1955, it had to be turned into programmatic reality. Not surprisingly, this task fell to
Donald Quarles. On June 8, 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson wrote a memo
placing Quarles in charge of starting the scientific satellite program. Quarles then created
an Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, chaired by Homer J. Stewart, to select a
scientific satellite and a method for launching it. They held hearings and listened to
presentations by the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Army's proposal was basically a
variation of yon Braun's earlier Orbiter concept. The Air Force submitted a proposal from
Schriever's Western Development Division, but did not make a concerted effort to win the
program. The Navy Research Laboratory proposed using a modified upper atmosphere
research rocket. The Advisory Group selected the Navy proposal, which as named
Vanguard. z3
Many involved, particularly Army group, which consisted primarily of Wemher
yon Braun's "rocket team," were surprised that the Army proposal had lost out. The
Army team had extensive experience with ballistic missiles and had begun developing their
proposal a year before. When explaining the decision years later, members of the
Advisory Group gave a number of reasons, including Navy developments in satellite
instrumentation, the supposed lower costs and growth potential of the Vanguard, and the
desire to avoid using a ballistic missile for the program. 2' The latter point was the most
relevant one: NSC 5520 was quite explicit in its statement that the satellite program
should not interfere at all with ICBM and IRBM programs. There was no way that the
Army proposal could be selected without interfering with Army development of the
Redstone booster as the basis of an IRBM to be called Jupiter--at least without significant
additional cost.
The Advisory Group's decision in favor of the Navy program did not settle the
issue. The Huntsville group, justifiably, felt that they deserved to win. "There wasn't
much confidence, frankly, in the Vanguard." said Fred Durant, one of the original
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membersof the Orbitergroup. TheNavy proposalwas too new andthe teamunproven.
But according to Durant it was not necessarily arrogance that caused the Army team to be
so stunned. The Huntsville group was more confident because of their longer experience
launching rockets and making mistakesY The Vanguard team had none of that experience
and lacking that, would have to make their own mistakes before achieving success. From
the perspective of the Army, that meant that the Soviets were more likely to reach the goal
first.
Throughout 1955 and 1956, the Army team proceeded with development of a
Jupiter/Redstone rocket designed to conduct re-entry tests of ballistic nosecones while the
Navy developed the Vanguard and the NSF and National Academy of Sciences developed
the satellite for flying atop it. But the Army continued to lobby behind the scenes to
obtain permission to proceed with their own satellite launching program.
On April 23, 1956, the newly formed Army Ballistic Missile Agency, under the
command of Major General John B. Medaris, informed the Office of the Secretary of
Defense that a Jupiter missile could be fired in an effort to orbit a small satellite as early as
January 1957. It proposed that this be considered an alternate to the Navy Vanguard
program. On May 15, the Secretary of Defense's Special Assistant for Guided Missiles
disapproved ABMA's proposal. On May 22, the Assistant Secretary of Defense informed
ABMA that no plans or preparations should be initiated for using either Jupiter or
Redstone missiles as satellite launch vehicles. _6
But all good military officers and bureaucrats know that there is no such thing as a
"no" in Washington. ABMA took its plea to Deputy Secretary of State Hoover, who was
in charge of the Operations Coordinating Board which was responsible for overseeing the
implementation of the NSC 5520 decision. In June 1956, then-Colonel Andrew
Goodpaster, who was serving as Eisenhower's staff secretary, reported on an incident that
demonstrated both the Huntsville group's lobbying and their perception of the prejudice
against them. Goodpaster stated:
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OnMay 28thSecretaryHoovercalledmeoverto mentionareport hehadreceived
from a former associatein the engineeringand developmentfield regardingthe
earthsatelliteproject. Thebestestimateis that the presentproject would not be
readyuntil the endof'57 at the earliest,andprobablywell into '58. Redstonehad
a projectwell advancedwhenthenewonewassetup. At minimalexpense($2-$5
million) they couldhavea satellitereadyfor firing by the endof 1956or January
1957. The Redstoneproject is one essentiallyof Germanscientistsand it is
Americanenvyof themthat hasledto aduplicativeproject.
I spoketo thePresidentaboutthis to seewhat would be the best way to act on the
matter. He asked me to talk to Secretary W'tlson. In the latter's absence, I talked
to Secretary [Deputy Secretary of Defense] Robertson today and he said he would
go into the matter fully and carefully to try to ascertain the facts. In order to
establish the substance of this report, I told him it came through Mr. Hoover (Mr.
Hoover had said I might do so ifI felt it necessary)Y
This incident started a new evaluation of the satellite selection process which
ultimately rejected the Huntsville group once again. On June 22, 1956, Homer J. Stewart,
who was Chairman of the Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, reported the results of
two meetings held by the Group in late April to Charles C. Furnas, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Research and Development who had replaced Quarles (who was now
Secretary of the Air Force). Stewart reported that although Project Vanguard was
suffering some minor setbacks and was short of highly capable people, in general the
project was on a satisfactory schedule and "one or more scientific satellites can be
successfully placed in orbit during the IGY. ''_ Stewart also stated:
Redstone re-entry vehicle No. 29, now scheduled for firing in January 1957,
apparently will be technically capable of placing a 17 pound payload consisting
principally of radio beacons and doppler-equipment in a 200-mile orbit, even with
the degradation in performance below the present design figures which might
reasonably be expected, but without any appreciable further margin. This
capability will depend upon successful accomplishment of several developments,
such as the use of a new fuel in the Redstone booster, and the spinning cluster of
fifteen solid propellant motors. The probability of success of this single flight
cannot be reliably predicted now, but it would doubtless be less than 50 per cent.
Stewart explained why the Army proposal should be rejected once again:
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In any case,such a singleflightwould not fulfillthe Nation'scommitment for the
InternationalGeophysical Year because itwould have to be made before the
beginning of thatperiod. Adequate tracking and observationequipment for the
scientificutilizationof resultswould not be availableat thistime. Moreover, any
announcement of such a flight(or worse, any leakage of informationifno prior
announcement were made) would seriouslycompromise the strongmoral position
internationallywhich the United Statespresentlyholds in the IGY due to itspast
frank and open actsand announcements as respectsVANGUARD.
Stewart mentioned that a Redstone could be used as a backup later in 1957 if
Vanguard fell behind schedule and that No. 29 was the only vehicle which could be used
without interference in the Redstone program. Finally, he concluded, "At the present
time, therefore, the Group does not recommend activating a satellite program based on the
Redstone missile, but will reconsider this question and the possibilities of the ICBM
program at its subsequent meetings when the critical items of the VANGUARD program
are further advanced. "29
On July 5, 1956, E.V. Murphree, DoD's Special Assistant for Guided Missiles,
wrote to Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Murphree stated
that he had looked into the matter of using a Jupiter re-entry test vehicle for possibly
launching a satellite into orbit. He stated that the January 1957 test could be adapted to
this purpose with little effort and no impact on the program and said that an attempt could
be made as early as September 1956, although this would affect the Jupiter program. Both
dates were before the June 1957 start of the International Geophysical Year.
Murphrcc further noted that proposals for using the Jupiter were not new and that
the original Redstone satellite and re-entry test vehicle proposals resulted from a common
study (the early Orbiter proposal) which argued that the same vehicle could be used for
both. Murphree also stated that the first two tests of the Jupiter were essentially
propulsion system tests and could accomplish much of their goals for that program even if
used for satellite launch attempts. He continued: "There is, however, room for serious
doubt that two isolated flight attempts would result in achieving a successful satellite, and
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the dates of such flights would be prior to the Geophysical Year for which a satellite
capability is specifically required, and prior to the time when tracking instrumentation will
be available. ,,30(emphasis added)
Murphree then stated that these facts had been taken into consideration at the time
that the Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed the satellite program and decided to
assign the mission to the Navy group. He stated: "That decision was based largely on a
conviction that the VANGUARD proposal offered the greater promise for success. The
history of increasing demands for funds for this program confirms the conviction that this
is not a simple matter. I know of no new evidence available to warrant a change in that
decision at this time."
The rest of Murphree's memorandum is extremely interesting and is reprinted
below in full:
While it is true that the VANGUARD group does not expect to make its first
satellite attempt before August 1957, whereas a satellite attempt could be made by
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency as early as January 1957, little would be gained
by making such an early satellite attempt as an isolated action with no follow-up
program. In the case of VANGUARD, the first flight will be followed up by five
additional satellite attempts in the ensuing year. It would be impossible for the
ABMA group to make any satellite attempt that has a reasonable chance of success
without diversion of the efforts of their top-flight scientific personnel from the
main course of the JUPITER program, and to some extent, diversion of missiles
from the early phase of the re-entry test program. There would also be a problem
of additional funding not now provided.
For these reasons, I believe that to attempt a satellite flight with the JUPITER re-
entry test vehicle without a preliminary program assuring a very strong probability
of its success would most surely flirt with failure. Such probability could only be
achieved through the application of a considerable scientific effort at ABMA. The
obvious interference with the progress of the JUPITER program would certainly
present a strong argument against such diversion of scientific effort.
On discussing the possible use of the JUPITER re-entry test vehicle to launch a
satellite with Dr. Fumas, he pointed out certain objections to such a procedure.
He felt there would be a serious morale effect on the VANGUARD group to
whom the satellite test has been assigned. Dr. Furnas also pointed out that a
satellite effort using the JUPITER re-entry test vehicle may have the effect of
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disrupting our relations with the non-military scientific community and
international elements of the IGY group.
I don't know if I have a clear picture of the reasons for your interest in the
possibility of using the JUPITER re-entry test vehicle for launching the satellite. I
think it may be helpful if Dr. Furnas and I discuss this matter with you, and I'm
trying to arrange for a date to do this on Monday. 31
Robertson's special assistant, Charles G. Ellington, forwarded the memos to White
House Staff Secretary Andrew Goodpaster. Goodpaster wrote on the bottom of
Ellington's cover memo, "Secy. Robertson feels no change should be made--per Mr.
Ellington. Reported to President."32
On September 20, 1956, Jupiter-C rocket number RS-27 was launched from Cape
Canaveral. It flew 3,355 miles, reached an altitude of 682 miles, and achieved a velocity
of Mach 18. It carried a deactivated fourth stage that was filled with sand under specific
orders from Major General Medaris. Medaris had received specific orders himself. He
had been instructed by someone in the Pentagon to ensure that the Jupiter's upper stage
was not fueled and did not "accidentally" place a satellite in orbit before the International
Geophysical Year. Wernher von Braun had been told to keep quiet, and did so. 33
Thus, despite the obvious potential to launch a satellite sooner to beat the Soviets
into space, or simply to maximize the possibility that the United States would place
something in orbit, no such effort was made. Despite much high-level discussion of the
psychological impact of being first into space, neither the White House or Pentagon
officials pursued this feat with great commitment. Indeed, there was no clear desire to
simply be first.
How to "Beat" the Soviets
As one would expect, the scientists involved in creating the program stressed that
a scientifically useful program would enhance U.S. prestige. National Science Foundation
Director Alan Waterman specifically noted that the schedule was less important than the
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prestige to be gained from a program that produced a major scientific breakthrough. In
other words, being first but not scientifically significant wasn't as important for national
prestige as accomplishing something scientifically noteworthy. 34 One could win the race,
but lose the scientific competition.
Rather surprisingly, this was also the conclusion of the National Security Council's
Planning Board. NSC 5520 had mentioned the possibility of the Soviets developing a
satellite, but took no position on whether the U.S. should attempt to launch before the
Soviets. The Defense Department's response in NSC 5522 stated with more urgency that
the United States should be first, but must do so carefully. The NSC Planning Board, in
November 1956, made an amazing statement:
The USSR can be expected to attempt to launch its satellite before ours and to
attempt to surpass our effort in every way. It is vitally important in terms of the
stated prestige and psychological purposes that the United States make every
effort to (1) make possible a successful launching as soon as practicable and (2)
put on as effective an IGY scientific program as possible. The prestige and
psychological set-backs inherent in a possible earlier success and larger satellite by
the USSR could at least be partially offset by a more effective and complete
scientific program by the United States. Even if the United States achieved the
first successful launching and orbit, but the USSR put on a stronger scientific
program, the United States could lose its initial advantage2 5
Thus, one year before Sputnik, the NSC's official position was that the United
States could lose prestige even if it launched a satellite first but the Soviets developed a
better science program. Science, therefore, was a higher priority than schedule.
The issue of the propaganda value of launching a satellite had been mentioned in
numerous documents, including RAND reports, intelligence assessments, and NSC 5520
and NSC 5522. In NSC 5522, the CIA equated it with the psychological impact of the
atomic bomb. Clearly, many top U.S. policy-makers felt that it was a major issue.
But Eisenhower always dismissed these concerns. He just did not believe that it
would be that important. _ His concern was with the political vulnerability of
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reconnaissance systems, not a race for prestige. He proved to be dreadfully wrong from a
domestic political standpoint, but not necessarily from the standpoint of international law.
Sputnik Crisis?
By the fall of 1957, the Vanguard satellite program was proceeding roughly on
schedule, with first launch anticipated for late 1957 or early 1958, during the International
Geophysical Year. No one, not the Huntsville team or the Vanguard engineers
themselves, expected the first launch to be successful. All rockets blew up the first time
they were launched. But Vanguard had a year and a half to place a satellite in orbit. A
year and a half to fail. The primary criteria was that Vanguard achieve orbit before the
American intelligence satellite was ready to fly.
The satellite reconnaissance program, however, was underfunded and not making
significant progress. Rather surprisingly, this was the fault of Donald Quarles, who had
served as Secretary of the Air Force and then risen to become Deputy Secretary of
Defense. Although Quarles had immediately appreciated the potential for using a civilian
scientific satellite to establish freedom of space for future military satellites, he was
skeptical of the reconnaissance satellite then under development by Schriever's Western
Development Division. Quarles felt that the program was unlikely to produce anything in
the short term and he therefore refused to provide significant funding for development. As
many of those involved in the program noted, Quarles created a self-fulfilling prophecy:
Quarles thought that the program was not advanced to deserve funding, but the program
was not advancing because it was underfunded.
Quarles had ordered those in charge of it to not build any actual hardware.
Schrievefs underlings essentially ignored the order, pushing ahead with a satellite design.
But they lacked money. They had asked for $117 million in 1956 and got almost nothing.
General Schriever was bewildered. "Now what can I do?" he asked later. "I can't
understand it. One of the great problems is surprise attack, and here we're saying we can
do a satellite reconnaissance program, and we get $3 million. .. "_7
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Eisenhowe(s scientific advisors Din Land and James Killian took renewed interest
in the reconnaissance satellite by the fall of 1957 and the Science Advisory Committee
even sponsored a special briefing for the White House on the subject on September 20. 38
A proposed interim reconnaissance satellite was gaining increased attention from
Washington at the same time that the small Vanguard satellite was taking shape. The
strategy was proceeding, but by October it was overtaken by events.
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched a 184 pound metallic ball called
Sputnik. It was instantly major news around the world. On October 7, acting on the
publicity generated in the wake of Sputnik, President Eisenhower asked Donald Quarles,
by then Deputy Secretary of Defense, to explain why the United States was in the position
it was. Goodpaster recorded Quarles' explanation in the minutes of the meeting: "The
Science Advisory Committee had felt, however, that it was better to have the Earth
satellite proceed separately from military development. One reason was to stress the
peaceful character of the effort, and a second was to avoid the inclusion of material, to
which foreign scientists might be given access, which is used in our own military rockets."
Furthermore, "He [Quarles] went on to add that the Russians have in fact done us a good
turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space--this
seems to be generally accepted as orbital space, in which the missile is making an
inoffensive passage."39
Two days later, Eisenhower mentioned the subject of getting "beaten" in another
staff meeting. "When military people begin to talk about this matter, and to assert that
other missiles could have been used to launch a satellite sooner, they tend to make the
matter look like a 'race,' which is exactly the wrong impression."4° As far as Eisenhower
and Quarles were concerned, the United States had never been in a race and had certainly
not been "beaten." The complex strategy had not gone entirely according to plan, but the
end result was the same for them. But Eisenhower also had a blind spot. While he was
concerned that taking certain actions like publicly racing the Soviets into space would
prompt them into escalating the Cold War, he failed to understand that failing to take
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these actions could allow others to establish the agenda. He and his advisors were caught
in a web of political manipulation that may have been too subtle and complex for their
own good.
The true purpose of the early American space program, however, remained
shrouded in secrecy for decades. It was only one of many secrets surrounding the
program. There were others.
The CIA and the Scientific Satellite
When Alan Waterman met with Allen Dulles in early May 1955 to discuss NSF
sponsorship of a scientific satellite, he also met with Richard Bissell, whom he described
as "the one in Central Intelligence who is following this closely."41 Bissell had reason to
follow it closely, since he was then in the middle of managing the newly-created U-2
reconnaissance aircraft program. Use of the U-2 hinged on issues of international law and
the CIA therefore had good reason to pay attention to any subject involving international
airspace.
But even more surprising is the discovery that, as the scientific satellite program
continued and ran into significant cost overruns, the CIA actually provided money for it to
continue. In April 1957, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Percival Brundage,
sent a lengthy memo to Eisenhower on the Vanguard cost overruns. Vanguard was
initially supposed to cost 15-20 million dollars. By spring 1957, it was projected to cost
ten times that amount. Brundage recounted the funding difficulties of the program and
stated "Apparently, both the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation
are very reluctant to continue to finance this project to completion. But each is quite
prepared to have the other do so." He also noted that the National Science Foundation
had contributed an extra $5.8 million in funds to the Department of Defense to fund the
program and that the CIA had contributed $2.5 million of its own money to the program
as well.42
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Why was the CIA, which had no official stake in the scientific satellite program
and no space programs underway or even under study, willing to spend its own money on
a civilian scientific space program? The answer is unknown. But it was likely due to
Bisselrs intervention, since he was the person delegated to follow the program and he was
also in charge of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. 43 By April 1957, when the CIA provided
the money to the scientific satellite program, the U-2 had already made nearly a dozen
flights over the Soviet Union, each protested vigorously, but quietly, by the Soviets.
Although the CIA did not have a reconnaissance satellite program at this time, it would be
given one by Eisenhower less than a year later, a program code-named CORONA. Not
surprisingly, Richard Bissell was placed in charge of that endeavor as well. Bissell was in
control of a substantial amount of funding for covert and technical operations at CIA and
it is likely that the money to support the scientific satellite program came from these funds
or from Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles' substantial discretionary account
(which may have accounted for up to a sixth of the CIA's budget at the time).
Brundage concluded his memo to Eisenhower by noting that the Air Force had
already started its own, much larger, reconnaissance satellite. "Therefore, whether or not
the International Geophysical Year satellite project is completed, research in this area will
not be dropped." But this missed the point, since the scientific satellite program had less
to do with research than with establishing legal precedent.
Further Hidden Agendas
The Soviets launched SputnikH on November 5 and it had an even more profound
public relations impact than its predecessor. Sputnik II was not only far larger than
Sputnik I, but it also carried a dog, demonstrating a sophistication that belied early
administration attempts to downplay the Soviet achievement. The size of the payload was
sufficient for the carrying of an atomic bomb, which heightened Americans' fear that the
Soviets could now effectively attack the United States. A little over a month later, the
U.S. attempt to launch the Vanguard satellite ended in embarrassing failure. Clearly, in
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the realm of space exploration, the Soviets had taken a substantial lead over the United
States. From an international legal standpoint, this should have rendered the subject of
freedom of space moot, but it did not. Furthermore, the Eisenhower administration
continued its practice of using deception to cover its real goals.
In November, newly-appointed Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy proposed
centralizing control of the various American space projects then underway, such as
Vanguard and WS-1 17L, along with advanced ballistic missile development. McElroy
proposed that they be put in a Defense Special Projects Agency (DSPA), which would be
responsible for whatever projects the Secretary would assign to it. The idea for the DSPA
apparently came from the Science Advisory Council in mid-October, just days atter both
Sputnik and McElroy's nomination. '4 Eisenhower himself expressed the opinion that a
fourth service should be established to handle the "missiles activity."4s McElroy said that
he was weighing the idea of a "Manhattan Project" for anti-ballistic missiles. The
president thought that a separate organization might be a good idea for this problem. _ In
testimony before Congress, Quarles, whom some regarded as an Air Force partisan, stated
that long-range, surface-to-surface missiles had been assigned to the Air Force because it
possessed the targeting and reconnaissance capabilities to use them, not because it was
uniquely an Air Force mission. 47 Space could conceivably be treated in the same way.
Although the plan for incorporating ballistic missile development in the new
agency was eliminated, the new space agency idea proceeded. The Special Projects
Agency would act as a central authority for all U.S. space programs and would essentially
contract out missions to the separate services, civilian government agencies, and even
universities and private industry. "Above the level of the three military services, having its
own budget, it would be able to concentrate on the new and the unknown without
involvement in immediate requirements and inter service rivalries." McElroy stated in
front of Congress that "the vast weapons systems of the future in our judgment need to be
the responsibility of a separate part of the Defense Department. ''_ This proposal was
placed in a DoD reorganization bill. At this point, it was still assumed that the entire
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American space program would remain under military control, although at the level of the
Secretary of Defense in an office specially created to manage it.
Discussion of the Defense Special Projects Agency continued within the
Administration. Its name was changed to the Advanced Research Projects Agency
(ARPA) and Eisenhower sent a message to the Congress on January 7, requesting
supplemental appropriations for the agency. 49 In early January the newly-created
President's Science Advisory Committee addressed the issue of ARPA.
On February 7, 1958, James Killian and Din Land, who was also a member of the
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, met with Eisenhower
and his staff secretary, General Andrew Goodpaster. There they briefed him on the
potential of both a recoverable space capsule and supersonic reconnaissance aircraft
program, suggesting that in order to speed up the development of a reconnaissance
satellite, the U.S. should pursue the recoverable capsule idea as an "interim" solution.
Eisenhower accepted this recommendation at that time and the satellite program was soon
named "CORONA."
An equally important result of this first meeting was the decision to finalize
Secretary of Defense McElroy's proposal and create the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) to house highly technical defense research programs. General Electric
executive Roy Johnson was named as its director. Eisenhower decided to give ARPA
control of all military space programs. The military man-in-space program,
meteorological programs, and WS-117L would all be turned over to ARPA.
Sputnik also led to the creation of NASA to manage a civilian space program.
Although Eisenhower had initially felt that the military could handle the task of space
science, he was eventually persuaded that a civilian space agency was needed, in part by
Vice President Nixon, who argued that a civilian agency was important for international
prestige purposes. A military space agency could not be used as an effective means to
"show the flag," particularly if the president was interested in keeping the Cold War from
heating up. But a civilian space agency could be used to great effect for psychological
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purposes. The creation of these new bureaucracies proceeded apace, drawing much
attention from the Congress and the public. ARPA was officially in charge of the nation's
WS-117L reconnaissance satellite program, whose existence had leaked to the press in the
aftermath of Sputnik.
While all this was being done, Eisenhower had also directed that the recoverable
satellite program---the program which eventually became known as CORONAmbe
handled by a covert team involving the Air Force and the CIA. For many of those who
had been involved in it, including those who had proposed it, the recoverable satellite
program simply ceased to exist. As far as they knew, WS-117L was the only satellite
program that the United States had.
Those in charge ofWS-117L eventually sprit it off into several programs, including
the reconnaissance program known as SENTRY (later SAMOS), an early warning satellite
known as Midas, and Discoverer, an engineering and development program which was to
include the launching of biomedical payloads such as mice and monkeys. In reality,
Discoverer was nothing more than a cover for the CORONA program, and SENTRY
appears to have been continued at least in part as a sleight of hand--to distract attention
away from Discoverer. Canceling it would have been too suspicious and would have
raised the ire of the Air Force. Continuing it kept attention elsewhere. While the
American public paid attention to NASA and ARPA and SENTRY, another program
materialized into existence unnoticed. It was just like the strategy used earlier with the
scientific satellite program.
Freedom of Space Marches On
By the first half of 1958 the issue of the militarization of space flared up again due
to the expanding space programs. The National Security Council addressed it initially in a
classified document in August 1958. Known as NSC 5814/1, the document stated that the
United States must "seek urgently a political framework which will place the uses of U.S.
reconnaissance satellites in a political and psychological context more favorable to the
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U.S. intelligenceeffort." Respondingto this, the StateDepartment declared that one of
the priorities for the United States was establishing "an acceptable policy framework for
the WS-117L program..."_ Even within this highly-classified document, CORONA was
nowhere mentioned.
Protection of WS-117L then became the U.S. goal, and the State Department
debated it internally and eventually brought it to the United Nations. At the suggestion of
the United States, the United Nations created the UN Ad Hoe Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). COPUOS became the source of much heated debate
over the next several years, as the Soviets refused to participate and instead complained
about American nuclear weapons and overseas bases, stating that concessions on these
issues were a prerequisite to their participation in COPUOS. Calls by COPUOS for
cooperation between the superpowers on space projects were met with derision from the
Soviets, who feared that such cooperative efforts would reveal the limitations of their
ICBM technology. Much controversy was generated, but no actual policy. All the time
that this was being discussed in the United Nations, the newspapers, and in classified State
Department meetings, CORONA continued its development totally unknown to even
those at high levels of the government, who only discussed the legal protection of the
overt WS- 117L program.
The advent of military reconnaissance satellites themselves created their own legal
issues In January 1959, O.G. Villard, Jr., of Stanford University and a member of the
National Academy of Sciences and the Space Science Board (SSB) wrote Lloyd V.
Berkner, Chairman of the SSB. Villard expressed concern that the U.S. military might
attempt to portray its satellite launchings as scientific in nature. This deception could have
negative effects on American space science, particularly with regards to international
cooperation. Villard stated that it was in the best interests of U.S. scientists that such
deception not occur.
On January 28, 1959, Berkner brought the issue to the attention of Killian, who
was by now Eisenhower' s science advisor. On February 13, Killian in turn mentioned it to
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NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan, and Gordon Gray, Eisenhower's Special Assistant
for national security affairs. Gray felt that it might require further action by the National
Security Council. 51 The results of their discussion of the issue are not known, but this
discussion took place over a year after Eisenhower had directed that a small
reconnaissance satellite program be peeled away from the bigger reconnaissance program
(the one that Villner referred to in his letter) and be conducted covertly. Indeed, the first
launch was scheduled to take place later in the month---under the cover of an engineering
and scientific programT
The first Discoverer was launched on February 28, 1959. It was in actuality a test
of equipment for the CORONA program. Although the satellite did not reach orbit, the
Soviets still protested the flight, decrying its military nature. This prompted Richard
Leghorn, the architect of Eisenhower's 1955 "Open Skies" proposal and the president of
Itek, which was then managing the manufacture of CORONA cameras, to draft a proposal
for the president titled "Political Action and Satellite Reconnaissance." In it Leghorn
stated:
The problem is not one of technology. It is not a problem of vulnerability to
Soviet military measures. The problem is one of the political vulnerability of
current reconnaissance satellite programs.
For many years the U.S. has had overflight capabilities (aircraft and balloons)
which have been substantially invulnerable to Soviet military countermeasures, but
very vulnerable politically. Already the Communists (East Germany) have
attacked Discoverer I as an espionage activity, and we can anticipate powerful
Soviet political countermeasures to the Discoverer/Sentry series. 5:
Leghorn continued:
What is needed is a program to put reconnaissance satellites "in the white" through
early and vigorous political action designed to:
1. blunt in advance Soviet political countermeasures;
2. gain world acceptance for the notion that the surveillance satellites are powerful
servants of world peace and security, and are not illegitimate instruments of
espionage;
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3. regain the political initiative of the "open skies" proposal.
Leghorn was fully aware of all American reconnaissance satellite efforts and it is
impossible to believe that his proposal was anything other than a continuation of his earlier
thinking on overflight. But at this time the United States still had not orbited a covert
reconnaissance satellite (and would not for over a year, suffering a string of failures with
CORONA) and was not overtly anywhere near flying a reconnaissance satellite. Taking
any public position at all on the subject seemed premature at best and foolish at worst.
From the White House's point of view it was best to let the political deliberations at the
United Nations run their course. Leghorn's proposal went nowhere.
Gary Powers' U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down on May 1, 1960,
creating yet another public embarrassment for Eisenhower that in fact revealed a carefully
planned and executed strategy to gather intelligence on the Soviet Union--a strategy that
like GENETRIX, CORONA and Vanguard also relied upon a scientific cover story to
mask the true mission of the program. Although the downing ruined the upcoming
summit, the U-2 had proved an intelligence bonanza for the United States, something
which Eisenhower did not wish to emphasize even in his television address to the nation
following the incident. 53 He had no desire to reveal America's intelligence coup and no
desire to inflame relations with the Soviet Union.
Soviet Premier Khrushchev used the event to maximum propaganda effect,
rejecting Eisenhower's renewed proposal for "Open Skies." Khrushchev declared, "as
long as arms exist our skies will remain closed and we will shoot down everything that is
there without our consent." France's President de Gaulle then asked whether this would
include satellites, noting that Soviet satellites had already carried cameras into space.
Khrushchev then replied "As for sputniks, the U.S. has put up one that is photographing
our country. We did not protest; let them take as many pictures as they want. ''54
The State Department continued to discuss the subject in secret. By mid-1960, the
Bureau of European Affairs at the State Department had even drafted a policy paper
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concerning the planned upcoming launch of the SAMOS reconnaissance satellite. One
option proposed was an "open approach" which advocated the sharing of all
reconnaissance photographs taken by SAMOS. This approach was considered "more
likely to facilitate wide acceptance of photographic satellites than the 'closed' approach. ,,55
While the State Department was debating the merits of sharing reconnaissance satellite
photographs with the world community (something that the United States had not done
even with U-2 photographs), CORONA's engineers were preparing for another launch.
The memo was written August 12. Six days later CORONA returned its first images of
the Soviet Union. There was no talk in the White House of sharing the photos with
anyone.
The State Department continued to debate the merits of the American space
program, but gradually even SAMOS itself was enveloped within the dark cloak of
secrecy that surrounded CORONA. State Department discussions in general, and public
statements in particular, ceased. Freedom of space had essentially been achieved. Further
discussion was largely irrelevant. And CORONA began to chalk up success after success,
as the press focused on SAMOS and the public paid attention to NASA and its daring
Mercury astronauts.
Conclusion
Any close study of the Eisenhower presidency reveals a president who frequently
rejected overt and provocative policies in favor of covert actions intended to achieve the
same result but without heightening Cold War tensions. It also reveals a president who
saw little separation between national security and science and who was fully willing to
use allegedly "civilian" science programs to cover military operations. Reconnaissance is
perhaps the premier example of this. First with the U-2, then with CORONA, Eisenhower
chose to change direction and place the programs under different management primarily to
avoid public scrutiny. He allowed the existing programs to continue before they slowly
disappeared. He also used scientific cover stories extensively to cover the reconnaissance
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programs. Few expected these cover stories to last forever. They were, in the language
of the intelligence community, "melting assets." But they worked for a time. Rather
surprisingly, they did not appear to have any negative effects for the civilian scientific
community.
There is no evidence among Eisenhower's scientist advisors of any real debate over
this practice of using science as cover for intelligence programs. They seem to have not
recognized any line between the scientific establishment and the national security
establishment. The idea of the scientific establishment deliberately separating itself from
the military establishment did not come until later. And perhaps most ironically of all, this
deliberate blurring of the lines between scientific and military establishments that
Eisenhower did so much to create was one of the things he warned of in his farewell
address.
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The Sputniks and the IGY
by Rip Bulkeley
The programs which launched the first artificial earth satellites were conducted by the Soviet
Union and the United States during the second half of the 1950s, within the overall framework of
the International Geophysical Year (IGY). The IGY was an ambitious international undertaking,
comprising a network of planet-wide geophysical studies, which was proposed in 1950 and carried
out in 1957-58. Sixty-seven national scientific teams, from countries with widely dissimilar political
systems and levels of economic development, participated in different ways and to differing
degrees. In view of the generally hostile relations between the countries of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and those of the Warsaw Treaty (signed only two years before the opening of
the IGY) it is particularly remarkable that nearly all the members of the two rival alliances took part
in the Year, and that the two nuclear superpowers led the way in this cooperation, in spite (or
perhaps because?) of the fact that many of the scientific topics to be studied were of considerable
military as well as scientific significance.
The proposal to develop and use the daring technological innovation of artificial satellites
for IGY experiments was a late addition to the program, and like one or two other areas with
similar dramatic appeal, such as Antarctic exploration, it became a focus for informal but intense
rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, as the only two nations with the
technological capacity to enter such a 'race'. At first glance, the rival IGY satellite programs recall
the old dictum that nations which challenge one another over prestige will usually need to
'cooperate in order to compete'. However, the precise extent and nature of the IGY cooperation in
this area has been little studied to date.
1) The U. S. Proposal
The use of artificial satellites for IGY experiments was proposed unilaterally by the U. S. IGY
Committee in October 1954. At that point the Soviet Union had not yet officially joined the Year,
which had been established as an international scientific committee, by the International Council
of Scientific Unions (ICSU), only two years previously. An informal Soviet delegation was
however present at the successive Assemblies, in Rome, of the International Union of Geodesy
and Geophysics (IUGG) and the Comitd Scientifique de rAGI (CSAGI), the annual coordinating
meeting for the IGY, at which the satellites idea was proposed and then, in principle, accepted.
And the Soviet Academy of Sciences announced in Rome that it had decided to join the Year, and
was about to form the requisite national IGY committee through which to do so. For its part, the U.
S. IGY Committee was now obliged to 'take back' the CSAGI satellite resolution, which it had
written itself, for further domestic consideration. It would be necessary, first, to determine whether
the idea was technically feasible and scientifically desirable, within the short time-frame of the
IGY, and second, in the event of a positive determination on this point, to persuade the
economically conservative and militarily preoccupied Eisenhower administration to divert the
necessary resources from its urgent missile program. This process took several months, but
finally, on 29 June 1955, U. S. IGY scientists took part in the official White House announcement
of the world's first satellite program, appropriately but unfortunately designated 'Vanguard' by its
planners.
For the next fourteen months there was only one, very public, national program for a
scientific IGY satellite, that of the United States.
2) The Soviet Response before Sputnik 1
The SovietAcademyof Scienceswasobligedto beginits belatedparticipationin the IGY by
forminga nationalcommittee,reviewingthe entireIGY programas formulatedto that date,
determiningwhatadditionalactivitiesit mightliketo suggest,andstartingto prepareits scientific
teams,instrumentsandexperimentalstations.1 In March1955theSovietAcademyinformedthe
secretaryof CSAGI,MarcelNicolet,that its committeepresidentwouldbe AcademicianI. P.
Bardin,2andinApril,that its representativesontheCSAGIcommitteewouldbe Academicians V.
V. Beloussov and N. V. Pushkov. On 12 April Pravda told the Soviet public, in general terms, that
there would be a Soviet IGY program. Further details were anxiously awaited, and wherever
possible requested, by Westem scientists, including the overall president of the IGY, Sydney
Chapman. 3 But the record of the informal Rome conversations indicates that the Soviet
delegation could reasonably have formed the impression that national reports were to be prepared
for presentation at the next annual CSAGI Assembly, scheduled for Brussels in September 1955,
and not before. This was, in any case, the procedure which they followed, to the extent of bringing
multiple copies of their report to Brussels, rather than forwarding it to Nicolet for circulation in
advance. 4
In a separate development, the official Soviet media announced in April 1955 the formation
of an "lnteragency Commission on Interplanetary Travel". The U. S. committee prepared a major
presentation of its recently announced satellite program for Brussels, and hoped for news of Soviet
plans, despite the fact that no announcement linking the new Commission with the Soviet IGY
program had yet been made from Moscow. The Americans were disappointed when no leading
Soviet experts in the rocket sciences even came to Brussels, and the single Soviet delegate to
attend the relevant working group adopted an entirely passive role.s
The CSAGI working groups were responsible for coordinating the global scientific effort
within the IGY disciplines, both at the annual international meeting and through subordinate
meetings and correspondence, insofar as was possible for busy working scientists with many other
current commitments, during the rest of the time. An overall 'reported for each discipline was
tasked with the preparation of a manual or group of manuals, for distribution to the participating
stations, which should embody the detailed expedmental plans and guidelines drawn up in the
preparatory consultations. In the satellites part of the Rockets and Satellites discipline, the
preparation of instruments, launch vehicles and tracking stations was of course fraught with the
additional burden of novelty. The late arrival of the Soviet Union in the IGY, and its continued
silence on the question of satellite experiments, left the U. S. scientists frustratingly unable to
conduct the necessary dialogue. In February 1956 further details of the U. S. program were
circulated to all national committees, and in the same month the first informal indications were
received that the Soviet satellite program would include scientific experiments of the sort
appropriate for the IGY.6 Lloyd Berkner, vice-president of the IGY and reporter for Rockets and
Satellites, proposed that a full two days of the next CSAGI Assembly, scheduled for September in
Barcelona, should be given over to a symposium on the satellite program.7 Meanwhile he
continued to urge that the Soviet Union be pressed to join its satellite program with the IGY. e The
Soviet IGY committee, however, remained uncommunicative in general, and completely silent on
the matter of satellites. No response having been received to the proposal for a two-day
symposium, this was curtailed to a single day. The only information given about Soviet plans was
a terse announcement from Bardin, to the effect that there would indeed be a Soviet IGY satellite
program, and that information about proposed launch schedules and expedments would be
supplied in due course. One resolution passed by the rockets and satellites working group at
Barcelona, and not contested by the Soviet delegates, recommended "that for all iGY satellites the
radio systems employed for tracking and telemetering be compatible with those which have been
announced at the current CSAGI meeting in order that the same ground-based receiving
equipment can be used throughout". _ The "announced" systems were of course those planned for
the U. S. Vanguard program, using a frequency of 108 megahertz, which had been described in U.
S. documentation distributed before the meeting. 1° Other resolutions at Barcelona called for
"countries having satellite programs" [i.e. the Soviet Union] to supply information about their
tracking equipment and launch schedules. However, It was to be a further nine months before any
such information was officially supplied by the Soviet IGY committee.
The problem for IGY planners was exacerbated, rather than eased, by the amount of
unverified information about the likely shape of the Soviet satellite program that had appeared by
late 1956, including the disturbing claim that Soviet scientists might attempt to place a satellite in
orbit during 1956 (which quite apart from any prestige considerations would have implied a general
disregard for the IGY framework). 11 This informal material was compiled and assessed by various
bodies to the best of their ability. 12 But although some of the estimates derived from it were later
proved to have been remarkably accurate, it could not be used or even referred to within the
CSAGI structures, because none of it had been supplied or endorsed by the Soviet IGY
committee.
On 6 March 1957 Radio Moscow confirmed that the size of the first Soviet satellite would be
around 50 kg, as had already been suggested by unofficial sources. But it was only in June, less
than a month before the start of the IGY, that Soviet scientists began to provide any detailed
information about their rocket and satellite programs. A seven-page document was sent to
Berkner, giving brief indications of the types of experiment to be carded on sounding rockets and
satellites, but with no technical information about the measuring instruments or telemetry. Three
"zones" for rocket launches were listed as "Franz Joseph Land", "the Antarctic, mainly in the area
of Mirny", and "middle latitudes of the USSR". The site for satellite launchings was not specified. 13
In the same month the Soviet joumal Radio published two articles giving detailed explanations of
how the satellite's radio telemetry could usefully be observed by amateurs on frequencies of about
20 and 40 megahertz; a further two articles appeared in the same journal in July, another in
August, and another in September. TM The Central Amateur Shortwave Radio Station of the Soviet
Union went on to broadcast specimens of the planned satellite signals "several times a week"
during August and September, without any notice being taken by the outside wodd. _5
Berkner's first draft proposal on the interchange of rocket and satellite data, intended for a
future manual, had been written, with no Soviet input, in December 1956. TM In July 1957 it was
rewritten, without any significant changes, by Admiral Day, the IGY's Coordinator, to form the
relevant chapter for the first edition of The CSAGI Guide to IGY Wodd Data Centres. 17 At that
stage, the only matedal taken from the Bardin document was the designation of rocket launching
zones.
Expressing his dissatisfaction with the lack of detail in the Bardin document, on 23 July
1957, the British space scientist Harde Massey drew particular attention to the absence of any
specification of a telemetering frequency. 18 Three days later, however, Massey attended a
meeting with a party of Soviet rocket scientists who were on a two weeks' visit to their British
counterparts. On this occasion A. M. Kasatkin gave a detailed description of one of the principal
Soviet meteorological sounding rockets, including its telemetering frequency of 22 megahertz. TM
Then on 16 August Bardin wrote again to Berkner, this time giving the exact frequencies to be
used in Soviet satellite telemetry. A note on the copy of this letter in Chapman's files states that
the U. S. IGY office forwarded the original to Berkner at Boulder, where he would have been
attending the Assembly of the International Radio Science Union (URSI). 2° However, the letter
appearsto havemiscarried,anditsimportancewasmissedbythe U.S. IGYstaff,withthe result
that U. S. scientistspreparingtheir country'ssatellite-trackingstations were left ignorant of the
Soviet decision on frequencies until shortly before the launch of Sputnik I on 4 October 1957.
The Bardin letter had not been copied to Nicolet at the international IGY office in Brussels,
where its significance would not have been overlooked. But, either in response to a recent
pressing enquiry about the telemetry frequency from the British, or else by accident, a copy was
sent to the Royal Society. 21 Although the British did not set the probability of a Soviet satellite
high enough to make any advance preparations for tracking it,22one British scientist put his mind
to devising a method for studying the distribution of ionization in the upper atmosphere by
comparative observation of the signals on the two frequencies, and presented this at the
Washington meeting, three days before the launch of Sputnik 1.23
The final source of information of the Soviet satellite program, prior to Sputnik 1, was the
September issue of the Soviet Academy's journal Achievements of Physical Science, a special
two-volume issue devoted exclusively to articles about past or planned experiments to be carded
on rockets and satellites.
It is worth mentioning here that the contrast which is usually drawn between American
openness and Soviet secrecy about their IGY satellite plans, prior to October 1957, has probably
been overdrawn in the literature. As late as mid-June of 1957 W. T. Blackband, a senior physicist
with the Royal Aircraft Establishment, was still urging that both the United States and the Soviet
Union should be pressed to provide full details of their telemetry systems. He continued: "Of
course both have agreed to standardize, but it has been so hard for us to learn details of American
plans that it is likely that the Russians do not know much, and, knowing little they will go their own
way. _24
3) Problems of the Soviet IGY Committee
By comparison with the wealth of advance information that was distributed about the U. So
Vanguard satellite program, that provided by the Soviet IGY committee about what was nominally
_heid satellite program can fairly be described as too little too late'. But several considerations
are worth mentioning at this point. First, nations joining in the IGY were not thereby committing
themselves to adopt U. S. values or policies in the conduct of their scientific programs. In the
Antarctic, for example, nations maintaining territorial claims, such as Argentina, Britain or Chile,
frequently pointed out that their acceptance of international scientific activities within 1heir sectors
during the Year should not be regarded as establishing any sort of political precedent. 2s Next, as
has been made clear, no procedures for the conduct of satellite experiments, including the nature
and extent of information to be released in advance, had been mutually discussed, elaborated and
agreed, under IGY auspices, prior to the
before Sputnik 1. Doubtless the lack of
Soviet rocket scientists at Brussels and
Washington Conference which convened only a few days
such a meeting was largely due to the non-attendance of
Barcelona, but it seems certain that the participation of
such personnel in IGY meetings was not something controlled by the Soviet IGY committee. Even
in the United States, a satellite program which had been initiated, and in its early phases planned,
entirely by the national IGY committee showed signs of reverting to more direct government
control after the national furore occasioned by the first two sputniks. In the Soviet case it seems
doubtful that the Academy of Sciences ever had much say in any aspect of the first sputniks, other
than their scientific instrumentation.
The Soviet Academy of Sciences may have been a de facto department of the Soviet
government, but the IGY committee formed under its auspices probably carded little political
weight. Onlyonememberof itsinnercircle,Pushkov,wasactuallya memberof theCommunist
Party.26 Bardin'stwo communicationsto Berkner,in JuneandAugust1957,contain clear and
probably deliberate indications of his helplessness in matters pertaining to the Soviet satellite.
The first points out that he is merely forwarding the document, adds that he hopes it is what
Berkner expected, and goes on to apologize for sending it so late. In the second he once again
emphasizes that the frequency information comes from '_he specialists" and he is merely passing
it on. 27
It is also reasonable to assume that the Soviet decision to use the prototype A-1 military
launcher for their satellite program placed them under severe constraints in respect of security, of
a kind also experienced, though to a lesser degree, in the United States. Influential Soviet officials
may well have had some inkling of Lloyd Berkner's excellent connections with the political
leadership of the United States, as well as its intelligence community. 28 If so, they would have
mistrusted the repeated attempts at obtaining information closely related to their ICBM program
that were channelled through the IGY, such as Berkner's proposal for a two-day conference at
Barcelona. 29 Such fears, if they existed, may or may not have been justified. There were always
excellent scientific reasons for coordinating the two countries' satellite programs as early as
possible. But it is certainly noticeable that nothing like the same pressure for advance information
of Soviet plans was generated by the U. S. IGY leadership in any of the thirteen other subject
areas of the IGY.
In June 1957 the political leadership of the Soviet Union was rocked by a crisis in which
Khmshchev, who had strongly backed the development of a satellite-launching potential within
the Soviet rocket program, was hard put to it to retain political power. While the crisis and its
resolution in Khrushchev's favour came after Bardin had sent the seven-page description of the
Soviet satellite program to Berkner, and after the first Radio articles had gone to press, it may be
presumed that if matters had gone the other way, and Khrushchev's rivals, who were largely
opposed to the diversion of military resources for a satellite program, had succeeded in
overthrowing him, then even the small amount of information which began to flow that summer
would have dried up.3° If the Soviet satellite program had been closed down completely, of
course, we would not be sitting here today. Conversely, by rewarding the Soviet leader's gamble
with a political triumph, the first two successful sputniks probably made it easier for some Soviet
scientists to develop interactions with their Western colleagues.
In the event, the Soviet reluctance to share advance information about their satellite plans
was not immediately harmful to their scientific or political interests. The tracking stations of other
IGY nations were able to be adapted to the required frequencies and orientations within days,
sometimes hours, of the launching of Sputnik 1. It can be argued, however, that the lack of a
cooperative international network of tracking stations, such as might have been built up by
following a more open policy, cost the Soviet scientists the prestige of one of the most impressive
discoveries in the early years of space science, the Van Allen radiation belts, which could not be
clearly detected from the partial orbital and experimental data which were all that they could obtain
with their own resources.31
4) To Cooperate, or Not to Cooperate? - Writing the Book
The CSAGI Conference on Rockets and Satellites, held in Washington from 30 September to 5
October 1957, was in effect the first real joint discussion between Soviet and American scientists
about the arrangements for satellite experiments within the IGY. While minutes of some of its
working groups survive, no full record of the conference proceedings appears to be extant. There
seemsto havebeenlittledisagreement,atthisstage,aboutthearrangementsfor the exchange of
experimental results. What proved controversial was the nature and extent of the 'operational data'
to be made available by those launching a satellite for observers in other countries. The
Americans at first wanted flash announcements of all launchings to be broadcast within one hour,
and precise details of launch sites and orbital inclination angles to be given. This was modified at
Washington to allow a two-hour notice pedod, and for successful launchings only. Reference to
the launch site was deleted, and the phrase "Complete orbital elements at an instant near the time
of launching" was substituted, presumably because such data could be packaged in such a way as
to protect the location of the launch site or at least, appear to do so, for reasons of 'face'.
The issue of telemetry frequencies was a subject for intense discussion. Kasatkin defended
his country's choice on the grounds of its scientific value for the study of ionospheric refraction,
and suggested that the tracking precision, for which the Americans had opted with their higher
frequency, might be attainable through statistical treatment of a large number of observations of a
lower frequency beacon. It might also be practicable to include a tracking signal at the U. S.
frequency in the "next sedes" of Soviet satellites. In reply to a cross-examination from Porter and
others about the design of the Soviet transmitter, the polarization of its signal, and the design of
tracking station antennas, he stated that the Soviet delegation "had not been prepared to give
detailed information of this nature at this conference".32 Western participants repeatedly
underlined the undeniable inference that, if the Soviet scientists wanted observational support for
their satellite program from scientific institutions and amateurs around the world, as they appeared
sincerely to do, then they would have to provide considerably more information on some of its
technical aspects than had been given so far. On the other hand Kasatkin's reference to the
articles in Radio may have come as a surprise to most Western delegates. The telemetry issue
was resolved by endorsing both the American and the Soviet choice., and the potential value of
the Soviet 40 megahertz frequency for ionosphere measurements was also accepted. 33 The draft
Guide to IGY World Data Centres had proposed that orbital predictions (ephemerides) be
distributed to observing stations via the IGY's global telecommunications network, known as
Agiwam. 34 This was accepted, but with a rider that "additions" to the text might be needed after
further study. In general, the conference recognized that much remained to be done in building
effective global cooperation for the satellites portion of the IGY.
The urgency of these tasks was underlined by the news, on the evening of 4 October 1957,
of the launching of Sputnik 1. At the last session of the conference on the following day
Blagonravov volunteered a few more details of the spacecraft, namely its size, weight and the
expected battery life for its transmitter. Chapman closed the meeting with a speech congratulating
the Soviet scientists, but drawing attention to the indirect way in which CSAGI had been informed
of the launch (through the news media) and contrasting the openness of the American program
with the "silence" of the Soviet effort. He ended with a plea "that our resolutions concerning timely
announcements and adequate information will be fully observed"._
Blagonravov had also remarked that Sputnik 1 was not a properly instrumented satellite of
the kind which Soviet scientists were planning for the IGY, but merely a preliminary test vehicle. _
This distinction, which had also been floated within the Vanguard program, raised concerns that
Sputnik 1 might never be registered and reported as an IGY experiment, despite the worldwide
publicity which it had generated for the Year. After a ten-day interval, during which the Soviet IGY
committee showed little sign of conforming with Chapman's recommendations, the CSAGI
coordinator Day cabled Moscow to request information about the satellite's orbit for distdbution on
Agiwam, "while understanding from press reports that satellite now orbiting is not part of IGY
programme". Yu. D. Boulanger, one of the vice presidents of the Soviet committee, replied that,
onthe contrary,Sputnik1 was "launched ... in accordance with the Soviet IGY programme". 37
The U. S. committee responded by distributing its own ephemerides for the two objects then in
orbit, through the Agiwam system. 38
There followed a period of acute misunderstanding and disagreement. Replying to a further
telegram from Day, Boulanger listed 26 foreign observing stations to which his committee was
already supplying ephemerides for Sputnik 1. This was not yet being done through Agiwam, but
Boulanger stated that the IGY network would be used from the beginning of November. _ At about
the same time the deputy president of the Soviet Academy's Astronomical Council, A. G.
Massevitch, wrote to Fred Whipple, director of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO),
who had proposed the first international nomenclature for satellites, and whose observatory was
coordinating the Moonwatch program for optical satellite observations by voluntary groups. The
purpose of her letter was to inform Whipple, "according to our agreement with Mr. L. Campbell in
Barcelona", of the telegraphic codes which the Soviet committee proposed to use when
transmitting ephemerides, and which it desired observing stations to use when sending data to
Moscow. She added that stations in the USA, Japan, and South America (areas not yet
represented in the Soviet distribution list) would also be supplied with predictions, about 48 hours
in advance of the relevant transit, as soon as their precise geographical coordinates and IGY
station numbers were sent to Moscow.4°
Seemingly unaware of these favourable, if tardy, developments, Berkner wrote to Chapman
on 7 November with his considered opinion as to the degree of compliance and non-compliance of
the Soviet committee with the existing IGY agreements about cooperation in respect of satellites.
The Soviet committee, he thought, had probably met the requirements of the IGY in respect of
advance notice and early publication of orbital data, especially in the case of Sputnik 2, which had
been launched a few days earlier on 3 November. But little of that information, such as it was, had
been sent through IGY channels. He accepted, also, that it would be unreasonable to expect the
results of on-board experiments to be communicated internationally for some time. However, "we
should reasonably expect ... under the CSAGI agreements to have early and frequent information
from the Soviet Union on its orbital observations and on its telemetry code in order that scientific
information from the satellite could be observed and interpreted by observers of other nations. In
my opinion, failure to provide this information promptly seems inexcusable on their part, and with
this I am sure you must agree." He concluded by expressing strong support for an attempt which
was currently being mounted by Day to secure the attendance of Soviet scientists at a meeting on
satellites to be held at the Royal Society at the end of November, which could be extended for a
second day for the express purpose of hammering out a clear arrangement on the exchange of
satellite information, by which the Soviet committee might thereafter feel itself to be bound.41
Chapman responded on 20 November. While he agreed with much that Berkner had said, he
disagreed strongly with his interpretation of the IGY rules on the matter of telemetry codes. As
Chapman pointed out, the ability of foreign observers to record but not interpret the telemetry from
the sputniks was no different in principle to that which "was expected to arise from the US
satellites" - perhaps a tactless remark, in view of the fact that none had yet been launched. 42
Nicolet had already sent Chapman his own opinion to the same effect, namely that Berkner was
reading far too much into the IGY rules. In Nicolet's typically brusque opinion, the rules had been
written by the Americans and were now being followed by the Russians._
Apparently as unaware as Day of what Massevitch was doing, V. A. Troitskaya, the
secretary of the Soviet IGY committee, cabled Day on 14 November to the effect that precise
orbital data could not be supplied "as satellites still move about in space'. Such information could
only be supplied at some indefinite future date, "after final reduction of observation results'. _ A
weeklater,BeloussovinformedDaythat the Sovietcommittee would not now be sending a
representative to the second part of the Royal Society meeting, which was therefore cancelled. 4s
A few days later the cooperation pendulum swung yet again, when Bardin sent Day a
detailed proposal for the transmission of ephemerides from the Moscow Research Institute of
Terrestrial Magnetism, Ionosphere and Radio-Wave Propagation (NIZMIR) to observers around
the world, and the transmission of data on Soviet satellites from foreign observers to Moscow.
Though Day was sceptical at first, he soon realised that the new Soviet proposal would have to be
taken sedously. = In December he replied to Bardin with a letter agreeing that the interchange of
visual observations, both between observers and between the two IGY World Data Centres
(WDCs), one in the Soviet Union and the other in the United States, and between those Centres
themselves, to which a third was about to be added in Britain, was now a pdodty. The second type
of data exchange had not yet begun, but should do so immediately. 47
Day first tded, unsatisfactodly, to incorporate the new Soviet communication codes into the
existing text of the Guide. 4s Then in January he went to Moscow for a full discussion with the
Soviet committee on all aspects of data exchange. The meeting was conducted amicably, despite
the continuing dispute between the U. S. and Soviet academies over the latter's claim that parts of
the upper stage (Alpha-I) of the Sputnik 1 carder rocket had crashed on U.S. territory after
reentry from orbit, and should therefore be returned to the Soviet authorities. 49 At this meeting the
chairman of the Soviet committee's working group on rockets and satellites, E. K. Fedorov,
presented Day with a complete redraft of the Guide chapter which proposed several important
changes. The time-frame for a launch announcement and initial details of orbit was relaxed still
further to "the day of launching". Orbital predictions should be supplied only "to the institutions
participating in obervations', in other words, in retum for data supplied by them. Preliminary
accounts of satellite observations and a description of the on-board expedments should be
published several weeks after a launch. Full scientific reports should be published within a year.
No explicit provision was made for observers to send their observations or recordings of one
country's satellite to a WDC located in another country, although this was already being done. In a
subsequent letter repeating the Soviet proposals, Fedorov categorically rejected the possibility of
shadng the telemetry codes, and hence the unreduced experimental data, with other scientists:
"All investigation work and the whole analysis of observational data should be done by the
launching country". The letter underlined the impression already received by Day, that the Soviet
proposals were not intended for further discussion,s°
Undismayed, Day presented a further revision of the Guide, now incorporating what he saw
as "the two programme principle" insisted on by the Soviet committee, to a meeting of the CSAGI
Bureau in Brussels on 27 February. This document was rejected by Beloussov in March, with a
statement that he could not accept anything beyond the Fedorov draft. A series of amendments
proposed by the U. S. committee, however, were incorporated into the February draft. Berkner, as
the IGY discipline reporter, then authorized this version both for distribution by Day and for
inclusion in the Manual on Rockets and Satellites, which was to be published in July in time for the
Moscow CSAGI Assembly. At Berkner's suggestion, a statement was added to this section of the
Guide, explaining that, because of the novelty of satellite experiments, certain aspects of the data
exchange could not yet be finalized, but that meanwhile Berkner's own proposals on the exchange
of precision observations, and on depositing the reduced satellite data at the WDCs, were being
appended as a basis for discussion at the forthcoming CSAGI conference in Moscow.sl
At the CSAGI Bureau meeting in February, Berkner reported that the three IGY satellites
launched to date, two Soviet and one American, had yielded "very substantial scientific
information". There had been "some delay and problems" with the exchange of orbital
observations of Sputnik 1, caused by "understandable failure to foresee the exact problems of
encoding and communicating the necessary information", but a better system had now been
devised "through close collaboration with the nations concerned". "Certain necessary revisions in
the World Data Guide" were being worked out with Day, and "Certainly future problems remain to
be solved as might be expected in dealing with such a new form of scientific activity. "s2
On 20 May Fedorov wrote again to Day, flatly rejecting the revised version of the Guide that
had been circulated in April. Perhaps because of the obscurity of the circumlocution "primary
prediction authority", which Day had started using to refer to the national committee that a satellite
belonged to, Fedorov mistakenly supposed that there were now no provisions requiring observers
to send their data "to the country that launched the satellite". He also rejected out of hand any
obligation to pass "to certain scientific institutions ... the unprocessed data of registration of
different measurements carried out on rockets and satellites"._ Since Berkner's suggestion,
appended to the April version of the Guide, had carefully explained that the data in question
should first "be reduced and corrected as may be necessary to put them in the form of physically
significant parameters useful for scientific analysis", it seems likely that Fedorov had recast this
as an unreasonable request for raw data, simply in order to reject it. Drawing attention to the
likelihood of linguistic confusions, Day wrote to Berkner that the completion of the Guide would
now have to be left to the CSAGI Assembly, due to open in Moscow on 29 July._4 More than two-
thirds of the way through its course, the IGY was still without an agreed structure for scientific
cooperation on satellites.
5) The Moscow Assembly
At the CSAGI Assembly in Moscow, discussions about scientific cooperation on satellites were
distracted both by positive and by negative developments. On the positive side, scientists were
naturally more interested in sharing and discussing some of the earliest results of satellite
experiments, than in discussing a set of bureaucratic rules about future exchanges of data. On the
negative side, the conference was racked with severe political disagreements between Western
delegations and the Soviet hosts, which placed considerable tensions on all participants, and
which sometimes meant that experienced delegates were unable to attend a formal session,
because they were caught up in something going on elsewhere behind closed doors._5
The working group on rockets and satellites was chaired by Homer Newell, convenor of the
U. S. committee's panel on IGY rocket experiments, in his capacity as Berkner's alternate. At the
end of the meeting Newell was obliged to report that it had been impossible for American and
Soviet scientists to reach agreement on the outstanding issues of data exchange in respect of
satellites. In his view, the resolutions passed by the working group "are so general that they do not
guarantee an automatic and adequate flow of the kinds of data needed to make it possible for
researchers in countries other than launching countries to conduct research on artificial satellites
and the radio signals from them."56 In a subsequent confidential report he summarized these
disagreements as arising from "a firm party line: ... donl give away any basic rocket and satellite
data .... They refused to: (a) provide orbital elements for Soviet satellites during the satellites'
lifetimes; (b) provide precision radio tracking data for satellites; (c) agree to an automatic dispatch
of basicdatato the WorldDataCenters."_ Berkner's suggestions for the Guid____ee,in particular,
seemed "to upset them". _
Another type of data which Soviet delegates at the Moscow Assembly refused to supply
were the physical characteristics of rocket stages placed in orbit, on the grounds that studying
such objects had "no scientific value". When the Americans proposed to cease sending orbital
I
predictions for such objects, however, Massevitch reportedly contradicted herself by stating that
after all, they were "of some scientific value". The line on witholding information about operational
aspects of the Soviet satellites was firmly held, and Newell formed the impression that "the day's
work was being reviewed each evening, and specific orders issued with regard to the position to
take up on the following day"._
Other U. S. delegates also noted "a rather sharply drawn line between the research effort
and the 'hardware' by means of which the research was accomplished". Logical contortions, or
simple silence, were resorted to whenever the discussions in Moscow showed signs of crossing
this line.s° Discussing this distinction, Newell emphasized that "basic data" were usually essential
to establish the methodological credentials of a piece of research. His impression was that such
material was provided in some of the papers on upper atmosphere rocket experiments, but was
rigorously witheld in respect of satellite experiments. American attempts to acquire operational
data about the Soviet satellite program beyond the confines of the conference, such as from the
Sputnik Exhibition which was staged in Moscow to coincide with the CSAGI and IAU Assemblies,
were also frustrated, el
A careful reading of the actual amendments to the Guide which were agreed by the Moscow
working group, however, suggests that Newell's reproaches, though not without grounds, may
have been overdrawn. On the third point, §17 of the Guide, the Soviet delegates did indeed
refuse to send such data automatically. But on the first and second points, §§ 8, 9 and 13 in the
Moscow version of the Guide committed every launching authority to give the approximate orbital
characteristics of its satellite within 24 hours of the launch, to relay orbital predictions to observing
stations, and to lodge reduced results of precision observations of the orbit with World Data
Centres within six months. The main effect of the Moscow amendments was to delete all
references to "complete" data, and to substitute such phrases as "results ... necessary for
processing scientific experiments", or "the observational scientific data concerned" with a
particular experiment. _ The Soviet scientists were not, then, refusing to hand over any basic data
from their satellite observations and experiments. But they were certainly refusing to hand over all
their data, and reserving the right to choose what they would hand over, and to whom. It is
relevant to note that the U.S. State Department may not have given its final approval to
Berkner's proposal for exchanging the complete precise orbital data, either, prior to the Moscow
Assembly. e3
The working group meetings in Moscow appear to have ignored the slightly variant version
of the Guide chapter given in the official Manual on Rockets and Satellites. The Moscow revision
of Day's April draft thus became the final text of the Guide. It was circulated in October 1958,
shortly before the end of the Year, and published in the Annals of the IGY in 1959. s4 The U. S.
and Soviet IGY committees both agreed to an ad hoc extension of the IGY for the calendar year of
1959, a period known as the International Geophysical Cooperation (IGC). But there was no
meeting of the full CSAGI Assembly or an equivalent successor body during this period, nor of its
working group on rockets and satellites. The ICSU Assembly of October 1958 in Washington had
created a new Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), which was intended to take over the
functionsof the IGYworkinggroup. However,Sovietobjectionsto its constitutionmeantthat it
wasunabletocontributetothedevelopmentoftheprinciplesof internationalcooperationonspace
scienceuntil the early 1960s. ChapterXI of the CSAGI Guide, including the important
disagreements and reservations entered by the Soviet Union and the United States, therefore
remained the last official word on this subject for some time.
6) Exchanging Data
Whatever may have been the contents and status, at any particular date, of the arrangements for
cooperation on scientific satellites proposed by the CSAGI Guide, the overt purpose of including a
rockets and satellites discipline within the IGY, as with all its other disciplines, was to promote the
exchange of relevant geophysical data and research findings between the participating
committees. The effectiveness of this part of the IGY can therefore be assessed, at the cost of a
little repetition, from the extent to which such exchanges actually took place. Unfortunately most
of the primary evidence on this aspect of the IGY derives from internal documents or public
exchanges in which either the United States or the Soviet Union, but most often the United States,
tended to assume that what it wanted to happen was what had been positively agreed to by the
other party, instead of listening carefully to what the other party had actually said it would or would
not do.
The accusations of bad faith levelled against the Soviet IGY committee by Odishaw and by
the director of the U. S. National Science Foundation, Alan Waterman, within less than three
weeks of the opening of the space age on 4 October 1957, were not a good omen for how such
matters would be handled over the next two years. 6s One typical U. S. document, written around
18 November 1957, contrasted the detailed descriptions of Vanguard instrumentation, telemetry
and experimental plans which had been circulated during 1956 and 1957, with the absence of such
information from Bardin's document of June 1957. It went on to charactedze Soviet information
on the first two Sputniks as "belated and somewhat incomplete" and "ineffective", by comparison
with the "detailed orbital data" on Sputnik 1 which had been sent by the U. S. committee to all the
others, and specifically to the Soviet Academy on 27 October 1957. Although it noted that the
proposals on data exchange in the CSAGI Guide had not been formally adopted by the
Washington Conference, the document tended throughout to treat them as a set of mutually
agreed 'rules' which the Soviet Union was infdnging,ss
The eady, unilateral versions of the Guide had included a recommendation, later dropped,
that a launching authodty should announce the "approximate period of launchings" in advance.
With the exception of Sputnik 1, both the United States and the Soviet Union were generally held
to have complied with this, usually through press statements or news broadcasts.67 In respect of
prompt announcements of a successful launch, both sides also complied, except that the Soviet
authorities used the official IGY Agiwam channels only for one satellite, Sputnik 3, on the day after
its launching, and for two lunar probes launched in 1959.
The hasty condemnations of their Soviet colleagues by a few American scientists are all the
more puzzling, in retrospect, in the light of eady moves by the Soviet committee to establish a
modest level of cooperation. As noted above, Sputnik 1 was confirmed as an IGY experiment on
18 October. The delay seems to have been a matter of confusion rather than deliberate
obstruction. Then on 31 October Boulanger sent Day the list of 26 stations outside the Soviet
Union to which predictions were already being sent, adding that predictions would be circulated on
the Agiwamnetworkfrom the beginning of November. ss Meanwhile Massevitch had already
written directly to Whipple on 26 October, arranging to send predictions to the SAO, and promising
to send them to observatories in the USA, South America and Japan, as soon as the relevant
coordinates were provided. = Predictions for Sputnik 2 began to be received at the SAO on 5
November. 7° Thereafter something seems to have gone wrong, perhaps as a result of Odishaw's
bilateral intervention into a process that was being fostered with some success by Day from
Brussels, in his role as IGY Coordinator, or perhaps because the Soviet committee was rethinking
the proposed arrangements. For whatever reason, the Soviet committee never did distribute its
predictions through Agiwam, and did not even copy to the CSAGI office those which were already
being distributed to a limited number of stations. There also seems to have been an interruption in
the supply of predictions to the SAO. 71
The Soviet committee continued to show an interest in receiving observational data on their
own satellites from abroad. At the end of November Bardin sent Day the proposed codes for such
messages, and Massevitch sent Shapley a list of 68 satellite-observing stations in the Soviet
Union, complete with coordinates. 72 BUtthat this was not expected to be a one-sided arrangement
is shown, first, by the fact that Bardin included outward codes for the transmission of ephemerides
to foreign observers of the sputniks, and second, by the explicit Soviet proposal, in January, to
amend the Guide so as to underline the reciprocity of such exchanges.
In December the U.S. committee responded by sending a list of visual (Moonwatch)
stations to Massevitch. This was followed in March with a combined list of over 100 stations,
which included not only U. S. stations but also those established by other national IGY committees
in cooperation with the UoS. committee and the SAO. 73 But the Soviet committee apparently
made few if any changes to its existing distribution of orbital predictions.TM By July 1959 the flow
of predictions to the SAO had dried up, but visual and photographic observations of Soviet
satellites from Soviet stations were still arriving at a rate of about two messages a week. 75 In May
1959 an Izvestiya article stated that over 70,000 "tables of observations', from all IGY fields, had
been supplied to foreign investigators from the World Data Centre B in Moscow.7s
While the Soviet committee generally declined to publish the codes for interpreting
telemetry from the early sputniks, the code for the cosmic ray detector on Sputnik 3 was given to
an American scientist at the Moscow Assembly in August 1958, and was regularly used by foreign
scientists thereafter. 77
In the sphere of scientific results, the Soviet committee's Preliminary Report on Sputniks 1
and 2 was published at the end of January 1958, much as required by the provisional IG¥
arrangements. The first report on work with meteorological rockets in the Arctic and Antarctic
followed in March.TM A preliminary scientific report on the first two sputniks appeared in August
1958, and a final one in March 1959. Although this was after the one-year deadline specified for
the IGY, the stipulation could not be said to have been seriously breached, in view of the
numerous scientific papers based on observations and measurements with the first two sputniks
which had already been presented at the Moscow Assembly, some of which were also published in
Russian journals during 1958. 79 The Sputnik 3 experiments were also covered in some of this
literature, and studies of the orbit of its upper stage (1958 1) were published from December 1958.
A final scientific report on Sputnik 3 appeared in May 1959, carefully meeting the one-year
deadline, s°
JustastheU.S..committeehadgiven a far more detailed account of its satellite-launching plans
in advance, including technical details of the launch vehicle which were never matched by any
information from the Soviet Union, so too the data and reports on satellite observations and
experiments which were circulated by the U.S. committee, on both Soviet and American
satellites, were both prompt and abundant. The set of documents drawn up by the U.S.
committee in 1959 (reproduced below as Appendix A) omits some of the earliest Soviet
information, and includes on the American side of the expression several items which hardly
amount to satellite data or results, such as bibliographies. But it should be added, in fairness, that
if the lists were to be completed with the advance descriptions of satellite experiments and
equipment supplied by either side, the balance would certainly tip still further in the Americans'
favour. Nor do the summary entries convey the real extent of the Amedcan cooperation; for
example, on every working day between 16 May 1958 and 16 July 1959 the SAO sent about eight
to ten observations, of all satellites, to the Agiwam centre at Fort Belvoir for onward distribution to
the global IGY network, including of course the Soviet Union.81 (The Fort Belvoir facility may not
have forwarded them daily, but it certainly did so several times a week.) One noticeable feature is
the regular use of the Agiwam network, for launch announcements, that was made by the U. S.
committee, in accordance with the Guide. Another point worth making is that some of the fully
processed scientific observations took many months to complete and publish, just as they did in
the Soviet Union.
The U. S. satellites made more use of interrogated, and less of continuous telemetry than the early
sputniks, with the result that Soviet tracking stations were less able to record U. S. telemetry and
therefore less interested in acquiring the codes for processing it, even though they were made
available, s2 From Berkner's odginal draft onwards, all versions of the CSAGI Guide included a
clause which went unchallenged, and which read in its final version as follows:
"18. Raw data whether film records of optical observations, primary records of radio
observations and telemetered signals are not suitable for exchange but it is expected
that they will be available for consultation through WDCs when so requested. "83
The continuous radio telemetry of Sputnik 1 was broadcast for 23 days, that of Sputnik 2 for 7, and
that of Sputnik 3 for 691, thanks to its use of solar-powered batteries. Very large amounts of the
raw data were thus able to be recorded by tracking stations outside the Soviet Union. One of the
bitterest disputes between the U. S. and Soviet committees, in respect of this part of the IGY,
began with a Soviet claim that such recordings "are not forwarded to the Soviet Union
immediately", "in spite of the existing thesis of the CSAGI Guide for WDC". _ References in the
document to the U. S. Atlas communications experiment in December 1958 and to unpublished
information from Explorer IV, namely its Project Argus data, suggest that it was probably intended
to make anti-American propaganda at a time when the disputes in COSPAR and the U. N. Space
Committee (COPUOS) were extremely severe. There was however a genuine issue at stake, and
one which had not been resolved by the IGY discussions, because they had tended to assume that
the raw data from a satellite would be in the hands of its launching authority, and because they
had overlooked the fact that the WDCs would be expected to harmonize their holdings by copying
matedal between themselves. _ The Soviet committee could not in fact point to any provision
within the IGY arrangements which required the transfer, let alone the immediate transfer, of such
material, but their moral case was superficially strong. The propaganda problem was, however,
thatsuchrecordings had already been handed over by U. S. scientists to their Soviet colleagues,
as the Soviet note itself remarked.
By May 1958 Donald Menzel, director of the Harvard Observatory, had already been in
correspondence with Fedorev about the handling of recordings of signals from the sputniks. He
had also already sent "some tapes" directly to the Soviet Union. Under Odishaw's guidance, the
U. S. IGY office told Menzel that they were "interested in getting these tapes for transmittal to the
U.S.S.R. as a part of the IGY program", and asked how much material might be involved. Menzel
estimated that at that point there were between 50 and 100 tapes in the hands of various groups._
Odishaw wrote to Beloussov offering to send tapes of sputnik signals, and asking for tapes of
Explorers 1 and 3. Beloussov replied thanking him for the offer and regretting that the Soviet
committee had no tapes of the Explorers. At the end of July six tapes of Sputnik 1 telemetry were
delivered to the Soviet committee at the CSAGI Assembly in Moscow, and a further six, of
Sputniks 1 and 2, were delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Washington in August. In September
and October the Soviet committee sent requests for tapes of Sputnik 3. Odishaw replied asking
for tapes of Explorer 4, which "you must have" in view of its higher inclination. The Soviet
committee simply repeated its request, and the Americans handed over 34 tapes from Sputnik 3
on 31 December 1958. A Soviet request for more Sputnik 3 tapes, in February 1959, was
countered with another request for Explorer 4 tapes in April.87
Although the record of these exchanges dries up with Odishaw's understandably curt reply
to Beloussov at the end of July 1959, it seems safe to conclude that the Americans never received
any tapes of their satellites' telemetry from the Soviet Union, and that the last tapes sent to the
Soviet Union by the U. S. committee were those despatched at the end of 1958. sa But in late July
or early August 1959 one further tape (at least) was probably sent directly from the University of
Alaska's Geophysical Institute to the Soviet physicist M. G. KJ'oshkin,who had sent the request in
February 1959 (repeated in March) referred to above. Once again Odishaw expressed a
preference for placing such exchanges on an official basis, preferably through the World Data
Centres, but did not finally intervene to prevent a direct transfer, which presumably ensued. _ The
sending of this tape is of particular interest, in view of Beloussov's accusation in May, that "The
most valuable in scientific respect pad of these records made in Alaska has not been received at
all .,9o
The Soviet satellite tracking stations were all sited within the U.S.S.R., and hence unable to
record the continuous telemetry from their satellites while over the southem hemisphere. Berkner,
for one, had long recognized the potential scientific value of such data. 91 A Soviet request to the
Australians for records of the southem telemetry of Sputnik 3 is known to have been refused. _ It
is not known whether any of the tapes of sputnik telemetry given by American scientists to their
Soviet colleagues contained such data.
The official picture of the extent of scientific cooperation in respect of the IGY satellites is given by
interim and final catalogues of the holdings of the VVDCs in January 1959 and December 1962.
The first of these was compiled from the WDC A report, with some input from WDC C in Britain,
but none from WDC B in Moscow. It includes only two Soviet documents, and omits the
"Preliminary Report" on Sputniks 1 and 2 which had reached Washington in February 1958, and
seems to be unreliable for that reason alone.93 The holdings of Soviet material in WDC A must
surely have increased quite rapidly during 1959. From one source or another, at least, Homer
Newell was able to produce a comprehensive comparative survey of the space science
achievementsof the UnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion,bythe endof the year._ The final
catalogue of WDC holdings, drawn up in consultation with all three WDCs, was published in the
Annals of the IGY. It lists extensive series of Soviet orbital reports on Soviet satellites, as well as
hundreds of scientific papers from Soviet scientists. None of the handful of raw data records held
in WDCs A and C was of Soviet origin, and no such holdings are recorded for WDC B. Using a
crude measure of page-length, American contributions of all types outnumbered those from the
Soviet Union in an approximate ratio of 3 to 2. No Soviet scientific papers discuss the orbits or
experimental data from American satellites. Dozens of papers by American and other Western
scientists discuss the orbital data, and some the experimental data, from Soviet satellites. _
7) Discussion
The events related in this paper show that the IGY-IGC period was not some golden age of
cooperation between the early satellite programs of the Soviet Union and the United States. It is
probably more useful to see the IGY interactions over satellites as continuous with the frictions in
COSPAR and COPUOS which immediately followed them. Such agreements over satellite
cooperation as it was possible to reach within the IGY structures were arrived at only tardily, in the
middle of 1958. They were imperfectly devised, incomplete, and marred with get-out clauses.
Even such as they were, the Soviet committee failed to observe the clauses which had apparently
been agreed, for example in the matter of distributing orbital predictions through the Agiwam
network. The last part of this paper will summarize what the author suggests were the obvious and
less obvious causes for things having been so.
The first consideration must be the unusual properties of satellites in respect of international
scientific cooperation, especially as it was understood at that time. The remainder of the IGY was
conducted, for the most part, within a traditional structure of national compartmentalization. The
plans of national committees were strongly coordinated for each discipline or sub-discipline, above
all in respect of making similar, often synchronous, observations with similar instruments. But the
actual work of taking such measurements was not done publicly, in the direct presence of foreign
colleagues. They were taken at the various stations equipped and manned for that aspect of the
discipline by a team sponsored by a national committee. Data were subsequently _vorked up',
reduced and tabulated, and only deposited with a Wodd Data Centre in due course, when they
were thought to be ready. By general consensus, the initial scientific analysis of the data was held
to be the privilege of the primary observers, or their close institutional or national colleagues.
Multinational or transnational scientific enterprises were still exceptional during the IGY. Some
scientific teams from relatively developed countries, such as Poland, the Netherlands and the
Soviet Union, mounted major or minor expeditions to less developed countries or colonial
territories, such as Viet-Nam, Curac,,ao and Egypt, respectively. Oceanographic expeditions
naturally visited many countries and sometimes internationalized their personnel to a small
degree. In Antarctica there was an internationally-staffed Weather Central under U. S. overall
control, and some other exchanges of personnel. The Trans-Antarctic Expedition was staffed by
several countries, but only on an 'old Commonwealth' basis. The strongest internationalization in
Antarctica was that addressed to meteorology, both for immediate practical reasons and also
because of the long transnational tradition in that science, itself the product of obvious scientific
requirements. _
The conduct of the early Soviet space program shows many signs of insisting that the
separation of national efforts, which was the dominant pattem elsewhere in the IGY, should be
applied to satellites also. They would launch the scientific packages, collect the data, tabulate the
data, and write the papers. They would then publish the papers and deposit the reduced data at
WDCs in their own time. They were not interested in receiving raw satellite data from U. S.
satellites or providing their own to other scientists. However, Soviet scientists were powerless to
alter the fact that their satellites were public objects. The physical characteristics of their orbits
and continuous radio signals were exposed to anyone, from school-children to intelligence
agencies. But in Westem countries that did not mean that data downloaded by a military service,
for example, would automatically have been placed at the disposal of the local IGY committee.
The attempt to develop cooperation in respect of the IGY satellites also suffered from the
close involvement of the new technology with the top secret missile programs of the Soviet Union
and the United States. In the prevailing circumstances, the U. S. demand for a full and immediate
disclosure of all the 'operational data' from the Soviet satellites was certain to be perceived, and
rejected, as an attempt to acquire military intelligence. U.S. IGY officials certainly did consult
regularly with the State Department and occasionally with the C.I.A., and U. S. scientists attending
foreign conferences were routinely required to report back on any matters that might be of interest
to their govemment, as, doubtless, were Soviet scientists also. There were of course perfectly
legitimate scientific reasons for Amedcan scientists to wish to discover, if they could, how their
Soviet colleagues were adapting their instrumentation to cope with the stresses of the on-board
and near-space environments. But the fact was that many of those problems also had to be
addressed in missile and warhead development, and they could not be freely discussed without
careful scrutiny by the relevant security agencies on each side. Soviet scientists were probably
entitled to be suspicious in this area. There were no similar demands from the U. S. committee
about the specifications and performance of Soviet lorries taking scientific instruments into the
Libyan desert, even though the lorries, too, may have affected the eventual scientific results. One
other aspect of this part of the problem, already mentioned above, is that the Soviet IGY
committee probably had no control over, and not much liaison with, the group of scientists and
engineers under Korolev who were actually charged with launching the first sputniks. (A
somewhat similar situation developed in the United States when the U. S. Army's Explorer project
was added to the IGY program after Sputnik 1.)
There must also have been widespread considerations of 'face'. The Soviet Union came
late into an IGY program that was dominated by the United States and its allies. The Uo S.
scientific agenda had become the IGY agenda; their norms were assumed to be 'the' norms of
intemational science; they already held the key positions and were wdting the rules. Prestige
plums, such as the South Pole station, were already spoken for. Intentionally or not, the United
States also became the Year's chief paymaster. By contrast, it is evident to anyone reading
between the lines of the few contemporary accounts of the internal Soviet preparations for the IGY
that are available, that there were enormous organizational, logistical and financial problems to be
overcome. Much of the infrastructure for the Soviet IGY program was simply not in place until the
middle of 1958 or later. _7 (This single fact, more than any other, explains the Soviet determination
to extend the Year through 1959.) Faced with difficulties arising from the relative backwardness
of their country, _ Soviet scientists may sometimes have needed to conceal the fact that they were
unable to do something behind arguments which stated that they could not agree to doing it. With
the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see that if the Americans had had a better appreciation of
howlongthesortof thingstheywerelookingfor were bound to take in the Soviet Union, and had
exercised a little more patience even while letters slowly limped from one country to another (by
modem standards), there might have been far less friction. On the other hand, exactly the same
point can sometimes be made about the Soviet committee. Kroshkin wrote asking for further data
from Sputnik 3 in March 1959; by April the Americans were moving to meet his request, but in
May there came Beloussov's intemperate intervention into the process. A little more patience in
Moscow and Kroshkin would have received the Alaskan data far sooner than, presumably, he did,
and much heat and fury would have been avoided.
Also in the matter of 'face', the willingness of the leadership of the U. S. delegation to rain
on the Soviet parade, at the 5th CSAGI Assembly in Moscow, can hardly have smoothed the way
for negotiations in the rockets and satellites working group or any other part of the meeting.
Considerations of prestige were also present on the American side, of course, especially
between 4 October 1957 and 31 January 1958. The hasty American accusations of bad faith, over
Sputnik 1, were not only churlish but also short-sighted, since they probably did much to set back
negotiations over space cooperation which were still at a very early stage at the end fo 1957.
Finally, however, it is important to remember that the satellites portion of the IGY was at
best a mating of scorpions, conducted in a fog of mutual prejudice and mistrust which the rational
ideals of international scientific cooperation could only partly dispel. From time to time in their
internal discussions, American IGY scientists consciously reminded each other that they were
dealing with foreigners, and should make due allowance for the strange expectations and ways of
doing things of such people. In the case of the feared and detested communist enemy, however,
it must have been enormously difficult for scientists passionately committed to Western ideals, as
nearly all of them were, to go on making such allowances indefinitely. And the same could
doubtless be said, rnutatis mutandis, about the obverse relationship. The feelings of triumph,
pride and sheer relief must have been overwhelming for Soviet scientists who worked on the early
sputniks, and the temptation to snub the Americans for a change must sometimes have proved
just as irresistible to others, as it did to Fedorov in January 1958.
Taking all these difficulties into account, however, what is really striking about the Soviet IGY
satellite program is not that the level of cooperation achieved was so imperfect, but that there was
after all some degree of useful scientific interaction and exchange, even on such a militarily
sensitive topic in the depth of the Cold War. As one optimistic scientist told the U.S. IGY
committee, and anyone else who may have been reading over its shoulder, in his confidential
report on the Moscow CSAGI Assembly:
"The most important over-all conclusion to be reached from the Moscow Conference,
however, is not that cooperation was sometimes difficult and incomplete, but on the
contrary that there was indeed more cooperation than ever before and that with
patience and understanding it may yet be possible to achieve a working relationship
among scientists as far apart as the United States and Soviet Union. "9_
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1958, minus the amendments which were incorporated from Odishaw-Day, 19 March 1958 - NAS IGY, D:
72, F: Porter 16A. There were in fact several differences between Day's version and that which appeared in
the IGY Manual on Rockets and Satellites, Annals of the IGY, vol. VI, three months later. The main one was
an additional "note" from Berkner which largely contradicted the "two programme principle" conceded by
Day, by stating that observers might send their data to any computing centre they liked, and that the U.S.
committee definitely wished to receive observations of Soviet satellites in order to do its own computations
of their orbits - Annals, vol. VI, p. 468, para. (A).
S2Berkner, "Report on Rockets and Satellites", February 1958 - CP, B: 62, F: 252.
S3Fedorov-Day, 20 May 1958 - NAS IGY, D: 34, F: CSAGI - Manuals and Annals, Part 1.
_4Day-Berkner, 23 May 1958 - ibid.
SSBerknerwas obliged to miss the conference for personal reasons. For a graphic account of the political
problems as they affected one distinguished American scientist, see J. A. Simpson, "An Account of
Experiences in the Soviet Union, 1958", n.d. - SP, B: 95, F: 1.
_Newell, "To CSAGI Bureau", ca. 9 August 1958 - CP, B: 58, F: 162. This was, of course, a fiat rejection of
the Soviet view that telemetered data, in particular, was not intended for use by researchers from other
countries, and that they themselves had no wish to receive such data from American satellites.
5?Newell, "Impressions Received During the Fifth General Assembly of the Comit_ Speciale pour I'Ann_e
Gdophysique Internationale", 18 August 1958- NAS IGY, D: 73, F: IGY: CSAGI Moscow Mtg. 1958.
SSNewell,"Items of non-agreement", MS notes, n.d. - ibid.
SgNewell, "Impressions"- n. 57 above.
_'Comments of Delegates on the Scientific Meetings", n.d., p. 9 - NAS IGY, D: 2, F: USNC Agenda, 15th
Meeting; see also P. Hart, "Report on Fifth Assembly of CSAGI, Moscow, August 1958", 29 January 1959 -
NAS IGY, D: 35, F: Delegates' Reports - Moscow.
61Newell, "Impressions", Ioc. cit. n. 57; by contrast, two American scientists were easily able to buy geiger
counters from a scientific equipment shop in Leningrad, of a type that would not have been publicly available
in the United States at that date - Simpson, "An Account", n. 55, pp. 45-6.
6:"Amendments to Chapter xr', n.d., attachment 5 to Document 145, 5th CSAGI Assembly - NAS IGY, D:
35, F: CSAGI - 5th Assembly, Moscow, 1958 - Documents.
63p. Hart, untitled minutes of a meeting between Hugh Odishaw and State Department officials, 14 July 1958
- NAS IGY, D: 35, F: CSAGI 5th Assembly - Correspondence.
_Annals of the IGY, vol. VII, pt. II, ch.Xl.
65For the Odishaw-Bardin letter of 1 November 1957, see nn. 41 - 43 above. An anonymous
memorandum, noting Waterman's proposal that '_ve can point out to good advantage the Soviet's lack of
frankness in making available information on their earth satellite", was drafted with his approval on 23
October 1957. This suggests that Odishaw may have been responding to political guidance from
Waterman, even if he ignored the latter's recommendation that the issue should be taken up through CSAGI,
rather than bilaterally - "Soviet Non-cooperation with IGY", 23 October 1957 - DDE, White House Office
Papers, Staff Research Group Series, B: 15, F: N. S. F.
_MS text, 10 pp., n.d., no title, ca. 18 November 1957 - NAS IGY, D: 20, F: TPESP Sat. Corr. Undated.
67Berkner's first draft ("Preliminary Proposal", 19 December 1956 - n. 16 above) made explicit provision for
the use of the news media in this way, but Day dropped the reference from his revised version in July 1957.
_Text of cable is in Day-Chapman et al., 31 October 1957 - CP, B: 62, F: 257.
69Massevitch-Whipple, 26 October 1957 - NAS IGY, D: 19, F: TPESP Sat. Corr. Oct. 1957 (2).
_°New York 77rues, 8 November 1957. Soviet ephemerides and observations were first sent directly to the
SAO on 5 November 1957. After an interruption of unknown date and duration (see n. 71 below), they
continued from January 1958 to at least the middle of 1959. They are another striking omission from the
listing of satellite data received from the Soviet Union, that was prepared for Odishaw in 1959 (see Appendix
A).
71Shapley-Odishaw, 24 March 1958, states that the SAO began receiving regular station predictions from
Moscow only on 17 January 1958. Presumably those received in November 1957 did not at first become a
regular service - NAS IGY, D: 19, F: TPESP Sat. Corr. Mar. 1958.
T2Bardin-Day, 25 November 1957 - CP, B:,62, F:,257; Massevitch-Shapley, 26 November 1957 - ibid. In a
subsequent interview with Izvestiya, 2 April 1958, Bardin amended this figure to 66.
T3Odishaw-Beloussov, 19 March 1958 - CNA, RG77, vol. 26, F: 4-G7-$7-17 pt. 2.
74The minutes of the British subcommittee on artificial satellites show that orbital predictions for Soviet
satellites continued to be received from the Soviet committee through 1958 and on into 1959, and that visual
observations and, occasionally, recordings of sputnik telemetry, were routinely despatched to Moscow from
British observatories.
;SBoggs-Weldon, 21 July 1959 - NAS IGY, D: 20, F: TPESP Sat. Corr. Oct. 1959.
_'ln World Centre 'B"', IzvesUya, 20 May 1959.
;TRichter-Reid, 10 September 1958 - NAS IGY, D: 20, F: TPESP Sat. Corr. Sep. 1958; Space Science Board
Committee on International Relations, Minutes of 2nd Meeting, 15 October 1958, p. 3 - SP, B: 96, F: 6;
British IGY Committee, Artificial Satellites Sub-Committee, Radio Methods Working Group, Minutes, 4
December 1958 - RS IGY.
7s"Prehmmary Report on Launching in the USSR of the First and Second Artificial Earth Satellites (1957 and
1957 )", received in Brussels 3 February 1958 -Anna/s of the IGY, vol. VI, p. 488; "Information Nr.1 on the
USSR meteorological rocket firings under the IGY programme", 13 March 1958 - attachment to Beloussov-
Odishaw, 13 March 1958 - CP, B: 62, F: 252. The preliminary report on the sputniks was received by the
U. S. IGY committee on 11 February 1958, but surprisingly, and tactlessly, neither the date nor even its
reception was acknowledged by the latter in the compilation "Material on IGY Rockets and Satellites sent to
USA from USSR" - attachment A, Odishaw-Beloussov, 31 July 1959 - NAS IGY, D: 20, F: TPESP Sat. Corr.
July 1959. The early orbital predictions sent to the SAO were also ignored, or rather, their publication and
re-transmission to the Soviet Union were listed as data flowing in the oppos#e direction - see item A:25 in
Appendix A.
_gFor details, see Anna s, vol. XlI, pt. 1, p. ix.
S°ArtificialEarth Satellites, #2, Moscow, 1959.
8_Mechau-Hart, 16 July 1959 - NAS IGY, D: 23, F: Rockets & Satellites. ShapleyoOdishaw, 24 March 1958,
n. 71 above, shows that the first observation of a Soviet satellite (1957) was sent to Agiwarn from the SAO
on 19 March 1958. Many of the early U. S. IGY satellites orbited at low angles of inclination, which probably
meant that their ephemerides were of little interest to Soviet observers - Massevitch-SAO, n.d. but ca. June
1959 -ibid.
s2
For evidence that Soviet satellites may have had some interrogated telemetry from as early as Sputnik 2,
see Richter-Reid, 10 September 1958, n. 77 above.
S3CSAGI Guide tq World Data Centres, Ch.XI, first circulated 22 October 1958.
S4Beloussov-Newell, "Fulfillment of the V CSAGI Resolutions", 15 May 1959 - NAS IGY, D: 73, F: IGY:
CSAGI Corresp.
SSInJune 1959 a document prepared for the U. S. committee's satellite panel recognized that '_here has not
as yet been any definite guidance [from CSAGI] on whether this [data for exchange] should be raw or
processed data" -'The US-IGY Earth Satellite Program", June 1959 - NAS IGY, D: 73, F: TPESP Meeting
21 July 1959.
S6Reid, memo for record, 27 May 1958 - NAS IGY, D: 19, F: TPESP Sat. Corr. May 1958. The Harvard
Observatory had a long history of good relations with Soviet astronomers under its previous director, Harlow
Shapley, both directly and through the International Astronomical Union.
STAnon., "Notes on Beloussov Communication to Newell", May 1959 - NAS IGY, D: 49, F: 646 etc. The date
of March 1959 for Kroshkin's request, given in the attachment to this document, has been corrected to
February in the light of:.JCT-AWF, 11 February 1959 - NAS IGY, D._49, F: 630.
ssOdishaw-Beloussov, 31 July 1959, and attachments - NAS IGY, D: 20, F: TPESP Sat. Corr. July 1959.
sgOdishaw-Elvey, 30 April 1959, and Elvey-Odishaw, 7 July 1959 - NAS IGY, D: 49, F: 646 etc.
9°Beloussov, "Fulfillment", n. 84 above.
91Berkner-Fraser, 29 July 1957 - n. 18 above.
_J. W. Dungey, 'The Radiation Belts", in D. R. Bates (ed.), The Planet Earth, (2nd edn), Pergamon Press,
1964, p. 311.
93Office of Coordinator, Cataloque of IGY Data received at WDCs by January 1959, Ch. XI, March 1959. It
seems scarcely credible, but might WDC A have refused to 'count' any Soviet material not addressed
directly to it? At all events, the omission of the Soviet "Preliminary Report" from WDC A's listing might
account for its omission from the U. S. committee's compilation later in the year (Appendix A).
94H. E. Newell, "U. S. and U. S. S. R. Space Science Results", 15 December 1959 - NASA Release No. 59-
277.
95Annals of the IGY, vol. XXXVI, 1964, ch. XI, "Rockets and Satellites - Catalogue of Data in the World Data
Centers", January 1963. "All papers received through December 1962 ... are included."- p. 578.
_lf the sciences of the upper atmosphere and space had been able to develop harmoniously out of
meteorology, instead of breaking away from it, they might perhaps have inherited a more securely
internationalist cultural viewpoint.
97U. S. Department of Commerce, Soviet Bloc International Geophysical Year Information, 16 November
1957, pp. 1-12; ibid., 25 April 1958, pp. 1-7; idem, Information on Soviet Bloc International Geophysical
Cooperation, 12 June 1959, pp. 1-2. Also Hart, "Report", n. 60 above.
_One possibly apocryphal rumour has it that stocks of duplicating paper for the 5th CSAGI Assembly in
Moscow had to be flown in from Brussels, either because of a physical shortage or else because existing
supplies could not be 'released' to the Soviet Academy even for such a prestigious event.
_'Comments of Delegates", n. 60 above, p. 8.
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sm,_._m_r TO Arra_:i_Ma_rrB
(July 1959)
MATERIAL OR IGY ROCKETS AND SATELLITES RECEIVED
FROM USSR
Io Latmcktn a and Frequent 7 Information Via AGIWARN
1. Second Comic Rocket to Moon
2. Third Comic Rocket to Moon
Date of
Receipt
Sept. 14, 1959
Oct. 4, 1959
II. _lKrtt Series
A. Balletin of Stations of Optical Observations of Earth Satellites
3. No. 3
4. mo. 4
5. No. 5
6. No. b
ArtS. 18, 1959
AUl;. 18, 1959
Aug. 18, 1959
AUS. 18, 1959
B. _ Information Bulletin
7. No. 7 Sept. 1959
C. R_su_s of obse_'vatiopa of Soviet Arci$i_ial Earth Satellite_
8. No. 7: 1958 Delta (Rocket), May - Jane 1958 Oct. 1959
Katerlal sent co USA
-2-
Y. FrOnted Matter and _eprincs
17. IGY Informatiou Bulletin NoB. 1 - b
G. F_eprincs and Reports
18. _nformacion No. 1 on USSR Meteorological Firings
19. Flight Infonucio_ Summaries cm Rockets fired in
USSR durlng ICY. InformJclon on fllghC s_Im_aries
includes rocket n_aOer; location of firing; dace
and cLme of flrlns; flight objectives; kind of
lnsCrtnentaciou, existence of telemetry; flight
rmrks (for s,".-e rockets) Indlcatln S peak altl-
Cuds, parachute recovery of nose-cone, exlscence
of concurrent biological exper4..enc8, and, for
oue rocket, c_mmencs on r_elpt of electron con-
centration data and on scabiliraJcion of rocket.
as teeued
ATTAC_B_M_ B
MAI'EEIAL Oil _ _OCKZTS AND _TELLIITS
IE_T TO _ no_ us_
Io Lean-hi u aa_ Fro_.n¢¥ _nformatio_
d
I. Via _AGlltkltlq, an,_o_mcmmmt of lauachln| of Sputulk Ill
saves tnclinattou of orbit, spoaee, period, wetEht_
shape, oae frequency, and experiments.
IX. Addi_toaa_ Cables; AGX_Mb_ ummla_es and AIR_" _eeeaum
2, Via J_IWAEN, c_ae observatio_ of 1958 Epsilo_
3, Via cable, macelllte predicti_8 of Spurmik Ill for
Cambri_e. Mammachume its.
_1I. tev_r_s, lhrsprtn_s, leo_ntm
A. IMp@Met end _mC,)llLt:e Kepor_ Series
4. Iio. 1: i_reLLatur 7 Eesultm of Scteatific leeearches oa
the First Soviet Artificial Earth Satellltee
and _kets
|, IMmlletia of 8ta¢tc_e _ 0_ticai Obs_rvat_on.s of Artt_/_ial
|ar|b Satelliteq
¢. _vlla_a o_ _.omi_,_alm ?_ Obeervmtio_
7, (mmmb_red) i957 Sate, 4 Nov 1957 - 28 ]rub 1958
8, lie, I 1957 Sere, i - 10 _rch 19S8
t. Iio, 2 1957 Sara, 11 - 20 March 1958
10. Issue lie. ls 1958 Delta (Kocket), 16 Kar - 30 june 1%58
11. Imsm We, 2:19_1 Delta (_ocket), 1 July - 31 July IgM
12. Issue le, 3: 1_5_ Della (ilocice_), tuaust 1958
13, Issue Uo, _: _gM Delta (Seeker.), Sop;ember 1958
1_, Issue No, $; 1958 Delta (Kocke_), October 1958
I. Ar: :Ac ml smt,zZ.t. :.,
15, Issue Is, 1: I_aulte of Scientific _nvemCtSatlo_s condoled
_£_| _bo [G'_ v_h the ai_ o_ _e F_et e_d
Second Artificial garth &atelli_es
16, Issue _o. 2; ;esu1_8 of Scleutiflc Investi_atioas re_elved
vlth _bm aid of _he Thlrd A_tificial Earth
Satellite
Ka7 16, 19_S
3uXy 1959
rq_AarZy
A_t I_M
Deember 19_
April 1959
_arek 19_
_arek 19_
Mareb 19_4
December I_M
Om_mm_mr 1954
Jute 1950
_treh ltSe
October 15, 1959
SUPPLEMENT TO ATTACHMENT A
(July 1959)
MATERIAL ON IGY ROCKETS AND SATELLITES
SENT TO USSR
Laumching and Frequency Information Via AGIWARN
I. Explorer Vl
2. Vanguard III
3. Explorer Vl!
Date of
Transmittal
Aug. 7, 1959
Sept. 18, "
Oct. 13, "
II. Report Series
A. IGY Satellite Reoort Series
4. No. 9: Symposium on Scientific Effects of Artificially
Introduced Radiations at High Altitudes ( 15
September 1959)
B. Special Reports of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
5. So. 27: Research in Space Science (June 30, 1959)
6. Wo. 28: Research in Space Science (Sept. 16, 1959)
7. No. 28A: Research in Space Science (Sept• 23, 1959)
8. No. 29: Research in Space Science (Sept. 21, 1959)
Oct. 8, 1959
Aug. 6, 1959
Oct. 15, "
It
Ill.
_reprints and Repor ta
9. Rocket-Jrenade O0servacion of Atmospheric Heating in the
Arctic, by W• G. Stroud et al
I0. A Simplified Falling-Sphere Method for Upper-_Ir Density,
Part II: Density and Temperature Results from Eight Flights,
by L. M. J_._nes et al
IV.
V •
ReDr in tm
ii. Eight reprints from journals of general availability
Tape Recor dlnKs
12. Two reals of recordings of Sputnik III signals for 15 May
1958 to 17 June 1959
Aug. 3, 1959
Material Sent to USSR -5- Dat_ of
Trcnsmittai
IV. Tape Recordings (continued_
85. Six reels delivered to Embassy of the :HSR (SpuCniks I and
II).
86. Thirty-four reels sh_pped by air to Federov (_putnik llI).
_J:, :;&_ SeL_c tO USSR
-4
G. Miscellaneous Preprints and Reports
62. Determination of Coefficlent J of _econd Harmonic in t_art,h's
Gravitational Potential from Orbit of 1958 B_ta 2 by !scar
et aL.
63. Simplified Satellite Predictions from Moa_f;ed Orh._ai Ele-.
_mt8
6/4. Rlu/tation Observationa of 195_ Epsi!on. ov Van Alien
65. Cowposition of the Upper Atmosphere by J, round,end.
66. Introduc¢ory Remarks for Argus Symposiu_ _, _. _. Porter.
67, The Argus Experiment, by Nicholas Christofilos.
6ft. Satellite Observations ot Radiation Ar_ific_a_lv lnjected
into the Geomagnetic Field, hy J. A. Van A_Len. et ai.
69. Measurement of T=apped ELectrons fr,_ a ._uc'e_r Device _y
Sounding Rockets, h',,, Major Lew Allen. 5r.
70. Theory of Geomagnet_calty Trapped Electrons _ro_ an ,_rtt-
ficiai Source, by Captain Joseph $_. Welch, Jr.
7l. Optical, Electromagnetic and "_ateLlite Obsevvations of High-
Altitude Ndclear Detonatior,_, Part ], bv Phiiip Newman.
?2. Optical, Electromagnetic and _ateklite Observattous O_ High-
Altitude Nuc'ear Oetonatxotts, Part: It. hv Alien ._. P_.terson.
H. Printed Matter an_ ReprLnts
73. Smithsonian Cortt_zbutions Lo Astropt_.yslcs, "'oi. 2, No. IO:
Orbital Data and Preliminary Analysis of 1957 Alpha and Beta.
74. Interim B_btiography of the I,c_'.
75. Literature of Space Sciences and Rxptoration (bibliography
by NRL).
76. Proceedings of the IRE, February :_59: Special Issue on the
Nature of the :onosphere - An ICY O0jective
77. Nine reprints from journals of _eneraL ava_LahiL(_v.
78. ICY Bulletin, Nos. L 2_.
I. Copies of Foreign Data Received h_ WDC-A (senL as need indicated_
79. Reports on lap_nese O'servacions of S;telii:es for October -
November, lg57 and January - May ',958.
80. Observations of _._5 _' Alpha from Pakistan.
81. Flight Su_m_aries .;TOm British M_nistry o: S_pp'v for Skylark
Rockets No. 7 a_d ._.
J. Flight S_===aries for _'. S. iCY Rockets
82. Duplicates forwarded as received; _lsg, comptlatlon to
July l, 1958, in Rocket Re_rt _o. Z-
K. Stx-_onthly Catalogue _f Dat:a
EJ. Catalogue of data ih ICY _F,_C-A for Rockets and Satellites
(January "959).
Iv. Tare Recor__iige_
84. qix reels deiivervd t.o Mo_c.w at|the F=£th CSAG| AssetM;!v
tar" =n_k T).
bare of
rr_a_smt t tai
";ept. 18;, 1958
Oct. 23i 1958"
Dec. ZO_._ 1958 "
Dec. 17,:L958
July _6,: 1959 _
July lb_ 1959 :
July 16, 1959
July 16= 1959
J_ty 16,- 1959
JuLy 16, 1959
July 16. 1959
JuLy 3, 1958
Dec, 8; 1958
Dec. 81 1958
May S, 1959
aa..i$sued
Iune 3, 1958 and
June 16, i958"
June 3, [956
June ll, t9.58 an
Aug. 8. 195_ -
Dec. l l, 1958. -
Jan. 9 : 1950 and
Apr. 17, 1959
Jan. 15, 1959 -
July 1958
• 2
*'e'.eriai Sent '.e JSSI_
-3-
30. No. 10: Processed Observational Data for I S St. -atei [ties
L_57 A:pna and £957 Beta (March i. i_5,_
31. No. it: hiatus Reports on Optical Observat,>ns o.¢ Satellites
1958 Alpha and 19%8 Beta (March 3l, 195h)
32. No. 12: Miscellaneous Infur,aatton on the Artificial Earth
Satellites (April 30, i958)
33. No. 13: Orb/ca[ Results f:,r Satellite [957 Beta One tMav 21,
1958)
34. No. 14: Reports and Analyses of Sate[llte Observations
(Jury £5, 1958)
35. No. lS: The Descent of S_.cetlite 1957 Beta One (July 20,
L958)
36. No. 16: Positions of Sateitite L952 Beta One during the First
100 Revolutions (July 25, I958)
37. No. 17: Pos_tions of Sate'tile 1958 Alpha during the First
1400 Revolutxor_s ,iSeptember 5, 1958)
38. No. 18: Satellite Data an./ Analyses (October _, [95_)
39. No
40. No
41. No
42. No
43. No
44. No
45. No
46. No
19: Research in Space Science (December b, i958)
20: Research tn Space Science (J_muarv 5, [959)
21: Research in Space'Science (February. 27. 1959)
22: Research in Space Science (March 20, 1959)
23: Research in Space Science _March 30, 1959)
24: Research in Space Science (April 9, t959)
25: Research in Space _c;ence (April 2(), [959)
26; Research in Space Science (May 21, 1959)
D. Smltbsonian-ABHA I958 Epailon Orbital Data Series
47. Issue No. l. July 26 - August 2. 1958
48. Issue No. 2: Augus_ 2 - August 13, 1958
49. Issue No. _ August 13 - August 27, 1958
50. Issue No. 4: August 27- September 19, [958
E. Other Observationai Re op__
51. Orbital Data of Russian 'Jartn S-_tellltes I and [I as deter-
mined by USAS_DL.
52. Ephemeris of 1957 Alpha ,' (Sputnik I). hv A. Ecke[s, R.
dasCrow, et ai (sent via airmai 1).
F. Jet Propulsion Laborator___keports
53. Calibration Records for the IO_' Earth b, telllte "958 Caaaaa.
54. Calibration Eecord f-,r t:_e IC"r Earth Satellite igb8 Alpha.
55. Microlock: a Minimum-Weight Radio In4trumentation System for
a:S,teltlte
56. Application of Microtock to ICY ,ate[tile Instrumental[or.
57. _allistics ot ti_e Explo_er
58. Satellite T_avperature M_asuremenrs for t958 Alpi_a
5_. Explorers I aria II! !nstrumer, tat.,._n
_O. U. S. Exp!,rer Satellites
61. Temperature ot a_: 0:_i::ngMisst. _
Date of
Transmi r ca:
II .c
|il ._"
tf -
el -
#f
#t
I|
II
#1
II _
Oct. 17. I_5._
Oct. 17, 19"8
Oct. 17. 1_%6
Oct. 17 195_-
Apt 23, 195_
May 21, !95 _
Dec..a. t95_.
Dec. S. [958
Dec. C5, !_5._
b_c. _. i95. _
Dec. ,_, 195._
Dec. 8. 1958
Dec. 8. 195b
Dec. 8. 1958
Dec. $ 19 _,t,
_tacerlal Sent co USSg -2- Date of
Transmittal
12. No. 2: Flight S_mnaries for the U.S. Rocketry Program for
the IG_, Part I: 5 July 1950 - 30 2une 1958
(Harcb l, t959). Information on flight summaries In-
eludes roclcet number; rocgec type; precise location
of firing; dace and time of firing; flight objectives;
Informatlon on the flight: especially weight and di-
mansions of rocket, weignt or" payload, tralectory in-
formation Including peak altitude; detailed descrlp-
tlbon of telemetry and tracking equipment, detailed
description of geophysical instrumentation; performance
of rocket, tracking and telemetry; performance of geo-
physical instrumencatlon, and tndicatlon of quality
and amount of data recovered and (An some cases) pre-
ltmfnary scientific results.
Apr. 17, 1959
B. ICY Satellite Report Series
13. No. 1: Processed Observational Data for USSR Satellites 1957 May 14, 1958
Alpha and L957 Beta (Harch 1, 1958).
14. No. 2: Status Keports on Optical Observations of Satellites L958
Alpha and 1958 Beta (April 30, 1958). May 2b, 1958
15. No. 3: Some Preliminary Reports of Experiments in Satellite,
k958 Alpha and Gaa_a (May i, 1958).
16. No. 4: Observational Information on Artificial Earth Satel-
lites (July !5. 1958).
17. No. 5: Radio Observatlonsof Soviet Sate[files 1957 Alpha 2
and 1957 8eta 1 (July 30, 1958).
18. No. 6. Reports and Analyses of Satelllte Observations
(August 15, 1958).
19. No. 7: Slmplzfted Satellite Predictlon from Modified Orbital
Elements (January I, 1959).
20. No. 8: Ephemeris of Satellite 1957 Alpha 2 and Collected Re-
ports on Satelllce Observations (June 15, 1959)
May 26, 1958
Aug. 1, 1958
Aug. 1, 1958
Sept. 3, 1958
Apr. 17, 1959
July 15, 1959
C. S__peclal Reports of Smichsontan Astrop_hyslcal Observatory
21. No. I: PrelLm_nary Orbit information for USSR Satellxtes
Alpha One and Alpha Two (Octouet 14, 1957_
22. No. 2: Additional Orbit Information for USSR Satellites t957
Alpha One and Beta One (November 5, 1957)
23. No. 3: Some Prelimznary Values of t'pper Atmosphere Density
from c3bservetions of USSR Satellites (November 15, L957)
24. No. 4: Glossary of Astronomical Terms for the Description of
Satellite Orbits (November 30, 1957)
25. No- == Soviet Orbit Predictions and O:bital Information for
,m
US_,R Satellites 1957 Alpha One, Alpha Two, and Beta
(December 4, 1957)
2e. No. 6: Visual Observations of Alpha One made by Moonwatch
Stations during L,ifet_me of the Object (December 17,
t957)
27.._o. _ An !oter£m Model Acmosphege Fitted to Preliminary
Dens:ties Inferzed foot, tJSSR Satellites (December 31,
195/)
28. _o fi: Sgvier (:chit Info._atati for USqR bare(l,tes I'/57 Alpha
Two e._:d P,eta Ot_e _ ;a._ary ;I, _9_8)
29. ";o _" bss:_ C:IL, iraL C}_ta (.,_ Satellite i957 8eta O_e
(Febr_,m.r,/ 2L, _,_H'}
£88ued
H
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[July 1959j
HATKE_ ON IG'Y ROCKETS AJ_ SA2"ZLLITES
S_ TO USSR
I. Launchln_ aunM Frequenc_ Information
4. Camuunicatlon! _hroueh A(;IW41tN
(Cables sent livlnl date and time of launchlns, data and time of
injection into orbit, place of launchlng, approxlmate geographical
coordinates of injection point, estimates of orbit inclination,
alm|se, F4rlsee, and period, veIsht and dimensions of satellite,
rgu/io trequancles, power level, ex1>ecced battery life and 8clan-
tiflc experiments; and in the case of space probes, such of above
Infonsatlcm u was approprlecs.)
I. Zrptorar l
2. Vsalluard I
3. Emplorer III
4. Explorer IV
5. Vmtsuard I I
6. Pioneer IV
Above cables also sent to CSACISIC, COORDDA¥, Imd 14__.
II. Additional Cables , ACI_AJIN M_msa_e8, and AIVJHAIL MesJaEee
7. Via ACII/ABI, lelected photoErephlc (and • fay visual) sheer-
vatle_s of Sputnik III sent on an averase of ever7 seemed
day.
8. Via £_l_dAJW, predictions of all orbitin K bodies launched by
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Sputnik, the Gaither Committee, and the Escalation of the Cold War
Dr. David L. Snead
University of Richmond and Randolph-Macon College
The crises President Dwight D. Eisenhower faced at the end of 1957 can be traced to both
domestic and foreign policy issues. Without underemphasizing the widespread disenchantment
with Eisenhower's handling of race relations and the economy, the concern of most Americans in
late 1957 lay elsewhere. For the first time, the Soviet Union had made a significant technological
advancement ahead of the United States. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union shocked the
world with the launch of Sputnik. Coupled with the Kremlin's earlier claim of a successful test of
an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the launch of Sputnik II on November 3, and the em-
barrassing failure of the United States Vanguard rocket in December, the Soviet satellite repre-
sented a clear challenge to U.S. technological superiority. More importantly, it raised the possi-
bility that the Soviet Union might be able to launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United
States using this new missile technology. Eisenhower's attempts to minimize the implications of
the Soviet accomplishments only inflated fears as many Americans assumed he was trying to con-
ceal U.S. military weaknesses.
In the midst of the uproar surrounding Sputnik, Eisenhower received a top-secret report
prepared by a blue ribbon committee of leading scientific, engineering, economic, and military ex-
perts. The panel, called the Gaither committee in recognition of its first chairman, H. Rowan
Gaither, Jr., emphasized both the inadequacy of U.S. defense measures designed to protect the
civil population and the vulnerability of the country's strategic nuclear forces in the event of a So-
viet attack. The Gaither committee members viewed these defense measures--ranging from a mis-
sile system to defend the continental United States to the construction of shelters to protect the
population from radioactive faUout--and the maintenance of sufficient strategic forces to launch
military strikes against Soviet targets as essential for the preservation of U.S. security. They con-
eluded that in the case of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack the United States would be unable to
defend itself with any degree of success. The report emphasized the urgent need for the
Eisenhower administration to strengthen the country's continental and civil defenses and to accel-
erate the development of its strategic striking power. It stressed that the United States either had
to respond immediately to the expanding Soviet military capabilities or face potentially grave con-
sequences.
The Gaither committee recommended that the United States reduce the vulnerability of its
strategic forces, strengthen and enlarge its nuclear ballistic missile capabilities, improve the ability
of the armed forces to wage limited military operations, reorganize the Department of Defense,
and construct fallout shelters to protect the civilian population. These recommendations would
cost $44.2 billion spread between 1959 and 1963. The price was high, but the committee con-
cluded that the costs for not instituting them would be higher yet--the possible subjugation of the
United States to the Soviet Union. It stressed that, "The next two years seem to us critical. If we
fail to act at once, the risk [of not preparing for a Soviet attack], in our opinion, will be unaccept-
1For U.S. reaction to Sputnik, see Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993); and Walter A. McDougall, ... the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1985).
able.''2 Thecommitteeaccentuatedthatbytheendof thistwo yearperiodtheSovietUnion
wouldpossessufficientnuclearforcesto overwhelmU.S.defensesandto eliminateU.S. strate-
gicnuclearcapabilities.Theonlyway theUnited Statescouldavoidthis"risk" wasto adoptthe
recommendationsadvocatedbythecommittee.
Of allthe Gaithercommitteerecommendations,Eisenhowerdisagreedonlywith afew.
Whileheopposedconstructionof fallout sheltersandexpandingmilitarycapabilitiesto wagelim-
itedwar,heapprovedtheimplementationof most of theotherrecommendationsat leastin part.
His requestsfor supplementaryappropriationsto theFY 1958defensebudgetandincreasesto the
FY 1959budgetrevealthe importanceof theGaitherreport. Betweenthetwo budgets,
Eisenhoweraddednearly$4billion in defensespending,analmosttenpercentincreaseto annual
expenditures.Heacceleratedthedevelopmentanddeploymentof ICBMs, intermediaterange
ballisticmissiles(IRBMs), andthePolarissubmarinelaunchedmissilesystem.He orderedthe
reductionof thevulnerabilityof the StrategicAir Command(SAC)throughthe constructionof
earlywarningradar,the dispersalof SACforcesto a largernumberof airfields,andtheimple-
mentationof alert programs.Furthermore,hesoughtandreceivedCongressionalapprovalfor the
reorganizationof theDefenseDepartment.
Theinfluenceof theGaitherreport did not endwith thesechanges.As a senatorandthen
president,JohnF.Kennedychampionedmanyof the sameprogramsrecommendedbythecom-
mittee. After the contentsof thereportwereleakedto themediain December1957,manycritics,
includingKennedy,challengedEisenhower'spolicies. TheMassachusettsenatorquestionedwhy
theUnitedStateswasnot doingmoreto overcometheapparentSovietleadin militaryprepared-
ness.WhileEisenhowerefusedto expandmilitary spendingbeyondcertainlevels,Kennedydid
not showthe sameinhibitions. In the 1960campaignandhispresidency,Kennedyreceivedad-
vice fi-om at least a dozen Gaither committee members and even cited the Gaither report as evi-
dence of Eisenhower's failure to respond adequately to the Soviet threat. His "flexible response"
military strategy reflected much of the advice contained in the Gaither report. He accelerated bal-
listic missile developments, expanded limited war capabilities, and advocated civil defense pro-
grams.
The Gaither committee's conclusions and recommendations had a clear influence on the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. The report, however, has been ignored or, at a mini-
mum, underemphasized by most scholars) One of the main reasons for this slight is that scholars
2 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Defense Production. Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (The
"Gaither Report" of 195 7) [hereafter Gaither Report] (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office [hereafter
GPO], 1976), 25.
3 See for example Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-61 (New York: St. Mar-
tin's Press, 1996), 210-11; Divine, Sputnik Challenge, 40-41, 84, 125-7, and 196; Chester J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo
Pdchardson, Presidency ofDwight D. Eisenhower, Revised edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991),
173; McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth, 151; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, v. 2 (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 434-35; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A CriticalAppraisal
of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 185-86; Samuel P.
Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1961), 111-13; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years
(New York: Random House, 1988), 335-37; Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Pro-
gram of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 27-30; Richard A.
Aliano, American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy: The Politics of Changing Military Requirements,
1957-1961 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1975), 59; John C. Donovan, The Cold Warriors: A Policy-
3have focused on Sputnik as the cause for the changes in Eisenhower's policies. Sputnik captured
the world's attention and allowed the Soviet Union the opportunity to boast of its technological
excellence. With each orbit around the earth, Sputnik instilled in Americans a sense of vulnerabil-
ity. Yet as much as the satellite magnified concerns about Soviet missile capabilities, it was the
Gaither report that provided specific recommendations to overcome any possible deficiencies in
U.S. military preparedness.
Establishment and Activities of the Gaither Committee
President Eisenhower's National Security Council (NSC) ordered the creation of the
Gaither committee in April 1957 after questions were raised about the implications of radioactive
fallout, the correct balance between shelters and evacuation, and the requirements for stockpiling
emergency materials. 4 These issues were not new. Ever since the Soviet Union acquired the ca-
pability of attacking the United States, the president and his advisors recognized the potential
consequences of a nuclear exchange for the civilian population, the country's infrastructure, and
the government's ability to continue to function. 5 After studying a Federal Civil Defense Admini-
stration (FCDA) report recommending the United States build a $32 billion shelter system, the
NSC decided to perform a series of studies examining the countries civil defense needs. 6 It re-
quested that the Science Advisory Committee appoint a panel of experts--soon to be called the
Gaither committee--to study U.S. active and passive defense measures. 7
Through the early summer, Gaither and the Office of Defense Mobilization's Science Ad-
visory Committee selected individuals to serve on this panel. Gaither divided the committee into
two principle groups: the Steering Committee and the Advisory Panel. After he became ill, he
stepped down as the committee's director in September to be replaced by Robert Sprague and
William Foster. Sprague and Foster directed the Steering Committee, which also consisted of Dr.
James Baxter, Dr. Robert Calkins, John Corson, Dr. James Perkins, Dr. Robert Prim, Dr. Hector
Skirter, William Webster, Dr. Jerome Wiesner, and technical advisor, Edward Oliver. The Advi-
sory Panel included Gaither (after his illness), Admiral Robert Carney, General James Doolittle,
General John Hull, Dr. Mervin Kelly, Dr. Ernest Lawrence, Robert Lovett, John McCloy, and Dr.
Frank Stanton. In addition to these individuals, two other groups played important advisory
Making Elite (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974), 130-49; and David A. Rosenberg, "The Origins
of OverkiU: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 7:4 (Spring 1983), 46-
49.
4 See Robert A. Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960 (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1978), 54; and Allan A. Winkler, Life UnderA Cloud: American AnxieryAbout the Atom (New
York: Oxford University, 1993), 84-135. See also Letter to President Eisenhower [from eight Representatives],
June 7, 1957, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [hereafter EL], White House Central Files, Official Files, Box 526,
Folder - (3), 2-4.
5 See for example, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, August 24, 1951, National Archives [hereafter
NA], RG 218, JCS, 1951-1953 - Geographic File, CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49), Sec. 14, 5.
6Memorandum of Discussion at the 318 th Meeting of the National Security Council, April 4, 1957, Papers Related
to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, 19 (GPO, 1990), 463-64.
7 Among the members of the Science Advisory Committee at the time of the Gaither study were Dr. Lloyd V.
Berkner, Dr. Hans A. Bethe, Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Dr. James B. Fisk, Dr. Caryl P. Haskins,
Dr. Albert G. Hill, Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Dr. Edwin H. Land, Dr. Emanuel tL Piore, Dr. Isidor I. Rabi, Dr.
Herbert Scoville, Jr., Dr. Alan T. Waterman, and Dr. Jerrold tL Zacharias.
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roles: a subcommittee of the Science Advisory Committee containing Dr. James Fisk, Dr. James
KiUiaa, and Dr. Isidor Rabi, and a committee from the Institute for Defense Analyses composed
of General James McCormack and Dr. Albert Hill.
In addition to its permanent members, the Gaither committee recruited nearly seventy ex-
pert consultants from leading scientific organizations, engineering firms, strategic think tanks, and
business institutions to provide advice and make recommendations, s These consultants provided
invaluable background material and technical support to the committee. In fact, some scholars
have argued that several of these advisors actually played much larger roles than their titles as
technical consultants would indicate. In particular, Colonel George Lincoln and Paul Nitze
seemed to have had great influence on the final report. 9
The high caliber of this committee was without question. A sample of the qualifications of
some of the members of the Steering Committee and Advisory Panel should provide ample evi-
dence of its expertise. Killian and Baxter served as the respective presidents of Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and Williams College. Because of his research at the Radiation Labora-
tory on molecular beams, Rabi won the 1944 Nobel Prize for physics. During the last years of the
Truman administration, Lovett and Foster acted as the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, respectively. These men and the rest of the Gaither committee represented some of the
best minds in the country.
By late August, the Gaither committee and its various subcommittees were earnestly ex-
amining the complex issues that surrounded U.S. strategic capabilities. For active defenses, the
committees studied how the United States could prevent attacking Soviet forces from reaching
their targets. Generally, this meant the development of sufficient forces of interceptor airplanes,
anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles to destroy attacking Soviet bombers and/or missiles.
In conjunction with its examination of active defenses, the experts explored passive defense meas-
ures designed to protect the civil population from the effects of a nuclear attack if Soviet bombers
and/or missiles reached their targets. These measures were designed to achieve the earliest possi-
ble warning of an impending Soviet attack and to shield the population from the worst effects of
nuclear explosions.
The Gaither committee had access to voluminous sources, which detailed U.S. offensive
and defensive capabilities. The committee received briefings from the Defense Department, the
Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Atomic
Energy Commission, the FCDA, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the NSC Representative
on Internal Security.l° In addition to these briefings, the committee had access to both CIA and
Air Force intelligence estimates, to special studies performed by the agencies mentioned above,
and to studies by private organizations like the Rand Corporation and the National Academy of
s For a complete membershiplist, see Gaither Report, 41-45.
9 See Kaplarg Wizards of Armageddon, 128-34; David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold
War (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990), 167-71; and Steven L. Rearden, The Evolution of American
Strategic Doctrine: Paul Nitze and the Soviet Challenge (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 41-46.
_o Informal Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither, June 25, 1957, EL, White House Office [hereaRer
WHO], Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-1961 [hereafter OSANSA],
NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters (3), 3-4. See also John Prados, The Soviet
Threat: U.S. Intelligence Analysis & Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), 68-69.
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Sciences. The committee members also questioned the nation's top military leaders and inspected
its key defense installations. _1
The Gaither Committee's Conclusions and Recommendations
On November 4, the leaders of the committee presented their preliminary conclusions to
President Eisenhower. Three days later they delivered their final report to the NSC. At the first
meeting, Gaither spoke for the committee and summarized its major conclusions. He explained
that the currently planned active defense system was inadequate. The programmed passive de-
fenses did not provide sufficient protection for the civilian population. SAC was vulnerable to a
Soviet surprise attack. By 1959, U.S. vulnerability would increase with the advent of ICBMs.
The risks to the country would continue to grow until there was a workable arms control agree-
ment. Finally, Gaither stressed that "The long-run peril to the U.S. civil population demands
prompt and effective measures for increasing our basic and inherent strengths and for melding the
will and resources of the free world. ''12
In its final report to the NSC on November 7, the committee wasted little time defining the
Soviet threat. Instead, it accepted the basic American Cold War attitude that the Soviet Union
sought world domination. It argued that "'We have found no evidence in Russian foreign and
military policy since 1945 to refute the conclusion that the USSR intentions are expansionist, and
that her great efforts to build military power go beyond any concepts of Soviet defense. ''_3 The
threat as the committee members envisioned it encompassed both economic and military factors.
Although it recognized the current economic superiority of the United States, the com-
mittee viewed this advantage as fleeting. It argued that while the United States was economically
much superior to the Soviet Union, this difference was shrinking at a rapid rate. When coupled
with the Soviet Union's emphasis on military spending rather than producing consumer goods, the
decline of U.S. economic strength in comparison to the Soviet Union seemed even more stark.
The Gaither report emphasized that while the two adversaries presently spent almost equal
amounts on defense, current trends in spending indicated that the Soviet Union would surpass the
United States in defense spending by the 1960s. It concluded that "'This extraordinary concentra-
tion of the Soviet economy on military power and heavy industry makes.., available economic
resources sufficient to finance both the rapid expansion of their impressive military capability and
their politico-economic offensive by which, through diplomacy, propaganda and subversion, they
seek to extend the Soviet orbit. ''14
The committee found the Soviet military threat closely paralleling the economic one. Af-
ter examining recent military and technological developments, the committee presented a picture
of an ever-strengthening communist menace. It stressed that the Soviet development of atomic
weapons, long-range aircraft, both ICBMs and IRBMs, a huge submarine force, an extensive air
H See William C. Foster, "Search for Survival," June 1958, EL, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary [hereat_er
OSS], Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, Folder - Foster, William C. May-July 1958 (1), 1-2; and
Memorandum for James S. Lay, Jr., December 24, 1957, NA, RG 273, NSC, Folder - NSC 5724 (background
documents), 1.
_: Security Resources Panel Advisor's Notes for Conference, November 4, 1957, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series,
Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, Folder - Gaither Report November 1957-December 1958 (1), 2-3.
is Gaither Report, 1.
_4 Ibid., 4.
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defense system, and an army composed of 175 divisions posed a serious threat to the United
States and its allies. Together with the economic threat, the Soviet Union's growing military
15
strength challenged the supremacy of U.S. world power.
Faced with the Soviet economic and military advances, the committee issued three "broad-
brush" opinions. First, the active defense systems currently in place and those planned for the fu-
ture offered little defense against a determined Soviet attack. Second, the passive defense meas-
ures designed to protect the civilian population provided little or no protection from the effects of
a nuclear blast and/or radioactive fallout. Finally, because of the low levels of both active and
passive defenses, the security of the United States rested primarily on SAC. The committee
warned that "The current vulnerability of SAC to surprise attack during a period of lessened
world tension (i.e. a time when SAC is not on a SAC 'alert' status), and the threat posed to SAC
by the prospects of an early Russian ICBM capability, call for prompt remedial action."16
The committee made several recommendations to help strengthen U.S. continental and ci-
vilian defenses. The highest priority was to reduce SAC vulnerability and to increase the strategic
retaliatory capability of U.S. nuclear forces. SAC forces, the committee argued, should be able to
react with between 7 and 22 minutes warning. Additional air bases needed to be constructed to
augment the dispersal of strategic forces. Active defenses surrounding SAC bases through the
use of Nike-Hercules or Talos surface-to-air missiles should be strengthened. Additionally, it em-
phasized the need to accelerate and expand the introduction of both ICBMs and IRBMs into U.S.
strategic retaliatory forces. It recommended expanding the number of planned IRBMs and
ICBMs from 60 to 240 and from 80 to 600 by 1963, respectively. Finally, it stressed that the
United States needed to improve the ability of its military forces to wage limited operations that
17fall short of general war.
In addition, the committee advocated programs of slightly less priority. The committee
made its recommendations based on the belief that "Protection of the civil population is a national
problem requiring a national remedy. ''18 It estimated that if the Soviet Union launched a nuclear
attack, the American civil population would suffer between 70 and 150 million casualties (be-
tween 35 and 75 percent of the estimated 1965 population). 19 It questioned the capability of the
United States to acquire sufficient warning of a Soviet attack to initiate civil defense plans and to
notify the population if an attack was indeed underway. 2° It concluded that the implementation of
a $25 billion program of fallout shelters and civil defense planning "would symbolize our will to
survive, and our understanding of our responsibilities in the nuclear age."21 [emphasis in original]
The committee also made recommendations in other areas. It stressed the need to im-
prove the organization of the Defense Department so that it could effectively incorporate scien-
tific and technological advances into its programs. It emphasized the importance of obtaining a
greater understanding of Soviet intentions through hard intelligence. Finally, it argued that any
changes in U.S. policies to reduce its vulnerability needed to be integrated with a broader foreign
15 Ibid., 4-5.
16 Ibid., 5.
17 Ibid., 6-7.
is Ibid., 10.
19 Ibid., 18-20.
20 Ibid., 7-8.
21 Ibid., 22.
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policy that would insure that allied countries would not see it as "a retreat to 'Fortress Amer-
ica. ,,,22
The committee calculated that these recommendations would cost approximately $44 bil-
lion spread over five years (FY1959-FY1963). The active defense measures, including the reduc-
tion of SAC vulnerability, the construction of missile defense systems, and the expansion of U. S.
military capabilities, would cost $19 billion, while the measures to protect the civilian population
with improved radar and fallout shelters would cost $25 billion. 23 The committee concluded that
the United States could afford these programs although they "would necessitate.., an increase in
taxes, a somewhat larger federal debt, substantial economies in other government expenditures,
and curbs on inflation. ''24
The committee stressed the importance of implementing these recommendations immedi-
ately or risk losing the military advantage to the Soviet Union. It argued that during the next two
years, 1958 and 1959, the United States would be in a position to launch a decisive attack on the
Soviet Union if necessary, while at the same time, it would remain in position to negotiate from a
position of strength. Beyond this period, the committee expressed grave concerns about the fu-
ture of the United States. "The next two years," the committee emphasized, "seem to critical. If
we fail to act at once, the risk in our opinion will be unacceptable. ''25
The National Mood and Initial Reactions to the Gaither Report
The Gaither committee presented its report to the NSC during one of the most tumultuous
periods of the Eiserthower administration. In the preceding months Eisenhower had experienced a
protracted budget crisis, was forced to intervene in the integration of schools in Little Rock, and
had received reports of an impending economic downturn. Even more troubling, the launch of
Sputnik seemed to challenge U.S. national security. The potential implications of the Soviet
rocket capability had a profound impact on the Gaither committee and how Eisenhower, Con-
gress, and the country would receive its findings. Sputnik raised questions about Eisenhower's
ability to lead the nation, the United States military position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and the
status of the United States among the world's scientific and technical elite, z6 David Beckler, a
Gaither Committee member, described these concerns when he argued that "Although the satellite
is not a military weapon, it tends to be identified in the minds of the world with the impressive
military and technological strength of the USSR. In a military sense it underscores Soviet long-
range missile claims. In a technological sense it shows the Soviets to have impressive technologi-
cal sophistication and resources. ''27
By the time the NSC received the Gaither report on November 7, Eisenhower was already
under intense pressure to modify his national security programs. The launch of Sputnik and the
Soviet announcement of a successful ICBM test raised considerable public concern about U.S.
22 Ibid., 11.
23 Ibid., 22.
24 Ibid., 12.
25 Ibid., 14. For the timetable the committee used in making its recommendations, see ibid., 15-17.
26For U.S. reactions to Sputnik, see Divine, The Sputnik Challenge; and McDougall,... the Heavens and the
Earth.
27Memorandum for Mr. Victor Cooley, Acting Director ODM, October 8, 1957, EL, WHO, Office of the Special
Assistant for Science and Technology [hereafter OSAST], Box 3, Folder - Space October 1957-October 1959, 1.
8military strength. 2s Previously, Eisenhower had been able to quell criticisms of his defense poli-
cies by reminding the American people of his widespread experience and knowledge in these
fields. After October 1957, things were different. Eisenhower's status as a war hero and popular
president were no longer sufficient to allay the people's doubts about weaknesses in U.S. security.
Over consecutive weeks in late October, Aviation Week argued that Eisenhower and his advisers
"have been and still are embarked on a fiscal policy that is shaking the military, scientific and in-
dustrial foundations of our national defense system so badly that only emergency action with the
utmost speed will prevent a major deterioration of our atomic airpower strength in relation to the
Soviets in the immediate future. "29 The following week it claimed that "In the face of this over-
whelming mass of evidence on the growth of Soviet military strength from new technological
weapons, our own national leadership has been executing a policy aimed at reducing our own
atomic-airpower strength in being, artificially retarding the pace of our military technological de-
velopment and thoroughly discouraging the best efforts of both military and scientific leaders con-
cerned with this vital program. ''3°
Senators and congressmen reached similar conclusions. Comparisons to the attack on
Pearl Harbor were widespread. In special hearings to address the adequacy of U.S. missile pro-
grams that began in November 1957, Senator Lyndon Johnson claimed that "We meet today in
the atmosphere of another Pearl Harbor. "31 Charles Donnelly, a legislative assistant, explained
that "there were few in January [1957] who foresaw that, before the end of the year, the United
States would suffer a Pearl Harbor in the Cold War and be striving to repair its damaged prestige
just as desperately as, in 1942, it was trying to reconstitute its battered naval strength. ''32
The general population showed similar concerns. Newsweek concluded that Sputnik rep-
resented a "defeat in three fields: In pure science, in practical know-how, and in psychological
cold war. ''33 Life argued "Let us not pretend that Sputnik is anything but a defeat. ''34 One public
opinion poll revealed that 49 percent of the American people believed that the Soviet Union was
"ahead of the United States in the development of missiles and long distance rockets. "35 Another
poll in late November 1957 found only 26 percent of Americans satisfied with U.S. defense poli-
cies and 53 percent advocating that they be reexamined. 36 After the embarrassing failure of the
Vanguard rocket in December, the national mood grew more somber. U.S. News & World Report
2s Newsweek found that "Most Americans are in favor of a crash program to put the U.S. ahead in the missile race.
•.. There was concern but no panic. Rather Americans seemed to have suffered a severe blow to their pride.
They weren't used to being second best, and they wanted to catch up. Above all, they understood that catching up
might well be a matter of survival. "The U.S., Ike, and Sputnik," Newsweek, 50:18 (October 28, 1957), 30. See
also "The Moon's Meaning," ibid., 50:16 (October 14, 1957), 39.
Robert Holtz, "Why Mr. President?," Aviation Week 67:16 (October 21, 1957), 21.
30 Ibid., "Intelligence Without Leadership," Aviation Week 67:17 (October 28, 1957), 21.
31 United States Congress, Senate, Inquiry into Satellite andMissile Programs, Hearings before the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 85th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 1957-
1958, 342.
32 Chris Donnelly, United States Defense Policies in 1957 (GPO, 1958), 1.
33 "Into Space: Man's Awesome Advenau¢," Newsweek, 50:16 (October 14, 1957), 37.
34Quoted in Mc,Dougall,... The Heavens and the Earth, 145.
35 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, v. 2 (New York: Random Hottse, 1972), 1521.
36 American Institute of Public Opinion, November 24, 1957, rqarinted in Hazel Gaudet Erskine (ed.), "The Polls:
Defense, Peace, and Space," The Pubfic Opinion Quarterly 25:3 (Fall 1961), 483.
9claimed that the "U. S., today, is far behind Soviet Russia in the big race for superrockets. ''37 A
week later, it reported a growing awareness and fear of nuclear war. "These new fears about
war," it opined, "seemed more immediate and personal than war fears in the past. When past
wars threatened, people worried about whether their sons might be called into service .... Now,
all at once, war became a personal thing for everyone--something that could hit you, yourself,
right in your home. ''3s
The Soviet Union did nothing to discourage these fears. During Eisenhower's second
term, he faced a Soviet disinformation campaign designed to raise Soviet military and technologi-
cal prestige while undermining U.S. strength, w One week after the launch of Sputnik, Khrush-
chev claimed that "We [the communists] now have all the rockets we need: long-range rockets,
intermediate-range rockets and short-range rockets. ''4° In November, Khrushchev gave two,
seemingly threatening, interviews. He argued that "If war is not averted, the Americans will expe-
rience the most devastating war ever known to mankind. It will rage not only in Europe and Asia,
but, with not less fury, in the United States. ''41 A little over a week later, he bragged that "The
fact that the Soviet Union was the first to launch an artificial earth satellite, which within a month
was followed by another, says a lot. If necessary, tomorrow we can launch 10, 20 satellites. All
that is required for this is to replace the warhead of an intercontinental ballistic rocket with the
necessary instruments. There is a satellite for you. ''42
It was in this atmosphere that the Eisenhower administration received the Gaither report.
If the president could have kept the report a secret, the committee's findings might not have be-
come so important. However, almost immediately leaks about the committee began to surface.
On December 20, any remaining secrecy concerning the Gaither committee's conclusions disinte-
grated in a front page story in the Washington Post. The headlines read: "NATO VOTES MIS-
SILE BASES, PEACE TRY; SECRET REPORT SEES U.S. IN GRAVE PERIL." In the ensu-
ing article, reporter Chalmer Roberts disclosed the committee's most important findings. He
wrote:
The still top-secret Gaither Report portrays a United States in the gravest
danger in its history.
It pictures the nation moving in frightening course to the status of a sec-
ond-class power.
It shows an America exposed to an almost immediate threat from the mis-
sile-bristling Soviet Union.
3_ "'U.S Satclhtc - A .Mxl.h Exploded," U.S. News & World Report 43:24 (December 13, 1957), 31.
38 "The Changing Mood in America," ibid., 43:25 (December 20, 1957), 43.
39The leading scholars of Soviet propaganda in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush,
claim that "'For four years [1957-1961], Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders gave every indication in their public
statements that they _'ere indeed in a hurry to capitalize on their initial advantage and that they were bent on ac-
quiring a large force of first-generation ICBM's." Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet
Foretgn Poltcv (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965, 1966), 36. See also McDougall, ... the Heavens
and the Earth, 237; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, lnside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to
Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 192-94; and Bundy, Danger and Survival, 416.
40Pravada, October 11, 1957, reprinted in Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, 43.
41Pravada, November 19, 1957, reprinted in Horelick and RusK, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, 48.
42Pravada, November 29, 1957, reprinted in Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, 44-
45.
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It finds America's long-term prospect one of cataclysmic peril in the face of
rocketing Soviet military might and of a powerful, growing Soviet economy and
technology which will bring new political propaganda and psychological assaults
on freedom all around the globe. 43
Public knowledge of the report made the administration's evaluations more difficult. As
an internal document, Eisenhower and his advisers had great freedom in assessing the report's
worth. However, in the public arena that was still reeling from the shock of Sputnik, the report
fanned fears. It seemed to symbolize U.S. weaknesses. People demanded its release to the pub-
lic. Eisenhower refused on the grounds of executive privilege. 44 By refusing to do so, he created
the impression that he had something to hide. 45
Influence of the Gaither Committee
As many Americans clamored for the release of the report, Eisenhower and his advisers
attempted to evaluate the committee's findings. Stephen Ambrose argues that the president ulti-
mately "rejected the Gaither Report. He refused to bend to the pressure, refused to initiate a fall-
out shelter program. It was one of his finest hours. ''_ This is a rather shortsighted view of the
influence of the Galther report. Between January and July 1958, the committee's recommenda-
tions remained at the forefront of the Eisenhower administration's deliberations concerning na-
tional security issues. In particular, the administration evaluated ways to limit SAC vulnerability,
accelerate ballistic missile capabilities--including ICBMs, IRBMs, and the Polaris system--improve
limited military operations capabilities, reorganize the defense establishment, improve continental
defenses, and implement various shelter strategies. It can be argued that the Gaither committee
did not present any revolutionary new ideas or programs, but as Eisenhower's Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs Robert Cutler explained, "It certainly helped, and pushed and prodded,"
many of them. 47
Eisenhower realized in late 1957 that he needed to address certain deficiencies in U.S. na-
tional security programs. He also recognized that any additional appropriations in the FY 1959
budget would not go into place until July 1958 and that something needed to be done before then.
A_er Defense Secretary Neil McElroy proposed supplementing the FY 1958 defense budget,
Eisenhower agreed to seek an additional $1.26 billion to accelerate and/or augment the Polaris
missile system, SAC dispersal, missile detection, and the development oflRBMs and ICBMs. 4s
Congress acted quickly. On January 23, 1958, the House of Representatives voted unanimously
43 Chalrner Roberts, "Enormous Arms Outlay Is Held Vital to Survival," Washington Post, December 20, 1957,
Sec. A, pp. I, 19. Roberts was not the first to write about the Gaither report, but his article provided the most in-
depth description and discussion of it. For early articles, see the New York Herald Tribune, November, 23, 1957,
1; andAvmt_on Week 67:22, December 2, 1957, 28.
44Eiserthower to LBJ, January 21, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Administration Series, Box 4, Folder -
NSC Agenda and Minutes - 1960, 1.
45 See political cartoon in "Perils, Problems, The Job Ahead," Newsweek 51:2 (January 13, 1958).
46Ambrose, Eisenhower, v. 2, 435.
47 Comments by R.C. [Robert Curler] on W. C. Foster article, May 29, 58, EL, WHO, NSC Series, Briefing Notes
Subseries, Box 8, Folder - Fallout Shelters (2), 1.
48Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 5, 1957, bid., OSS, Subject Series, Department of
Defense Subseries, Box 2, Folder - Budget, Military (6) (September 1957-January 1959), 1.
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to grant the entire request. 49 The House argued that its purpose was "to accelerate and expand
certain high priority programs in the interest of shortening the time by which our military capabili-
ties will have been advanced so as to more arrestingly deter war and more swittly and devastat-
ingly respond to any attack. In short, it is to buy time. ''5°
As the president and Congress implemented initial changes in U.S. national security pro-
grams in January, the NSC began to deliberate the Gaither committee's conclusions more fully.
When the Gaither committee presented its report to the NSC in November, the United States
planned to have 10 ICBMs in 1959, 30 in 1960, and 50 in 1961. In addition, by 1961, the United
States forecast stationing 120 IRBMs in Europe and commissioning 3 nuclear submarines carrying
16 Polaris missiles each. 5_ Over the last two months of 1957 and in 1958, the administration be-
gan to re-examine these force goals. In December, Eisenhower agreed to an ICBM force of 130
missiles. In March 1958, the JCS asked for additional funding for other programs. It requested
$400 million for the Polaris missile system, $100 million for developing solid-propellant IRBMs
and ICBMs, and $100 million for the Titan ICBM. 52 In April, Eisenhower agreed to expand the
number oflRBMs to 180 missiles. 5s
At the same time as administration officials were examining ballistic missile capabilities,
they were also discussing how to reduce SAC vulnerability. The Gaither committee recom-
mended five specific ways to lessen the vulnerability of U.S. retaliatory forces: increasing alert
capabilities, dispersing SAC forces, obtaining greater warning of an attack, hardening SAC bases,
and building anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses. In his memoirs, Eisenhower explained that of
all the committee's recommendations, he "was personally interested most in the measures to put
more SAC bombers on an alert status and to disperse our SAC bases. "'54 With the exception of
hardening SAC bases, the Eisenhower administration adopted these recommendations at least in
part. 55
SAC worked under two scenarios in developing plans to reduce its reaction times. Under
the first, the presumed Soviet attack would use bombers, which would be detected at least 30
minutes prior to reaching their targets. Until 1960, SAC expected any Soviet attack to provide
this amount of warning. After 1960, SAC planned for the second scenario where the Soviet first
strike would involve ballistic missiles. Under such an attack, SAC forces would receive less than
15 minutes warning. One scholar aptly concludes "It would be difficult to overstate the impact
49Memorandum for the Record, Jal't_ 27, 1958, ibid., WHO, NSC Staff, Special File Series, Box 3, Folder -
Gaither Report, 2-3.
5o Ibid., 1.
51Comparison of Estimated US-USSR Missile Operational Capability, January 5, 1958, ibid., OSANSA, NSC Se-
ties, Briefing Notes Subscries, Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1.
5: Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Appendix A, March 19, 1958, Library of Congress [hereafter LC],
Nathan F. Twining Papers, Box 105, Folder - Memos 13-31 MR 1958, 1
53Memorandum of Discussion at the 363 rd Meeting of the NSC, April 24, 1958, EL, Dwight D. Eiscnhower [here-
after DDE] Papers, NSC Series, Box 10, Folder - 363 rd Meeting of NSC, April 24, 1958, 6.
54Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 222. At the an NSC meeting in January 1958, Eisenhower asserted that "money
expended on improving the early warning system and the dispersal of SAC bases to be money well spent." Discus-
sion at the 350th NSC Meeting, January 6, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, Box 9, Folder - 350th Meeting of
the NSC 18. See also Memorandum for General LcMay, January 20, 1958, LC, Thomas D. White Papers, Box 15,
Folder - Chief of Staff Signed Memos January 1958-December 1958, I.
55Memorandum for General Curler, April 23, 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries,
Box 16, Folder - Security Resources Panel, 1-2.
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that this time reduction [from the introduction of the ICBM] had on the analysis of national secu-
rity and on U.S. society. ''56 In March 1958, SAC accelerated the implementation of 15 minute
alert status. It proposed having 158 aircraft on 15 minute alert by mid-1958, 355 by mid-1959,
425 by mid-1960, and 480 by mid-1961.57 Of these aircraft, SAC expected to have 85 B-52
bombers on 15 minute alert in 1959, 140 in 1960, and 165 in 1961. 5s SAC made substantial prog-
ress in achieving its goals. By May 1960, SAC commander Power could disclose the fulfillment
of this goal. 59
Tied closely to the reduction of reaction times was the Gaither committee's recommenda-
tion to disperse SAC forces to a larger number of airfields. The committee was concerned that
U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities would be concentrated at a limited number of vulnerable air-
fields. It recommended the construction of additional SAC bases and possibly using non-SAC
and/or commercial airfields as alternatives. In February 1958, Defense Secretary McElroy an-
nounced that the supplementary appropriations for FY 1958 and the funding contained in the FY
1959 budget would "provide for completion of the dispersal of the heavy bomber wings and of a
substantial number of the medium bomber wings. ''6°
While reducing the reaction time of SAC forces and dispersing SAC squadrons to more
airfields won widespread support within the administration and in military circles, hardening SAC
bases did not. The Gaither committee recommended building blast shelters to protect SAC air-
craft, equipment, and personnel. The JCS and Defense Department concluded that "Any program
to harden other than the SAC numbered Air Force command control centers does not appear to
be warranted at this time. ''61 They explained that while hardening might protect personnel and
planes, it would not prevent the destruction of the runways or reduce the dangers posed by radia-
tion. 62
In addition to the issues of alert, dispersal, and hardening, the Gaither committee made
two other recommendations, which were designed to reduce the vulnerability of SAC and protect
the continental United States. It advocated acquiring early warning of an attack and constructing
active defenses against both aircraft and missiles. The Soviet Union possessed, or would in the
near future, the capability to launch an attack against the United States using airplanes, ICBMs,
and submarine-launched missiles. After evaluating the Gaither committee's proposals for air de-
fense weapons systems, the JCS decided to "provide for NIKE and/or HAWK protection at 55
SAC (41 bomber, 9 refueling and 5 missile) bases, with incidental protection afforded 15 (8
56Jack H Nunn. The Soviet First Strike Threat: The U.S. Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), 159.
5_"Supplcmental Rcpon on Items m Security Resources Panel Report," March [?1 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA,
NSC Series. Poltc_ Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, 3.
58Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, March 21, 1958, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1958 - Geographic File, CCS
381 US ( i-31-50) Sec. 76 RB, 4.
s9 Hopkins. J.C.. and Sheldon A. Goldberg, The Development of Strategic Air Command 1946-1986 (The Fortieth
Anniversa_. Hzsto_) (Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska: Office of the Historian, SAC, 1986), 101.
60 Statement of Secretary of Defense Nell McElroy Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services, February 26, 1958, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Department of Defense
Subseries, Box 1, Folder - Department of Defense Vol. 2 (5) February 1958, 8.
61"Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staffon Provision of Blast Shelters at SAC
Bases," February 19, 1958, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 75, 2585.
62Memorandum for the Record, January 31, 1958, NA, RG 51, Office of Management and Budget Records, Gen-
eral Budgetary Administration, Subject Files, Series 51.14a - Subject Files for the National Military Establishment
and Department of Defense, 1953-1961, Box 3, Folder - Defense Department Air Defense Programs, 2.
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bomber, 6 refueling and 2 missile) additional SAC bases for a total of 70 projected bases, by end
FY 196 l."6s Furthermore, it recommended the performance of"vigorous research" on the devel-
opment of defenses against ICBMs. 64 It also emphasized that the "operational availability of
BMEWS [Ballistic Missile Early Warning System] for ICBM should be actively pursued. ''65
The concern over the submarine threat led to an increase in the FY 1959 budget of $262
million more than had been requested prior to the Gaither committee. 66 An even more telling in-
dication of the fear generated by submarines was a JCS plan for dealing with them. The JCS ar-
gued that "the most practical solution [to the submarine threat] lies in establishing control over
the launching submarine prior to the launching of its missiles. In peacetime, this control includes
detection, tracking, identification, hold-down tactics, and in certain situations constituting an im-
mediate and vital threat to the security of the United States, destruction of the submarine. ''67
One of the last Gaither committee recommendations coneemed augmenting U.S. limited
military operations capabilities. The committee was very worried that the administration's reli-
ance on nuclear weapons as the main deterrent against the Soviet Union reduced U.S. military
options in the event of a crisis and made a nuclear war more likely. Civilian strategists had been
debating various aspects of limited war strategies since at least 1954 with the discussions reaching
a peak after the publication of Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons andForeign Policy in 1957. 68
The Gaither committee did not recommend specific increases in limited war capabilities but did
call for a study of whether the United States was prepared for such conflicts.
The Defense Department, Air Force, and Eisenhower questioned whether the United
States did not already possess the necessary capabilities to wage limited military operations. Sec-
retary of Defense McElroy expressed concern at the increased costs involved in augmenting U. S.
conventional forces. 69 Deputy Defense Secretary Donald Quarles doubted any war with the So-
viet Union could be fought without nuclear weapons and feared that if the United States an-
nounced that it could occur, then it would encourage Soviet aggression with conventional weap-
63 "Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff," March 3, 1958, NA, RG 218, JCS,
1958 Geographic File, CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 75 RB, 2605.
64 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (Area Defense Against ICBMs), March 31, 1958, LC, Twining Pa-
pers, Box 105, Folder - Memos 13-31 MR 1958, 2.
65 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (BMEWS), March 28, 1958, ibid., 1. See also "Report by the Joint
Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Stair," March 24, 1958, NA, RG 218, JCS, 1958 Geographic File,
CCS 381 US (1-31-50) Sec. 76, 2655.
66 "Supplemental Report on Items in Security Resources Panel Report," March [?] 1958, EL, WHO, OSANSA,
NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 22, Folder - Gaither Report, 7.
67Report by the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, July 17, 1958, NA, RG 218 JCS, 1958 Geographic File, CCS
381 US 91-31-50) Sec. 78, 2751.
68 See Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), Robert
Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1957), and R. McClintock, "A National Doctrine for Limited War," October 4, 1957, NA, RG 59, Records of the
Department of State, Policy Planning Staff Records, 1957-61, Lot 67D 548, Box 121, Folder - Military and Naval
Policy. For excellent bibliographies of the writings concerning limited war strategies, see Morton H. Halperin,
Limited War: An Essay on the Development of the Theory and An Annotated Bibliography (Cambridge, MA:
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1962); and Department of the Army, Pamphlet 20-60: Bibli-
ography on Limited War, Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 1958.
69Memorandum of the Discussion at the 364th Meeting of the NSC, May 1, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series,
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ons. 7° Both Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas White and JCS Chairman Twining "insisted that the
United States already possessed strong capabilities for fighting limited war. ''71 President
Eisenhower acknowledged concerns that he had with augmenting U.S. forces for limited military
operations. He believed that "Each small war makes global [nuclear] war more likely. ''72
While the NSC debated limited military operations capabilities, an interdepartmental study
group discussed these issues and completed a 250 page examination in June. Unfortunately, most
of its report and the discussions related to it remain classified. However, it evidently reached sev-
eral general conclusions. While the United States could use more limited war capabilities, its cur-
rent forces were adequate. If a limited war did occur, the United States needed to notify the en-
emy of its intentions. The public needed to be educated about the role of nuclear weapons. _3 The
interdepartmental group's final report did not lead to any substantial changes in Eisenhower's
programs concerning limited military operations.
The last two Gaither committee recommendations dealt with the reorganization of the de-
fense establishment and the construction of fallout shelters. In making its recommendation con-
cerning reorganization, the committee concluded that the defense establishment was not incorpo-
rating scientific and technological advances into is military programs in an efficient manner and
was plagued by bureaucratic conflicts. Eisenhower could not have agreed more. In his 1958 state
of the union address, he argued that "The first need is to assure ourselves that military organiza-
tion facilitates rather than hinders the functioning of the military establishment in maintaining the
security of the nation. "74 After several months of deliberations, Eisenhower made six recommen-
dations for changes in the organization of the defense establishment. A designated unified com-
mander rather than a commander should lead troops deployed overseas fi'om a particular service
branch. The designated unified commander should answer directly to the Secretary of Defense
who answered to the president. The JCS should serve the Secretary of Defense directly rather
than particular military branches. Each chief should concentrate on managing his respective
branch, not on developing operational plans. A new position of Director of Defense Research and
Engineering needed to be created. Congress should appropriate funds to the Secretary of Defense
rather than to the individual services. 75 In August, Congress sent Eisenhower a bill that contained
most of what he requested.
The Eisenhower administration's response to the five year $25 billion shelter program was
not nearly as favorable. Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon expressed serious reserva-
tions about the effectiveness of shelters in maintaining the viability of the country after a nuclear
exchange. The question for them was not whether the shelters would reduce casualties. They
recognized that shelters would substantially lower casualty rates. However, the president "noted
that it had been said that fallout shelters might save 50 million people, a reduction of 35% in casu-
alties. In talking about such figures, we were talking about the complete destruction of the
70Ibid., 4.
71Ibid., 7.
72Ibid., 10.
73Conference, June 17, 1958, EL, WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 21, Folder - Nuclear
Exchange (Sept. 1957-June 1958) (3), 1. See also Memorandum for the National Security Council, June 18, 1958,
NA RG 59, State Department/OCB and NSC, 1947-63, Lot 63D 95, Box #111, 2.
74Dwight D. Eisexthower, "Annual Message to the Congress of the State of the Union," January 9, 1958 Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, 7.
75Ibid., 247-48. See also Chris Donnelly, United States Defense Policies in 1958 (GPO, 1959), 48-50.
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United States. ''76 Nixon was even more blunt. He "suggested that it be assumed that 40 million
people would be killed in event of enemy attack if we had shelters, and 60 million would be killed
if we did not have shelters. If40 million were killed, the United States would be finished. He did
not believe we could survive such a disaster. Our major objective must be to avoid the destruc-
tion of our society. ''77
The FCDA was the only government agency to support the program without reservations.
Leo Hoegh, the FCDA's director, argued that shelters would bolster the deterrent power of re-
taliatory forces, strengthen the position of U.S. negotiators, and would reduce casualties in a war
35 to 45 percent. 78 Opponents, such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Robert Cutler, and
Atomic Energy Commission chairman Admiral Lewis Strauss, questioned the costs and effective-
ness of shelters, thought they might make war more likely, and wondered about their impact on
U.S. allies. 79After these discussions, the NSC decided not to accept the Gaither committee's
shelter recommendation. But, it did create an interdepartmental committee to study passive de-
fenses, institute a public education program, and support research on different types of shelters.S°
It finally recommended spending $35 million in FY 1959 for certain minimal shelter studies.81
During the first six months of 1958, Eisenhower instituted alert and dispersal programs,
expanded early warning radar coverage, programmed anti-aircraft and anti-missile defenses, and
accelerated the development and deployment of several different missile systems. While the spe-
cific recommendations did not reflect complete agreement with those of the G-aither committee,
they do show its considerable influence. After the summer of 1958, the Gaither report was rarely
discussed within the Eisenlaower administration or mentioned in public debates. However, the
report's obscurity during this time does not signify its lack of importance in helping shape debates
concerning U.S. national security programs. The changes in these programs during the first half
of 1958 were only the first of many to occur before Eisenhower left office.
Between July 1958 and the end of his presidency, Eisenhower continued to expand strate-
gic missile forces, disperse U.S. nuclear delivery systems, increase SAC alert capabilities, expand
radar coverage, and construct active defenses. The G-aither committee proposed the expansion of
five separate offensive missile systems: Thor and Jupiter IKBMs, Atlas and Titan ICBMs, and the
Polaris SLBM. By the end of FY 1963, it recommended that the United States deploy 240
IRBMs, 600 ICBMs, and 6 Polaris submarines carrying 16 SLBMs. In total, these forces would
have consisted of almost 940 nuclear missiles, s2 Over his last three years in office, Eisenhower
met and then surpassed these force levels. In August 1958, the Defense Department studied ex-
panding the programmed ICBM force to 200 missiles (110 Titan and 90 Atlas). s3 In November
76Memorandum of Discussion at the 351st NSC Meeting, January 16, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Series, Box 9,
Folder - 351st Meeting of NSC, January 16, 1958, 8.
77 Ibid., 11-12.
78 Ibid., 2.
79 Ibid., 6-11.
8o Ibid., 4.
81 [Untitled], March 28, 1958 - R.C., EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subscries, Box 8, Folder -
Fallout Shelters, 1.
82Gaither Report, 34.
83 See Jacob Neufeld, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force 1945-1960 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1990), 190; and Roman, Eisenhower and the Mis-
sile Gap, 179.
16
1959, the Defense Department proposed and Eisenhower approved a force of 270 ICBMs (140
Titans and 130 Atlas). u By Kennedy's inauguration in January 1961, Eisenhower had pro-
grammed the deployment of 810 ICBMs (130 Atlas, 140 Titan, and 540 Minuteman). s5
Eisenhower also supervised a similar expansion of the development of Polaris missile sub-
marines. He saw the Polaris as a major hedge against the Soviet Union launching a surprise at-
tack. By providing a virtually invulnerable second strike capability, the Polaris would force Soviet
leaders to consider even more seriously the consequences of attacking the United States. In 1958,
Eisenhower approved plans to construct 9 Polaris submarines. A year later, he agreed to expand
the force even further to 15. s6 By July 1960, the president approved the construction of 24 Po-
laris submarines, s7 These 24 submarines added 384 SBLMs to the already planned 810 ICBM
force.
In addition to the ICBM and Polaris forces, the Eisenhower administration implemented
its plans to deploy both Thor and Jupiter IRBMs overseas. In April 1958, Eisenhower had agreed
to a Defense Department recommendation to deploy 12 IRBM squadrons (9 Thor and 3 Jupiter)
containing 15 missiles each. Ultimately, four Thor and 3 Jupiter squadrons became operational in
Great Britain, Turkey, and Italy between 1959 and 1962. ss The Eisenhower administration lim-
ited the deployment of IRBMs to seven squadrons when it realized that reliable ICBMs would be
available which would make the IRBMs unnecessary and obsolete. However, while the IRBMs
were plagued with shortcomings, they "demonstrated America's resolve to defend its allies and
represented the only display of strategic missiles in Europe. "89
The ICBM and IRBM forces and the Polaris submarines represented only two legs of the
U.S. nuclear arsenal. The third part of the nuclear triad remained SAC bombers. The Gaither
committee did not recommend substantial increases in bomber force levels, but it did emphasize
the importance of reducing SAC vulnerability. It proposed the implementation of alert forces, the
further dispersal of bomber squadrons, the improvement of early warning, and the construction of
active defenses. Eisenhower and the NSC focused on each of these issues between 1958 and
1961. Additionally, Eisenhower adopted proposals to modernize the composition of the bomber
and tanker forces. While he phased out the B-36 in 1958 and began to reduce the importance of
the B-47 in 1959, he increased the deployment of B-52 bombers from 243 in 1957 to 567 in 1961.
Furthermore, he modernized the tanker force by introducing the KC-135.9°
Despite significantly expanding U.S. military programs in the three years after Sputnik and
the Gaither committee, Eisenhower faced almost constant criticism that his defense policies failed
to provide adequate guarantees for the nation's security. More specifically, his policies were
84 See Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles, 184; and Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap, 197.
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(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), 57.
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87 Ibid., 190.
ss Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles, 224-26.
89 Ibid., 232.
90Alert Operations and the Strategic Air Command, 1957-1991 (Offutt Air Force Base, NE: Office of the Histo-
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challenged in the area of missile strength. Senators Smart Symington, Lyndon Johnson, and John
F. Kennedy led a chorus of opposition to Eisenhower's military programs. Symington claimed in
early 1958 that "It is a tragic fact that, even after the warnings contained in the Sputnik launch-
ings, and despite the previously known deficiencies in SAC, nothing has been done to rectify
those deficiencies. ''91 The leak of the Gaither report played an instrumental role in furthering the
perception that U.S. missile capabilities were inferior to those of the Soviet Union. One recent
scholar aptly concludes that while the Gaither report did not create the missile gap or fears of a
national emergency, it "was essential to their circulation beyond the intelligence community and,
ultimately, outside the administration. ''92
Claims of a missile gap periodically resurfaced between 1958 and the 1960 presidential
election. 93 Senator Symington wrote Eisenhower in the summer of 1958 "'we [Symington and his
advisers] believe our national intelligence system is underestimating the enemy's current and fu-
ture ballistic missile capability .... As a result we also believe that our national defense plans and
programs are not being effectively related to sound estimates of Soviet capability. ''ga Others criti-
cized the administration for failing to recognize and overcome the emergence of the alleged So-
viet quantitative lead in missile capabilities. If the Soviet Union did have such a lead,
Eisenhower's critics argued that the communist leaders might be more willing to take policy risks
in pursuit of its goal of world domination. Senator Lyndon Johnson's chief legal counsel captured
the essence of the critics' concerns when he argued that "we [U.S. leaders] have been unwilling to
face the disagreeable facts that we are actually in a state of war, that the enemy has prepared for
war and that unless we work 365 days a year with an urgency, as though we were in a war, we
are liable to be licked and become a second-class country. ''gs
In 1958, Senator John Kennedy argued that the United States needed to overcome its
military deficiencies. He advocated adding more tanker aircraft to SAC's forces, accelerating the
development and deployment of ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs, improving continental defenses,
expanding airlift capabilities, and increasing manpower for limited military operations. 96 He com-
plained that if these measures were not implemented, the Soviet "missile power will be the shield
from behind which they will slowly, but surely, advance--through Sputnik diplomacy, limited
brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation, and subversion, internal revolution,
increased prestige or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our allies. The periphery of the Free
World will slowly be nibbled away. The balance of power will gradually shitt against us.'97
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During the 1960 election campaign and his presidency, Kennedy asked many former mem-
bers of the Gaither committee to serve in important advisory roles. 9s The new president shared
many of the committee's views and attempted to include them in his policies. In a campaign
speech in October 1960, Kennedy cited the Gaither report in his arguments that Eisenhower was
not doing enough to meet the Soviet threat. He claimed that during the Eisenhower administra-
tion, "The Soviet Union decided to go all out in missile development. But here in the United
States, we cut back in funds for missile development. We slashed our defense budget. We
slowed up the modernization of our conventional forces--until, today, the Soviet Union is rapidly
building up a missile striking force that endangers our power to retaliate--and thus our survival
itself. ''99 Not surprisingly then, by the end of 1963, most of the committee's recommendations,
with the significant exception of fallout shelters, had become part of U.S. policy.
Kennedy and his advisers believed that "A posture of flexible response was deem[e]d to be
more credible in support of American security interests and foreign policy objectives, because a
clearer and closer correspondence could be struck between the military force that was to be ap-
plied by the President and the political stakes and the scope of the military conflict at issue be-
tween the United States and an enemy power."1°° To achieve this policy, he expanded U.S. nu-
clear forces even more, increased U.S. capabilities to wage limited wars, and recommended an
enlarged civil defense program. In implementing these changes, he increased expenditures for the
military services from $41.3 billion in 1960 to $47.9 billion in 1963 and added approximately
225,000 military personnel to Eisenhower's force levels. 1°1 At a news conference in 1963, Ken-
nedy bragged that "The fact of the matter is, when we came into office we had 11 combat ready
divisions; we now have 16. We increased the scheduling of Polaris, nearly double per year.
We've increased the number of planes on 15 minute alert from 33 percent of our strategic air
force to 50 percent. In a whole variety of ways.., we've strengthened ourselves in defense and
space. ''1°2 Furthermore, by the time he was assassinated in November 1963, the United States had
deployed 631 ICBMs and 160 SLBMs and had programmed the deployment of an additional 800
missiles. 1°3
Conclusions
The Gaither committee finished its report at a time in the Cold War of extremely high ten-
sion. The Soviet launch of Sputnik I in October and Sputnik II in November raised serious ques-
tions of the vulnerability of the United States. While it was much easier to launch a rocket into
space than to hit a target with a nuclear weapon thousands of miles a way, the Soviet satellites
98David L. Snead, "Eiserthower and the Gaither Report: The Influence of a Committee of Experts on National
Security Policy in the Late 1950s," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1997, 272.
99"Speech to the American Legion by John F. Kennedy," October 1960, quoted in "Kennedy on National De-
fense," Aviation Week andSpace Technology 73:17 (October 24, 1960), 21.
1ooEdward A. Kolodziej, The Common Defense and Congress, 1945-1963 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University
Press, 1966), 328.
lo_ The Statistical History of the United States: From Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1976), 1123 and 1141.
102The President's News Conference of April 3, 1963, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
dohn Fitzgerald Kennedy, (GPO, 1963), 308.
103Ball, Politics and Force Levels, 50-1.
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seemedto indicatethat country'snuclearsuperiorityovertheUnitedStates.Khrushchev'sclaims
thathiscountrypossessedthiscapabilityonlyheightenedconcerns.While Americanfearswere
shortsighted,especiallywhenU.S. StrategicAir Commandbomberswereincludedin acompari-
sonof U.S.andSovietstrengths,it washardfor themto feel securewhenSputnikcouldpass
overthe UnitedStateswith impunity.
The Gaither committee was not immune to these fears. Its conclusions were pessimistic
and its recommendations reflected deeply held fears of the Soviet Union. It asked for an incredi-
bly comprehensive security system. It requested military capabilities that would have allowed the
United States to launch a preventive war or an overwhelming retaliatory strike, and to wage lim-
ited wars with or without nuclear weapons. Although Eisenhower wondered whether he could
"carry out all of these plans and still maintain a free economy in the United States," he still care-
fully considered the committee's conclusions.I°4 While he did not accept all of them, he did find
many of the recommendations necessary and incorporated them into his national security pro-
grams with a careful eye on limiting their impact on the economy.
Between November 1957 and July 1958, the Gaither report remained the centerpiece of
discussions of national security issues within the Eisenhower administration. After careful analy-
sis, Eisenhower adopted changes to his national security policies, which reflected the influence of
the Gaither committee's recommendations. By July 1958, he increased force levels for IRBMs,
ICBMs, and SLBMs; ordered the dispersal of SAC forces to more airfields and improved in
SAC's alert status; expanded early warning radar coverage; constructed additional anti-missile
defenses; reorganized the Defense Department; and initiated studies of U.S. limited war capabili-
ties and fallout shelters. While he did not accept all of the Gaither committee's recommendations,
their impact is clear.
The influence of the Gaither committee did not end in the summer of 1958. For the re-
mainder of Eisenhower's presidency and during the Kennedy administration, the presidents con-
tinually reevaluated the policies that the Gaither committee brought into focus. During these
years, the specific Gaither committee recommendations lost their relevance as new reports and
intelligence estimates forced the two administrations to reevaluate U.S. strategic needs. How-
ever, the import of the committee's conclusions, specifically its calls for greater strategic capabili-
ties, limited war forces, and fallout shelters, provided a continued impetus for discussions of U. S.
national security needs.
_04Memorandum of Discussion at the 356th Meeting of the NSC, February, 28, 1958, EL, DDE Papers, NSC Se-
ries, Box 9, Folder - 356th Meeting of the NSC, February 27, 1958, 11.
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ORGANIZING THE U_TED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR OUTER SPACE: 1957-1958
EILENE GALLOWAY
Definin_ the Problem
The dramatic orbiting of the first Sputnik by the Soviet Union on
October 4, 1957 was like a spark that ignited and speeded the process of develop-
img the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space on a continuing and larger
scale. People throughout the world were astonished by this phenomenal opening
of outer space as a new environment, and surprised that the Soviet Union was
first to accomplish this feat. But the news struck Capitol Hill like a thunder-
bolt because thrusting the 184-pound satellite into outer space was evidence
of the capability of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles, and therefore
instantly perceived as a crisis for U. S. national defense. This perception was
reinforced on November 3, 1957 when a second Sputnik weighing 1,120 pounds began
circling the Earth. The U. S. was still working on the civilian scientific
Vanguard satellite of 3.25 pounds.
There was instantaneous reaction by the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
brought forceful leadership to this challenge, I/ and on November 25, 1957 began
the basic investigation of the nation's resources for achieving a superior space
program. The "Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs" 2/ called upon experts
representing government and industry, Iscience and technology,--education, military
and civilian fields of knowledge. These hearings continued through November and
December and into January 1958, recording 2,476 pages of the facts essential for
understanding the total situation as a basis for planning the future. The sense
of urgency was a driving force during these hearings which began at 9 A. M. and
often lasted until 9:00 P .M.
An understanding of the comprehensive nature of the task was revealed by the
testimo_ of scientists and engineers. Instead of fearing rockets as weapons,
they hailed them as advanced technology for producing many benefits for mankind.
Thus, the problem that required solution was two-dimensional: to preserve outer
space for peaceful exploration and uses, and prevent its becoming a new arena
for warfare. This situation was a classic case of presenting a choice between
good and evil.
It became apparent that organization of the resources required for a space
program would need to take the following factors into account: (i) satellites
are inextricably international as they orbit over national boundary lines in
90 minutes or less; (2) all spacecraft require co_mmnications to send and receive
information from the Earth; (3) a network of tracking stations is essential and
requires international agreements; (4) the geostationary orbit used for global
communications has been declared a "limited natural resource", already organized
by the International Telecommunication Union: (5)nations must guard against
ollution, contamination of the Earth and outer space, including celestial bodies;
6) provision must be made for protecting the health and safety of astronaute;
(7) measures must be taken 5o cope with interference from space debris; (8)
space vehicles can Operate and produce benefits only when they comply with the
specific rules of space technology and science; and (9) space exploration is
expensive but large projects can prcmote patterns of internaticaal cooperation.
.As the configuration of the total problem took shape during the Preparedness
Hearings, major issues arose. What should be the roles of military and civilian
organizations? How should national and international aspects be administered?
How should the Congress be organized to handle space legislation?
On November 21, 1957 the Rocket and Research Panel submitted a proposal for
creating a National Space Establishment, an independent civilian agency separated
from the military and funded on a long-term basis. A similar proposal had been
sent to President Eisenhower by the American Rocket Society on October 14, 1957,
on_ ten days after the Sputnik launching. The two proposals were combined and
on January 4, 1958 the Congress was urged to establish a new civilian space
agency authorized to conduct manned and urmmmned space missions, consider a
permanent base on the Moon, flights to Mars and Venus, and develop a variety of
peaceful uses. Scientists and engineers promised international leadership on
this "endless frontier" and identified benefits which could be expected from
space activities: 3_/
There will be a rich and continuing harvest of important praotical
applications as the work proceeds. Sc_e of these can already be
foreseen -- reliable short-term and long-term meteorological forecasts,
with all-the agricultural and commercial advantages that these i_ply;
rapid, long-range radio communications Of great capacity and reliability;
aids to navigation and to long-range surveying; television relays;
new medical and biological knowledge, and so forth. And these will be
only the beginning. Many of these applications will be of military
value; but their greater value will be to the civilian community at large.
The Subccezmittee concluded that the satellite was not yet a weapon, the
Soviet Union had led the world into outer space, and it was now essential for
the United States to make a tremendous effort to organize the resources for
achieving preeminence in space. A finding was that the "same forces, the
same knowledge, and the same technology which are producing ballistic missiles
can also produce instruments of peace and universal cooperation": ccmmmmications,
meteorology, navigation and remote sensing. The responsibilities of the Sub-
committee were limited to defense and it was necessary to create a special
committee to handle the civilian aspects of space legislation. _4/
Investigation b7 House and Senate Committees
On February 6, 1958, the Senate established the Special Cc_muittee on Space
and Astronautics with Senator Lyndon B. Johnson as chairman. Membership on the
Committee was determined by the concern of existing committees with the variety
of subjects involved in space applications that could cut across their Juris-
dictions. To solve what could becc_e a complicated legislative problem, action
had to be taken to avoid dispersal of the legislative process within the Congress,
fix responsibility, and give outer space matters the highest priority.
In the House of Representatives a similar "blue ribbon" Oommittee on
Astronautics add Space Exploration was created on March 5, 1958 with the Majority
Leader, Hon. John W. McCormack as Chairman.
_ile these committeeswere ccmsiderlng how to organize the Executive Branch,
Congress moved swiftl_ to pass interim legislation to speed U. S. space development.
.The Secretary of Defense was authorized to engage in advanced research projects
leading to the creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and
for one year to be responsible for space projects as designated by the Presi-
dent 5/ The Supplemental Military Construction Authorization Act provided
$10 million in transfer authority to the Secretary of Defense for advanced
research. 6/
Among the organizations in a unique position to furnish basic information
and advice on planning for the future development of space activities were the
National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics (NACA), the International Geophysical
Year (IGY) coordinated by the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU),
and the Department of State on U. S. foreign policy for arms control.
Congress established the National Advisory C_muittee on Aeronautics (NACA)
on March 3, 1915 as an independent agency reporting to the President. NACA
was given authority to "supervise and direct the scientific study of the problems
of flight, with a view to their practical solution...and to direct and conduct
research and experiments in aeronautics." 7/ Research included missiles and
manned aircraft; rocket research was concerned with engines for space and
ballistic missions. Although a small agency with limited funds, NACA was
successful with its expert staff in relations with the_epartment of Defense and
as a link between the government and the aviation industry. 8/
The International Geophysical Year (lOT) was established by the international
scientific community from July l, 1957 to December 31, 1958 for scientific
research of the world's totL1 environment: the Earth, oceans, atmosphere, and
outer space. This 18-month "year" was a period of peak sunspot activity favor-
able.for interdisciplinary research. Two such studies had been made in what
were termed polar Years in 1882-1883 and 1932-1933. Since that time, advances
in communications and aviation technology had produced new tools for indepth
research and 67 nations took part in the IGY which was organized by scientific
disciplines, national committees, governmental sponsorship, and international
coordination. 9/
In February 1953, the U. S. National Committee for the IGY was created by
the National Academy of Sciences'National Research Council, the scientific
U. S. organization that adheres to the International Council of Scientific
Unions. The role of the government in administering U. S. contributions to the
IGY was undertaken by the National Science Foundation which received an appro-
priation from Congress of $43,500,000 for IGY research. Additional financial
and logistical support came from other government agencies ihvol_d_lri_h_Eegp_y-
sical projects, e. g., the Department of Defense, Weather Bureau, Bureau of
Standards, and C_ast and Geodetic Survey. The linkage between the scientific
community and the government was effectively managed, both nationally and inter-
nationally, by organizations with clear policy objectives, implementing programs,
and adequate funding. I0/
The United States and the Soviet Union each made a commitment to launch a
satellite during the IGY. The U. S. decision was announced by the White House
on 29, 19 5" LI/ ....
•.. the President has approved plams!_{ ._1_S_'e_: Z__g_-e_
with the launching of small, unmanned e_rth-circling satellites as
part of the United States participation in the International Geophysical
.Year... This program will, for the first time in history, enable scientists
throughout the world to make sustained observations in the regions beyond
the earth's atmosphere.
Three days later, on August 2, 1955, the Chairman of the USSR Academy of
Sciences, L. I. Sedov, stated, during a press conference at the International
Congress of Astronautics, that the Soviet Union planned to launch a satellite.
This announcement was confirmed by the Soviet National Ccmnittee for the IGY
which described the scientific mission as measurement of atmospheric pressure
and temperature, cosmic rays, micro-mete.rites, the geomagnetic field and
solar radiation. 12__/
U. S. Arms Control Polic_ in the United Nations
U. S. policy on preventing rockets from being used as weapons in outer
space, and limiting the new environment to peaceful uses, was being pursued in
the United Nations and in diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union. In a
memorandum to the United Nations on January 12, 1957, the U. S. called attention
to the development of rockets and that it was "clear that if this advance into
the unknown was to be a blessing rather than a curse, the efforts of all nations
in the field need to be brought within the purview of a reliable armaments
control system." On July 22, 1957, Secretary Of State Dulles emphasized the
opportunity to forte in adv_hce a system for ensuring beneficial scientific
uses rather than d@s_r_c_iTe.veapons. 13__/
On November 14, 1957, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 1148 (XII)
calling for study of "an inspection system designed _to ensure that sending
objects through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and beneficial
purposes, n On Jannary 12, 1958, President Eisenhower wrote S_viet Premier
Bulganin proposing "that we agree that outer space be Used for peaceful purposes
... Let us this time, and in time, make the right choice, the peaceful choice.
By the time the Congressional committees began deliberations on future U. S.
organization for space activities, the high priority objective had become
peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958
_hile the House and Senate committees had been investigating the impact of
Sputnik on the United States and the future for space development, analytical
studies were under way in the Executive Branch. The President's Special Assistant
for Science and Technology and the Science Advisory Committee combined their
assessments with those of the Department of Defense, Department of State, the
Bureau of the Budget and the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics as a
basis for recomnendations on legislative proposals. 15/ On April 2, 1958j
President Eisenhower sent his message to the Congress--with draft legislationl6/
_ich was referred to the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space --
Exploration and the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics. There
was agreement by the committees with three main issues: that a new civilian
space ag@_y be created; that NACA should be the nucleus for transfer to the
_eW agency; a_d that the Department of Defense should have Jurisdiction over
projects primarily associated with military requirements. However, as legislative
.inquiries progressed, it became apparent that there were differences between
the Congress and the Executive Branch on some of the major problems of organiza-
tion that required solution.
The draft proposal assumed that all agencies would cooperate without overall
coordination; _L_SA was to have an internal advisory board which met infrequently
and had no authority over other agencies with space and space-related programs
and budgets. If a question arose as to whether an activity was military or
civilian, it was proposed that NASA "may act in cooperation with, or on behalf
of, the Department of Defense." Although the draft preamble provided that NASA
should cooperate with nations and groups of nations", there was no provision
implementing this objective in the draft bill. 17__/
The House Committee favored solution of the problem of overall coordination
by civilian/military liaison committees of cooperation at the staff level with
disputes settled by the President. The House Committee also recommended an
internal Aeronautics and Space Advisory Committee of 17 distinguished members
to advise the President. The Senate Committee, however, realized that the total
U. S. space program involved coordination of a number of agencies and recommended
a National Aeronautics and Space Board. This was changed by the Conference
Committee to the National Aeronautics and Space Council whose function was to
advise the President on the following duties: to survey allsignificant aero-
nautical and space activities, develop a comprehensive program, allocate
responsibility, ensure effective' cooperation and resolve differences. The
Council was provided with a small staff. 18/ The objective of Congress was
to ensure that all U. S. space activities wou_ be handled at the highest
Presidential level. The bill as finally enacted required the President to send
Congress an annual report.
Both House and Senate Committees emphasized the necessity for international
space cooperation. On January 14, 1958, Senator Johnson called for world
leadership by the United States in the new dimension offered by space explora-
tion: 19/
We should, certainly, make provisions for inviting together the
scientists of other nations to work in concert on projects to extend
the frontiers of man and to find solutions to the troubles of this
earth.., it would be appropriate and fitting for our Nation to
demonstrate its initiative before the United Nations by inviting all
member nations to join in this adventure _to outer space together.
On May 13, 1958, Congressman McCormack introduced a House Concurrer.t _:esolution
calling for the Peaceful Exploration of Outer Space and expressing the sense
of the Congress -- 20/
That the United States should seek through the Unit_i Nations or such
means as may be most appropriate an internatior,_l agreement providing
for Joint explo_a%i_ of outer space and establis_g a method by which
disputes which arise in the f_%_ in relation to outer space will be
solved by legal, peacefUl methods, rather than by resort to violence.
The C_a_rent Resolution was passed by the House on June 2, 1958 and by the
Senate on July 23, 1958.
oEmphasis on international space cooperation was further provided in the
NASA Act by the Declaration of Policy and Purpose:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United
States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful
purposes for the benefit of all mankind. (Sec. 102 (a)).
Furthermore, the aeronautical and space activities shall be conducted so as to
contribute materially to --
Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of
nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful
application of the results thereof. (Sec. 2 (c) (7)).
Section 2 of the Act provides for international cooperation:
The Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the President,
may engage in a program of international cooperation in work done
pursuant to this Act, and in the peaceful application of the results
thereof, pursuant to agreements mmde by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.
When President Eisenhower signed the NASA Act on July 29, 1958, he stated that 2____
I regard this section merely as recognizing that international treaties
may be made in this field, and as not precludirg, in appropriate cases,
less formal arrangements for cooperation. To construe the section
otherwise would raise substantial constitutional questions.
When the Senate Committee issued its Final Report, it reccmmended that the
Congress should be kept informed of progress being made in studies
undertaken by the United Nations Ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space... Particular attenticm should be paid to preserving and
extending the patterns of cooperation which were formed during the
International Geophysical Year... The special committee commends the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration for establishing an Office
of International Cooperation... and recognizes the need of the Adminis-
tration to provide for various types of cooperation as approved by the
President. 22/
Thus the way was open for NASA to engage in mamy kinds of scientific
bilateral and multilateral projects with other rmtions, leading to hundreds of
projects _Ith over I00 nations and international organizations.
Senator Johnson was determined that outer space activities receive continuing
priority at all gove_ntal decision levels. On August 21, 1958, two
appropriation bills, one on military construction ar_ the other on supplemental
appropriations, were amended to provide for an annual authorization of funds
for I_SA. The requirement Was at first temporary but became a permanent
feature of the legislative process for NASA's activities: 23__/
oNotwithstanding the provision of any other law, no appropriation
may be made to the National Aerormutics and Space Administration
unless previously authorized by legislation hereafter enacted by
the Congress.
Congressional Organization 1958 2___
The work of the Senate and House Special and Select Committes ended with
the passage of the I_ASA Act and it was necessary to consider how Congress sh_ald
be organized for jurisdiction over future space legislation. Four options were
examined: (i) to create a new joint cmumittee; (2) to divide jurisdiction among
existing committees; (3) to refer space legislation to the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy; and (4) to create new standing committees in the House and
Senate. The fourth option was chosen and the House Committee on Science ard
Astronautics was established on July 21, 1958. The Senate created the Committee
on Aeron_tical and Space Sciences on July 24, 1958. This action was unusual
and underscored the intent of Congress that all space activities must receive
specific unified attention according to the bicameral system.
The United States and United Nati_s
In little more than a month after creating _L%SA with the strong statement
of U. S. policy in favor of international cooperation, President Eisenhower
asked the United Nations General Assembly to include on its agenda a draft
U. S. resolution calling for the establishment of an Adhoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This Committee _ms to report on United Natic_s'
resources and organizations _.ich could advance cooperation among nations to
avoid national rivalries and preserve outer space for peaceful uses; including
identification of legal problems that might arise. The resolution advocated
continuation on a permanent basis of the scientific research being carried on
by the International Geophysical Year.
President Eisenhower invited Senator Lyndon B. Johnson to address the United
Nations and lend his influence for adoption of the U.S. resolution. This
occasion, when the President sent a plane to Texas to fly Senator Johnson to
the United Nations, is a dramatic event in American history, demonstrating the
unity of the Government when the Republican President joined _@th the Democratic
leader of the Senate for international action on a critical U. S. foreign
policy.
On November 17, 1958, Senator Johnson urged the United Naticr:s to adopt
the U. S. proposal for the Ad hoc Committee: 2_A_'"
... if nations proceed unilaterally, then their penetrations into space
become only extensions of their national policies on Earth. _at their
policies on Earth inspire -- whether trust or fear -- so their accomplish-
ments in outer space will inspire also... Today outer space is free. It
is unscarred by conflict. No nation holds a corcession there. It must
remain this wa_.. . We know the gains of cooperation. We know the losses of
failure to cooperate. If we fail now to apply the lessons we have learned
eor even if we delay their application, we know that the advances into space
may only mean adding a new dimension to warfare. If, however, we proceed
along the orderly course of full cooperation, we shall by the very fact
of cooperation make the most substantial contribution yet made toward
perfecting peace ....
Nineteen other nations joined the United States in sponsoring the resolution
1348 (XIII) which passed the General Assembly on December 13, 1958. Membership
on the 18-nation Ad hoc Committee was chosen on the basis of those most advanced
in space technology and other nations representing fair geographical distribution.
The U.S.S.R. (joined by Czechoslovakia, Poland, India and the United Arab
Republic) would not participate because of opposition to majority voting. This
hurdle was overcc_e, however, when agreement was reached on making decisions by
consensus •
On December 12, 1959, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1472 (XIV)
creating the permanent United Natioms Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS) whose membership has now grown to 61 nations. COPUOS established
two subcommittees: the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee analyzes and
reports on technical subjectswhich are then taken up by the Legal Subcommittee.
This is the organization and process by which five spa_ treaties have been
formulated. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe made a useful
definition of the consensus process: 25__/
Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection
expressed by a representative and submitted by him as constituting
an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question.
After attending mamy sessions of COFUOS and the Legal Subcommittee, this
author observed: 26/
It is evident that consensus is a highly desirable way of achieving
international accord because (1) the process of seeking agreement continues
with patience and is not cut off suddenly by a vote which may defeat what
might have come to fruition had more time been taken with the give and take
process of consensus; (2) the situation may be such that a majority vote
could not result in the adoption of a course of action, particularly if
implementation of the decision in terms of funding, personnel and techno-
logical expertise, depended upon natior.s which had voted against the
measure; and (3) group solidarity in decisionmaking ensures maximum
compliance in establishing and maintaining an activity of general benefit.
There is also a positive psychological effect when members of a group feel
together with sympathy for differing viewpoints, motivated by a desire to
bring about harmor_ in their collective judgment. If a member has not
objected, a proposal can be adopted but this unspoken consent should not
be interpreted as negativism; there is a positive willingness to settle
the issue in question.
The creation of COPUOS as a permanent space organization within the United
Nations advanced the movement toward international space cooperation for protecting
outer .space from conflicts. The method of establishing the facts of operational
espace technology as a basis for formulating legal principlesj and the process
by which consensus was obtained on decisions by political representatives
strengthened compliance with essential guidelines. The United Nations became
the forum for coalescing action at a critical time in history. Strong agreement
on the objective of maintaining outer space for beneficial uses kept nations
negotiating with patience until their disagreements were overcome. Within this
UN context which the United States worked with dedicated leadership to establish,
the UN COPUOS formulated the basic Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, 27/ now ratified by 93 nations which comply with its
science/technology orien_'d guidelines. From the provisions of this treaty,
and to keep abreast of changing conditions of space science ar.d technology,
four more treaties have been spun off: the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space 28/,
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 29/--
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched _to Outer Space 30/
A_wement Oovernimg the Activities of States on the Moc_ and other--Celestial
Bodies. 31/
In addition, Principles were sdopted on four subjects: The Declaration of
LeEal _h_IncIples Governi_ the Activities of States in the Zxploration and Use
of Outer Space,with outstandimg U. S. leadership, was adopted in 1963; the
Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting in 1982, Principles Relating to
R_mote Sensing of the Earth from Space in 1986 and Principles P_levant to t_2
Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space in 1992.
All the treaties except the Moon Agreement have gained acceptance and
compliance, so evidently the Moon situation requires more defim_ttion before there
is movement toward acceptable solutions.
/
During the past 40 years we have been successful in exterding internatiunal
law izto outer space, and to such an extent that we have created a special
branch of space law. We do not need a police force to ensure compliance with
these ratified legal provisions because they have been shaped to cor.form with
the operational imperatives of space technology.
On December 31, 1958 the Senate Special Co_.ittee on Space and Astronautics
published "Space Law: A Symposium" which was an expression of continuing
concern with legal guidelines for orderly conditions in outer space. 32/
Conclusions
If the Vanguard had been orbited before the Sputnik, we would not have
been able to establish a coordinated national and international framework for
developing the beneficial uses of outer space as quickly and successfully as
we did; instead, we might have drifted into a period of instability without
decisiveness on creating the conditions essential for maintaining outer space
for peacefUl uses. Vanguard first would have been an historical event hailed
by engineerw and scientists as tools for their projects, and it would have made
front page news. But it would not have electrified the world, the U. S. public,
in particular, would have taken for granted that we would be first in rocketry;
and most of all, it would not have aroused the fear of orbiting Soviet weapons
that galvanized political decisior2_akers to take immediate action for achieving
o- •
I0.
U. S. preeminence in outer space. Had the second Sputnik of 1,120 pounds been
orbited after Vanguard, it would have aroused fear of those responsible for
U. S. national defense, but information falling on the public in pieces over a
period of time would not have had the same psychological impact on all groups
simultaneously as happened with the timing of Sputnik.
The Sputnik was launched at exactly the right time, when space rocketry
was in its earliest stages, to alert nations to the necessity for containing
this global mechanism within the bounds of civilization. By striking such a
complete lightning blow, the Sputnik had a unifying effect, drawing together all
the societal elements needed for finding ways to establish conditions to ensure
peace and prevent war in this pristine envirozment. Groups that were working
separately on space missions, national defense, arms control, and within national
and international organizations, immediately fused on one objective: to maintain
outer space as a dependable, orderly place for beneficial pursuits. They were
strengthened by the nature of space science and technology which produces benefits
only when operating under normal coDditions. No one wanted any disruption of
space connnunications, which became a multi-billion dollar industry, weather
predictions which saved lives and property, disaster relief, and the many
practical uses of remote sensing.
The quickened pace of political action in 1957-1958 launched a regime that
preempted outer space for the peaceful exploration and uses that we have enjoyed
for 40 years.
In 1957 the United States had all the resources needed for developing a
superior space program.
First, there was a thriving aviation industry ready to expand into aerospace.
Second, the NACA, a government agency already working 0n prob3ems of flight
and outer space, could be expanded into a new civilian space agency. NACA already
had excellent relations _@th the Department of Defense and the aviation industry,
and there was agreement that the Department of Defense could hot develop all the
civilian applications but needed jurisdiction over military space matters.
Third, the International Geophysical Year was organized by scientists and
engineers _rking on outer space projects, and with a strong U. S. contingent.
Fourth, political leadership rocketed immediately on the day after Sputnik
_ms launched. Senator Lytton B. Johnson began planning for the fUll-scale
investigation "Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs" which began in
November 1957. He was a driving force for speeding U. S. space objectives.
On Jarmary 31, 1958 the U. S. orbited Explorer I, the satellite whose data led
to the significant discovery of the Van Allen radiation belts.
Fifth, there was harmor_ between the Executive and Legislative Branches of
the government; between the Republican President ar.dthe Democratic Congress on
national and interr_tional space objectives.
Sixth, to implement space policies, organizations were quickly formed in the
Executive Branch by dividing civilian and military uses and providing overall
c6o_tion, in the Congress with new standing co_nittees, and in the United
Nations by establishing the Ccnmittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
ii.
National and international organizations expar_iedto use space technology to
improve functions they were already performing, i. e., the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the World N_teorological Organization (_0),
and their counterparts in natior_l governments.
During four decades of space development, some institutions made changes in
their organization charts, but the general framework for achieving overall goals
contimed. Such changes are not unique to outer space and often occur because
different managers like to alternate between centralization _ decentralization
practices.
As long as rules and regulations are effectively coordinated with scientific
and technical facts, we can expect to maintain peaceful non-violent conditions.
Difficulties could develop, however, if special groups were allowed to promote
political and economic philosophies which ignore physical facts.
We have succeeded in expanding international law into outer space so that
a new branch of internatic_ai space law has been formed. Space law is remarkably
self-enforcing because engineers and scientists have contributed to its formation
by specifying the conditions they must have in order to operate and communicate
between the Earth and outer space.
Dr. Eilene Galloway retired fr_n the Congressional Research Service as Senior
Specialist in International Relations (National Security). Following the
launching of Sputnik, she was Special Consultant to Senator Lyndon B. Johr_on
in 1957-1958 when he was Chairman of the three Senate committees that held
hearings on the missile-satellite situation and the NASA Act of 1958. She
continued as Special Consultant to the Senate Ccemuittee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences. She was Consultant to Hon. John W. McCormack, Chairman of the
House Cc_mittee on Astronautics and Space Exploration during the hearings on
the NASA Act of 1958. She has been U. S. Delegate to the United Nations Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal Subcommittee, and as Observer
for the Internatior_l Astronautical Federation. She received the NASA Public
Service Gold Medal Award in 1984. She is Honorary Director of the International
Institute of Space Law and Trustee Emeritus of the International Academy of
Astronautics. She is a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics and the American Astronautical Society. She is at present a
member of the NASA Advisory Committee on the International Space Station.
Her biography and list of publications are in Who's _ho in America and those
including American Women and Science and Engineering.
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It is cormnonplace in the United States for presidential candidates and opposition panics
to criticize intenmly the policies of the incumbent president and party. This tactic is often used
to garner support for the challenger and opposition party; moreover, it provides a basis on which
the party can formulate its platform and a foundation on which the individual, if elected, can
develop and implement new policies. This is precisely what the Democratic Party--and its
prospective presidential candidates--did in the late 1950s in preparation for the 1960 presidential
election. A major locus of the Democrats was U.S. national security and American power,
prestige. ,and leadership in the international sy_em. In fact, the 1957 Sputnik launching became
the primary symbol of the Democrats' argument that Eisenhower administration defense policies
bad allowed a missile gap to develop that favored the Soviet Union and had precipitated a
supposed decline in American power, pre_ige, and leadership in the international arena.
This paper will examine how and why the Democratic Party in the late 1950s used the
Sputnik launching, and tht_,¢ subsequent questions about the missile gap and American power and
prestige, to raise national attention about American national security and national leadership for
tlac 1960 presidential campaign. It will investigate the Party's efforts--including those of
individual members within and outside of Congress--_o articulate a hey,, approach to national
defense with the expressed purpose of regaining the White House in 1960. Specifically, it will
study the role of the Democratic Advisory Council (which published the P,'u'ty's pamphlet on
national defense in 1959), the Congressional Democrats' use of budgeting and oversight authority
(which _rvcd as a stage to promote their version of national security and defense), the conflicting
interpretation of intelligence data by Eisenhower administration persormel and the Democrats
(which ft,eled the Democrats" allegations about national defense), and John Kennedy's merging
of the missile gap ,_nd American power and prestige questions during the 1960 campaign (which
allowed him to est,ablish his legitimacy as a potential national leader). As a resuh, this paper wilt
clearly demonstrate how Sputnik 'launched' a political battle that ultimately caused a stiift in
national defense policy: from Eisenhower's massive retaliation strategy to Kennedy's flexible
response.
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ABSTRACT
The 1954 meeting in Italy of the organizers for the International Geophysical
Year (IGY) was crucial for both:
a) the agreement to include interplanetary, cosmic radiation and solar-
terrestrial research as part of the IGY program, and;
b) the decision of the Soviet Union to join the IGY.
At this meeting the author of this historical account became one of the twelve
leaders/organizers of the various scientific programs for the 67 nations in the IGY.
This paper is a brief, personal account of key events leading up to the launch of
Sputnik. Included are accounts of meetings and decisions--both scientific and
political--that led the United States and the U.S.S.R. to declare the launching of
satellites as one of the goals for the IGY.
The United States should not have been surprised by the launch of Sputnik
since a year prior to its launch the Soviet leaders gave full and correct information
on the orbit, frequency, fall quarter 1957 launch plan and other details to the author
in Barcelona, September 1956. Efforts to inform U.S. officials proved futile.

Building a Third SpacePower: WesternEuropean Reactionsto Sputnik at the Dawn of
the SpaceAge
John Krige
(ESA History Project and
Centre de Recherche en Histoire des Sciences et des Techniques,
Cit6 des sciences et de l'industrie, Paris, France)
Paper prepared for the symposium 'Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet
Satellite', NASA Headquarters, Washington DC, September 30- October 1, 1997.
Preliminary draft. Not for citation or quotation.
The dawn of the space age is commonly indentified with the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet
Union on October 4, 1957. For the United States that dawn was a particularly traumatic one.
This was not simply a Soviet scientific and technological first. It was also a warning that "the
evil empire" would soon be technologically capable of striking American targets from Soviet
bases using intercontinental ballistic missiles. It was seen too as a sign of the economic
strength and even political superiority of state socialism, the triumph of rational planning over
laissez-faire liberal democracy. Sputnik turned space from a realm of dreams and fantasies into
a locus of superpower rivalry, a major battlefield in the technological cold war. 1
If the US was able to move so quickly to transform space it was because the
institutional, technological and industrial infi-astructure was already in place when Sputnik was
launched. Out of the missile programme came the launchers. Scientific and applications
satellites for civilian or military purposes were on the drawing boards if not already built.
Within months of Sputnik being launched the properties of the Van Allen radiation belts were
being probed with Explorer. Within a year the Department of Defence's communications
satellite SCORE (Signal Communication by Orbiting Relay Equipment) was aloft. Film-
capsule recovery from the first mixed civilian-military Discovery series of reconnaissance
s_/tellites, under development since 1955, occurred in August 1960. The Air Force's SAMOS
(Satellite Nf_flitary Observation System) satellite followed a few months later. Tiros I, the first
of a series of meteorological satellites was launched on April 1, 1960. 2 And of course in April
1961 manned space flight began with Yuri Gagarin. In short within three or four years space
had become a region to be researched, exploited and dominated, the new world which the
United States and the Soviet Union raced to conquer.
Yet if this was the meaning that space quickly assumed for the two superpowers,
matters were different in western Europe. Here there was excitement and admiration for the
1 The classic account is of course W. A. McDougall, ... The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the
Space Age ( New York, 1985).
2 On these applications satellites programmes see A. J. Butrica (ed), Beyond the Ionosphere. Fifty Years of
Satellite Communication (Washington DC/NASA-SP4217, 1997), P. E. Mack, Viewing the Earth. The Social
Construction of the Landsat Satellite (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), and F. Nebeker, Calculating the
Weather. Meteorology in the 20th Century 5San Diego: Academic Press, 1995).
scientific and technical achievement. 3 But there was not the same drive for conquest, nor the
same level of fear, of feeling militarily vulnerable to attack. More than a decade after the war
Western European governments had adapted themselves to the 'communist threat' on their
doorsteps or, indeed, in their homes if not under their beds. Through NATO their security
was intimately tied up with the presence of US troops on European soil and the shelter
provided by the American nuclear umbrella. Of course Sputnik reinforced doubts that the
United States would be prepared to retaliate 'massively' to defend Western European cities
from a Soviet attack: could one really expect New York to be sacrificed to save Paris74 But
the Suez crisis in 1956 had already shaken any blind faith in the US's willingness to support the
military adventures of their European allies. Indeed six months before Sputnik the British
Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, had confirmed that the country would develop its own
nuclear deterrent based on its V-bomber force equipped with hydrogen weapons and an
intermediate range ballistic missile called Blue Streak. 5 At the same time negotiations were
under way with the US early in 1957 for the installation of Thor IRBMs on British soil and
cooperation had already begun on nuclear submarines. In short, while people operating
everything from amateur radios to the giant radiotelescope at Jodrell Bank enthusiastically
tracked the passage of Sputnik over British soil, the newly elected government of Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan had already taken steps to redress the technological imbalance of
power in the European theatre. 6
There was, then, no 'Sputnik crisis' in Britain. On the contrary, the UK government
welcomed the event as a renewed opportunity for them to draw closer to the USA. For a
decade the British had been smarting under what they felt was the cruel injustice of the Atomic
Energy (or McMahon) Act, passed by Congress in July 1946. This bill prohibited the passing
of nuclear information to foreign nationals, so effectively putting a halt to Anglo-American
nuclear collaboration which had been so valuable to both partners since 1941. Minor
modifications were made in 1954, when the US authorities were permitted to supply
information on the external characteristics of atomic weapons, though sharing information on
warhead design was still prohibited. 7 Sputnik changed all that. A few days after Sputnik II
was launched, Duncan Sandys told the House of Commons that "the Sputniks [...] have helped
to precipitate closer collaboration with the United States [...] the new impetus towards
unrestricted collaboration [...] offers new prospects which we dared not hope for a few
3For the 'euphoria' in Britain over the tracking of Sputnik I, whose orbital inclination near 65 ° carried it over
the British isles, see H. Massey and M.O. Robins, History of Britfsh Space Science (Cambridge University
Press, 1986), pp.39-41.
4 On NATO see typically L.S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States. The Enduring Alliance (Boston: Twayne
Publishers). Kaplan quotes Secretary of State Herter in April 1959 as saying that he could not "conceive of any
president engaging in all -out nuclear war unless we were in danger of aU.out devestation ourselves" (p. 80).
See also A. J. Pierre, Nuclear Politics. The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939-1970
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
5 For general political developments in the UK see A. Sked and C. Cook, Post-War Britain. A Political History
(Penguin Books, 1980), chapters 5 and 6.
6 On JedreU Bank see e.g.J. Agar, "Moon Relay Experiments at JodreU Bank and references cited therein, in
A. J. Butrica, Beyond the Ionosphere. Fifty Years of Satellite Communication (Washington DC" NASA
History Series, NASA SP-4217, 1997), 19-30.
7 On the Anglo-American 'specal relationship' see, e.g, J. Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-
1984 (London: Macmillan, 1984), I. Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship. Britain's
Deterrent and America, 1957- 1962 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), and IVLGowing, "Nuclear Weapons
and the 'Special Relationship'", in W.M. Roger Louis and I-LBull (eds), The 'Special Relationship'. Anglo-
American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chapter 7, and A. Pierre, op. cit..
months ago". Indeed the British felt that it was just this kind of shock that the US needed to
alert to them to the value of working together with their friends. The Americans, one internal
Whitehall minute noted patronisingly in December 1957, "need Pearl Harbours from time to
time, and perhaps it is just as well that the Russians are capable of delivering them in this
relatively harmless way". s Indeed in 1958 the McMahon act was revised to permit the
exchange of information about the design and production of nuclear warheads and the transfer
of fissile materials to countries that "had already made substantial progress in the development
of atomic weapons", meaning Britain above all. There were further relaxations in 1959. 9 The
'Sputnik shock' in the US had then just the opposite effect in Britain. It was seen as being to
Britain's advantage, as breathing new life into the faltering Anglo-American "special
relationship" in the nuclear field just when the UK was developing new technologies for its
independent deterrent.
Britain's coolness in the face &the new Soviet triumph also reflected its relative
impotence, its knowledge that it had neither the institutional, technological or industrial
infrastructure to confront Khrushchev on his own terms. And what was true for Britain was
even more so for France, whose science base was only just beginning to show real signs of
post-war recovery and whose crumbling IVth Republic was embroiled in a bitter war in
Algeria._0 "The victory of the Soviet engineers ('techniciens')", wrote Le Monde a couple of
days atter the news of'Spoutnik' broke, "can be seen to be purely scientific". The editorial
recognized that missiles and satellite launchers originated in the same technology of course,
but it insisted on maintaining a strict divide between the objectives of the two. Sputnik was a
small, temporary star which would soon disappear like an inoffensive meteorite and "it would
need the extrapolation of a pessimistic novelist to furnish it already with a thermonuclear
explosive or with the eye of a mechanical spy". The Soviet satellite was then above all a
symbol of scientific and technological progress: "There is no cause for alarm for the moment",
Le Monde reassured its readers.ll
In 1957 then, Sputnik and space meant very different things on opposite sides of the
Atlantic. In the United States they were charged with layers of meaning, the new focal point
of the titanic confrontation between the two world systems at every level. Their significance
in Europe was quite other, far thinner, far more restricted. My aim in this paper is to explore
that other, to show how space was perceived in western Europe, in contrast to the USA, at
the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. I shall concentrate on Britain because she was the
leading western European power of the day, because my source material is extensive, and
because I can benefit from a number of recent other studies relevant to my problematic.
s These two quotations are from N. Whyte and P. Gummett, "Far Beyond the Bounds of Science: The Making
of the United Kingdom's First Space Policy", Minerva (1997), 139 - 197, where the original sources can be
found.
9 See Crowing, op. cit., p. 124.
10This paper will concentrate on Britain, though some reference will be made to the French and German
situations at the end. For the former see W. A. McDougall, "Space-Age Europe: CJaullism, Euro-Cranllism,
and the American Dilemma", Technology and Culture (1985), 180-203; C. Carlier and M. Gilli, Les trente
prelates armies du CNES, L'Agence fran_aise del'_space (Paris: La Documentation franqaise, 1994); L.
Sebesta, "La sceince, instrument politique de securit6 nationale? L'espace, la France et l'Europe", Revue
d'histoire diplomatique, n ° 4, 1992, pp. 313-41. For Germany see P. Fischer, The Origins of the Federal
Republic of Germany's Space Policy 1959-1965 - European and National Dimensions 0qoordwijk: ESA HSR-
12, 1994).
11Le Monde, Bulletin de l_Error! Bookmark not define&tranger, 6-7 octobre 1957.
WhatI want to do in this microhistory is to trace in some detail how, for British
scientific and political elites alike, the meaning of space changed in the two or three years
immediately following the launch of Sputnik. Originally seen above all as a domain for
conducting scientific research and gaining national prestige, space gradually came to assume
new functions, functions more congruent with those that it had in the US (and the USSR), yet
functions which were expressed in a form specific to a Europe of medium-sized powers. It was
the launcher above all (though not only) that sparked this change, a change that turned space
from a realm controlled by scientists into a platform for governments to unite against the
communist threat, to build a European industrial base and to create the foundations of a _third
space power' between the United States and the Soviet Union.
From upper atmosphere research to space research t2
If the launch of Spunik created a sense of'euphoria' in parts of the British scientific
community it was not simply because of the scientific and technological achievement that it
represented. It was also because they could, literally, hardly believe their eyes or their ears.
When Eisenhower announced in July 1955 that the USA planned to launch an earth satellite in
the framework of the International Geophysical Year (IGY), to be held in 1957-1958, the UK
had not yet officially embarked on a sounding rocket programme for upper atmosphere
research. Indeed, meeting in April 1956, the British members of the IGY National Committee
"were very sceptical about earth satellites ever appearing and if they did, that anything of real
interest would result". Massey, the leader of the British scientific community in this field, was
thus as 'surprised' and 'greatly amazed' as everyone else to hear of the launch of Sputnik at the
reception which he and three other British delegates (the only representatives from Western
Europe) were attending at the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C. in October 1957. Six
weeks later on November 13, 1957, after eight months of tests, Britain's first scientific
experiments began using their sounding rocket Skylark.
The British sounding rocket programme, like that in other European countries and in
the USA, benefitted enormously from military interest and support.t3 Indeed, according to
Massey, the initiative for launching an upper atmosphere research programme came not from
the scientists themselves but from the ministry responsible for the UK's guided missile R &D
programme at the Royal Aircraft Establishment in Farnborough.14 It is worth quoting
12 This section is based on H. Massey and M.O. Robins, History of British Space Science (Cambridge
University Press, 1986) and N. Whyte and P. Gummett, War Beyond the Bounds of Science: The Making of
the United Kingdom's First Space Policy", Minerva (1997), 139 - 169. Some of the key papers cited in this
article are easily accessible as published appendices in Massey and Robins. A fully researched history of the
UK's sounding rocket programme remains to be written.
13 For Europe see D. Pestre, "Studies of the Ionosphere and Forecasts for Radio Communications. Physicists
and Engineers, the Military and National Laboratories in France (and Germany) after 1945", History and
Technology, 13(3) (1997), 183-205, and O. Wicken, "Space Science and Technology in the Cold War: The
Ionosphere, the Military and Politics in Norway', History and Technology, 13(3) (1997), 206-232. For the US
seeD.H. DeVorkin, Science with a Vegeance: How the American Military Created the Space Sciences in the V-
2 Era (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992), D.K DeVorkin, "The Military Origins of the Space Sciences in the
American V-2 Era", in P. Forman and J.M. S_Error! Bookmark not defined.nchez-Ron, NationalMilitary
Establishments and the Advancement of Science and Technology (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1990), 233-260, and B. Hevly, "The Tools of Science: Radio, Rockets, and the Science of Naval Warfare', in
Forman and S,qError! Bookmark not defined.nchez-Ron, op. cir., 215-232.
14 For a full account of that programme see S. Twigge, The Early Development of Guided Missiles in the
United Kingdom, 1940- 1960 (Chur: Harwood, 1993).
Massey's account in full. In its quaint, unpretentious simplicity it reveals the gulf in values that
separated British researchers at this time from their ambitious, driving, entrepreneurial
colleagues in the United States:
"On the morning of 13 May 1953 [Massey] was just preparing to depart from his
office in the physics department of University College London to take part in the
annual departmental cricket match between staff and students, when he recieved a
telephone call from an official at the Ministry of Supply asking whether he would be
interested in using rockets available from the ministry for scientific research. Without
hesitation he said _yes' and this really marked the beginning of the British scientific
rocket programme".15
Subsequent negotiations led to a request for £100,000 for rocket research in the upper
atmosphere to be spread over four years. Half of this money was to be paid to the Royal
Society who would distribute it to university groups for building scientific instruments. The
remainder would be paid to the Ministry of Supply to cover the cost of the rockets and other
facilities.16 In the absence of a safe launching ground in a small country like Britain, this
meant sending the Skylarks aloft from the Anglo-Australian rocket range in Woomera, near
Adelaide, with the rather perverse effect that the British experiments measured conditions in
the southern hemisphere and observed the southern sky. 17 The Treasury agreed to this request
in 1955 telling the Ministry of Supply that its principal reason for doing so was not because
the Royal Society thought it to be "a good piece of pure research" but because there was "a
defence interest in the widest sense".18
With the sounding rocket programme getting into its stride in 1958, and with the
conviction that the data that UK scientists needed could be obtained from US satellites, there
were was little enthusiasm at senior levels in the Royal Society or in the M_mistry of Supply for
a British satellite programme. However, Bernard Lovell, the director of Jodrell Bank, pleaded
strongly for Britain to have its own satellite and his newly won prestige and public visibility
obliged both the Royal Society and the Ministry to look into the matter. The result was two
virtually identical papers produced in October 1958, and essentially drafted by Massey.19
They embodied a comprehensive statement of what a British space programme should involve,
and as such imbued space with a new significance, with new meanings, which it had not
previously had in the United Kingdom.
In his paper Massey made a strong plea on scientific grounds for UK participation in
space research with artificial satellites. Satellites, he insisted, had two advantages over
sounding rockets. Firstly, whereas the former took useful data for "only a few minutes", the
latter could carry out as many observations in a month as "several thousand vertical sounding
rockets". Secondly, satellites could rise beyond the atmosphere, and so study radiation which
was not accessible to sounding rockets because absorbed by the air. Starting from these
advantages he then went on to list eleven foreseeable scientific uses of satellites, selected
15 Massey and Robins, op. cit., p. 16.
16 Masse), and Robins, op. cit., pp.16 et seq.
17 p. Morton, Fire across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint Project, 1946-1980 (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1989).
18 Quoted in Whyte and Gummett, Minerva, op. tit., p. 145.
19 One version of Massey's paper is reproduced as Annex 3 in Massey and Robins, op. tit. The next four
paragraphs are based exclusively on it, and all quotations can be found there.
specifically to bring out the possibilities for systematic study, continuous observation, and
world-wide coverage opened up by this new technology. To blunt the criticism that
everything would have done by the time the satellites were built, Massey insisted that the
variety and the extent of the data were so great, and the likelihood of making unforeseen
discoveries so high, that "there is no risk at all that the usefulness of the satellites will be
confined to a few years only".
Massey was emphatic that this programme would only produce the desired benefits if it
was an independent, purely British effort, a "Thoroughgoing British enterprise" as he put it.
Could one not simply build instruments and include them in the payload of an American
satellite? No said Sir Harrie. There was in the UK "a long tradition of scientific research and
the British approach to scientific problems contains something unique born of this long
tradition and experience". If'British instruments were flown on American satellites, they "have
to conform very largely with American designs in order to be acceptable. This would destroy
the main advantage of a different approach to the experimental problems".
Granted that Britain should build her own satellites, could she not then ask another
country to launch them? Massey felt that only one line was needed to dismiss this possibility
Such an option, he wrote "seems to offer no advantage at all, quite apart from the obvious loss
of prestige". He also considered the possibility of western European collaboration in the
launching of satellites, only to rule it out immediately on the grounds that Britain's lead was so
great that "there would seem to be big disadvantages in the collaboration at this stage" .2o
We shall discuss the launcher issue more carefully in a moment. Now let us simply
remark that these arguments for an autonomous British space programme are so quick, even
superficial that one imagines that Massey was convinced, on independent grounds, that his
government would be willing to support a national space programme using not only all-British
satellites but also home-built launchers. And indeed he and the Ministry of Supply
recommended "adapting military vehicles to launch useful satellites [...]", as Massey's paper
put it. What Massey had in mind here, although his paper did not mention this, was the
possibility of developing a British launcher by combining the IRBM Blue Streak with Black
Knight, a rocket initially developed to test the re-entry of warheads into the atmosphere, plus a
small third stage.2_ This was technically possible and was presented as being relatively cheap.
Massey assumed that the development costs of these weapons would not be carried over from
the military budget into the civil space programme. Thus British science could have a launcher
capable of putting satellites weighing one ton into orbit "for the cost ofadaption" only, which
he estimated at £9 million for the first five satellites.
What of the use of space for other than scientific research? Massey very briefly
considered three 'applications' satellites. The first was meteorological, to be used for the
possible development of "methods for long-range weather forecasting, arising from the
availability of regular systematic world-wide observations of atmospheric cloud and other
conditions of meteorological importance". Secondly, there were telecommunications, though
narrowly defined, i.e. "the use of satellites as repeater stations for long distance transmission
2o We suspect that this is a reference to a US proposals to build a European IRBM under NATO auspices - see
later.
21 For a description of Black Knight, a highly successful rocket first launched in 1958, which later served as an
upper atmosphere research tool for both civil and military science, see Morton, op. cit., chapter 21. That
Masse), had in mind this combination of launchers is from Whyte and Gummett, Minerva, op. cit, p. 148.
of short radio waves". Finally, and even more briefly, Massey spoke of the "use of satellites
revolving in high orbit, undisturbed by atmospheric drag, for navigational fixes". None of
these ideas were developed, nor were they included for anything more than completeness,
Massey arguing that it was still too "difficult to predict" the potential of such "practical
benefits".
What of the military dimension? Massey explicitly excluded a discussion of military
aspects from his review. The debate on this issue in Britain has, however, recently been
analysed in some depth by Whyte and Gummett. 22 Their overall conclusion is that, at least for
the period covered by this paper, the British government was never convinced of the military
importance of space, systematically refused to use the military argument to justify a space
programme and, which amounted to the same thing, was not willing to spend significant
amounts of defence money on satellites or launchers. The reactions of the Chief Scientists of
both the Ministry of Supply (Wansborough-Jones) and of the Ministry of Defence (Brundrett)
to Massey's paper of October 1958 are typical in this respect. The former had serious doubts
about the military interest of space, was convinced that a military space programme would be
far beyond Britain's means, and suspected that the military information she might need could
be acquired from the US anyway. Brundrett, for his part, recognized that there might be
military benefits in the future, especially in the reconnaissance, meteorology and
telecommunications areas, but he felt that these applications were "unpredictable" and that the
Americans had made exaggerated claims for them. Early in 1959 the Pentagon called a joint
meeting of American, British and Canadian military R & D officials to facilitate collaboration
in defence research projects in the space area. US representatives stressed the "value and
importance" of a military space programme. Brundrett briefed the British delegate to the talks
to "try to keep space out of the defence field [...],,.z3 Although of course this view was
contested, it did summarise the general attitude that prevailed at this time: for Britain at the
end of the 1950s space (unlike the upper atmosphere) was not a domain of military
importance.
Let us now take stock. At the end of 1958 Britain had a sounding rocket programme
which was just getting into stride. Funded 50-50 by the civilian science and the defence
budgets, its aim was to study the properties of the upper atmosphere over the south Australian
desert. A debate was also under way on the nature and scope of a British space programme.
This programme was perceived primarily as a non-military scientific research effort which
would extend a unique British tradition in upper atmosphere research and which would
contribute to British scientific prestige (Massey specifically excluded the launch of small
satellites weighing a few pounds on the grounds that they would be outmoded scientifically
once they were built, and would have no prestige value). The proposed programme had one
other important feature: it was to be a "Thoroughgoing British enterprise". This independence
was only possible because, hovering in the wings of the space programme was the IRBM Blue
Streak, one lynchpin of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent whose importance had been
reaffirmed in the Defence White Paper published on 5 April 1957. Massey, and the 1W_inistry's
idea was that Blue Streak could be "adapted" to a space programme, so ensuring British
autonomy -- and its status as a significant world power. That status had been badly shaken by
the Suez crisis in November 1956. Sir Pierson Dixon, Britain's representative to the UN,
22 N. Whyte and P. Gummett, "The Military and Early United Kingdom Space Policy', Contemporary Record
8(2), Autumn 1994, pp. 343-369.
23 For this material see Whyte and Gummett, Contemporary Record, op. cit, pp. 345-7.
wrote soon after that "[...] at the time I remember feeling very strongly that we had by our
action reduced ourselves from a first-class to a third-class power". 24 In 1958 Lovell and the
Foreign Office played on the same fears -- Britain would be "classed as an underdeveloped
country" -- to argue that it was essential that she launch her own satellite with her own
launcher. 25 In the minds of scientists and policy makers alike, then, at the end of 1958 space
was a place where Britain would harvest scientific data and gain scientific prestige, but also a
place where she would confirm, to herself and to others, that she was still a major power to be
reckoned with.
The changing fortunes of Blue Streak in 1957 and 1958 and the place of Massey's
proposals in that context
Blue Streak was a liquid-fuelled missile using kerosene and liquid oxygen based on
certain designs of the US Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile. It was powered by two Rolls
Royce engines built under licence from North American Aviation's Rocketdyne division and its
range was specified as 1,500 miles initially but capable of development to 2,500 miles. 26
Embarked upon in 1954 with strong American support and help, the British missile was soon
overtaken by the parallel development in the US of the Thor and Jupiter IRBMs intended for
deployment in the European theatre. In March 1957 British and American negotiators
meeting in Bermuda agreed in principle to instal Thors on British soil (Jupiter was destined for
Italy and for Turkey) under a dual-key arrangement, a decision which immediately raised fears
of duplication inside Britain and doubts about the need to continue with a costly and slower
indigenous programme.
Blue Streak weathered this storm predominantly because the Air Ministry, supported
by the Minister of Defence Sandys and his Chief Scientist Brundrett were emphatic that the
missile was the cornerstone of Britain's independent deterrent and the necessary symbol of
great power status. As one memo put it, "unless we are to become a second-class power we
must make an independent contribution to the deterrent; the ballistic rocket is the only weapon
likely to last and therefore we must have it". 27 But Blue Streak was never safe. Parts of the
Air Ministry interpreted the claim that Blue Streak was the only durable weapon system as a
threat to the V-bomber force. The Admirality saw it, and rightly so, as the major obstacle to
the development of a Polaris-type submarine nuclear deterrent. And they had a strong
argument in their favour: the question of vulnerability. Blue Streak was a fixed-site land-based
missile and very expensive measures would have to be taken to protect the missile _om "
destruction by incoming enemy nuclear weapons. Submarine-launched weapons were not, of
course, subject to the same danger. Finally the Treasury was concerned about rising costs.
Estimates of the total cost of developing the missile excluding the warhead amounted to
between £160-200 million, double the original figures. What is more the Thor deal was linked
24 Quoted in Sked and Cook, op. cit., p. 153.
25 See Whyte and Gummett, Minerva, op. eit., p. 152.
26 For the birth of Blue Streak see J. Krige, "What is q_tilita_ Technology? Two Cases of U.S.-European
Scientific and Technological Collaboration in the 1950s", in F.I-I.Heller and J.1L Gillin_ham The United
States and the Integration of Europe. Legacies of the Postwar Era (New York: St. Martin' Press, 1996), pp.
307-338. See also Twigge, op. eit.
27 The quotation is from Clark, op. cit., p. 165. This section relies heavily on his detailed analysis of Blue
Streak's political fortunes in chapter 5.
9with thewithdrawalof US financialsupport for Blue Streak which had amounted to some $8
million by mid-1958. 28
Sputnik, indirectly at least, changed the terms of this debate. As we saw earlier it
quickly led to amendments to the McMahon Act and to important relaxations in the
restrictions on the transfer of sensitive information from the United States to the United
Kingdom. One immediate result of this was that, in November 1958, Sandys could report that
the Americans would be willing to supply full details of the design of the Thor warhead, which
was also "entirely suitable for Blue Streak" .29 In addition the Americans had let it be known
that they regarded Thor as a technologically inferior first-generation system, which would
ultimately have to be replaced in any case. Thus by the end of 1958 the Minister of Defence
was satisfied that Thor was no substitute for Blue Streak. However, he had to admit that
Polaris might be, simply by virtue of its advantages in terms of mobility, flexibiliy and
invulnerability, as well as its reducing the risk to the British Isles which a land-based IRBM
dotted all over the country would entail. Since Blue Streak was far more advanced than
Polaris at this stage, however, it was decided to go ahead with the development of the missile
on a provisional basis, keeping a watchful eye on the progress of the latter. Prime Minister
Macmillan decreed a pause of a year or so in the hope that matters would become clearer and
a working party chaired by Sir Richard Powell was set up to review the future of the British
deterrent.
It is into this context that Massey and the Ministry of Supply's memoranda were
inserted recommending an independent British (civilian) space programme. That
recommendation, it will be remembered was made in October 1958. In November Sandys
was, to quote Clark, "rallying his Cabinet colleagues in support of a reprieve for Blue Strealg'.
This is surely why Massey reinforced his argument for a space programme with an appeal to
the independence that would come from using a nationally built launcher. He was at once
confirming the importance of Blue Streak for non-military puposes, adding an additional
argument for its reprieve, and creating the foundations of an all-British space science
programme. With that agenda it is hardly surprising that Massey gave such short shrift to
alternative solutions, above all the use of American launchers.
For completeness we should add that collaboration with the US was not the only
alternative in the air in 1958. Indeed various kinds of European solutions were also being
floated, both as regards satellites and launchers. Regarding the former, in mid-1958 the
British Foreign Office suggested that Britain might take the lead in proposing the joint
development of a western European satellite as a sign of its "solidarity" with countries across
the Channel and to show that she was not only interested in collaborative schemes with the
USA. 3° Around the same time some people in NATO had the idea that a second generation of
solid-fuel medium-range missiles should be produced in Europe under NATO auspices. The
British were most reluctant about this scheme, fearing that it might enable both France and
Germany to acquire an independent missile capability. 31 Was Massey referring obliquely to
these initiatives in his October 1958 paper when he wrote: "As almost all the experience on
large rockets and their use in scientific research is at present confined almost entirely to
2s These figures are from Clark, op. cit., pp. 161, 163.
29 Ibid., p. 172.
30 See Whyte and Guminett, Minerva, op. cit., p. 152-3.
31 Clark, op. cit., pp. 175, 178-9.
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Britain, among Western European countries", he said, "there would seem to be big
disadvantages in collaboration at this stage. ,32
1959. Two new possible contexts emerge for conducting the British space programme
Even as Massey was drafting his recommendations the context in which he would think
about a British space effort began to shift. Indeed by April 1959 what was said to be
inconceivable only a few months before - collaboration with the USA -- now looked distinctly
attractive.
Two considerations pushed Massey in this direction. Firstly, there was the reaction to
his paper in February and March 1959 by the Advisory Council on Science Policy (ACSP).
This body, which was chaired by Sir Alexander Todd, reported directly to the 'science
minister'. It supported Massey's suggestion for a scientific space programme. But it backed
offfrom using a British launcher for this purpose on the grounds of cost and the complications
arising from the military connection. Better, said the committee, to make "an immediate
approach" to the authorities in the USA "to ascertain the terms under which suitable rockets
could be supplied".33 Only if this avenue proved unsatisfactory should one consider adapting
Blue Streak to a satellite launcher. In sum the ACSP felt that the civil science budget could
not afford the £2 million per annum needed to modify Britain's IRBM. The Ministry of
Defence, for its part, had made it quite clear that it would not finance the changes. That leR
collaboration as the only alternative.
In making its recommendations, the ACSP was doubtless aware that there were moves
afoot in the US to foster closer ties with Britain. A first gesture in this direction was made in
September 1958 when the United States suggested launching British instruments on American
satellites from Woomera more or less free of charge. Then, in October 1958, the US
government released a report praising British achievements and extolling the virtues of
international collaboration in space. Six months later this suggestion was given definite shape
at a meeting of the newly established COSPAR (Committee on Space Research) which had
been set up in 1958 to take over space research matters with rockets and satellites after the
IGY. At its meeting in The Hague on March 14, 1959 the American delegate announced that
the US would be prepared to launch "suitable and worthy experiments proposed by scientists
of other countries". NASA was prepared to consider single experiments to be inserted along
with others into larger payload or groups of experiments comprising complete payloads
weighing from 100 to 300 lb, which could be placed in an orbit ranging from 200 to 2000
miles in altitude. In the former case the collaborator would be invited to work in a US
laboratory on the "construction, callibration, and installation" of the equipment in the
spacecraft. In the latter case NASAwas "prepared to advise on the feasibility of proposed
experiments, the design and construction of the payload package, and the necessary pre-flight
environmental testing". And although the official letter did not explicitly say so, during the
public announcement it was said that NASA intended to use its newly developed Scout rocket,
and that the launching would be free of charge. 34 Within six weeks the British National
Committee on Space Research (BNCSR), established at the end of 1958 with Massey as
32 This is the penultimate paragraph in Massey's paper of October 1958 which is reproduced in Massey and
Robins, op. cit., Annex 3.
33 Quotes from Massey and Robins, op. tit., p. 68. See also Whyte and Gummett, Minerva, op. cit., pp. 155-
160.
34 From Massey and Robins, Annex 4, which reproduces the US offer, and pp. 67-69.
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chairman, had established working groups to define the experiments which could be proposed
to NASA.
What was behind the NASA offer? The wish to encourage international scientific
collaboration, of course. But not just that: the road to space was paved with Cold War
intentions. This was already obvious when the first US offer was made six months before to
fly British experiments on American satellites launched from Woomera. The idea, said the
State Department, was to ensure that the next nation to enter space was from the Tree World'
not the communist bloc, and it wanted the British equipment to be ready within about six
months. 35 That was far too precipitate for the British scientists, but Massey and his colleagues
did what they could to comply. The ad hoe working groups set up by the BNCSR to react to
the NASA proposal in April 1959 were asked to formulate lists of experiments under three
headings. One of them was "Experiments which could be prepared quickly for launch". 36 In
doing so they, perhaps unwittingly, became a pawn in power polities, were sucked into a
definition of space which placed space science at the heart of superpower rivalry.
There is a further political dimension to the NASA offer that bears discussing. As I
argued earlier, the US/NASA offer, in the context of the lVfinistry of Defence's and the ACSP's
refusal to fund the adaptation of Blue Streak from military missile to civilian satellite launcher,
knocked out at a stroke the hope, the plan, the dream of a "thoroughgoing British enterprise"
in space. Collaboration was now the sine qua non of a British space effort. What is more one
argument for developing Britain's independent deterrent was sabotaged i.e. the supplementary
argument that Blue Streak was not simply an IRBM for hitting Soviet targets but could also
serve, with relatively minor modifications, to preserve Britain's freedom of action in space.
Conspiracy theorists might see in this an attempt by the US to cripple the technological
autonomy of the leading European nation of the day, to force her to accept the new balance of
power of the postwar era, a deliberate attempt to reduce the UK to a "second-class" -- or let
us rather say medium-sized - world power.
This reductionist argument is surely too simple. But the grain of troth in it should not
be ignored. For there is no doubt that in the late 1950s, with negotiations under way over the
deployment of Thor, the US was increasingly impatient with Blue Streak, cutting off financial
support for the project and arguing that Britain was wasting money by duplicating American
effort. In parallel, as we mentioned a moment ago, there were the plans inside NATO to
encourage a European MRBM programme. And these dovetailed neatly with steps being
taken in NATO in 1959 to establish the Organization as an umbella for a European space
effort.
In December 1957, in the wake of Sputnik, the NATO heads of government decided to
set up a Science Committee to ensure that science and technology flourished, this being
essential "to the culture, to the economy and to the political and military strength of the
Atlantic community". Within a year this committee had proposed to launch "a satellite for
peaceful outer space research, bearing the emblem of the Atlantic community and circling the
earth by 1960". NASA's proposals in March 1959 rendered this option redundant. However,
Fred Seitz, who took over as NATO Science Committee Chairman from Norman Ramsey in
June 1959, was not prepared to leave matters at that. He was strongly against the
35 From Whyte and Gttmmett, Minerva, op. tit., p. 153.
36 Mass_ and Robins, p. 69.
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development of a European space organization then being widely discussed (see below). He
thought that the possibility of such a body coming into being was "improbable and, in fact,
impracticable". Instead he wanted NATO to establish a space agency in western Europe
resembling NASA and which would collaborate with the US agency in planning the utilization
"for scientific purposes of the best missiles available for space research in the NATO family".
One potential member of that family was the new, second-generation solid-fuelled %uropean'
IRBM produced under NATO auspices which the United States was promoting at the time,
and for which it was prepared to offer technical and financial supportP 7 In sum, in 1959,
intentionally or not, the US, through NASA and through NATO, was systematically cutting
the ground away beneath an autonomous space effort in Europe. After all he who controlled
the launcher controlled access to space.
The US was not the only possible partner for Britain. Another option was beginning
to take shape in 1959, doubtless spurred on by the NATO and NASA initiatives. In April that
year two scientific statesmen and cosmic ray physicists, Edoardo Amaldi and Pierre Auger,
began to promote the idea that European nations should pool their resources in a
collaborative, civilian, scientific space effort. They launched their idea officially in December
1959 in an article published under the title Crdons une organisation eropdeenne pour la
recherche spatiale. It was accompanied by positive statements by a number of influential
European science administrators. And its timing was not coincidental. The month before
CERN, the first European organization for scientific research, had just commissioned the most
powerful particle accelerator in the world. The month after COSPAR was to hold its first
general assembly in Nice.
These ideas were discussed further in the early months of 1960. On April 29 about
twenty European space research scientists from ten western European countries met formally
for the first time in the rooms &the Royal Society, London. A survey was made of the plans
afoot in the various countries for space research. The British, however, went further. They
had not only hosted the meeting to inform their colleagues about what they were doing but
also to get a feel for their interest in supporting a European research programme based on the
use of Blue Streak as a a satellite launcher. Indeed just two days before the meeting in the
rooms of the Royal Society the Macmillan government had announced to a vociferous
parliament that it had officially decided to cancel the missile project.
We shall not pursue here the further development of the collaborative European
scientific research programme, institutionalized in ESRO (the European Space Research
Organization), which was officially established in 1964. An accompanying paper at this
symposium by Arturo Russo handles this in depth. 3s There are two points that I want to stress
for my purposes, however. Firstly, that the British space science community, led by Massey,
37 This paragraph is based on J. Krige and L. Sebesta, "US-European Cooperation in Space in the Decade after
Slmmik', in G. G-emelli, Big Culture. Intellectual Cooperation in Large Scale Cultural and Technical
Systems. An HistoricalApproach (Bologna: Clueb, 1994), pp. 263-297, where detailed references may be
found. See also Clark, op. cit. who explicitly discusses the conspiracy theory regarding the US's desire to
abolish Blue Streak in chapter 5.
38 For the launch of ESRO see J. Krige and A. Russo, Europe in Space, 1960-1973 (Ncordwijk: ESA, 1994).
See also M. de Maria, Europe in Space: Edoardo Amaldi and the Inception of F_SRO (Noordwijk: ESA HSR-5,
1993) and J. Krige, The Prehistory ofESRO (Noordwijk: ESA HSR-1, 1992).
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were enthusiastic supporters of the European programme, seeing in it a supplementary source
of government funding and of scientific opportunity to the NASA option. What is more it was
one in which, given their leading position in the field and their experience, they could hope to
play a preponderant role. Secondly, their promotion of this option was intimately linked to
their government's reassessment of the military Blue Streak programme, and the initiatives
being taken in Whitehall to build a parallel European launcher development organization.
1960/61 Towards building a 'Third Space Power'
We left offthe Blue Streak story at the end of 1958 with its future in the hands of the
Powell Committee. By February 1960 its fate was sealed, essentially on military grounds. The
main objection to it was its vulnerability. Because the missile was liquid fuelled, and so took
some time to prepare for launch, and because it was land-based in fixed sites, it was vulnerable
to pre-emptive attack. Thus as the interim report of the Powell committee, recently
declassified, put it, "It would therefore only be efficient if it were fired first, for example, in
reply to a Soviet attack with conventional weapons". 39 The new Minister of Defence, Harold
Watkinson (Sandys was now Minister of Aviation) found this militarily and politically
impossible. As he was to put it later to his French counterpart Messmer, it was always
difficult in a democracy to take an irreversible, 'push-button' type of decision. 4° The Chiefs of
Staffand the Prime Minister concurred, only Sandys defending the missile to the bitter end.
On 13 April 1960 the government decided to eliminate Blue Streak from its military arsenal
and to replace it with two mobile deterrent systems: Skybolt, to be fired by the V-bombers,
and Polaris, to be launched from submarines.
Blue Streak was down but not out. For in cancelling the missile the Macmillan
government announced that it would consider recycling the launcher for a civilian space
programme in collaboration with suitable western European countries. This would be a way
of turning the millions already spent on the missile to good account. It would also keep the
engineering teams at Farnborough and in industry intact, and available if later in the decade
Britain decided to develop her own independent deterrent. Finally it would serve as an
important gesture towards Europe, a sign of the UK's goodwill to her partners across the
Channel. 41
Britain was not a signatory of the treaties establishing the European Economic
Community (EEC) and Euratom in 1957 signed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Unconvinced of the economic interest of the arrangement,
and desirous to protect her privileged arrangements with the Commonwealth, she mounted
instead a rival scheme with the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland to
form a European Free Trade Area. EFTA, unlike the EEC, had no suprantaional component
39 Cited in Clark, op. cit. p. 180.
40 See report on meeting between them on 12-13/4/61 in Box 62, Affaires Error! Bookmark not
defmed.trangers, Secretariat General, Entretiens et Messages 1961, Quai d'Orsay, Paris.
41 For the full Blue Streak story from 1960 onwards see J. Krige, The Launch ofELDO (Noordwijk: ESA
HSR-7, 1993), J. Krige, "Polilicians, Experts and Industrialists in the Launch of ELDO: Some Pitfalls and how
to Avoid Them', in J. Krige and A. Russo, Reflections on Europe in Space ('Noordwijk: ESA HSR-11, 1994),
and M. de Mafia and J. Krige, "Early European Attempts in Launcher Technology: Original Sins in ELDO'
Sad Parable', in J. Ka'ige (ed), Choosing Big Technologies (Chur: Harwoed, 1993), 109-137. See also Krige
and Russo, Europe in Space. 1960-1973, op. tit.
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and nor did it apply to agricultural products. 42 Yet even as its convention was signed in
January 1960 Macmillan began to have doubts about the wisdom of the move. Economically
the EEC was making rapid progress in bringing down internal tariff barriers. Politically Britain
had moved away from her allies on the continent, to the distress of many, including the United
States. Thus the Prime Minister felt that some gesture ofsolidadty, some symbol of Britain's
good neighbourliness was needed. Blue Streak was to be such a symbol.
France was the most important continental power to be seduced into the scheme. She
was not only the leader of the European community at the time. She also had a major interest
in space science and rocket technology. De Gaulle, ever-distrustful of les Anglo-Saxons', and
determined to maintain French sovereignty in security matters, had authorized the
development of an independent nuclear force de frappe, which included missile development.
The National Assembly adopted the project in December 1960. A year later, in December
1961 it also adopted the law establishing the French national space agency, the CNES, with
Pierre Auger as President and a military general, Robert Aubini_re, as Director General. 43
Throughout 1960 the British tried to woo the French on board. Their initial proposal
was that France contribute to the cost and development of a three-stage launcher called Black
Prince, which had Blue Streak as its first stage, Black Knight as its second, and a small third
stage. The French objected: they wanted the second stage to be built in France. They also
wanted, in exchange for collaboration, technical knowledge on the re-entry cone and on the
inertial guidance system of Blue Streak. Britain easily agreed to the first request; she could
not accept the second. Before embarking on the European project she had promised the
United States to strip the missile of its military characteristics --just those technologies that
the French now said they wanted.
Towards the end of 1960 the British were becoming desperate. It was costing
hundreds of thousands of pounds a month to keep the engineering teams at work on Blue
Streak in anticipation of its reconversion into a civilian rocket. Invitations had been sent to
European governments to attend an interministefial meeting in Strasbourg at the end of
January 1961 where the British hoped positive steps would be made towards a collaborative
launcher project. But the French had dug in their heels and were increasingly unwilling to
show support. Then, just a few days before the meeting the entire atmosphere changed. And
at Strasbourg the representtives of Britain and France agreed to build together a three stage
European launcher combining Blue Streak with a French second stage and a third stage also to
be built on the continent (above all by Germany who saw in space a way to build her industrial
strength in high technology).
Why this change of heart in Pads? On January 28, 1961 de Gaulle and Macmillan had
one of their regular meetings at the ChftError! Bookmark ,,or defmed.teau de Rambouillet. Here
in a wide ranging discussion of the current political situation they emphasized three points.
Firstly that the communist menace was mounting, notably in the Far East and that the western
alliance seemed incapable of taking joint action against it. As de Gaulle put it, "When the west
withdraws, the communists arrive, because there is only one really organized system in the
42 For a recent overview of Macmillan's European policy see J. Tratt, The Macmillan Government and Europe.
A Study in the Process of Policy Development (London: Macmillan Press, 1996).
43 For institutional details see G. Ramunni, "La mise en place dame politique seientifique', in lnstitut Charles
de Gaulle. De Gaulle et son si_cle. Tome III. Moderniser la France (Plon: La Documentation Fran_aise,
1992), pp. 654-742. See also McDougall, Technology and Culture, op. tit.
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world, the communist sytem. All the rest is dispersion."44 Secondly, both de Gaulle and
Macmillan felt that the United States could not be counted on to stand by Europe at this time.
The Kennedy administration which would soon take office would have its hands full dealing
with communism. What is more it represented a new generation, unknown to the old guard,
and its policies towards Europe were still not known. Thirdly, as de GauUe put it, "at such
grave moments in history solidarity must take precedence over short-term political
considerations". Despite the persisting differences between France and Britain over the
Common Market, it was in the interests of the entire world that Britain and France acted in
concert. Walking in the gardens of the Ch_Error! Bookmark not def'med-teau that atternoon de
Gaulle told Macmillan that "he was attracted by the idea of Europe becoming _the third space
power'. He would take a constructive line about Blue Streak at Strasbourg. He did not
mention the military aspect". 45 Blue Streak was reprieved again. And six months later
Macmillan deposited his government's request for membership of the EEC. 46
The changing physiognomy of the British space effort between 1957 and 1960 was intimately
linked with the fluctuating fortunes of Blue Streak, and so intimately linked to the progressive
recognition by British scientists and politicians alike of the painful truth that, in the context of
the technological Cold War between the USA and the USSR, the UK's resources were those
of a medium sized power. Hoping first for entirely national, civil scientific effort (which made
use of military technologies of course), it was soon realized that the science budget could not
bear the cost and that the military were not interested in space (though they continued to fund
upper atmosphere research) and were not prepared to sink any money in it. Collaboration was
thus essential. NASA's offer in 1959 to fly scientific instruments from other countries in US
satellites, and to provide the technical help required to do so, created a new scientific
opportunity, dealt a further blow to the increasingly vulnerable Blue Streak, and inserted
British space science squarely in the context of Cold War rivalry. This politicization of the
scientific space programme was furthered with the decision to recycle Blue Streak as the first
stage of a European launcher built along with France and Germany. Space, as seen from
Britain had become a symbol of European cooperation or, more precisely of European
solidarity. Outer space was a place alongside the politico-economic geographic space being
forged between 'the Six' in which to reinforce the bonds between the three major European
powers against the communist threat, to be sure -- but also against 'the American threat'.
Each of the partners in this alliance sought to protect its autonomy in the long term -- Britain
by keeping its missile teams intact, France by building an alternative to US hegemony,
Germany by building its industrial strength -- by collaborating in the here-and-now. Space
policy was no longer simply a question of science policy, but above all of industrial and foreign
policy.
44 From the report on their meeting in the Quai d'Orsay archives, Box 62, Secretariat General, 1945-1965,
Entretiens et Messages, 1961.
45 Memo "Record of a conversation at Rambonillet between the Prime Minister and President de GauUe
during a walk at 4.15 pm on Saturday January 28, 1961", File PREM11/3513, Public Record Ottice, London.
46 For Macmillan's account of this period see his autobiography, Pointing the Way, 1959-1961 (London:
Macmillan, 1972), chapter XI.
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In this paper I propose to review and analyze the impact of Sputnik I on the French between
October 1957 and May 1958, when General Charles De Gaulle came to power and redirected the
country's scientific and military agendas. Although France's initial reaction to _brb6 lune" (baby
moon) was one of amused admiration for the technical feat, the creation within four years of a
space agency to match Soviet and American efforts suggests that other factors were at work,
some of which existed already as the Fourth Republic (1944-1958) was coming to an end.
As Walter McDougall pointed out some 12 years ago, the French space effort was but another
manifestation of technological "GauUism" in which General Charles De Gaulle, President of
France from 1958 to 1969, strove to maintain France's independence from both superpowers by
embarking the nation on a series of high profile projects. De Gaulle's success in pursuing such a
policy, however, relied in part on successful efforts made in the 1950s prior to his coming to
power. What requires clarification, then, is whether there was any reaction to the Sputnik launch
that would denote French interest in "catching up" in the rocket race prior to President De
Gaulle's assumption of power.
The answer differs from the US case on four basic points. First, France was under protection of
the US through the NATO umbrella, and, like the rest of Europe, was already a potential target of
the Soviet Union long before Sputnik was launched. The French government, uncomfortable with
relying solely on the US for protection, was already working in 1957 on developing a nuclear
capability combined with the means to deliver it. The Sputnik launch, then, was less a matter of
recognizing a new threat than of establishing a proper counterbalance to an already existing one.
Second, there was no sense of a scientific lag in France comparable to the American experience,
at least not in the school system (France even participated actively in the 1958 International
Geophysical Year through its scientific research center and several universities). Even a series of
rocket experiments based on German technology had occurred since 1945. The problem, rather,
was one of funding and of organizational structure that prompted, for example, governmental
factories to compete with one another for meager state budgets rather than cooperate on a
common goal.
Third, the political party structure of France at the time, which included a strong Communist
party, helps explain the milder reactions to the Soviet success, especially in view of the awkward
relationship with NATO allies. To many observers, the event served as a way to make fun of the
United States rather than ponder the implications of the orbiting "baby moon".
Finally, and most important in this case, the apparently disinterested attitude reflected in French
newspapers across the political spectrum is to be explained by France's colonial crisis in Algeria,
which drew the attention of the entire nation and threatened the very fabric of the state. The
French "mission to civilize" was failing, but the very nature of the crisis, happening so close to
France and shaking its democratic constitution, made it difficult for the nation to turn immediately
to other endeavors.
In relation to this colonial and political crisis, the orbiting Sputnik thus became an entertainment
topic rather than a symbol of impending doom. Once the crisis subsided, however, and with the
formation of the Fifl_ Republic, new possibilities appeared. With General De Gaulle's interest in
reaffu'ming France's global importance, a dual response in the space and nuclear fields became
essential. Existing programs in the field of aerospace and nuclear research were given a new
boost, exemplified by the new organization of the French space program under a specialized
agency (the CNES), and the detonation of a French nuclear bomb, both of which occurred within
the four years following Sputnik rs launch. As one minister explained in 1962, "... the country of
Montgolfier and Bleriot should be among those powers engaged in space exploration."
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It is unlikely that the Soviet launch of an earth satellite on October 4, 1957
alone was responsible for schisms within the alliance. French bitterness over
America's role in Indochina in 1954, and both France's and Britain's anger
over America's stance on the Suez crisis in 1956 had fed centrifugal forces
that were already present. As Europe revived and groped toward unity there
was understandable resentment over America's dominant role in the alliance.
It was the smaller powers that most clearly expressed frustration over
inadequate consultation by the senior ally in the appeal of the "Three Wise
Men" in 1956.
The specter of a Soviet satellite circling the earth every ninety-five minutes,
with two special passes over Washington, DC, however, raised a question
that had not needed to be asked before: Would America's new vulnerability
to a Soviet attack by means of an intercontinental ballistic misssile affect its
commitment to the defense of Europe? For skeptics about the future of the
Atlantic alliance Sputnik could be the coup de grace to a failing institution.
What was obvious to the Eisenhower administration was a recognition that
both diplomatic and military action had to be taken to restore the apparently
forfeited confidence in America. These took a number of forms. One would
be modernization of the weaponry of the European allies, primarily in
surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. The secretary of defense on
2October 28th encouraged the Army and Navy to look for ways to promote
common production or coordinated production in Europe of a variety of short-
range weapons. 1 This point was taken up by Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles the next day following a meeting with Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan. Dulles spoke of interdependence, a not unfamiliar subject of
American colloquy with Europeans. It usually meant greater burden-sharing
of expenses for the common defense. But on this occasion the secretary
seemedto imply an interdependence based less on sharing production of
nuclear weapons than on an assurance that the United States in an emergency
was still willing to use them. 2
That confidence-building was necessary was made clear by Deputy Secretary
of State Christian Herter's appraisal of the foreign policy implications of
Sputnik's launching. While he professed to be hopeful about the reaction of
allies, "...even the best of them require assurance that we have not been
surpassed scientifically and militarily by the USSR." He concluded on a
somber note, saying that the United States would have to exert itself to
counteract negative reactions. 3
How confidence was to be reinforced was another matter. Part of the answer
would be to communicate clearly to the allies that the United States was
attentive to their concerns. France had opened a path in its proposal at the
NATO meeting in Bonn in May 1957 to build a nuclear arms stockpile for
NATO in Europe. It can be done, Dulles informed reporters at a news
conference on November 5th, within present laws. He cited arrangements
with Canada as an example. Intermediate nuclear weapons were already in
Europe, but they had been hitherto exclusively for the use of U.S. forces.
3"These would become so situated, "according to Dulles, that "they would also
be available to the forces of our allies." Frederick Nolting, deputy chief of
mission to NATO, enthusiastically endorsed the concept of a "NATO
stockpile as a means of soothing Europeans. ''4
The prospect of a NATO stockpile was on the agenda of U.S. planners
preparing for the December meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris, as
were mechanisms for coordinated production of advanced weapons. The
difficulty would be in determining how to make available warheads and
missiles to Europeans without violating the McMahon Act limiting
distribution of nuclear technology. This was a major issue for the American
agenda. As W. Randolph Burgess, chief of the U.S. delegation, proposed, the
United States would be prepared to deploy atomic warheads from the NATO
atomic stockpile that would be released from U.S. custody in the event of
hostilities "to the appropriate Supreme Allied Commander for employment by
the nuclear-capable forces of NATO in accordance with appropriate NATO
defensive plans." In return for this largess NATO allies, such as Britain,
having available technical data involving manufacture of nuclear weapons
systems would be expected "to make such data available to other nations as
required. ''5
But the most urgent message to be sent to Europe, in the view of American
diplomats was the certainty that the United States was prepared to accelerate
and expand the deployment of its intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs). While these would not have the dramatic impact of an ICBM, they
were less expensive, more numerous, and more effective in striking potential
targets in the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy noted at a
4meeting with the secretary of state that the Defense Department was in a
position to have ready 16 squadrons of 16 missiles each, to be delivered late
in the current calendar year through 1963. The Defense Department was not
as anxious for their use as State was. When the sea-based Polaris and the
ICBMs came offthe assembly line, the IRBMs would lose their present
importance. But it was a political and psychological imperative to say
something now, as Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) Lauris Norstad
demanded. Dulles understood Defense's concerns about costs but concluded
that "the need to reassure our NATO allies regarding US capabilities in the
missile field," should override other considerations. 6
Accordingly, the U.S. delegation encased the issue of IRBMs in two concrete
steps: 1) to make available under the United States Military Assistance
Program several squadrons of IRBMs to SACEUR, with an understanding
that such deployment would be agreed upon between the supreme
commander and the countries concerned, and 2) to make available "under
appropriate safeguards blueprints and other necessary data relating to the
IRBM delivery systems. ''7
Britain and Turkey responded quickly to the offer to place missiles on their
soil. In fact, Britain had made a preliminary agreement earlier that year at
Bermuda. Italy accepted on February 5, 1958 when the Italian Chamber of
Deputies approved the deployment of IRBMs, although it was not until
September that a formal agreement was concluded. 8
If Sputnik's success energized American foreign policy in the form of nuclear
sharing, even on a limited scale, it perversely promoted movement in arms
5control. Until October 1957 it was the United States that had taken the
initiative. At London in the summer of 1957 Dulles presented an American
proposal for a two-year suspension with the understanding that the Soviets
would agree to a future cut-off in nuclear weapons production. The Soviets
rejected the plan and broke off negotiations in August. But once Sputnik had
been launched the situation was reversed. The United States now held back
as it attempted to cope with the Soviet achievement, and it was the Soviet
Union that talked of a test ban while it appeared to enjoy the lead. Soviet
shrewdness in declaring a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing forced the
United States to follow suit. The path to a test ban agreement suddenly
appeared more promising than it ever had been m the past. 9 The American
could not allow the Soviets to walk away with a propaganda victory, no
matter how cynically it was conceived.
The Soviets made the most of the advantage that Sputnik gave them. First.,
Premier Nikolai Bulganin asked Eisenhower for a summit meeting early in
1958, proposing a pledge by the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the U.K, to refrain
from all nuclear tests for two to three years. Although the U.S. failed to
accept this plan, unless it was accompanied by a ban on production of nuclear
weapons, Moscow in February 1958 persisted in its effort to hold a summit
meeting on a test ban. The Soviet leaders hoped that the pressure of world
opinion would force Americans to accept a test ban unaccompanied by any
plans for verification and without reference to continued nuclear production.
A final by a panel of American scientists, headed by Hans Bethe of Comell
University, made it possible for President Eisenhower to accept the next
6Soviet ploy: namely, a unilateral suspension of tests. Bethe's panel claimed
that America's overall superiority in nuclear weaponry justified a test ban, and
that a network of control stations, including some on Soviet soil, could detect
a nuclear blast as low as two kilotons. Prodded too by his newly appointed
science adviser, James Killian of MIT, the president on April 28, 1958 agreed
to separate the issues of testing and production, and to join the Soviets in a
moratorium. As Secretary Dulles put it, "Wholly apart from the true merits of
the argument, the Russians were winning world opinion, and we were losing
it.-10
Delegations of Soviet and American scientists met for six weeks at Geneva,
and by mid-August 1957 had reached agreement on establishing 180 control
posts. Although the mutual moratorium did not last beyond 1961, it did
provide an infrastructure for negotiations that produced the limited test ban
treaty of 1963.
If Sputnik inadvertently pushed the superpowers along the path of nuclear
arms limitation, it also set in motion a massive American campaign to build
an intercontinental ballistic missile armory that led to greater arms
competition in the next decade. The objective was to fill the "missile gap"
which Sputnik supposedly revealed. Although new intelligence technology
revealed that the gap was essentially a fiction promoted by Khrushchev's
rhetoric to divide the alliance, this information was not fully understood in
1959. Nor was it understood by the public or Congress that even if the
Soviets might have had missiles in place, they lacked the means of delivering
them to their targets. Accordingly, the Eisenhower administration was pressed
by public opinion to admit that with a gross national product only one-third
7that of the United States, the Soviet Union was matching the nation's
expenditures m heavy industry. Estimates of overwhelming Soviet superiority
in ICBMs were circulated, with figures ranging from 100 to 300 missiles,
according to leaks from McEkoy's testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Although the secretary of defense asserted at a news
conference on January 2, 1959 that the figure of 300 was an exaggeration, he
was convinced that a gap did exist even if its size may have been
exaggerated. Eisenhower in effect confirmed the gap's existence when he
informed the public a week later that the gap was being closed. His
assurance did little to calm critics when he explained the problem in terms of
a one-year's head start on the part of the Soviets. 11
Given this background it was hardly surprising that the missile issue became
campaign fodder in the presidential election of 1960. In August Senator John
F. Kennedy warned about dangerous days ahead "as the missile gap looms
larger and larger." 12 Over the next two months of campaigning he repeatedly
demanded a crash program for missiles to accompany a complete
reevaluation of the national defense organization. His first State-of-the-Union
address in which he "instructed the Secretary of Defense to reappraise our
entire defense strategy," echoed this particular campaign theme. 13
The new secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, followed the president's
instructions and came up with the surprising findings that there was no missile
gap in the Soviet favor. The United States. he noted, possessed strategic
military capability twice that of the Soviet Union's. It was only in the
numbers of the mix, specifically in ICBMs, that the Soviets held a lead, and it
was a narrow one at that. Technically, the gap was meaningless. The real
8issue, as McNamara put it, was the "destruction gap," the differences in the
respective nation's ability to inflict greater damage on the other. In this
competition the United States held a commanding lead in long-range bombers
at a time when the Polaris intermediate range missile and the Minuteman
intercontinental missile programs had been placed on an accelerated
production schedule. 14 It appeared that Khrushchev's reckless boasting
sparked a new arms race that counteracted whatever gains might have been
made in banning nuclear tests.
The increased flow of the administration's adrenalin following the appearance
of Sputnik inevitably produced unanticipated side effects. The
administration's assumption that hyperactivity in support of the alliance--
increased spending on ICBMs, deployment of IRBMs and the build-up of
nuclear stockpiles in Europe- would invigorate the alliance and revive
confidence m the United States was not wholly warranted. From the United
States came unmistakeable signs of discontent with the shouldering of new
defense burdens. At a meeting with Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak in
October 1957 Dulles explained that the proportionate American share in
NATO costs was increasing, and that this trend had to stop. 15
From the European side came a counterpart complaint: namely that the United
States was undercutting its profession of support by reducing its troop
strength m Europe. Just a few days after the appearance of Sputnik were
expressing concern that the United States intended to reduce its forces in that
country under the ambiguous concept of "streamlining." This was actually a
9longterm consequence of the "New Look" of 1953 whereby nuclear weaponry
would allow for smaller ground forces. Similarly, the Dutch journal, Het
Vaderland, expressed dismay over Dulles's use of "partial" dissociation from
thes rumors, which had sent out alarm bells even before October 4th. To the
French ambassador in Washington Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald
Quarles had dismissed any idea ofa U.S. withdrawal, but did admit to "some
downward adjustment." 16 In the Kennedy administration European fears of
new reductions in U.S. forces became reality under McNamara's cost-
conscious rationalizations of his defense budgets.
Aside from the foregoing alarums the Eisenhower administration was sending
other conflicting signals in the wake of Sputnik. The major thrust of its policy
was to show full support of Europe despite the apparent new vulnerability of
the United States to missile attack. The promotion of coordinated production
of weapons, the willingness to build nuclear stockpiles in Europe, and the
offer of intermediate range missiles to NATO allies were all earnests of this
intention. But it did not escape the notice of European members that there
were significant strings to these commitments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff made
it clear that in giving American know-how and hardware they were not
including nuclear warheads in their packages. These would remain in
American hands. The JCS, along with most of the administration, were
concerned that IRBMs under allied control might lead to a dangerous nuclear
proliferation. Although American caveats were understandable, the interest of
America's European allies in seeking their own individual or collective
nuclear capability was equally understandable.
10
The end result of American efforts to reassure their partners led to more
tension and less confidence. In the early Kennedy years France was
distressed over American obstacles to its force de frappe; Britain was upset
over American handling of the Skybolt crisis m 1962; and Germany was
anxious about its place m the nuclear programs. Each ally expressed its
dissatisfaction with American leadership, particularly when Secretary
McNamara raised doubts about the utility of nuclear weaponry in general.
With varying degrees of enthusiasm the United States turned to a potential
panacea in the Multilateral Force (MLF), touted by SACEUR Norstad as a
means of making NATO into a fourth nuclear power, armed with MRBMs
and enjoying equality with the United States. The MLF never achieved this
status, partly because the nuclear warhead gain would remain exclusively
American. But for a time in the mid-1960s the MLF quieted discontent and
represented a solution to troubled European-American relations.
In retrospect, Sputnik energized the alliance and shattered American
complacency. It also exacerbated fissures in within NATO. But it did not
produce fundamental changes. These were not to be made until another
decade had passed. If NATO survived into the Harmel era of detente, credit
may be given to Soviet-generated crises-- Berlin and Cuba, in particular-
which periodically fostered unity which might not have been possible without
the goad of a Soviet threat.
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From the point of view of an historian and curator, the
world's first man-made satellite of the Earth is extremely
problematic. In either profession Sputnik is all but impossible to
describe. The archival evidence of its existence has not yet seen
the light of day. The actual object ceased to exist in January
1958. Judged by the strict standards of either profession, Sputnik
does not exist. Of course, that conclusion is absurd, but its does
point on the very peculiar historiographic legacy of this
satellite. Just as October 4, 1957, marks the beginning of the
Space Age, it also marks the beginning of a historiographical
dilemma that has plagued historians and curators for the last forty
years. Without the traditional reference points for studying the
object, the pattern of its study has been the reverse of what
historians and curators have been trained to expect. Instead of
beginning with the study the material object and its manufacture,
the field of Sputnik studies has begun with the legacy and global
political impact of the satellite and have slowly moved inward
toward the actually satellite. It has been as though the ripples
that Sputnik has left have been studied from the outermost inward,
with the farthest reaching implications being studied first. It is
now the business of historians and curators to explain the history
this icon as an artifact of the last half of the 20th century was,
who made it, where it fits within the material history of post
World War II Soviet Union. Answers to these question also promise
to shed light on the historiography of Sputnik as an icon.
The use of the word icon does take on a double meaning within
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the context of soviet history. The word icon means an image,
representation, simile or symbol I of a human or event(s). But that
image is an object (or class of events) in its own right. Over the
last 40 years, Sputnik has played the role as a icon representing
the spark that marked the beginning of the space age and the space
race that transported U.S. and Soviet military and strategic
competition to space. Historians have also offered an
interpretation of Sputnik as an icon of the efforts of two men,
Korolev and Khruchshev, to increase the political profile of their
work. Korolev used the launch of the satellite as political
currency to maintain support for his own aspirations for the
development of a space program. Khrushchev used the launch on the
international level as political currency to demonstrate the
technological prowess of the soviet Union. Here in the United
States, Sputnik eventually came to symbolize the political wake-up
call to end the inter-service rivalry that plagued american ICBM
z
development.
As an object, Sputnik has a material history that has not been
fully explored. Although we have good theories on why it was made
we know relatively little about who made it and how. By definition
it is an artifact of the political, military, social, economic, and
scientific and technological circumstances that surrounded it. 3
While the political and military circumstances of Sputnik have
attracted attention over the years, we still know very little about
its social and economic circumstances. We have good indications as
to who designed it, but little of the details on whose hands
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actually made the satellite, and what methods were used. Much of
the scientific and technological culture of Sputnik has been
dismissed as insignificant, because the scientific results of the
american Explorer satellite overcame the political shock of the
launch of Sputnik. Nevertheless, the earliest scientific and
technological evidence about the plans for Sputnik is important to
understanding how the object came to be. From that we can
ascertain the degree to which manufacture of the satellite was a
technological continuation or departure from the past.
Of course the line between icon and artifact is not precise.
The same is true for the line between the material and archival
evidence of each iteration of Sputnik. But the broad delineation
between the two lies in the region in which discussion of the
object turns from the implications of the object's existence to the
actual material object. To find the true evidence about Sputnik as
an object, the historian must look for information that answers
traditional questions about the material object and the technology
that it represents: who made it, how, and why? This requirement
places the historian of Sputnik (the object) in an awkward
situation of not being able to experience Sputnik as an artifact,
while being responsible for reconstructing the object. In order to
reconstruct the object, the historian and curator must rely on the
memoirs and official pronouncements and look for the material
judgements about the artifact, teasing them out from the larger,
iconic meaning of the object.
The first published sources about Sputnik predate the launch
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of the satellite, and probably predate the object itself. During
the Summer 1957 a series of articles about plans for a Soviet
satellite launch during the IGY appeared in the journal _.
Among these articles was one in which the Soviet Academy of
Sciences' Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics made the
first call for assistance in tracking the satellite by amateur
radio enthusiasts. This first, discrete announcement appeared on
July 7, 1957. 4 The Institute called on radio amateurs to report
on the "preparation for the reception of signals of satellites
launched in the USSR. ''5 The announcement accompanied other more
detailed articles outlining proposals for and theories about the
hypothetical launch of a satellite during the International
Geophysical Year. If anything, the initial appearance of Soviet-
authored articles of the subject indicate that a considerable
amount of thought had been applied to the plans to launch a
satellite. The solution to the difficulty of tracking such an
object had was the call for ham radio operators to assist in
tracing the orbital path of the satellite once in orbit.
After this specialized flurry of information, the absence of
initial Soviet comment about the Sputnik right after its launch is
striking. Other historians have speculated on the meaning of this
silence. But this initial period is a particular choke point of
primary information and access to hardware that has shaped the
historiography of Sputnik more than any other. As stated before,
the normal development of the historiography would begin with
detailed technological and material studies of the object and then
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grow and develop into studies of the larger ramification of the
object. But the primary information necessary to study the
satellite at that level did not materialize at that time.
Given the peculiar situation of Sputnik, the historiography
has developed in the opposite direction. The vacuum of
documentation has attracted rumors, innuendo, and outright
falsehoods, leaving western historians to make critical judgements
about motivations and accuracies on most every official and private
statement. From the beginning, western historians have had to
innovate: piecing together histories from disparate and often
questionable sources. A new dimension to this problem appeared
soon after Sputnik when the Soviet Union embarked on a controlled
plan of hardware display for western inspection, allowing western
experts to make comparisons between the encased Soviet hardware and
the well-documented space hardware of the United States. Even with
limited access to the material culture of the Soviet space program,
historians remained dependant on official Soviet statements,
rumors, suppositions, and a steady stream of emigre memoir
materials as a substitute for the archival evidence that historians
are trained to use. The absence of archival materials has been a
doubled edged sword. On one side, professionally trained
historians outside of the Soviet union have shunned the field,
leaving the history to technically astute amateurs. On the other
side, the comparison of the objects has dominated the field, making
it unique within the discipline of space history.
On the Soviet side, the situation for historians has been
09/19/97 FRI 14:10 FAX 2027862947 ........ DSH .... _oo8
6
similarly stifling. Scientists, politicians, and
governed the Soviet spaceflight historical community.
engineers
They set
political agendas, and settled personal and professional scores on
the pages on historical publications. Soviet historians of science
and technology have copiously published pre-packaged internal
histories of space science, technology, and rocketry that rely
heavily on equations and sketches, but few detailed photographs of
actual objects. Held hostage by the ideological role that space
was playing in the Soviet Union, Soviet historiography of space did
not go through a revival of archival research that many historical
fields experienced during the late Soviet era. Memoir materials
have remained the most prolific source of information in the field,
while still demonstrating the inherent weaknesses of this type of
source.
Nikita Khrushchev's example of this memoir literature and its
use of the iconic Sputnik is most illustrative of this phenomenon.
His two-part memoirs, which began with Khrushchev _members have
set the tone for subsequent Soviet memoirs on the topic, placing
6
Sputnik firmly within the realm of the politico-military arena.
Khrushchev's recollections of Sputnik begin with his initial
involvement in rocket development took place after Stalin's death,
as a consequence of Khrushchev's appointment as First Secretary.
At this point, even according to Khrushchev's own account, the
decision had already been made to turn away from the long-range
bomber (Maya-4, Bison) to the development of the ICBM. By his own
account, Khrushchev's involvement in selecting this strategic
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technology was his promotion of a competition among design bureaus
to make the most efficient ICBM. In his memoirs, released after
the Glasnost era, Khrushchev justifies his decision, "Thus we would
have a choice of the best design for the mass production of an
ICBM, and we could have a way of delivering a retaliatory strike
against the potential enemy. That would keep the enemy from
attacking the USSR. _ It is worth noting that by his own admission
the design that ultimately won the competition was not the design
that Khrushchev favored. The design that won was the R-7 ICBM that
was designed under Sergei Korolev. The R-7 design was the
simplest, relying on a set of seven identical liquid-oxygen fueled
engines. Korolev's design completed the first successful tests,
before the longer-range ramjet prototypes completed any successful
flights. Khrushchev had preferred the longer-ranged options. 8
Khrushchev's initial use of rockets was for propaganda
purposes, as a warning to all adversaries of Soviet technical
capabilities. In 1957, the Soviet Union had a single successful
intercontinental ballistic missile, the R-7. The first test of the
R-7 took place in August, thus demonstrating Soviet capability to
deliver a nuclear warhead onto the territory of the United States.
The second R-7 was launched the first man-made satellite into orbit
on 4 October 1957. The second, more publicly acknowledged launch,
was technologically redundant to the first, and yet it provided a
more impressive political effect. The U.S. had recently failed to
launch a satellite of its own. Almost immediately, the word
Sputnik became synonymous with American failure in science and
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technology and American weakness in the military competition with
the USSR. This early, developmental success of Khrushchev's
strategy of political preemption deterrence fostered a popular
politically significant impression that the Soviets could develop
strategic weapons and win a military conflict with the U.S.
Khrushchev linked the space firsts and the development with nuclear
weapons closely in his memoirs:
But we were the first to launch rockets into space; we
exploded the most powerful nuclear devices; we accomplished
those feats first, ahead of the United States, England and
France. Our accomplishments and our obvious might had a
sobering effect on the aggressive forces in the United States,
England, France, and of course, inside the Bonn government.
They knew that they had lost their chance to strike at us with
impunity. 9
The use of rockets for propaganda purposes was successful, in
that the launch of Sputnik and other Soviet space firsts laid the
ground-work for the popular and politically beneficial illusion of
soviet technological parity that was to outlive Khrushchev.
Khrushchev's political successors continued to keep this essential
illusion alive. While enhancing the role of nuclear weapons and
related propaganda in the fight to discourage a western attack on
the USSR, Khrushchev was able to actually reduce the size of the
soviet military. This was a reduction necessitated by economics,
and yet made difficult by the post-war strategic situation.
Khrushchev's strategy was, in many ways, similar to Japanese
strategy against the U.S. in 1941. _° At the time of Pearl Harbor,
Yamamoto had planned the attack as a one-time preemptive attack,
which would prevent American expansion in the Pacific.
Khrushchev's strategy differed from its Japanese counterpart in its
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basic focus. Instead of a military raid on the United States, he
proposed a political and psychological Pearl Harbor, which would
sabotage American resolve to fight before actual mobilization.
However, Khrushchev's strategy resembled Yamamoto's in the manner
if its execution. Khrushchev conducted a series of political
strikes with no plan for ending the struggle. Instead of
miscalculating the ability of American industry to mobilize for
war, as had the Japanese, Khrushchev underestimated American
political resolve and commitment. At the same time, Khrushchev was
taxing Soviet economic and technological abilities to their limits.
He failed to maintain a balance of miiitary and political forces,
allowing his political ambitions to exceed the military and
technical capabilities of the Soviet armed forces and economic
potential.
Since the final years of the Soviet Union, the potential in
the field has changed dramatically. The recent publication of
other, less politically (and personally?) invested individuals are
beginning to lead us back to the Sputnik the artifact, n Engineers
and managers have published unofficial memoirs and diaries. These
memoirs provide a critical mass of personal accounts that will
allow legitimate comparisons between individual perspectives.
Design bureaus, manufacturing establishments, and individuals have
recently sold hardware and memorabilia to offset the new harsh
financial reality. These sales have placed Soviet-era hardware in
the hands of western curators to allow detailed comparison to
American and other Soviet hardware. The Russian government has
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recently opened a new Space Archive, offering the hope for new
archival revelations. Nevertheless, as historians look upon the
flood of objects and first-person accounts questions remain about
the nature of the sources. Do these changes demand a shift in
methodology? Or has the political and economic unraveling of the
soviet space establishment provided historians with more artifacts
that require the same critical interpretation that has
characterized the field for the last 40 years?
What is the potential significance of further historical and
material study of Sputnik? We now possess a multifaceted
understanding of Sputnik the icon. But we lack an understanding of
the material object and its historical context. We can recount
what Sputnik did, but not who made it, how and why. not fully
understand what Sputnik really means. Sputnik represents a
deliberate use of technology in international competition. In
order to understand the function of using technology in politics,
we have to better understand the capabilities and origins of the
technology. We now have a good idea that Sputnik (the object) was
not the first choice of Soviet engineers and technicians, but a was
a simplest, fall-back proposal for the mission. 12 The fact that
the engineers were not able to complete the more desirable and
complex problem indicates that there were signs of technological
and economic weaknesses in the space program that predated the
Soviet efforts to land a man on the moon. But there remain other
questions about the origins of Sputnik. Sputnik is an artifact of
the social, economic, scientific, and technological community that
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created it, but historians have still not been able to make an
historical connection between the seeming simplicity of the
satellite and the complexity of its legacy.
I. William Morris, ed. The AmeriGan Heritage Dictionary of the
Enalish Lanquaqe. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976.
2. The image of Sputnik as a political wake-up call is itself best
symbolized by the famous political cartoon of Uncle Sam being
stirred from a sound sleep by the "Beep, beep, beep." of the
satellite.
3. American He_itaqe DiGtioDary.
4. Radio, No. 7. July, 1957. Cited in Kreiger, p. 333.
5. Kreiger, p. 333.
6. Talbott, Strobe, trans, and ed., Edward Crankshaw, intro, and
commentary. Kh_ushchev Remembers. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 198?, and Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The
qlasnost' TaDes. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990.
7. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost' Tapes,
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990, p. 187.
8. Steven J. Zaloga, "Most Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet
Strategic Cruise Missiles, 1945-60," Journal of Soviet Militarv
Studies, vol. 6, no. 1 (June 1993), pp. 262-273.
9.Khrushchev Remembers, p. 517.
I0. The similarity between Sputnik and Pearl Harbor was first
pointed out by American Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin: Steven J. Zaloga,
Taraet A_erica: The Soviet Unio_ and the Strategic Arms Race,
1945-1964, Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1993, p. 148. For a
description of Japanese strategy vis-a-vis the U.S. during World
war II, and its shortcomings, see: D. Clayton James, "American and
Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War," in Peter Paret, ed.
Makers of Modern Strateqv from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1986, pp. 707-708.
ii. These memoirs include those of Vasili Mishin and Boris Chertok.
12. Harford's interviews on the Sputnik 3 and Sputnik design.


Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite
Washington, D.C.
September 30 - October 1, 1997
Panel: The Long-term Consequences of Sputnik
Sputnik and the Creation of the Soviet Space Industry
by
Lt Colonel William P. Barry t
Department of Political Science
US Air Force Academy, CO
The Sputnik project, and the tumultuous world reaction to it, led to the creation of a space
industry unlike anything in the West. Accustomed as we are to an industry composed of
aerospace giants whose revenues are still primarily derived from the aircraft industry, it is difficult
to make sense of the bureaucratic maze of space design bureaus, state research and production
centers, scientific-production associations, and other industrial organizations that have outlived
the Soviet space program. The fundamental difference is that the Russian Federation and the
Ukraine do not have an "aerospace" industry. 2 Instead, the USSR bequeathed its successors with
a distinct "space" industry. This industry's unusual organization, habits of behavior, and high
level of involvement in the space policy making process are a result of long-standing traditions in
Soviet research and development (R&D) combined with the unique events leading to Sputnik, and
the reaction that followed it.
Soviet Research and Development
Sputnik, and the industry it spawned, were products of the Soviet weapons R&D process.
As in all Soviet industry, weapons research, development, and production was organized under
specialized industrial ministries; e.g., the Ministry of Aviation Industry. All ministries followed
the same highly compartmentalized approach to R&D. From the early 1930s onward, the Soviet
R&D process was divided among three distinct types of organizations. Basic research was carried
out by Scientific-Research Institutes (Nauchno-Issledovaterskii Institut or NII). Series
production of the final product was carried out by industrial plants or factories. The critical
bridge between research and production was supplied by the Design Bureau (Konstruktorskoe
Biuro or KB). The task of the design bureau was to develop new designs or applications of
technology in light of basic research information (from the NII), the limitations and capabilities of
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author. This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of the
Air Force Academy, the US Air Force, or the US Government.
2 Approximately eighty percent of the Soviet space industry was located in the Russian Federation, and inherited by
it, after the dissolution of the USSR. The Ukraine remains home to several important scientific and industrial
facilities. Although the other successor states inherited a number of facilities important to the operation of space
systems (e.g., the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakstan), only Russia and the Ukraine have retained a substantial
space research and production capability.
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industry, and the needs of the "customer. ''3 Major KBs had the capability to produce
experimental prototypes both for testing purposes and to prove the feasibility of production. (In
some cases the design bureau was co-located with the factory that was assigned to produce its
designs.) The most important design bureaus were distinguished by the title OKB (Opytno-
Konstruktorskoe Biuro); meaning Experimental Design Bureau.
OKBs were led by an individual who was perhaps the closest thing to an entrepreneur that
existed in the Soviet Union - the chief designer. These larger-than-life figures gave their
organizations a distinct personality. OKBs were often simply referred to by the chief designer's
name. In the aviation industry these include such famous organizations as the Tupolev and MiG
(Mikoian and Gurevich) bureaus. The space industry has its own honor roll of famous chief
designers; including, Korolev, Glushko, Yangel, and Chelomei. These chief designer not only had
to lead the development of new technologies, but had to succeed in "selling" their new proposals
to higher authorities. Failure on a project, or the inability to win new "contracts" could lead to
dismissal ofthe chief designer and, in some cases, the elimination of his bureau.
Despite such pressure on chief designers, head-to-head competition among design bureaus
was not the norm in Soviet industry. 4 However, the Soviet leadership did deliberately establish
competition in parts of the weapons R&D complex. This expensive approach had its origins in
aviation R&D of the 1930s. As a result of the relatively poor performance of Soviet aircraR
during the Spanish Civil War, Stalin purged and restructured the aviation industry. The leading
Soviet aircrat_ designer, Andrei Tupolev, was imprisoned and many new design organizations
were established under the control of promising young engineers. 5 Aircraft R&D was no longer
entrusted to these experts, but became more tightly controlled by the political leadership. For the
technically unschooled political leadership, competition between aircraft designers proved
extremely useful. Competition, combined with intrusive oversight by state security organs, was
highly effective in forcing the creation of the kind of Air Force the leadership wanted. Later,
these control mechanisms were applied to some other high priority, high technology weapons
programs; including missiles. The missile program chief designers were well aware of the high
price that Tupolev, and others, had paid for failing to please the political leadershipfl In such top
priority weapons programs chief designers lived a high-pressure life frequently characterized by
ruthless political maneuvering.
Steps Toward Sputnik
In the post-war era the Soviet leadership had no intention to waste resources on space
projects. Yet, despite the tight controls, missile chief designers were able to turn their energies to
starting the Soviet space program. Remarkably, early Soviet space enthusiasts had been rather
successful in developing rockets in the 1930s, but this line of research was snuffed out in the pre-
3 The "customer" could be mother ministry (e.g., the Ministry of Defense in the case of weapons), the producing
ministry, or the political leadership.
4 In fact, traditional Marxist economic thought holds that such competition is a tremendous waste of resources.
5 Tupolev and his many associates were released from prison near the end of World War II. For a very interesting
personal account of this period, see: L. L. Kerber, Stalin's Aviation Gulag: A Memoir of Andrei Tupolev and the
Purge Era, ed. and trans, by Von Hardesty, Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996.
6Missile chief designer Korolev had studied under Tupolev, and wound up working for him in the "aviation
gulag."
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war purges. Virtually all of the leading rocket engineers were arrested and sentenced to forced-
labor camps for various crimes. Some were lucky enough to work in prison design bureaus until
they were released late in World War H. As the war ended, many of the earlier rocket enthusiasts
were put to work analyzing German missile developments. Thus, the Soviet post-war missile
effort had a strong core of native talent with a theoretical background in rocketry, some practical
experience, a great enthusiasm for space exploration, and considerable caution about expressing
the later.
In early 1946 the Soviet leadership formally established a ballistic missile development
program. 7 There were a number of important parallels with the US ballistic missile program of
the time. In both cases, the programs began by exploiting German wartime developments and
relied heavily on the talents of captured German rocket developers. 8 Both countries also pursued
ballistic missiles as part of a three-pronged delivery system development effort. Long-range
nuclear capable aircraft and winged (cruise) missiles were the other two lines of investigation. In
the Soviet Union, as in the US, ballistic missiles were the least favored option, since success in
building a reliable long-range ballistic missile seemed far in the future. 9
However, there was a crucial difference between these US and Soviet post-war weapons
projects. In the US, R&D for the three delivery system projects was largely conducted by aircraft
companies. In the USSR these projects were assigned to two separate industrial ministries.
Aircratt and winged missile projects went to the Ministry of Aviation Industry. The liquid-fueled
ballistic missile program was assigned to the Ministry of Armaments. The logic behind this
decision is deceptively simple. Missiles do not have wings, and as ballistic projectiles are more like
artillery than aircratt. Thus, the artillery industry under the Ministry of Armaments was given
control of long-range ballistic missiles. This was not unprecedented, for the Ministry of
Armaments had earlier been involved in the development of solid-fuel projectiles like the
"Katiusha" rockets. However, it is highly likely that there was more to the decision than simple
logic, for the Minister of Armaments was the highly ambitious and effective Dmitrii Ustinov.10
Nevertheless, this was a fateful decision. Unlike the US, the Soviet ballistic missile program was
an outgrowth of the artillery industry, rather than the aircraft industry.
Within a few years the native Soviet space enthusiasts came to dominate the ballistic
missile program. The German rocket specialists worked largely in isolation from, and apparently
in competition with, their Soviet counterparts. However, the Soviet designers were able to take
full advantage of German technical and missile manufacturing experience. Within two years the
Soviet missile team displaced the Germans by rapidly producing and testing more advanced
missiles. By 1950 only about fii_y of the original four hundred German rocket specialists
7This was accomplished through Council of Ministers Decree No. 1017-419ss, dated 13 May 1946. (See: I. D.
Sergeev, et al., Khronika Osnovnykh Sobytii Istorii Raketnykh Voisk Strategicheskogo Naznacheniia, Moscow:
TsIPK, 1994, pp. 227-234.)
s Although the "brains" of the German rocket program were snapped up by the West, the Soviets inherited most of
the German rocket facilities. In October 1946, the Soviets rounded up several hundred of the remaining German
rocket workers and shipped them to various locations in the Soviet Union.
9 In fact, Soviet nuclear weapons were built only for delivery by aircraft until 1953.
_oPolitical maneuvering is also suggested by the fact that responsibility for solid-fuel missiles was assigned to yet
another ministry (the Ministry of Agricultural Machinebnilding - formerly known as the Commissariat of
Munitions). This ministry was controlled by another major industrial leader, Boris Vannikov, who later became a
major figure in the nuclear weapons program.
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remained in the Soviet Union. u The Soviet rocket team's rise was the result of a number of
factors. Political maneuvering at the highest levels of government appears to have been a factor
once again. However, more importantly, the Soviet rocket team proved extraordinarily fast and
effective.
One of the keys to the success of the Soviet rocket team was an organization known as
the Council of Chief Designers. Although the bulk of the initial missile program was concentrated
in a research institute under the Ministry of Armaments (NII-88), crucial subsystems were
developed by other NIIs and KBs in other ministries. The leading missile designer in NII-88,
Sergei Korolev, called a meeting of the other five major chief designers in November 1947. (see
Table 1) The "Big Six" began to meet regularly in Korolev's office to coordinate their work, to
discuss technical details, and to forge agreements about the overall course and direction of the
missile program. This unofficial working-level organization allowed the leading missile engineers
to present a "united front" to their overseers; this gave them greater control over key technical
decisions.12 At least two of the chief designers had an agenda that went well beyond ballistic
missiles. Korolev, the driving force in the Council of Chief Designers, had been a.leader among
the pre-war rocket enthusiasts and had spent the war in a prison design bureau. Valentin
Glushko, the chief designer of rocket engines, was an even earlier space enthusiast who had
worked with Korolev in the 1930s and suffered the same fate. Thus, the Soviet missile program
came to be led by a highly effective group of space enthusiasts who were able to coordinate their
efforts outside the usual bureaucratic channels.
S.P. Korolev NII-88/OKB-1 Long-range Missiles i Armaments "
V.P. Glushko OKB456 Rocket Entwines i Aviation Industry i
...... .................................................... ..................... ..........................!
......... ................................................... ................j
i M.S. Riazanskii i NII-885 [ Radio Control Systems Means of communication i
V.P. Barmin i State Specialized Design | Ground Equipment i Machine and Instrumentbuilding i
.....................................i.. ..................................l..........................................................i........................................................................i
Table 1: The Council of Chief Designers (prior to 1953)
Under the tight supervision of Stalin's secret police the missile designers were limited in
the pursuit of their space ambitions; however, at%er Stalin's death (March 1953) the situation
changed dramatically. The most important change came with the arrest ofLavrentii Beriia; the
man who oversaw Stalin's secret police. Following Beriia's arrest in June 1953, police oversight
of weapons R&D largely evaporated. Ironically, weapons R&D became even more politicized as
a result. Stalin's top lieutenants had been given responsibility for various weapons programs and
the behind the scenes struggle for political succession appears to have involved arguments over
the future of these weapons systems. Nikita Khrushchev's emergence as the champion of ballistic
nUS Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate Number 11-6-54: Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field, (Top Secret) Washington DC, 5 October 1954, as declassified 29
June 1993 by CIA Historical Review Program, pp. 5-6. (Those that remained were guidance and control
specialists, most of whom returned to Germany by the mid-1950s.)
]2 B. Chertok, "Lider," Aviatsiia i Kosmonavtika, No. 1, January 1988, p. 31.
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missiles was clearly a part of this struggle. 13 With Khrushchev's victory over his main political
rivals in mid-1957 the missile program found itself with an extremely powerful ally.
However, the first two Soviet space projects had actually been started three years earlier.
Although the evidence on the first project is still sketchy, it appears that a researcher in a Ministry
of Defense NII convinced his superiors to start a reconnaissance satellite research effort in 1954.
Interestingly, the researcher's argument for the project was built on evidence that the US military
was secretly pursuing a spy satellite project) 4 At about the same time, Soviet space enthusiasts
(Korolev, in particular) began to lobby for a scientific satellite through the USSR Academy of
Sciences. 15 Apparently, the scientific satellite idea was prompted by a call for satellite proposals
from the International Geophysical Year (IGY) organizing committee.14 Korolev's proposals
were not enthusiastically received in the USSR. Nonetheless, the Soviet government did approve
an IGY satellite proposal about a year later; in the summer of 1955. This was the same time that
the US announced that it would support an IGY satellite project.
Both Soviet satellite projects were rather low priority. The top priority for the missile
chief designers was to develop an ICBM. Since the end of Word War II the Soviet leadership
had focused on breaking the US monopoly in nuclear weapons. Although the nuclear program
had been remarkably successful, the Soviets had been unsuccessful in countering the US delivery
advantage. The US could launch a nuclear strike from a ring of bases surrounding the USSR.
However, the Soviets still needed a long-range delivery system in order to be able to strike the
US. Khrushchev came to favor the ICBM, and from 1953 onward the Soviet government made
the R-7 (SS-6) missile a top priority. In fact, Korolev's organization, which became a design
bureau known as OKB-1 in 1950, "spun-off" shorter range and naval missiles to other design
bureaus (see Attachment 1). Among these new organizations was a design bureau and plant in
Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, that became the primary Soviet missile facility under the leadership of
chief designer Mikhail Yangel. Unlike the satellite projects, the missile program had little problem
acquiring the resources it needed.
The satellite projects might well have died on the vine ifKhrushchev had not visited
Korolev's design bureau in January 1956. Early that month, the Kremlin leadership was given a
personal tour of OKB-1. Korolev seized the opportunity to sell Khrushchev on the IGY satellite
project. Khrushchev appears to have approved the idea largely because Korolev promised him
that he could quickly perfect the ICBM and then use it to beat the US into space; and with a much
larger satellite to boot. 17 A decree issued on 30 January 1956 grafted the Soviet IGY satellite
project onto the top-priority ICBM program. Such brazen lobbying was a well-established
tradition among the top chief designers, but in this case it had far-reaching consequences.
Khrushchev was so taken by Korolev that he granted him direct access. For the next few years,
Korolev was able to bypass the usual oversight mechanisms and lobby the leader of the Soviet
Union directly.
13William P. Barry, "How the Space Race Began: The Origins of the Soviet Space Program," paper delivered to
the Society for History in the Federal Government conference, 3 April 1997.
14N. Dombkovskii, "Oktiabr - Aprel' - Vselermaia," Sovetskaia Rossiia, 12 April 1989, p.3.
15Korolev was one of the many weapons designers who had become corresponding (junior) members of the
Academy of Sciences in the post-Stalin thaw.
16 See the paper by Asif Siddiqi, "Korolev, Sputnik, and the International Geophysical Year," presented at this
conference.
17 Sergei N. Khrushchev, Nikita Khmshchev: Krizisy i Raketv, Vol. 1, Moscow: Novosti, 1994, p. 111.
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Even with their powerful sponsor, the nascent Soviet space industry was still hampered by
problems. Perfecting the R-7 ICBM was the pre-requisite to launching any satellite, and the chief
designers' energies were focused on this until they succeeded in August 1957. Nonetheless,
Korolev still found time to work on his pet satellite project. Unfortunately, by January 1957 it
was clear that the IGY satellite would not be ready in time to beat the US. With characteristic
boldness Korolev proposed substituting two "simple satellites" for the IGY satellite. This
substitution was apparently approved in January 1957. Thus, the satellites we now know as
Sputnik and Sputnik 2 were born. (The Soviet IGY satellite was not successfully launched until
May 1958; it was known as Sputnik 3.)
The Reaction to Sputnik
After Sputnik the Soviet government asserted that their space program was a well
thought-out, long-term program of peaceful exploration. In fact, the Soviet space program
started as an official afterthought - attached to the ICBM program only at the behest of its
developer. The first satellite was "a result of the intensive work, by research institutions and
design bureaus"18; not the product of a fully developed state industry. Like the program it
supported, the Soviet space industry was really born in the aftermath of Sputnik. It developed in
fits and starts that reflected the preferences of the Soviet political leadership and long-standing
feuds within the space industry.
Khrushchev appears to have been both surprised and delighted by the impact that Sputnik
had on the world. 19 He had originally pinned his hopes for impressing the world on the creation
of a Soviet ICBM. However, the unprecedented announcement of the first successful R-7 (SS-6)
test in August 1957 went virtually unnoticed outside the Soviet Union. Only after Westerners
could see Sputnik whizzing overhead did they take notice of the military potential of Soviet
missiles. Khrushchev became an ardent proponent of space spectaculars as evidence of the
superiority of Soviet communism. Korolev was happy to oblige by putting his long-suppressed
ideas into practice with a series of ever-more astounding space launches.
The push for space spectaculars led to major changes at OKB-1 and in the missile
industry. Korolev's OKB-1 re-directed much of its attention away from missile work and toward
the string of space missions. Not only was OKB-1 the home of the R-7 (SS-6) launcher, but it
soon acquired the key personnel from other organizations that had been involved in satellite R&D.
This included the bulk of the Ministry of Defense NII that had been conducting research on
reconnaissance satellites. OKB-1 was quickly metamorphosing from a missile KB into a "space"
design bureau. Further evidence that the core mission of OKB-1 had changed is suggested by the
fact that in 1959 two new subsidiaries of OKB-1 were created to handle missile design and
production. The first of these (Filial #2) was set up in Krasnoiarsk to handle Korolev's newest
ICBM design - the R-9. 2° Further development work, and production supervision for the R-7 was
given to an organization (Filial #3) in Kuibyshev (now, Samara). n Korolev's space and missile
_sThis quote taken from the remarkably low-key TASS press release announcing Sputnik's launch, 4 October
1957.
19James Harford, Korolev: How One Man Masterminded the Soviet Drive to Beat America to the Moon. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997, p. 121.
20This organization later became known as NPO Applied Mechanics. See Appendices 1-3.
2, This organization became known as TsSKB-Progress. See Appendices 1-3.
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empire had grown dramatically, but clearly his personal interests and energies were devoted to the
space work at OKB-1.
Unfortunately for Korolev and the emerging space industry, Khrushchev's attention
returned to ICBMs. Although the R-7 (SS-6) eventually met the design requirement of being able
to deliver a nuclear warhead to the US, it turned out to be a very poor Cold War weapon. In
response to Soviet rhetoric, the US had rapidly escalated its nuclear posture - building forces
capable of an immediate and massive strike. The Soviet military successfully argued that the R-7
was much too slow to respond to such a threat (it took hours to fuel and prepare for launch). The
one weapon that could strike the US was, therefore, too easily pre-empted by the hair-trigger US
forces. To the surprise of Western intelligence, the USSR deployed just a handful of R-7 (SS-6)
ICBMs. 2_ Soviet efforts turned instead to developing a second-generation of ICBMs. More
interested in space than missiles, Korolev devoted relatively little attention to new ICBMs.
However, one of the organizations that had spun-off of OKB-1 in the early 1950s was already
hard at work on this problem. Mikhail Yangel, chief designer of OKB-586 in Dnepropetrovsk,
was much more attuned to the demands of the military. He had already begun work on a storable
fuel ICBM, the R-16 (SS-7), in 1956. It was ready for testing in 1960. Thus, Korolev's position
as th___eechief designer in the missile and space fields began to erode.
Failure to take strategic demands seriously was not the only thing that led to a decline in
Korolev's status. The "united front" provided by the Council of Chief Designers began to break
up shortly after the success of Sputnik. Disagreements over technical details soon turned to
bickering about control over space projects, resources, and who would get credit for the
successes. In particular, the chief designer of rocket engines, Valentin Glushko, took umbrage at
Korolev's dominance of the space program. In keeping with the traditional behavior of weapons
chief designers, the feud between Korolev and Glushko grew so bitter and personal that each
demanded the other's removal from the space and missile programs. Khrushchev's unsuccessful
personal efforts to mediate this dispute contributed to his loss of enthusiasm for Korolev and the
other missile chief designers.
By the Spring of 1960 Khrushchev was ready to take dramatic steps to shake up the space
and missile industry. The precise reason why Khrushchev acted when he did is still unclear, but
the problems he faced had been growing for several years. In addition to strategic nuclear
problems and his frustration with the Council of Chief Designers, it appears that he also lost faith
in the political leadership that was supposed to supervise the defense industry. Leonid Brezhnev,
the Central Committee Secretary overseeing the defense industry (and one who had benefited
greatly from his connections to Korolev), was "promoted" to the ceremonial post of President of
the USSR. At around the same time Khrushchev decided to set up new competition for the space
and missile industry.
As mentioned above, the use of competition between weapons design bureaus was not a
new idea. However, Khrushchev put a new twist on it. In 1960 he not only established a new
missile and space design bureau, but he set it up in a different ministry. Both Korolev and Yangel
See: US Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate 11-8/1-61 Strength and Deployment of
Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces, (Top Secret) Washington DC, 21 September 1961, as declassified by
the CIA Historical-Review Program.
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faced a new competitor, and so did their ministry. The competition was part of the aviation
industry, not the armaments industry. 23
Strangely enough, Khrushchev did not give this assignment to one of the major aircraft
design bureaus. Instead, a winged (cruise) missile design organization was authorized to start
work on both ICBM and space projects. OKB-52, under chief designer Vladimir Chelomei, had
been created in 1955 to develop the P-5 (SS-N-2) cruise missile for the Soviet Navy. Chelomei
was no stranger to political maneuvering. He had led the post-war effort to build an analog of the
German V-1 "buzz bomb." However, Chelomei failed to produce a useable weapon. He was
dismissed, and his design bureau was handed over to the MiG KB. u Only by lobbying the Navy
brass and Khrushehev himself, did Chelomei finally regain control of a design bureau. 25 Three
years later, in 1958, Chelomei hired Khrushchev's only surviving son, Sergei. This connection
helped Chelomei to gain access to the Soviet leader so that he could lobby for new projects.
OKB-52 clearly needed more resources to carry out the space and missile projects that
Khrushchev authorized in early 1960. The first major expansion came quickly, when the
Miasishchev aircraR design bureau (OKB-23) and its associated production facility were
subordinated to Chelomei. 26 (See Appendix 2) In 1962, Chelomei also won control of OKB-301,
the design bureau that had been headed by Lavochkin until his death in 1960. 27 Chelomei's
missile and space empire grew so quickly that he was reported to have claimed that he was "the
most expensive man" in the Soviet Union. 2s Despite the wealth of resources devoted to
Chelomei's projects, they did not bear fruit immediately.
Korolev's OKB-1 continued to run the manned space program since it was the only
organization capable of building and launching such missions. However, Korolev's dominance
over space and missile programs declined dramatically. His plans to build much larger booster
rockets and new manned spaeecraR were slowly starved of support. The R-9 missile was
canceled and Filial #2 in Krasnoiarsk was spun-offas OKB-10. (See Appendix 2) By mid-1962
this organization was tasked to develop a satellite project that had originated in Yangel's OKB-
586. 29 In fact, Yangel had begun to take on the bulk of unmanned earth-orbital missions in 1961
with the advent of the Kosmos series of satellites. 3° Thus, Korolev's early dominance of the space
industry dissipated rapidly with the rise of alternatives and competitors.
23During the 1950s the names and some of the functions of the defense industrial ministries changed several
times. In 1960 the Ministry of Aviation Industry was known as the State Committee on Aviation Technology
(GKAT). The Ministry of Armaments had become the State Committee on Defense Technology (GKOT).
24Nikita S. KILrushchev, Khn_hchev Remembers: The Last Testament, ed. and trans, by Strobe Talbott, Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., 1974, p. 35.
25S. N. Khn_hcbev, Nikita Khrushchev: Krizisy i Rakety, Vol. 1, pp. 371-2; N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev
Remembers: The Last Testament, pp. 44-5.
26OKB-23 was the organization responsible for the "Bomber Gap" scare in 1953 when its M-4 "Bison" bombers
were miscounted by Western attaches. The Miasishchev production facility was subsequently named the
Khrunichev plant; in honor of the post-war Minister of Aviation Industry.
2_Semen Lavochkin had been a highly successful designer of fighter aircra_. After World War II he turned his
attention to building a long-range supersonic cruise missile. Successes with ballistic missiles led to the
cancellation of this program.
28Roald Z. Sagdeev, The Making of a Soviet Scientist, New York; John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994, p. 202.
29OKB-10 later became a major communication satellite developer.
3oKosmos satellites were not all designed by Yangel's bureau. The name was used as a cover for a number of
unsuccesfful missions developed by Korolev.
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Unfortunately for Chelomei, his efforts were just beginning to pay offwhen his sponsor
fell from power. A prototype of his UR-500 launcher (Proton) and the "Polet" satellite were first
launched in November 1963. A second launch was carried out on Cosmonautics Day (12 April)
the next year. Six months later, in October 1964, Khrushchev was ousted from power. For the
space industry, the change of political leadership had huge consequences.
After Khrushchev was deposed there was a major reorganization and reprioritization in the
space and missile industry. Rejecting the two-ministry approach, the new leadership created the
Ministry of General Machinebuilding (MOM) and placed all of the space and missile industry
under its control. Within two years the major KBs were confusingly renamed; OKB-1 becoming
the Central Design Bureau of Experimental Machinebuilding (TsKBEM) and Chelomei's OKB-52
becoming the Central Design Bureau ofMachinebuilding (TsKBM). More importantly, the new
Soviet leadership, headed by Korolev's old ally Leonid Brezhnev, began a relentless attack on
Chelomei's empire. A number of Chelomei's projects were canceled, or turned over to other
design bureaus. 31 Chelomei's Filial #2 was made independent, renamed KB Lavochkin, and given
responsibility for developing planetary probes (a duty previously held by Korolev's organization).
(See Appendix 2)
With the support of the new leadership, Korolev once again focused on manned space
missions. Not only did Korolev have the support of Brezhnev, but his former minister, Dmitrii
Ustinov, became the top Communist Party supervisor of the defense industry. Ustinov, who had
his own reasons to dislike Chelomei, was the key figure in dissecting the empire that had been
built around OKB-52. In short order Korolev gained control over the Soviet manned lunar
landing program, and the separate circumlunar program that Chelomei had controlled. Although
Korolev died in January 1966, his organization carried the manned lunar programs forward under
the control of his long-time deputy Vasilii Mishin.
Chelomei's organization survived largely due to support from the Soviet military. The
Soviet General Stafffavored a number of Chelomei's projects and was able to keep them going
for quite some time. The UR-100 (SS-11) and UR-100N (SS-19) ICBMs were major Chelomei
missile programs that survived. The ICBM version of the UR-500 was canceled, but it remained
as a space launch vehicle (Proton). One of the reasons to keep the UR-500 alive was that it was
to be the launcher for Chelomei's manned military space station. This was a program started as a
counter to the US Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL); which was also to be a manned
reconnaissance platform. Although the US canceled MOL in 1969, the USSR kept their military
space station alive for nearly another decade. However, Chelomei lost considerable control over
this program. Most importantly, after the US won the race to the moon Ustinov commandeered
Chelomei's space station design (and much of the hardware) to turn it into a scientific space
station. This project was handed over to Korolev's bureau; TsKBEM. The military version of
the space station did fly three times under the cover names of Saliut 2, 3, and 5.32 Yet, this
project came to an end in 1977, when the last of these stations was de-orbited.
There were few major changes to the structure of the Soviet space industry from the late
1960s until the USSR collapsed in 1991. The changes that did occur reinforced the traditions and
31For example, Chelomei's space-plane project (analogous to the US Dyna-Soar) was turned over to the MiG
OKB.
32One of the best discussions of the military Saliuts can be found in: Phillip Clark, The Soviet Manned Space
Programme: An Illustrated History of the Men, the Missions and the Spacecraft, London: Salamander Books, Ltd.,
1988, pp. 66-75.
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practices that had begun with Sputnik. The most significant change came in the mid-1970s when
much of the Soviet R&D complex was re-organized into Science-Production Associations
(NPOs). (See Appendix 3) A number of the space design bureaus and industrial plants were
unified under design bureau control as NPOs. The designation of the design bureaus as leading
organization in the NPOs reinforced the power and perquisites of the space chief designers. They
were now formally responsible for production, as well as R&D.
The N-PO unification was also used as an excuse to dispose of Korolev's successor as
chief designer. Vasilii Mishin, who was still focused on putting a man on the moon, was "retired"
when TsKBEM was merged with Glushko's engine design bureau to create NPO Energiia.
Glushko took this opportunity to push his own agenda; part of which included re-writing space
history so as to downplay Korolev's role and enhance his own. 33 The influence of Glushko and
N-PO Energiia were substantially enhanced in 1976 when he won a position on the powerful
Communist Party Central Committee. This occurred at the same time that Dmitrii Ustinov
became a member of the ruling Politburo and Minister of Defense. Although Ustinov died in
1984, Glushko's influence continued until his death in 1989. After Glushko's death, the two great
design bureaus went their separate ways. Glushko's engine design organization became known as
NPO Energomash, while Korolev's former organization retained the name NPO Energiia.
Most of the other significant changes in the Soviet space industry relate to the continuing
assault by Ustinov and Glushko on Chelomei's empire. Throughout this period, Ustinov
continued to show favoritism for the OKBs that he had supervised as Minister of Armaments in
the 1950s. Thus, Yangel's organization, renamed KB Iuzhmash in 1966, came to dominate the
field of missile production while remaining involved with space work. 34 The other successors and
spin-otis from Korolev's design bureau consolidated their control of the space industry. A
landmark step in this process happened in 1981 when Chelomei's Filial #1 (the former
Miasishchev design bureau) was handed over to N-PO Energiia. 35 As can be seen in Appendix 3,
Chelomei's former Filial #1 was subjected to frequent changes and reorganization that coincide
remarkably with changes in the political leadership. 36 By the end of the Soviet period the design
bureau (KB Saliut) had been separated from the production facility (the Khrunichev
Machinebuilding Plant). Recently, these two organizations were reunited. In June 1993 the
"Khrunichev State Rocket and Space Center" was created. In this case, however, the plant
director (Anatolii Kiselev), and not the chief designer, was put in charge. 37
ss One of the more egregiousexamples of this is the Gas Dynamics LaboratoIy Museum in St. Petersburg. Another
example, that caused considerable semi-public acrimony was the publication of the Encyclopedia of Cosmonautics
in 1985. (V. P. Ghishko, ed., Kosmonavtika Entsiklopediia, Moscow: Sovetskaia Entsildopediia, 1985.)
34NPO Iuzhnoe, located in the Ukraine, remains an important producer of launch vehicles; notably the Zenit
booster.
35This was after the military space station program had been terminated, so Filial #1 was primarily building space
station hardware for Energiia and continuing work on the Proton launch vehicle.
36Ustinov's promotion to Minister of Defense and Glushko's promotion to the Central Committee coincide with
Chelomei's loss of control over Filial #1. Note also that Chelomei and Ustinov's deaths in 1984, and Glushko's
death in 1989, coincide with other changes.
37"Klmmichev State Research and Production Space Center," International Launch Services homepage,
http://www.lmco.com/ILS/text_html/facts_KhSC.html, dowrdoaded 16 October 1996.
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Conclusions
From its very beginnings the Soviet space industry was an unusual hybrid. Space
industries were born within the defense industrial complex and remained subordinated to it
throughout the Soviet period. However, the space program was never merely a military program.
It was, originally, a special state propaganda program; overseen and coordinated at the very
highest levels of government. This uncomfortable military-political duality prevented the creation
of a separate civil space organization on the model of NASA. Although the USSR tried to create
the appearance of having a civil space agency (pretending first, that the Academy of Sciences ran
the space program, and later setting up Glavkosmos), the Soviet space industry remained
subordinated to defense industrial ministries. Even in the post-Soviet period this did not change.
Although the Russian Space Agency (RKA) was "spun-off' of the Ministry of General
Machinebuilding in February 1992, control over the space industry remained in the hands of the
Ministry of Defense Industry until it was abolished in Spring 1997. 38 Within a month (notably
around April 12 th - Cosmonautics Day), it was announced that the Russian Space Agency (RKA)
would assume oversight of the space industry. 39
Although direct military influence over the Russian space industry declined throughout the
last thirty years, the habits of secrecy that characterized the defense industry did not. The tight
Soviet secrecy about space programs, objectives, and industry was probably unavoidable due to
the overlap between the missile and space programs. However, maintaining security also served
other purposes. Most importantly, the habit of announcing intentions only after success had been
achieved allowed the very small handful of leaders at the top to carry out their program with no
real oversight. Thus, people who rose to positions of power could pursue their personal agendas
with little fear of repercussions. This habit of behavior was evident throughout the Soviet period
and, only now, is it starting to change due to the glare of media and international scrutiny.
Members of the Politburo and the Central Committee were not the only ones who tried to
treat the space program as their personal fiefdom. The pattern of behavior of Soviet space chief
designers was also remarkable in its ruthless pursuit of power. Starting with Korolev, the most
politically successful chief designers shamelessly exploited their connections to top political
leaders to win approval of the all-important government decrees that drove major programs. 4°
Moreover, the chief designers developed a reflexive aversion to competition. This may have been
a reaction to their personal experiences under Stalin. Yet, whatever the cause, space chief
designers were not merely content to win a "contract." They seemed compelled to try to destroy
their rivals. This was evident in battles over programs, the struggles over control of R&D
resources, and even in writing the history of the space program.
One of the most important distinctions between the former Soviet space industry and its
counterpart in the West is that the Soviet industry was largely the outgrowth of design groups
with no real connection to the aviation industry. The Korolev and Yangel OKBs were originally
part of the artillery industry. The largely eclipsed Chelomei design bureau may have been
subordinated to the aviation industry (until 1965), but its leader was an outsider. OKB-52 was
3s In March 1997, the Russian Ministry of Defense Industry was abolished and its responsibilities were assumed by
the Ministry of Economics.
39 Inteffax report (in English), Moscow, 12 April 1997.
40The hiring and rapid promotion of relatives of Politburo members was a particularly notable habit. Although
Chelomei was the first to do so, other space chief designers (including Mishin and Glushko) followed suit.
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established and expanded through Khrushchev's intervention. Moreover, Chelomei had been a
cruise missile designer, not an aircraft designer. The non-aircrait roots of these organizations has
had major implications for their approach to rocket and spacecratt design. This is especially
evident in manned spacecraft, which tend to rely much less on pilot intervention than Western
designs. 41
For the former Soviet space industry the legacy of Sputnik has been long-lasting.
Although the structure of space industry is rooted in the traditions of Soviet weapons R&D, the
approval process for Sputnik and the leadership handling of space as a political program
established patterns of behavior that have had powerful influences. These influences are clearly
evident in the structure of the former Soviet space industry, and in its current behavior. The
restructuring of the Russian space industry announced in April 1997 may herald the opening of a
more Western-style approach to organizing space R&D. Yet, it is probably no accident that all of
the organizations selected to remain as the "powerful core" of the Russian space industry are the
ones tied most closely to the original Korolev design bureau. 42 The echoes of Sputnik still ripple
through the Russian space industry.
41There were some space projects that were developed by aircra_ design bureaus. However, none of these efforts
have been put into operational use.
42The 12 April 1997 announcement of RKA control over the space industry stated that, after restructuring, the
core space industry organizations would be Energiia, Energomash, the Khrunichev space center, and the Samara
space center (TsSKB-Progress). (Interfax report (in English), Moscow, 12 April 1997.)
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"A Certain Future: American Higher Education and the Survival of a Nation"
Abstract for "Reconsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite" Conference
John A. Douglass
UC Berkeley Center for Studies in Higher Education
john.douglass@ucop.edu
The nation's ascendance as the major military and economic power in the post-World War
II period helped to make the cult of the sciences pervasive in American society. As
explained by Daniel Yankelovich, science and technology "were almost universally
credited with a decisive role in gaining victory in war, prosperity in peace, enhancing
national security, improving our health, and enriching the quality of life. In the late 1950s,
Americans took comfort in the fact that they were the champions of this rational and
mechanical art. Sputnik shattered that vision, not only creating the image of an enemy
capable of launching missiles of massive destruction. Sputnik also generated a widespread
fear that America had failed to nurture the sciences and build advanced technologies, with
potentially horrifying implications.
To a large degree, American popular opinion credited the Soviet educational system with
Sputnik's success. Here was the source for its scientists and research. Conversely, the
reason for America's apparent second place position in both the arms and space races was
its faltering schools and universities. "For several years independent observers have been
warning us about what the Soviets were doing in education, especially in science
education, explained Thomas N. Bonner in the Journal of Higher Education," but they
were crying in the wilderness until October 4, 1957, when the Russians punctured our
magnificent conceit by making it clear that in a number of related areas of basic research
and applied technology they have already outdistanced us... Science and education have
now become the main battleground of the Cold War.
Bonner was not alone when he pronounced his belief that, "It is upon education that the
fate of our way of life depends." The quick conclusion of many was that America's system
of education was disorganized, that it failed to provide sufficient training and research in
the sciences, and that it catered to mediocrity at the expense of the promising student.
The proposed paper will discuss the impact of Sputnik on American higher education, and
specifically the changing nature of federal funding and programs intended to elevate the
role of the research university in a new Cold War framework. Three general themes will be
investigated:
-- One, the translation of Sputnik as a scientific and political event into policymaking,
and the subsequent expansion of the federal role in supporting key aspects of American
public education in general, and the research university in specific.
-- Two, the distribution of a virtual tidal wave of federal funds to research
universities, and general impact of federal monies on the development of state systems of
higher education using California as a case example. In the post-Sputnik age, leaders
within the higher education community engaged in a sometimes worrisome discussion of
the new federal role on the research university. As Clark Kerr remarked in 1964, it was
perhaps ironic that America's universities, "which pride themselves on their autonomy...
which identify themselves either as "private' or as "state' should have found their greatest
stimulus in federal initiative.., that institutions which had their historical origins in the
training of'gentlemen' should have committed themselves so fully to the service of brute
technology." Kerr and others talked of an ever expanding federal influence and the costs
and benefits to the university, and society in generally.
-- And three, a review of the impact of the post-Sputnik era on the research
university and subsequent importance of the university on economic growth of the nation
(for example, did the vision of a "federal research university" come into being?). The paper
will attempt to point to the changing nature of the research university in the post-Cold
War era, as well as the implications of a paradigm shiit in the perceived role of
government in American society.


SPUTNIK AND TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE
(draft)
Glenn Hastedt
James Madison University
paper presented at 'T, econsidering Sputnik: Forty Years Since the Soviet Satellite," Smithsonian
Institution, Washington D.C., September 30-October 1, 1997.
Sputnik was launched on Oct 4, 1957. It was not a small satellite. Twenty two
inches in diameter and weighing 184 pounds it dwarfed the six inch, three and one-half
pound satellite that was scheduled to be launched by the American Vanguard missile.
Sputnik II was even larger, weighing 1,121 pounds, and went into orbit on November 3
carrying a live dog. The Eisenhower administration put forward a low keyed response.
Eisenhower was at Gettysburg for a weekend of golf when the announcement of
Sputnik's successful launching was made. He left it to White House Press Secretary
James Hagerty and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to put forward the
administration's response. They informed the press that the administration had not been
caught by surprise by Sputnik's success and that Eisenhower was being kept abreast of
events because they were of "great scientific interest." Hagerty also offered the opinion
that the administration had "never thought of our program as one which was in a race with
the Soviets.'" In the following weeks Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson would dismiss
Sputnik as "a nice scientific trick" and trade advisor Clarence Randall called it a "silly
bauble."1
The measured and condescending response of the Eisenhower administration was a
stark comrast to the highly agitated response of the media and public. As Walter
McDougall notes the public's response to Sputnik poured forward in a series of chaotic
waves whose crests and troughs overlapped to "reinforce alarm one week and confused
inertia the next." 2 Frequent comparisons were made to Pearl Harbor. Time and
Newsweek placed Sputnik squarely into a cold war context of competition with the Soviet
Union. The New Republic likened Sputnik to Columbus' discovery of America and the
U.S. News and World Report compared it to the splitting of the atom. Eisenhower's
efforts to minimize the significance of Sputnik failed. By early November 1957 his
standing in public opinion polls had fallen twenty two points from a high of 79% in
January 1957 to 57%. 3
The loss of public confidence in Eisenhower was not due simply to the actions of
circulation-hungry press or opportunistic political opponents who wished to make
Eisenhower look bad. Sputnik touched a raw nerve that both excited and frightened the
American public in a way that the Eisenhower administration had not anticipated. Robert
Divine states that "at the heart of the problem was the popular belief in American
supremacy in science and technology." Sputnik set off a highly public and visible debate
on education, science, space exploration, national security, and fiscal policy that continued
on into the 1960s. MeDougall writes that with Sputnik, "a new political symbolism had
arisen to discredit the old verities about limited government. Local initiative, balanced
budgets, and individualism. ''4
The Eisenhower administration's protests not withstanding, it was caught by
surprise by Sputnik. The question examined here is why? Was it the product of forces
Robert A. Devine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), x_-xv.
2 Walter A_ McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space A_e (New York:
Basic Books, 1985), 142.
3 Devine, p. 44-45.
4McDougaU, p. 226.
that have produced other surprises or was the failure to predict Sputnik the product of a
unique constellation of forces. That possibility exists because where existing studies of
surprise have focused on military or diplomatic surprise, Sputnik -while it contains
elements of each-- is more accurately seen as a case of technological surprise.
Technological surprise is seldom studied. This in spite of the fact that one of the
defining features of scientific and technological research is the search for new ways of
doing things; new insights into how and why things work; and an unwillingness to accept
the limits of the present as the boundaries of the future. Barry Hughes notes that one
reason few studies of the future specifically address technological change is that "as
difficult as forecasting population growth or energy demand over the next twenty years
might be, such forecasts are trivial compared to the difficult task of anticipating
technological developments. ''5 Hughes then adds that "the rate of technological change is
both largely unmeasurable and uncertain." 6
The lack of attention to technological surprise is unfortunate given the increasingly
important role that technology plays in world politics today. Not only does technology
shape the traditional strategic agenda of states and shape the language in which strategy is
discussed, it is also central to the dynamics of many of the issues that occupy positions of
prominence on the post cold war agenda. By studying the surprise surrounding the
launching of Sputnik we can begin to lay a foundation for studying technological surprise
as an integral and distinct part of world politics.
WHY SURPRISE
Studies of surprise approach the subject from a variety of perspectives. Some
address the basic nature of surprise; some seek to uncover underlying forces that produce
surprise or are at least conducive to it; some examine the actions of the "attacker" where
others focus on the "defender;" still others are concerned with particular types of surprise
such as military surprise or diplomatic surprise. In order to better grasp the extent to
which the surprise induced by Sputnik was unique we need to place it within the context
of these broader theoretical and practical concerns.
The Nature of Surprise
On any given day foreign and national security policy makers have few reasons to
expect surprise. Bureaucratic inertia, vested personal interests, domestic political
pressures, and international system constraints conspire to prevent much more than
incremental change from usually taking place. Yet surprise does happen. What is
important about surprise is not that happens, but that sometimes when it happens a
surprise will fundamentally alter the strategic context within which future decisions are
made. In these cases surprise invalidates the assumptions on which diplomatic initiatives
were premised and defense plans based. It exposes states to vulnerabilities that they had
not anticipated and are not prepared for. As Richard Betts notes, intelligence makes its
impact through its "jolting originality" as policy makers are suddenly confronted with the
realization that events are moving in an unexpected and dangerous direction. 7
5 Barry B. Hughes, World Futures: A Critical Analysis of Alternatives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Umversity Press, 1985), p. 145.
6 Hughes, p 151.
Richard Betts, Surprise Attack (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1982).
Several different frameworks exist for classifying surprise. At the most general
level they can be grouped under two headings. One school of thought emphasizes
causation. Surprises are defined in terms of the defender's unreadiness. Potential
dimensions of unreadiness include whether the opponent would attack; when the
opponent would attack, where it would attack, how it would attack, and why it would
attack) A second school groups instances of surprise in terms of their impact on world
politics. Minor surprises are those which are unexpected moves that change the course of
relations between states but do not alter the underlying balance of power in the
international system. Major surprises are unanticipated moves that have a considerable
impact on the real or expected division of power either at the regional or global level. 9
Why Surprise Succeeds
Surprise is never total; bolts from the blue do not happen. There is always some
warning. The repeated instances in which surprise takes place in spite of warning has
caused researchers to look closely at the problems that the victim state encounters in
trying to correctly anticipate the moves of its adversary. Michael Handel suggests that
they might be grouped under three headings._°
First, are problems deliberately caused by the enemy. Foremost among these is
deception. Those contemplating a surprise move often seek to cloak their actions behind a
vail of secrecy. States contemplating surprise find deception to be an attractive strategy
because it is relatively cheap and because it is virtually impossible to maintain prolonged
secrecy for major diplomatic initiatives or military campaigns. _1 For example, in World
War II the allies made no serious attempt to hide their intentions of invading Europe.
Instead, they sought to deceive Hitler as to where the invasion would take place. Allied
intelligence was so successful in focusing Hitler's attentions on Pas de Calais and away
from Normandy that Germany still had most of its forces there even after the invasion of
Normandy was well underway.
Deception is most effective when it seeks to reinforce a belief already held by the
intended victim rather than when it tries to change a policy maker's mind. Such was the
case when Stalin refused to believe the warnings of Hitler's pending invasion. A paradox
also presents itself here. Findings suggest that the more alert a state is to the potential of
deception, the easier it is to deceive it. The acknowledged possibility of deception
provides a rationale for both dismissing as bogus all incoming pieces of information that
do not fit with current expectations and for being skeptical of all information that does fit.
The result is that policy makers are free to indulge their biases or engage in wishful
thinking.
Quite apart from any planned program of deception, the actions of the attacker
also complicate the task of anticipating a surprise move. The attacker always has the
option of changing its plans. Warnings of an attack, therefore, may be correct even if no
s Bells, p. 11 and Katrina Brodin, "Surprise Attack: The Case of Sweden," Journal of Strategic Studies 1
(1978), 99.
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10Michael I. Handel, "Avoiding Political and Technological Surprise in the 1980's," in Roy Godson (ec[),
Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analy$i$ and Estimat_ (Washington. D.C.: Consortium for
the Study of Intelligence, 1980), 85-111.
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4attack materializes. Japanese plans called for aborting the attack on Pearl Harbor if its
attack fleet was discovered. Indecision on the part of the attacker similarly complicates
the problem of predicting an attack or diplomatic breakthrough. On more than one
occasion in the period leading up to the surprise announcement of President Nixon's trip
to China contradictory signals were sent by China to the United States because of conflicts
within the Chinese Communist Party.
A second set of problems that stand in the way of anticipating surprise are inherent
in the task of predicting the future. Major events simply do not come in nice neat
packages. It is only with twenty-twenty hindsight that the correct interpretation of data
is obvious. Most commonly cited as obstacles to the correct assessment of information
are noise and the ambiguity of evidence. Noise is the opposite of deception. Where
deception succeeds by increasing the adversary's certainty about the validity of false
interpretations of data, noise confuses the adversary through the clutter of extraneous
information that its intelligence services are picking up. 12 The problem at Pearl Harbor
was not too little information but too many irrelevant pieces of information. Moreover, on
the eve of the attack a great deal of evidence existed supporting all the wrong
interpretations of the last minute signals being received. A chronology of over 100 events
can be strung together pointing to the culminating announcement of Nixon's breakthrough
trip to China. But the picture was far less clear as events unfolded. Diplomatic feelers
often went unanswered because they were too subtle, sometimes more than one month
separated the sending of a signal and the response to it. And, building on points raised
above, because neither side fully trusted the other, ambiguity was often purposefully
inserted into messages in order to allow for an orderly diplomatic retreat.
Faced with this barriers, some intelligence analysts and observers argue that a
distinction needs to be drawn between forecasting and fortunetelling. Too often
intelligence is asked to engage in fortunetelling where they are asked to predict the
occurrence of a particular event. Former Israeli intelligence officer Shlomo Gazit argues
that intelligence organizations should only be tasked with producing estimates on three
situations: 1) decisions already taken; 2) possible reactions to a certain situation combined
with speculation on the most probable one; and 3) analyzing the outcome of a developing
situation in terms of milestones, turning points, and possible outcomes.13
A final set of problems in anticipating surprise are self-generated. One obstacle to
the ability of policy makers to appreciate and respond to warning intelligence stem from
the blinding effect of current policy-maker preoccupations. Policy makers do not sit
back and passively take in information. They interact with it, picking and choosing which
pieces are relevant to their needs and which are not. One of the most important
perceptual filters that determines what is seen and what is not are the immediate concerns
that dominate the policy maker's thoughts (the evoked set) _4. Policy makers in
Washington were doubly blinded to Japanese war plans. Not only were they absorbed
with events in Europe but they were convinced that Japanese aggression would first take
12Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).
13 Shlomo Gazit, "Estimates and Fortunetellmg in Intelligence Work," International Security 4 (1980),
36-56.
_4Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton Umversity
Press, 1976), pp. 203-216.
place in the Western Pacific. Secretary of the Navy Knox responded to news of the attack
on Pearl Harbor by asserting "this can't be true... [it] must mean the Philippines."
Communications between Washington and Pearl Harbor also show the impact of the
evoked set on reading intelligence. Policy makers in Washington assumed their immediate
concerns about a Japanese attack were shared by their counterparts at Pearl Harbor. This
was not the case. Officials at Pearl Harbor were primarily concerned with the possibility
of internal sabotage and they read the warnings from Washington in this light.
Contingency plans have the same blinding effect. Having spend considerable time
and energy into putting together a contingency plan, the tendency is for it to color one's
perceptions to the point where all future events are seen as being consistent with its
assumptions. Committed to stopping the spread of communism, U.S. policy makers
needed little information to "see" communism in Third World revolutionary movements.
The response was highly predictable with the United States either coming to the aid of the
threatened government or committing itself to overthrowing the newly installed regime.
Given this pattern of response, many observers have concluded that the failed 1960 Bay of
Pigs invasion of Cuba to overthrow Fidel Castro was in a sense inevitable because in
carrying out covert operations against communist regimes the United States had come to
rely too heavily on responses that had been successful in Iran (1953) and Guatemala
(1954) and had stopped paying close attention to the unique features of each situation.
Also promoting surprise is a policy maker's commitment to a given course of
action and the problems it creates for integrating intelligence and policy. Selecting a
course of action and building support for it is an expensive undertaking and once adopted
personal and institutional prestige become attached to its success. Into this setting walks
the intelligence professional. To be effective intelligence must know the policy maker's
concerns and plans otherwise the inteUigence they provide is likely to be found irrelevant.
However, if intelligence is brought into close contact with policy it runs the risk of being
corrupted. Intelligence will be expected to support policy and not allowed to perform its
intended function of presenting policy makers with warning. This tension between
intelligence and policy was evident in the period preceding the fall of the Shah. The
complete confidence that the United States had in the ability of the Shah to survive
skewed U.S. intelligence efforts. Analysts complained that "you couldn't give away
intelligence on the Shah.
At times the tunnel vision preventing policy makers from accurately reading the
intelligence available to the grows out of biases deeper than the attachment to a line of
policy or being preoccupied with a problem. It may also stem from a false set of
assumptions which are widely held throughout the policy making process.15 For Israelis
in 1973 it was the assumption that Egypt would not go to war until it could control the air
space over the battlefield; for the Arabs in 1967 it was that war would not begin until
negotiations proved fruitless; for Stalin it was that Hitler would issue an ultimatum before
attacking; and in 1950 the United States was surprised that North Korea attacked because
it was assumed that this would only happen as part of a more general war.
In a similar vein, surprised states also mistakenly assume that other states are
conducting their foreign policy on the basis of the same set of assumption under which
t5 William Ascher, Forecasting: An Am_raisal for Policy Makers and Planners (Baltimore: Johns
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6they are operating. They are especially likely to overestimate the value placed by others
on maintaining the status quo. The United States failed to understand that Japanese
leaders had posed their predicament in such a way that an attack on Pearl Harbor
appeared reasonable. In 1973 Israeli leaders failed to appreciate the fact that Sadat found
a continuation of the status quo to be so unacceptable that he was will to start (and lose) a
war in hopes of breaking the Middle East stalemate. Under these circumstances, the state
carrying out the surprise is able to exploit "the logic of craziness." The more extreme the
action, the more unbelievable is, the less likely is it be adequately defended against or
prepared for. As such the possibility of success is often better than iftbe state pursued a
more "reasonable" course of action.
Given the forces of inertia that have been noted above, massive amounts of
information are often needed to make policy makers reconsider their position. At the
same time it is possible to be overwamed. Individuals and organizations cannot stay at
high levels of alert indefinitely. The more often one is warned, the more accustomed one
becomes to the situation. Familiarity causes one's response to warning to become routine
as a "cry wolf' syndrome takes hold. Pearl Harbor was warned once in 1940 and twice in
1942. Israel counted on the numbing effect of routine to aid their surprise in 1967 and fell
victim to the deadening impact of repeated mobilizations and demobilizations in 1973.
The cry wolf'problem is especially difficult to overcome in dealing with terrorism. In
speaking to the problem of intelligence regarding bomb threats preceding the October
1983 attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut, one officer told a congressional committee
that "since we have been here, we have, I think, counted over a hundred car bomb
threats." Another noted that once a threat was received regarding a blue Mercedes and
added "there are quite a few blue Mercedes over in Lebanon."
Types of Surprise
In addition to laying out the fundamental tenets of why surprise happens, attention
has also been given to developing a better understanding of the two major types of
surprise: military surprise and diplomatic surprise. As Michael Handel observes, there are
significant differences between them.16 First, where military surprise is an inherent part of
military planning, diplomatic surprise is not. In military affairs, surprise is treated as a
force multiplier. In diplomacy continuity and predictability are valued, not the ability to
surprise an ally.
Second, military surprise and diplomatic surprise present intelligence organizations
with different types of problems. Due to their large size and need for long lead-time,
military operations emit many signals and are difficult to "keep secret." At the same time,
however, military actions present intelligence officials with multiple challenges in
predicting the where, when, and how of possible activity. Because it involves fewer
participants, and may even be unilateral in nature, diplomatic surprise is easier to keep
secret. Anticipating it involves understanding leader's perceptions more than it does
comprehending organizational behavior. Moreover, in trying to anticipate the moves of an
adversary those concerned with military surprise must pay attention to both intentions and
capabilities. Those concerned with preventing diplomatic surprise need only focus on the
adversary's intentions since capabilities are not a significant limiting factor in the ability to
carry out diplomatic surprise.
asHandel, Diplomacyof Surprise, p. 13-24.
7Third, the impact of mih'tary surprise is immediate because the national security
challenge to the attacked state is direct and real. The impact of diplomatic surprise may be
immediate or delayed because the consequences of the surprise may not place the state in
immediate danger. Fourth, military surprise is always a hostile and negative act.
Diplomatic surprise may be positive and cooperative in nature. Fifth, from the point of
view of the initiating state military surprise offers only advantages since it serves as a force
multiplier increasing the power of its existing military forces. Diplomatic surprise involves
a trade-off for the initiating state. Its action may alienate allies, provoke protests from
domestic groups, or negatively impact on the achievement of other foreign policy goals.
SPUTNIK
The Soviet Story
Soviet leaders made little attempt to keep the impending launch of Sputnik a
secret. Public signs of growing official Soviet interest in putting an artificial satellite into
orbit around the earth began to mount following Stalin's death. Responding to the call of
organizers of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) for the international community to
work together to place launch a satellite in earth orbit in1957 the Soviet Academy of
Sciences created a blue ribbon commission whose purpose was to "organize work
concerned with building an automatic a laboratory for scientific research in space." This
was followed by the Soviet Union's July 30, 1955 official announcement that, like the
United States, it planned to launch a satellite during the IGY. Radio reports spoke of
teams of scientists being formed to build such a satellite and Leonid Sedov, who chaired
the blue ribbon panel, predicted a satellite launch in 1957 using a multistage rocket. At
the First International Conference of Rockets and Guided Missiles in 1956, Soviet
scientists spoke openly about high altitude experiments and launching dogs into space.
McDougall notes that once the IGY began on July 1, 1957, "Soviet predictions of
a satellite became a weekly occurrence. ''17 The first test rocket exploded in failure in
spring 1957 and it was not until August 3 that a successful launch took place. After a
second success, the Soviet Union announced to the world on August 27 that it now
possessed an operational intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Sergei Korolov, one
of the key figures in the design and testing of Soviet missiles, states that it was only at
this point that Soviet leaders gave final approval for launching Sputnik. Moscow made
its intentions public on September 17 and on October 1 it informed the world of Sputnik's
radio frequency.
After Sputnik's successful launch Soviet leaders were quick to exploit its
propaganda value in the cold war competition with the United States. However, it is
worth noting that even prior to Sputnik high ranking party members and military officials
had begun to emphasize the Soviet ICBM capability and its significance for world
politics, is Between 1955-1957, Nildta KlmJshchev, Nikolai Bulganin, and Anastas
hrnkoyan all made public comments which either extolled the virtues of long range missiles
or denigrated the military significance of long range bombers. At the twentieth party
congress in 1956, Defense Minister Marshall Gerogi Zhukov made reference to long range
17McEkmgall, 60.
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University Press, 1982), pp. 55-57.
and "mighty" missiles. And a 1957 article cited the strategic virtues of ICBMs: it could
take off from mobile launchers; it could operate under all types of weather conditions; and
it would permit its possessor to launch surprise attacks.
Soviet interest in rocketry and space flight predated Stalin's death. The September
17 announcement coincided with the one hundredth anniversary of Konstantin
Tsiolkovsky's birth. Tsiolkovsky was one of the founding fathers of Soviet rocketry
having written a 1903 treatise on the mathematics of orbital mechanics and designed a
rocket powered from liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. Where under the Tsar's Russian
advances in rocketry were primarily in the areas of theory and design rather than testing
and building this changed with the Communist Party's ascent to power. In 1924 it created
a Central Bureau for the Study of the Problems of Rockets. By 1934, McDougall notes
that the link between rocketry and revolution had become institutionalized as the drive for
technological suprernaey had become a major goal of the Soviet state.19
Step by step rocket research was "swallowed up in the belly of Stalin's leviathan."
The Academy of Sciences was accused of counterrevolutionary activity and placed under
the direction of the Council of Peoples Commissars. The first Five Year Plan established
research and development priorities which replaced individual goals and visions as the
driving force in rocketry. During the 1930s, the entire Jet Scientific Research Institute fell
victim to Stalin's Great Purge. Still, by the end of the 1930s, Soviet scientists had
managed to test air to surface missiles, surface to air missiles, surface to surface missiles,
and launch the world's first two stage rocket. Soviet advances in rocketry were such that
for them, the German V-2 contained few technological breakthroughs.
Not only did the end of World War 1I produce a surge of Soviet activity directed
toward the development of an atomic bomb, it also brought forward renewed interest in
rocketry. The Chief of the Soviet Air Forces observed that merely building more V-2
rockets would not be enough to ensure Soviet security in a future war. "They were good
to frighten England, but should there be an American-Soviet war, they would be useless;
what we really need are long range reliable rockets capable of hitting target areas on the
American continent." The head of the Aerodynamics Laboratory of the Moscow Military
Air Academy echoed these thoughts: "we have no intention of making war on Poland.
Our vital interests is for machines that can fly across oceans" By the end of 1947, almost
two years prior to the detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb, "everyone wanted to design
a trans-Atlantie rocket. ''2° By 1949 results were beginning to appear. The first all-Soviet
upgrade of the V-2 with a range of 550 miles was in production. An intermediate range
ballistic missile (IRBM) was under construction by 1952 and the blueprints for the ICBM
which the Soviets used to launch Sputnik were approved in 1954.
The American Fiew of the Soviet Story
Lawrence Freedman notes that early postwar estimates of the Soviet strategic
threat to the United States were little more than guesses. 2_ The focus of these estimates
was the current and future size of the Soviet bomber force. InteUigence information was
scarce and came primarily from two sources. The first of these were official Soviet
19McDougall, p. 27.
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government statements which were distrusted and often dismissed as propaganda. The
second was personal observation. The main opportunity for viewing Soviet bomber
strength were air parades such as the 1955 May Day parade in which the Soviet's
appeared to fly more Bison bombers overhead than intelligence estimates suggested they
possessed. Where the 1954 estimate predicted that full production of the Bison bomber
would not begin until 1956, by the end of 1955 intelligence estimates were now predicting
that by the end of 1956 twenty five bombers would be produced each month with the total
Soviet inventory reaching 600-800 by 1969 or 1960.
The "bomber gap" became the focus of a short-lived but highly charged political
debate pitting congress against the president, and the air force against the other members
of the intelligence community. The issue was resolved largely through the development
and deployment of a new intelligence collection system: the U-2 reconnaissance plane.
The first flight took of from Weisbaden on July 4, 1956 and overflew Moscow, Leningrad,
and the Baltic Coast. Two additional missions were each flown on July 5 and July 9
before Soviet protests caused the flights to be called offfor several months. 22 These five
flights produced conclusive proof that Soviet bomber production was not preceding at an
alarming rate and a downward revision of the bomber threat began in December 1956.
What the U-2 flights did reveal was a growing Soviet commitment to ICBM
testing and production with the construction of a second missile testing site at Tyuratam
The intelligence community had been aware of the Soviet's first missile testing facility at
Kapustin Yar since 1947. Information on its activities was provided by defectors,
returning German scientists, and aerial reconnaissance. In 1952 the CIA set up an Office
of Scientific Intelligence and in 1954 it was predicting that the Soviet Union would be
capable of launching an earth satellite by the end of 1957 but that it would not possess an
operational ICBM before 1960. As with the bomber gap, the air force disagreed and
made use of its close ties with key congressional supporters to press the Eisenhower
administration to do something about the growing "missile gap."
Information gathered from U-2 overflights of the Tyuratam missile testing site in
1957 led CIA analysts to conclude that the Soviets were preparing to launch a satellite
into space using an ICBM. And, a U-2 overflight in the summer produced pictures of an
ICBM sitting in its launching pad. The status of the Soviet ICBM program was brought
to Eisenhower's attention a May 10, 1957 National Security Council Meeting. Public
attention was directed to the rapidly progressing Soviet ICBM program by a May article
in Aviation Week and a July column in the New York Times by Steward Alsop in which he
stated that the Soviets had tested an experimental long range missile. Between May and
August 1957, eight long range missile firings were observed. On September 12, 1957 the
Ottiee of the Army Chief of Research and Development estimated that the Soviet Union
would launch a satellite within 30 days. z;
The American Story
Control over air power (both from a strategic and bureaucratic perspective) was a
major focal point of U.S. military policy in the immediate post war period. The weapon of
choice was the manned bomber with rocketry and its accompanying satellites running a
zz Jeffrey Richelson, American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New York: Quill, 1987), pp. 143-48.
z_Vernon Van Dyke, Pride and Power: The Rationale of the Space Pro_ay_am CLlrbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1964), p. 15.
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distinct second. Not only was the manned bomber a known and trusted commodity to
military officers and strategists but real doubts existed over the ability of a rocket to
deliver atomic bombs given their size. The case for the manned bomber was buttressed
further by the desire of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to limit funding for
nonessential programs in pursuit of a balanced budget.
During the war the Army Air Force Services division tasked the Special Weapons
Group at Wright Field to do work on guided missiles. As the potential of the V-2 became
recognized by the military competition to control this program mushroomed and in 1944
the decision was made to give the Army Air Force control over all missiles dropped from
planes and the Army Services Unit control over ground-launched ballistic missiles. Upon
his return from Potsdam President Truman authorized an increase in aviation research and
development spending. Air Force spending on missiles went from $3.7 million in FY1945
to $38.8 million in FY1946. No sooner had this emphasis on missile research and
development begun than ended. Instead of a projected FY1947 budget $75.7 milfion on
missiles, the Air Force's outlays were cutback to $22 million. Eleven programs were
canceled including the MX-774, a 5,000 mile ballistic missile.
This reversal of field reflected four key assumptions that were widely shared
among American policy makers. _ First, funding military programs ranked third in priority
behind domestic spending and overall fiscal conservatism. Second, it was assumed that
the United States was ahead of the Soviet Union in aviation technology. Third, "blue sky"
air force officers favored the manned bomber over missile. And, fourth, there was a
general air of scientific pessimism surrounding the development of an ICBM
Research and development in the field of satellite technology faired little better.
Just days after their surrender German scientists had briefed some of their American
counterparts about the possibilities of missiles and satellites. The Navy was first to seize
the initiative establishing an Earth Satellite Vehicle Program in 1945. In 1946 it
approached the Army Air Force about the possibility of collaborating on a joint project.
Rebuffed by Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and
Development, the Army Air Force commissioned the RAND Corporation for a study of
the value of earth satellites. Its report released on May 2, 1946 made the following three
points. First, satellites would become one of the most potent scientific tools by the end of
the century. Second, the launching of a satellite would have repercussions comparable to
that of the atomic bomb. Third, "the nation which first makes significant achievements in
space travel will be acknowledged as the world leader in both military and scientific
techniques Still, 1948 proposals for funding by the Navy and Air Force were rejected
and the project canceled because of a failure to establish "either a military or a scientific
utility commensurate with the presently expected cost of a satellite vehicle."
New life was breathed into the U.S. missile program in by a series of events in the
early 1950s. The (unexpected) Korean War led Truman appointed K.T. Keller to the
newly created post of special advisor on missiles and in 1951 he authorized funds for work
on a new Air Force ICBM that would become the Atlas missile. The successful
detonations of hydrogen bombs by the Soviet Union and the Untied States put an end to
the debate over whether such a weapon could be delivered by missiles. Evidence was
24McDougall, p. 98.
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now also mounting that the Soviet Union was making significant advances in missile
research and development.
A 1950 RAND study released on October 4, 1950 also kept a spotlight on satellite
research and development by directly addressing their military significance. It noted that
while satellites were not weapons they did possess great military util/ty because they could
gather data not available from other sources. RAND predicted that their unconventional
nature would also guarantee that satellites would become a factor in the global balance of
power and thus have significant political-psychological effects as well as military ones.
RAND also felt that the primary political problem that satellites would pose centered on
the reaction of other states to the loss of sovereignty that resulted from their overflights.
A further boost to the U.S. missile and satellite programs was given by the findings
of the Killian Report that was commissioned by President Eisenhower in 1954 to study the
problem of surprise attack on the U.S. The Killian Report identified the period from late
1954 until 1955 was one of American air-atomic advantage but one in which it was
vulnerable to a surprise attack due to the lack of an early warning system. The following
period, from 1956-57 until 1958-60, was anticipated to be one in which the United States
would hold a great offensive advantage but one in which the Soviet Union would be
testing new missiles and bombers. The Killian Report noted that the "single most
important variable" in its scenarios was the Soviet development of an ICBM. It
recommended that the U.S. give highest priorities to the development of an ICBM, and
an early warning system. It was especially important noted committee member Edwin
Land that the U.S. find ways of increasing the number of facts on which our intelligence
estimates are based.
Three different satellite programs emerged almost simultaneously in the mid 1950s.
One, put forward in secret was the development of an advanced and technologically
sophisticated earth reconnaissance satellite, WS-171L, was a direct outgrowth of the
Killian Report. The second was a joint Army-Navy proposal, Project Orbiter, which was
to be a "'no-cost" satellite using existing technology. The third was a proposal from the
scientific community that the U.S. launch a scientific satellite to commemorate the IGY.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles oversaw a study to evaluate these
proposals from a military perspective. His staff recommended launching a small scientific
satellite in the near future and acknowledged that the Soviet Union was now working on a
satellite program of its own. The scientific satellite was recommended as a way of testing
the principle of '_eedom of space" and the legality of satellite overflight. The report
also insisted that care needed to be taken so that nothing done would prejudice U.S.
satellite efforts outside the scope of the IGY.
In July 1955, the Eisenhower administration publicly committed itself to a
scientific satellite as part of the IGY. It was agreed that the IGY National Committee
should take responsibility for work on the satellite and that the Defense Department would
provide the missile that would be used in its launching. The choice was between the Army
missile which was to be used in Project Orbiter and a Naval Research Laboratory
proposal. Project Vanguard, which involved designing a new four-stage Viking missile.
Work on Vanguard got underway in fall 1956. In May 1957, the National Security
Council approved a launch schedule that included flight testing of the three Vanguard
stages in the remainder of 1957 with a fully instrumented test satellite to be launched in
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March 1958. Testing of Vanguard was on schedule when Sputnik went into orbit on
October 4, 1957. The first launching ofa U.S. satellite was set for December.
SPUTNIK AS A CASE OF SURPRISE
Why Surprise
When placed within the context of the literature on surprise, a review of the events
leading up to the launching of Sputnik points to the conclusion that the major reasons for
surprise were self-generated within the United States. There is little evidence of Soviet
deception. Soviet leaders made no effort to hide their commitment to launching a satellite.
Vernon Van Dyke goes so far as to argue that there were "relatively abundant and open
reports concerning developing Soviet capabilities." 25 The principal problem lay in getting
top level officials in the United States to believe these reports. The successful Soviet
deception with regard to the bomber gap led many American observers to dismiss Soviet
statements about their progress in missile and satellite technology as nothing more than
propaganda-inspired boasting. Only in one sense did the actions of Soviet leaders directly
contribute to surprise. This was the relatively late date at which a firm commitment to
launch a satellite was made. It was only after the successful August 27 test firing of the
ICBM was that decision made. Given the secrecy of the Soviet system this did not permit
the intelligence community much time to warn American leaders of the actual launching of
Sputnik.
The second frequent cause of surprise noted earlier are problems inherent in the
task of predicting the future. Here too, these problems were only of secondary
importance in the ease of Spumik. According to Gazit, one of the three legitimate tasks
that can be assigned to an intelligence agencies is that of analyzing the outcome of a
developing situation. Not only did the CIA manage to accurately see future developments
in the Soviet missile and satellite program but so too did other elements of the national
security bureaucracy. Furthermore, RAND correctly saw the political and psychological
significance of launching the first satellite into space.
One can speculate that they were able to do so in part because as specialists
concerned primarily with developments in Soviet missile and satellite research they were
not as affected by the "noise" surrounding the many signals that Soviet leaders were
sending regarding their intentions as were officials with more general areas of foreign
policy responsibility. Soviet statements and actions regarding such early 1950s cold war
hot spots as Berlin, the Middle East, Central America, and Korea were far less likely to
distract them or negatively color their evaluations of Soviet missile and satellite activity.
In identifying self-generated problems within the United States as the primary
source of surprise, the ease of Sputnik is not unique. It falls well within the confines of
that body of literature which emphasizes that surprise occurs despite warning. The picture
which emerges is one of knowledge of Soviet activity but an absence of any sense of
urgency. At least four factors contributed to this false sense of security.
First, was the problem of mirror imaging -assuming that the Soviet Union was
making decisions on the same set of assumptions that were guiding American policy. The
most crucial assumption dealt with the continued superiority of the manned bomber as the
vehicle for delivering long distance air strikes on the enemy. Freedman notes that in the
25Van Dyke, p. 15.
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1940s American officials had come to dismiss the ICBM as a delivery vehicle for reasons
of cost and accuracy, and had assumed that Soviet officials would reach a similar
conclusion. 26 They were not totally wrong. For a time Korolev agreed with the
assessment that "winged rockets" and not missiles were destined to be the delivery vehicle
of choice in the space age and Soviet leaders expressed early interest in the Sanger
project, a wartime German plan for constructing a piloted bomber with intercontinental
capabilities. 2_ What they failed to recognize was the shift in Soviet thinking away from the
bomber to missiles, a shift signaled in Soviet publications and official statements.
Second, American officials were blinded to the significance of Sputnik by their
own policy priorities. For the Eisenhower administration speed was not of the essence. If
it had been the Army's Project Orbiter would have been given the nod in 195 5 over the
untried Vanguard as the delivery vehicle since as Army officials noted before and after
Sputnik, would have been ready to hunch as early as January 1957. By choosing the
Vanguard the Eisenhower administration made its decision in virtually total disregard for
the speed and direction of the Soviet space program. Top priority was given to its goal of
establishing the legal precedent that space was international territory and not the property
of sovereign states. _ Given the secrecy of Soviet society and pending advances in
military reconnaissance satellites (****) this precedent was seen as essential to the
continued U.S. ability to gather information on Soviet military capabilities. Eisenhower
felt that this would be best realized if the first satellite put imo earth orbit was scientific
and not military in nature.
Third, American officials failed to respond to evidence of a growing Soviet
satellite program due to the overriding influence of budgetary considerations. Van Dyke
correctly notes that the "general air of conservatism and the stress on economy under
Eisenhower and Secretary of Defense Wilson were not propitious to boldness pertaining
to space or for that matter imaginative research. ''z9 The power of this commitment to limit
government spending to serve as a restraining force on the U.S. space program comes
through even after Sputnik is sent into orbit as Eisenhower fought doggedly to limit the
funds that would be directed at space research. He continued to view excessive
govemmem spending and a weak economy as far greater threats to American national
security than a nascent Soviet ICBM force.
Finally, an unstated American belief in its presumed technological and scientific
superiority over other states seems to have blinded policy makers to Soviet advances. In
spite of warnings that the Soviet Union was moving steadily toward launching a satellite
no serious consideration appears to have been given by the Eisenhower administration to
the possibility that the United States was in a race with the Soviet Union or that it might
loose such a race. This sense of technological superiority was the basis for Eisenhower's
New Look" deterrence posture was maintained in the face of two jolting challenges: the
Soviet A and H bomb tests.
Spumik as Technological Surprise
26Freedman, p. 68.
27M_, pp. 52-53.
2sMcDougall, p. 123.
29Van Dyke, p. 13.
14
The ability to explain the surprise surrounding the launching of Sputnik is
significant because it does not fit neatly into either of the two dominant categories of
surprise that form the basis for theorizing. Strictly speaking it is neither a case of military
surprise (although Sputnik had great military significance) nor of diplomatic surprise
(although it had great propaganda value to the Soviet Union for its cold war diplomacy).
Sputnik is best seen as a case of technological surprise and its defining characteristics are
drawn equally from those Handel uses to define military and diplomatic surprise.
Using Sputnik as a point of departure, technological surprise shares with military
surprise the following characteristics. First, surprise is an inherent pan of technological
activity. Where diplomacy values consistency and predictability, technology values
innovation and experimentation. Thinking in terms of technological surprise does not
require developing new concepts or new ways of thinking on the pan of scientists or
engineers. Second, technological surprise poses many of the same types of forecasting
challenges as does military surprise. Like military surprise the scale of activity involved
makes it difficult to maintain 100% secrecy surrounding one's efforts. At the same time
because of the wide variety of ways in which the surprise might occur correctly predicting
all of the details of a technological breakthrough is difficult. Sputnik, for example, did not
surprise U.S. observers so much in terms of the timing of its occurrence as it did in its
size. Third, anticipating technological surprise requires an attention to both capabilities
and intentions. In the case of Sputnik the capability existed in both the United States and
Soviet Union. What differed was the political commitment to make use of this
technology. Writing more generally on the nature of technology and public policy
Dorothy Nelkin notes that "perhaps [the] overriding factor shaping priorities for science
and technology is the convergence of technological opportunity.., with political readiness
to accept technological change. 3°
Technological surprise also shares certain characteristics with diplomatic surprise.
First, as with diplomatic surprise the significance of technological surprise does not have
to be immediate. The Eisenhower administration correctly judged that Sputnik did not
present a short term challenge to American national security interests. Both sides in the
cold war, however, realized that Sputnik did foreshadow the possibility of a fundamental
shift in the global balance of power in the years ahead. Second, where military surprise
only offers advantages to the initiating side, technological and diplomatic surprise may
also offer advantages to the surprised state. In the case of Sputnik, the Eisenhower
administration saw in the world's reaction to Sputnik an _ation of the principle of free
skies that it hoped to establish with the launching of a scientific satellite. Finally,
technological surprise does not have to be a hostile, negative act. It can also produce
positive results. Sputnik produced a mixed bag of consequences in the United States. On
the negative side it set offau often bitter partisan political debate over whose fault it was
that the Untied States was surprised and what to do about it. On the positive side it
shocked the United States out of a sense of complacency regarding its technological
prowess and led to a burst of creative activity (and Rmding) for science education, and
research and development.
3oDorothy Nelkin, "Technology and Public Policy," in Ina Spiegel-Rossing and Derek de Solla Price
(eds.), Science Technology and Society (London: Sage, 1977), p. 399.
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SUMMARY
The forces which helped create an environment in which surprise was possible with
regard to Sputnik are consistent with those found in other studies of surprise. Sputnik
was not a bolt fi'om the blue. There was warning. What was absent on the part of senior
officials in the Eisenhower administration was an appreciation of the political significance
of Sputnik. Convinced of their own technological superiority, committed to a policy of
fiscal conservatism, and focusing on the narrowly defined issue of how to establish the
legality of overflights, the administration felt no sense of urgency in moving ahead with its
own space program.
The manner in which the United States was surprised by Sputnik should be of
interest to those concerned with the evolving dynamics of the post cold war international
order. The agenda of the post cold war international system gives a prominent place to
issues such as the environment, health, and economic growth, and arms control in which
technology plays a central role. Technology is also one of the foundations of"sof_ power"
which Joseph Nye and other commentators hold to be the key to the international politics
of the next century. 3_ And, as in the 1950s, it is assumed by many that the United States
is a leading source (if not the leading source) of technological change and innovation. If
technology and technological change are among the primary driving forces behind issues
and a key ingredient of power that is brought to bear on solving them, then preventing
technological surprise ought to be a prime concern of policy makers.
The events leading up to Sputnik suggest two facets of technological surprise
which appear to guarantee that technological surprises will continue to be experienced.
First, technological surprise is characterized by an abundance of "routine" information.
Overwarning rather than deception or secrecy appears to be a dominant motif. Second,
policy makers are not well-educated or sensitive to the larger implications of technological
breakthroughs therefore they do not act on the warning intelligence they receive. As with
military surprise, the most prudent course of action open to policy makers may be that of
coupling a concern for preventing surprise with an increased capacity for responding to it
and minimizing its consequences, something the Eisenhower administration failed at in the
case of Sputnik.
31Joseph S. Nye Jr., Bound tO Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books,
1990).
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